Commonwealth Development Corporation Bill

Debate between Andrew Mitchell and Mark Field

2nd reading: House of Commons & Money resolution: House of Commons & Programme motion: House of Commons
Tuesday 29th November 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Andrew Mitchell (Sutton Coldfield) (Con)]

I draw the House’s attention to my outside interests, which are listed in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests.

This is an extremely good Bill, and I hope it will be welcomed in all corners of the House. During my brief remarks, I very much hope to be able to satisfy the hon. Member for Edmonton (Kate Osamor), who leads for the Opposition, on the perfectly fair questions that she posed. The fact that the Government are able to bring the Bill before the House today shows the success of Britain’s development policies in general, and specifically the success of the CDC reforms that we introduced in 2010 and 2011. Today’s Bill is the fruit of those reforms.

It is worth reflecting a little further on the history of the CDC. As has been said, it was founded in 1948. It was the first development finance institution— another British lead—and an early example of Britain’s generosity and of recognising the importance of the private sector and of job creation. The CDC made a huge contribution in the years after the war to agricultural development in the poorest parts of the world with which Britain had a close connection. By 1997, the formula had become a little tired, and the Commonwealth Development Corporation, as it had become, was losing money, which was hardly a good example of private sector entrepreneurialism for poorer countries to emulate.

In 1997, the Blair Government considered privatising the whole CDC. That would have been a huge mistake, since the whole point of the organisation is to complement the private sector, not to compete with it. In the end, the Labour Government privatised the management, while leaving the capital in the public sector. The then Government turned it into a fund of funds: it invested in other people’s funding vehicles, while the private sector did what it is supposed to do, which is focusing on making money.

When I travelled as the shadow International Development spokesman, other countries’ development finance institutions would say to me that the transformation of the CDC after 1997 was a warning to other development finance institutions of what not to do. When I travelled in countries where in the past the CDC had generated enormous good will, people used to say to me, “Whatever happened to the CDC? It has simply disappeared.” Of course, that was right. As the CDC was investing in other people’s funds, it had simply disappeared.

In 2010, the coalition Government said that the CDC, this former great development finance institution, had lost its way. The CDC was under regular attack in the press—particularly in Private Eye—and my judgment, as the Secretary of State, was that the attacks were largely valid. It had been turned from a somewhat sleepy development corporation that was losing money into a city slickers private equity business. It was mostly staffed by the same people, who saw their civil service salaries soar to the exotic levels normally populated by very successful hedge fund managers and private equity investors. The central aim of the coalition was to re-inject the CDC once again with its distinguished development roots without losing the ability to earn a commercial return. Our aspiration on entering government in 2010 was that just as DFID is undoubtedly the leading development ministry in the world, so the CDC should become the envy of all other development finance institutions—the best Government-owned DFI anywhere.

We had three key aims. First, we wanted to regain control of investment expertise by bringing the responsibility for investment back into the CDC. In other words—Labour Members may care to take note—we decided to reverse the Blair Government’s privatisation by bringing the expertise back into the public sector. Secondly, we wanted to broaden the toolkit of financial instruments by which the CDC could achieve this. Thirdly, we wanted to shift the geographical focus of the CDC on to the poorest and most difficult parts of the world—Africa and south Asia. The CDC had previously focused on a loose collection of geographical locations in a very undifferentiated way. Of course, capital in such circumstances naturally gravitates to the areas of lower risk and higher return. That was exactly what we did not want it to do, because for the CDC and development, those are the areas of least value.

It was with dismay that I read in the Financial Times of all newspapers—it has a reputation for outstanding financial journalism, and should therefore know better—a rehash of a past that the CDC has long left behind completely. A moment of research would have shown Financial Times journalists that they were completely out of date. The Financial Times said that

“the government should place the CDC under the same broader level of public scrutiny as DfID.”

The CDC is overseen by DFID, the Treasury, the shareholder executive, the International Development Committee, the Public Accounts Committee and, as yesterday’s report shows, by the NAO. Perhaps in a rather better researched piece, those Financial Times journalists could explain who might be added to this already extensive list.

Contrary to the Financial Times view, the CDC is now well on its way to achieving a reputation as the best DFI in the world. The reforms that we introduced inevitably confronted vested interests, and involved an area of expertise that we did not of course have any right to expect within the civil service. We wanted the CDC to provide both pioneer and patient capital. We wanted pioneer capital because we wanted to show the reach of the private sector at its best in promoting economic activity, jobs, decent working practices, and the provision of key goods and services to the poorest in the most difficult places in the world. We wanted patient capital because it can take a longer view of the financial return and can therefore complement the private sector by adding what is often the key ingredient to the mix—funding that would not otherwise be available to generate jobs, whether in the power sector or in infrastructure—in, once again, the poorest places. All of that had the additional benefit of delivering value for money and a return for the British taxpayer, while having a substantial impact on poverty alleviation.

The Bill is part of the proof that these reforms have worked and that this new approach is succeeding. I do not think it is fanciful to believe that in 50 years’ time, the CDC rather than DFID will be seen as the embodiment of the UK’s strong support and success in helping the world’s poorest and most excluded people. The flow of CDC-type investments made by the developed world in the poor world is now overtaking, in quantum, the level of aid. I believe that the work the CDC is carrying out should command everyone’s support from the far left of the Labour party to the development-sceptic press.

To achieve this position, the CDC has faced the need for and delivered radical change. This would not have been accomplished without the high quality of leadership at the top that has prevailed throughout. We were successful in hiring Diana Noble as the chief executive. Diana Noble will retire next year, and the taxpayer and the development community owe her a great debt of gratitude. She has changed a passive organisation by recruiting outstanding new talent. People tell me that the spirit in the CDC has been transformed. She inherited an organisation of 50 people, a figure that was subsequently reduced to 40 but now stands at approximately 220.

Those extraordinary changes would not have been accomplished, either, without the skills and commitment of Mr Jeremy Sillem, a senior and experienced City financier who served as an adviser to DFID and was subsequently a non-executive director of the CDC while the reforms were implemented, and of Graham Wrigley, who now provides his expertise as the CDC’s chairman. That team, above all, has delivered those changes and deserves the gratitude and thanks of Parliament and the taxpayer. Their personal reward will be the transformation of the lives of very large numbers of extremely poor people.

Our reforms turned the CDC from a one-product business—a fund of funds—into a multi-product one. I am not a golfer, but if I may use a golfing analogy, the CDC was traversing the golf course of international development with only one golf club, that of investing in other people’s funds. We have now equipped it with a full variety of golf clubs, including equity and debt, direct investments, trade finance and infrastructure lending. We have also regained control of the golf swing rather than delegating it to others—I have probably pushed the metaphor as far as I should.

Inevitably, operating in markets such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Ethiopia is accompanied by considerable risk. Along with development impact, the CDC considers whether it is truly bringing additional funds that are unavailable elsewhere to each investment. It always seeks to avoid the lurking dangers of corruption that are ever present in development. It is a young business that will not always get it right, but for a young banker starting out in the financial world, as I did in 1979, there are few more exciting places to aspire to work across the financial world than the CDC, whose employees deploy their financial skills in an area where they have the power greatly to elevate the social condition of some of the poorest people in the poorest areas of the world. By the way, salaries have been sharply reduced and are well below what the staff at the CDC would earn in the commercial world.

[Mark Field (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)]

I am just being slightly mischievous, but will my right hon. Friend confirm that all those interested in a career in the CDC cannot expect to spend too much time on the golf course, either on a Friday afternoon or on any other day of the week?

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Mrs Eleanor Laing)]

Order. Before the right hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield (Mr Mitchell) replies to that intervention, may I just say to him that those of us who do not understand cricket are absolutely delighted to have had a golfing metaphor? It is so much simpler.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mark Field]

You can take the boy out of the Foreign Office but obviously, when it comes down to it, you can’t take the Foreign Office out of the boy. I suspect that this will be a live debate going forward. I know that my right hon. Friend feels very strongly about such matters.

[Mr Mitchell]

My right hon. Friend is quite right to slap down the former Foreign Office Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for East Devon (Sir Hugo Swire), on his implied suggestion that we should go back rather than forwards and put DFID under the Foreign Office: that is basically what he was saying. We have long ago said that that is the wrong way to proceed. Let me point out that there are already pooled funds of the type that he describes. In my day at DFID—I have every reason to believe that this continues—whenever there was eligible funding under the ODA rules that the Ministry of Defence or the Foreign Office wanted to spend, they would always have access to those funds. The huge amount of DFID money that goes through the Foreign Office now bears testament to that.

[Mark Field]

I would like to think that I am much too diplomatic to slap anyone down, although he knows where we are all coming from.