1 Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top debates involving the Ministry of Defence

Tue 12th Jul 2016

Iraq Inquiry

Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top Excerpts
Tuesday 12th July 2016

(7 years, 9 months ago)

Lords Chamber
Read Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top Portrait Baroness Armstrong of Hill Top (Lab)
- Hansard - -

My Lords, along with colleagues who were in Cabinet at the time of the decision in 2003, I take responsibility for my decisions. I have had the sort of upbringing that would never allow me to do anything but take responsibility for them. Of course, I associate myself with the expressions of gratitude to all those who served in Iraq, and especially to the families of those who paid the ultimate sacrifice. The parents of one of the victims live in the small town near me in the constituency I represented at the time. They are very proud of their son, and rightly so.

I supported the decision to go to war after considerable discussion with colleagues. Even though at the time I was not in one of the central departments—a department relevant to the war decision and the aftermath of the invasion—we were involved in extensive discussions. It was not just sprung on us at a Cabinet meeting. I, too, had the opportunity to meet the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, and I believe that I challenged him, asked serious questions and took some considerable time at the meeting.

It was very clear to me after that meeting, and after discussions with colleagues, that it was not just the British intelligence view that Saddam Hussein still had weapons of mass destruction. Most of the other intelligence communities, in countries that had that sort of information, thought that Saddam Hussein still had weapons of mass destruction. I had also met, in previous years, a range of Iraqis. I considered the reports of the dictator having already killed many of his own people. I knew that he had used weapons of mass destruction in doing so, and that he was in breach of 17 existing UN resolutions. It was in that context that I took the decision I did, and I concur with the views of my noble friend Lord Blunkett, who was much more centrally involved than me but who nevertheless expressed the views that were common around the Cabinet table at the time.

I am very confident that I was not lied to, and that Parliament was not lied to. The report criticises our judgment, and I accept that as their view. I do not believe that it criticises our integrity, or that we did anything other than act in good faith. I saw how hard the Prime Minister tried for a second resolution, partly because he just felt that the Americans should have been putting more effort into making the UN work, but mainly because he saw that it was important for political reasons.

I also saw his determination in getting the Americans to deliver a commitment to a Middle East peace process. My noble friend on the Cross Benches, the noble Lord, Lord Williams, reminded us of how unsuccessful it was. However, I remind the House that from my very clear knowledge, it was a very important issue for the then Prime Minister, as he has always seen the peaceful coexistence of Israel and Palestine as a necessary part of a peaceful way forward in the Middle East.

The report, however, makes it clear that serious mistakes were made, and that government and Parliament must learn lessons. That is very important. What is now clear is that Parliament will for ever more be asked to make these decisions. This was, however, the first time that Parliament had been asked for a decision to commit British troops in that way. Difficult as it was, I believe that that was the right call at that time.

There are those who criticise the decision to share intelligence information, and they have done so today. But I suggest that it would have been difficult to give Parliament the opportunity to vote without offering it the view of the intelligence community in some way. Again, we forget just how little parliamentarians had been allowed to see, or hear from, intelligence sources before then.

We are all very good at hindsight. None of us, thank goodness, is furnished with foresight. We do not know what would have happened if there had been no invasion of Iraq or if Saddam Hussein had still been there. The current state of the country and the vicious conflict in neighbouring states is frightening. The real differences between Shia and Sunni are being played out in ways that no one knows how to deal with. I hope that people do not take from this inquiry any belief that we can just ignore what is going on in the world. Many more people have been killed in Syria—in what is a horrendous civil war—and more people have been displaced from there than in the history of the world. This does affect us; it destabilises people in this country. It also destabilises and challenges the democratic values that we proclaim so proudly. What is happening is a challenge to the whole world. I hope that one lesson we learn is that we need to strengthen and reform the United Nations so that it is capable of protecting people from those brutal dictators who terrorise their own populations in the way that Saddam Hussain did.