Syria (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) Regulations 2025
(1 day, 15 hours ago)
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The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Stephen Doughty)
I beg to move,
That the Committee has considered the Syria (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) Regulations 2025 (SI, 2025, No. 507).
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Sir Roger, and to see all right hon. and hon. Members. These regulations amend The Syria (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019.
Five months after the fall of the brutal Assad regime, Syria stands at a crossroads. The country and its economy have been decimated by more than 13 years of conflict, and vital infrastructure has been destroyed. Some 90% of Syrians live below the poverty line, so they desperately need support to recover and rebuild their country.
On 24 April, I laid a statutory instrument amending the Syria sanctions regulations to promote and support Syria’s economic recovery. It revokes specific UK sanctions measures on some sectors of the Syrian economy, including transport, trade, energy and finance. We have taken this action to help to open up the Syrian financial system and to support the flow of essential investment in energy infrastructure, above all in the electricity generation sector, which is vital for Syria’s recovery and reconstruction.
This measure is the latest step in a series of gradual actions designed to aid Syria’s recovery and benefit its citizens. On 12 February, HM Treasury’s Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation issued a general licence allowing for payments to be made to support humanitarian delivery. My statement to the House on 13 February indicated the overall direction of travel—as I said, a gradual one—for our Syria sanctions regulations. Following that, on 6 March, we announced the delisting of 24 Syrian entities that were previously used by the Assad regime to fund the oppression of the Syrian people, including the Central Bank of Syria, Syrian Arab Airlines, and several energy companies.
Reflecting the momentous changes that have taken place in Syria since December, this measure brings the 2019 regulations up to date, as well as supporting the Syrian people in rebuilding their country and economy. In the light of the fall of the Assad Government, the regulations now prioritise the promotion of peace, stability and security in Syria, while encouraging respect for democracy and human rights. At the same time, they provide accountability for gross violations of human rights carried out by or on behalf of the Assad regime.
Alongside laying this instrument, we delisted a further 12 Government and media entities that were previously sanctioned due to their links to Assad, and that we judge to no longer have an association with the former regime. Those include the Syrian Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Interior.
I want to be very clear that the Government remain determined to hold Bashar al-Assad and his associates accountable for their atrocious actions against the people of Syria. Many hon. Members present have taken part in debates in this place over many years on that issue and have exposed those horrors. As such, we will ensure that sanctions imposed on 348 individuals and entities linked to the former regime remain in place.
A number of hon. Members have rightly raised deep concerns about the horrific violence that erupted in coastal areas of Syria in early March, on which the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for Lincoln (Mr Falconer), who has responsibility for the middle east, updated the House in his statement on 10 March. We also saw further violence in southern Syria at the end of April. Rightly, therefore, hon. Members may ask why we are lifting a number of sanctions at this time.
I reassure the House that we keep all our sanctions regimes under close review to ensure that they are used as a responsive tool, targeting those who bear responsibility for repression and human rights abuses. I want to be clear that the revised regulations give the UK scope to deploy future sanctions should that become necessary.
The violence that we have seen has given us a vision of Syria’s future if its new leaders choose the wrong path. They must protect the rights of all Syrians and ensure that all Syrians are included in the political transition. Without meaningful representation of Syria’s diverse communities, there can be no lasting peace, and ultimately no better future for the country. We consistently emphasise that message in all the UK’s engagement with interim President al-Sharaa and Foreign Minister al-Shaibani.
It is important to recognise, however, that there have been some positive developments that suggest Syria could choose the right path towards peace and stability. President al-Sharaa’s actions in the aftermath of the violence in March, announcing the formation of a committee to investigate those found responsible for crimes committed during the violence, is welcome. We also welcome the formation of a new Syrian Government on 29 March and the commitment of President al-Sharaa to hold free and fair elections. We expect those appointed to the new Government to demonstrate a clear commitment to the protection of human rights, allowing unfettered access for humanitarian aid, the safe destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles, and combating terrorism and extremism.
Further, we welcome the provisions made in the constitutional declaration on 13 March on freedom of expression, freedom of belief and women’s rights. It will be vital to ensure that Syria’s diverse communities are consulted as future iterations of the draft constitution are developed. We continue to call on the Syrian Government to prioritise inclusivity and representation in the building of state institutions and in further appointments, including to the legislative committee, and to set out a clear timeline for the next phases of the transition.
We are encouraged, too, by the positive and constructive engagement that Syria has demonstrated with the United Nations Human Rights Council’s new resolution on Syria, which the UK co-tabled and which renewed the mandate of the commission of inquiry for a further 12 months. The UK will continue to maintain our resolute commitment to supporting accountability and human rights in Syria—including freedom of religion or belief—and to advocate for their foundational place at the centre of the transitional process in Syria.
The appearance of Foreign Minister al-Shaibani at the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons’ executive council on 5 March was indeed an historic moment. We welcome the commitments by the Syrian Government to protect chemical weapons sites and not to use chemical weapons under any circumstances. The OPCW’s two visits to Syria are also important steps forward. It reported that the Syrian Government extended all possible support and co-operation, including through access to sites and people. We call on Syria to now move quickly towards declaration.
The agreement made by President al-Sharaa with the Syrian Democratic Forces in north-east Syria on 10 March was also a welcome development. We continue to engage with all parties in support of an inclusive process, as implementation of the agreement progresses.
Beyond our action on sanctions, we also remain committed to helping to meet Syria’s humanitarian needs. We have pledged up to £160 million of UK support in 2025, providing lifesaving assistance to millions of Syrians, inside Syria and across the region, as well as agriculture, livelihoods and education programmes to help Syrians to rebuild their lives.
To conclude, Syria’s transition remains delicately balanced. A step in the wrong direction could lead to instability and ultimately a collapse that would only benefit Iran, Russia and others. It would have wider ramifications for our efforts to counter Daesh—we remain a member of the global coalition—and illegal migration, and would risk destabilising the wider region. Promoting stability and prosperity in Syria through economic recovery is also firmly in the UK’s national interest. It will bolster regional and UK security, in line with our plans. The UK remains committed to the people of Syria and will continue to stand with them in building a more stable, free and prosperous future. I commend the regulations to the Committee.
Wendy Morton (Aldridge-Brownhills) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Roger, and I am grateful to the Minister for his opening remarks.
I welcome this opportunity to debate sanctions on Syria and this measure that the Government have introduced, but before we get into the substance of the matter, may I raise with the Minister a point relating to the process? Will he explain why the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office press release announcing the relaxation of sanctions was issued on 24 April and the legislation was signed by the Minister on 23 April, but it took a week for a written ministerial statement to be laid to Parliament announcing these changes, on 30 April? Can he explain why this discourtesy was shown to the House, and give an assurance that statements on changes to sanctions will in future be made to the House first whenever possible, and certainly in a timelier manner?
As my right hon. Friend the shadow Foreign Secretary has said in the House on multiple occasions, the Opposition are of the view that we need to exercise extreme caution when it comes to lifting sanctions on Syria. Syria is at a fork in the road, and there is still no guarantee which path it will take. The situation is very fragile and remains volatile, as clearly demonstrated by the appalling clashes between the pro-Government and Druze communities in recent days. Millions of Syrians remain displaced, facing hardship and suffering, while the security situation on the ground is volatile, with the country still vulnerable to criminal gangs smuggling weapons, drugs and people; still at risk of continuing to be exploited by terrorists; and still exposed to the malign influence of Iran.
Few will shed tears for the end of the vile, tyrannical Assad regime, which bore responsibility for repression, torture and death on a truly horrific scale and, infamously, the use of chemical weapons against its own people. However, there is still an onus on Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham to prove that it is serious about putting Syria on the path to a future that is materially different and better than that under the monstrous tyranny of the Assads, including when it comes to the protection of all communities, groups and minorities. With that in mind, we need to judge HTS and the transitional Government solely on the basis of action, not words or statements about a future vision. Will the Minister give his latest assessment of the number of groups and militias operating in Syria, and say how he will ensure that this relaxation in sanctions benefits the people of Syria?
Co-ordination of course is also important, so I will take the opportunity to ask the Minister what co-ordination, if any, he has undertaken with both the US and European allies on the approach to sanctions. The last Conservative Government helped to lead a co-ordinated approach when it came to Syria, but the UK does not appear to be trying to lead efforts on sanctions policy in the post-Assad period. We see key players in the international community now taking different approaches to the lifting of sanctions, when what we really need is consistency of message. We understand that the US is seeking to impose conditions on the lifting of sanctions, including over the removal of chemical weapons and counter-terrorism measures—indeed, there have been reports of letters being exchanged on these matters as the US seeks assurances—but it appears that the UK is not doing so. Will the Minister explain why he does not want to apply conditions? On what basis has he made the decision not to row in behind the US approach?
We recognise that regulation 5 of these regulations contains a list of high-level and laudable purposes for the UK’s decisions, but that is not the same as a concrete condition. On this point, the Minister will be aware that page 2 of the explanatory memorandum summarises the purposes of the regulations as being,
“to promote the peace, stability and security of Syria…to promote respect for democracy, the rule of law and good governance in Syria, including in particular promoting the successful completion of Syria’s transition to a democratic country…to discourage actions, policies or activities which repress the civilian population in Syria”.
Will the Minister explain what direct discussions have taken place with HTS about the requirements that we expect it to be able to fulfil? If he has not placed conditions on this decision, will he explain why he has not done so?
The Minister will be aware that the shadow Foreign Secretary tabled a written parliamentary question on 24 February on
“conditions he”—
the Foreign Secretary—
“plans to apply to the Government of Syria in relation to the relaxation of sanctions.”
The Minister who answered on 24 March did not give a direct response to that part of the question, so I would like to give this Minister the opportunity now to give a direct answer. Is this relaxation of sanctions directly linked to a clear set of conditions placed on the transitional Government, and will any future relaxation of sanctions be directly linked to conditions too?
It is also important for the Minister to explain what assurances, if any, he has been directly given by the transitional Government of Syria on adhering to the standards that we expect of them. What measures will be put in place to ensure that this relaxation of sanctions does not lead to investments and resources being abused? Syria remains a fragmented country, with different groups and militias exercising control, and conflict and violence still taking place. How often will the Minister review the impact of the relaxation of sanctions, and will he commit to putting sanctions on entities and people in Syria if the standards that we expect in relation to protecting rights are not met?
I ask that because section 10 of the explanatory memorandum gives some details on the Government’s approach to monitoring and reviewing this legislation, but seems to suggest that the Government will look only at the effectiveness of maintaining or relaxing the sanctions regime, rather than tightening it up, and that a specific review provision is not needed. The relevant section asks,
“What is the approach to monitoring and reviewing this legislation?”
and section 10.1 states:
“If His Majesty’s Government determined that…it was no longer appropriate to maintain a sanctions regime or specific sanctions measures, that regime would be removed or amended accordingly. In the case of the 2019 Regulations, that would include the measures introduced by this instrument. As such, the Minister does not consider that a review clause in this instrument is appropriate.
Will the Minister clarify his approach to reviewing and monitoring, which is important? If the transitional Government or other entities in Syria are not acting in an appropriate way to deliver stability to Syria and protect rights, will the current sanctions regime be amended, or will the Government consider introducing a new bespoke sanctions regime and set of regulations?
Will the Minister commit to giving a regular update and statement to the House on the status of Syria and the progress, or lack of progress, being made, and whether he is considering any further amendments to sanctions? Does he expect to make any further amendments this year? On monitoring the impact, what criteria will the Minister use to judge whether the lifting of sanctions has had the effect he desires, including on the security front, which will also be important?
Turning to more specific provisions, on 25 April the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation at HM Treasury issued a financial sanctions notice that updated references to the 310 individuals and 39 entities to which sanctions apply. With the Assad regime over, can the Minister confirm whether any of those individuals are still in Syria, or have all fled? We know that Assad is in Russia, but does the Minister know the whereabouts of other individuals?
Will the Government still consider adding names of individuals and entities to the list, should evidence emerge of the complicity in Assad’s crimes and the repression of Syria by those either currently in Syria or elsewhere? We agree those sanctions must remain in place, and those responsible for heinous acts be held to account. Will the Minister give details on the work under way with international partners and the transitional Government in Syria to bring those responsible to face justice? Will he give an update on his assessment of compliance with sanctions in place?
I now turn to the impact of the amendment. Section 9.2 of the explanatory memorandum states:
“The lifting of sanctions creates trade and investment opportunities for the UK. The impact on UK growth is expected to be positive but negligible, due to the small size of the Syrian economy. Any such trade and investment with Syria will remain subject to other existing legal regulation including international sanctions.”
Does the Minister have an estimate of the impact this would have on UK businesses? Will support and assistance be provided to any UK businesses looking to invest in Syria as a result of these changes, to ensure safe operations? How will he monitor new investments in Syria, to ensure that they are for the benefit of the Syrian people and are not making their way into the hands of those who will undermine our objectives in Syria?
With regard to regulation 6 of the 2019 regulations, headed “Designation criteria: meaning of ‘involved person’”, the amendments would add references to the regulation applying to activities during the period of the Assad regime, which is defined in the regulations as the period ending on 8 December 2024. They state that those designated will be persons involved in a range of abhorrent activities, including
“repressing the civilian population in Syria”
and
“the commission of, or obstruction of an independent investigation into a serious human rights violation or abuse in Syria.”
Can the Minister confirm whether that will mean that anyone who may obstruct investigations into human rights abuses that happened under the Assad regime but where the obstructive actions took place after 8 December 2024, will not be covered by that provision? Ensuring that evidence is secured is vital to bringing criminal cases against those responsible. Anything that could compromise that must surely be a concern.
In the 2019 regulations, regulation 6 defines
“prohibited activities related to chemical weapons”
and regulation 7 lists
“stockpiling or retaining chemical weapons”
as actions that can lead to sanctions being applied. Will the Minister confirm whether those aspects of the regulations will apply to anyone who has been maintaining chemical weapons, or obstructing any efforts to investigate and dispose of chemical weapons held in Syria currently, since the fall of the Assad regime? Or does the measure apply only to persons involved in those activities up to 8 December 2024?
I am sure that the Minister will share our concerns about the risks of chemical weapons not being secured and disposed of. Can he give an update on the international efforts to deal with chemical weapons in Syria and any progress that the transitional Government are making on that issue?
Finally, only an appropriate and inclusive constitutional future will ultimately guarantee peace and stability for Syria, so we should make sure that our policy on Syria’s economic recovery, of which sanctions are of course a part, is not decoupled from ensuring that the right governance structures are in place. On that basis, what is the Minister’s latest assessment of transitional Government’s progress and the plans that they have laid out? We seek assurances on all those points, and I trust that the Minister will give full answers to all those questions when he sums up.
James MacCleary (Lewes) (LD)
The Liberal Democrats recognise the power of lifting sanctions for the rebuilding of Syria after a decade of civil war and the end of the brutal Assad regime. However, it is vital that the new transitional Syrian Government under President al-Sharaa reaffirm their commitment to political inclusion and religious and sectarian tolerance—a position they originally outlined last December. They must take concrete steps to promote and protect the rights of minority groups and women in Syria, and to ensure that they are represented in the new Administration.
Will the Minister outline today an explicit strategy for supporting the promotion of political inclusion and the protection of minorities in Syria? How will that be linked to the future lifting of any sanctions?
Stephen Doughty
I thank the shadow Minister, the right hon. Member for Aldridge-Brownhills, and the Liberal Democrats’ spokesperson, the hon. Member for Lewes, for their comments. They highlighted many of the reasonable concerns of right hon. and hon. Members about the future of Syria and how those concerns relate to our sanctions regimes.
First, on the process, I assure the Committee that absolutely no discourtesy was intended. I gently say to the shadow Minister that, as she will know from her time as a Minister, these things often move at pace. We always try to keep the House updated as soon as possible on any changes that we need to make.
The shadow Minister asked about co-ordination with the United States, the European Union and other partners. I assure her that the Minister with responsibility for the middle east and I, and others, have regular conversations with partners across the region, as well as with those in the European Union, the United States and elsewhere, to understand our approaches and assessments of this rapidly moving set of circumstances. We have been quite honest that there are a number of unknowns, but we regularly discuss those and always seek to co-ordinate.
The shadow Minister will know, but it may benefit other Committee members to say, that our sanctions regimes are all different in their scope, their legal aspects and how they operate. There is not always a direct alignment between different measures and different approaches. We also have different nexuses and points of reference with relation to the entities and individuals who were previously sanctioned.
The shadow Minister and other Committee members will understand that there is a crucial balance to be achieved. As I said at the beginning, this is a gradual process. It is about balancing support for the people, for Syria’s economic recovery and for a hopeful and positive future for the people, of which we have seen some positive signs, against ensuring the rightful caution and assessment of the circumstances on the ground and of the performance and actions, not just the words, of the new regime.
The shadow Minister will be reassured that we are regularly keeping these matters under review. Obviously—I always say this—we do not comment on future designations or the future actions that we might take, but she can rest assured that this measure and our overall regimes allow the potential, should we seek to, to impose new measures in future given the circumstances on the ground. It is worth emphasising that this measure effectively relates to defunct regulations that were no longer appropriate, because they related to the Assad regime.
The shadow Minister asked about discussions with the Syrian Government. The United Kingdom engages privately and regularly with the Syrian Government at every level, including through our Syria envoy, to support them in delivering a more stable, free and prosperous future for the Syrian people. The UK National Security Adviser spoke to President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Foreign Minister al-Shaibani on 10 April. He made clear the importance of an inclusive political transition, the need to protect all civilians, and the hope that we would work together to tackle shared concerns, including countering Daesh.
The Minister with responsibility for the middle east met Syria’s Foreign Minister al-Shaibani in Brussels on 17 March, and they discussed the importance of an inclusive political transition, the need to protect all civilians, and the security situation in northern Syria. The Foreign Secretary also met Syria’s Foreign Minister al-Shaibani at the Munich security conference, and FCDO staff, including the UK special representative for Syria, have undertaken visits to Damascus. I hope the Committee is assured that we are engaging at every level, and making clear our expectations and hopes. We will work with others to support the transition and to take the necessary steps.
On conditions, I have clearly set out our expectations. Those are then kept closely under review, in the same way that we approach all matters in relation to Syria—not just sanctions, but our support and engagement with the regime.
The shadow Minister asked about the whereabouts of previously sanctioned individuals. I will not go into that now, but I will write to her with some assurances about the measures we are taking to monitor the situation. Those hundreds of individuals rightly remain sanctioned, but it is important for the Committee to be aware that we want to hold them accountable, and to stop those who were involved in atrocities under the Assad regime from being able to prosper and thrive as a result of their actions. She also asked about the number of militant groups; I will write to her with a more detailed assessment of the situation and perhaps we can offer her some briefing as well.
The shadow Minister referred specifically to growth and economic potential. Obviously, this is a fragile and fast-moving situation, and our advice to businesses is clear that they must undertake their own legal and risk assessments of the situation. There are a range of not only UK but international measures in relation to activity in Syria. It is very important that businesses get the best advice on that before engaging in any activities. Although this measure does not specifically relate to UK companies, it should help more broadly to achieve a prosperous, peaceful and stable future for Syria.
The shadow Minister asked about measures to secure evidence, routes to justice and ways forward. I want to be clear with the Committee that accountability and the protection of human rights are critical parts of a sustainable transition. We continue to advocate for that and, as I have said, we have raised it on a number of occasions. We have committed £1.15 million to accountability and documentation-related programming, and following the collapse of the Assad regime, we announced £240,000 in funding to help to secure and preserve vital evidence.
We also continue to work with international partners and civil society to support mechanisms such as the UN’s International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism, the Independent Institution on Missing Persons, and the commission of inquiry, to ensure that they have the resources to conduct their operations and to address impunity and the suffering of the Syrian people. We directly support Syrians documenting and gathering evidence to hold the former Assad regime to account for sexual and gender-based violence, which has resulted in the first conviction for sexual crimes. That is a core part of our work with the Syrian Government and is crucially important.
I can say, as someone who highlighted many of these concerns in the House alongside our former and deeply missed colleague Jo Cox and others, that the shadow Minister should be assured of my commitment, and that of the ministerial team, to ensuring that we have accountability that does justice for victims and survivors and that fundamentally underpins a peaceful future for civilians. That will be crucial.
The shadow Minister asked about chemical weapons. We are clear that any use of chemical weapons, by anyone and under any circumstance, is unacceptable. The brutal history of chemical weapons use in Syria must never be repeated. There is now an opportunity to rid Syria of chemical weapons and we have been very clear that Syria must meet its obligations under the chemical weapons convention and United Nations Security Council resolution 2118.
We are working closely with the new regime and other partners. We welcome commitments that they are going to protect the chemical weapons sites and not use such weapons under any circumstances. As I mentioned, that appearance with the OPCW, the visits by the OPCW in March, and a range of other measures are progressing that crucial work. We have provided nearly a million—£837,000—to the OPCW Syria mission since the fall of Assad to support its immediate work, which will absolutely continue.
More broadly, I should make the point that we have not given any new humanitarian funds to the new Syrian Government. Our humanitarian assistance is provided via NGOs and UN organisations operating in Syria to meet the needs of the most vulnerable across the country. As with all of our work, to reassure both spokespeople, we have extensive controls in place to ensure that our aid reaches those who need it and is not falling into the hands of those it should not.
More widely, I hope that I have clearly set out how we are engaging at every level, how we are working with partners, and how we are focused on crucial issues related to accountability, immediate humanitarian needs, economic recovery and setting out clear positions for the new regime that we hope it will come true on. As I said, there are positive signs and important steps forward being taken.
I assure the Committee and the shadow Minister that this situation remains high focus for the UK Government. Ministers are working across the piece on it and we will keep the House updated as matters develop. It is a finely balanced situation. We hope that it will move in the right direction, but of course we always retain the right to take other action should that not be the case. We will continue to make our expectations clear. With that, I commend these regulations to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That the Committee has considered the Syria (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) Regulations 2025 (SI, 2025, No. 507 ).
Draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Exemptions for Certain Foreign Power Investment Funds, Education, Government Administration and Public Bodies) Regulations 2025
Draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Publication) Regulations 2025
Draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Specified Persons) (Iran) Regulations 2025
Draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Specified Persons) (Russia) Regulations 2025
(1 day, 15 hours ago)
General CommitteesRead Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)
I beg to move,
That the Committee has considered the draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Exemptions for Certain Foreign Power Investment Funds, Education, Government Administration and Public Bodies) Regulations 2025.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to consider the draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Publication) Regulations, the draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Specified Persons) (Iran) Regulations 2025 and the draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Specified Persons) (Russia) Regulations 2025.
Dan Jarvis
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Stringer. I beg leave to speak for slightly longer than is customary, as we are debating four separate statutory instruments today.
On 1 April, I announced that FIRS—the foreign influence registration scheme—would go live on 1 July 2025, with Russia and Iran specified on the enhanced tier of the scheme. FIRS, which is contained in part 4 of the National Security Act 2023, will be an invaluable tool for deterring and disrupting state threats and providing transparency of foreign power influence in our democracy.
The scheme serves three principal aims. The first aim is transparency: the scheme will require those carrying out certain activities for foreign powers to declare them, and details of any political influence activities will be included on a public register. The second aim is deterrence: those carrying out malign activities for foreign powers will need either to cease their activities or to register them with the Government. The third aim is disruption: those who fail to declare their links to foreign powers will be at risk of criminal penalties.
The draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Specified Persons) (Iran) Regulations and the draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Specified Persons) (Russia) Regulations specify the entirety of the Iranian and Russian states on the enhanced tier of the scheme. For Iran, that includes the Supreme Leader, the whole of the Government, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran and the judiciary of Iran. For Russia, it includes the President of Russia, Cabinet Ministers, Government Ministries, regional governments, the judiciary and the legislature.
As I set out in a statement to the House on 4 March, the Iranian regime is targeting dissidents, media organisations and journalists reporting on the regime’s violent oppression. There is also a long-standing pattern of Jewish and Israeli people being targeted internationally by the Iranian intelligence services. Russia also poses an acute threat to UK security: in recent years, its hostile acts have ranged from the use of a deadly nerve agent in Salisbury to espionage, arson and cyber-attacks, including the targeting of UK parliamentarians through spear-phishing campaigns. Specifying Russia and Iran on the enhanced tier will mean that anyone acting for the Russian or Iranian state in the UK will face a choice: either they declare their activities to the UK Government, or they will face up to five years’ imprisonment.
Both instruments include a statutory five-year review period and a grace period for those who are in ongoing arrangements at the point of the scheme going live, to allow them to register arrangements without an impact on legitimate activities.
The draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Exemptions for Certain Foreign Power Investment Funds, Education, Government Administration and Public Bodies) Regulations introduce four new exemptions to the scheme. These exemptions, as well as those contained in primary legislation, are designed to ensure the proportionality of the scheme by reducing the amount of routine activity, and activity which is already transparent, that needs to be registered with the scheme.
First, the instrument introduces an exemption from the political influence tier of the scheme for foreign power investment funds, which is intended to cover sovereign wealth funds and certain public pension funds. Secondly, it introduces an exemption for funded study arrangements, such as foreign Government scholarships. Thirdly, it introduces an exemption from the enhanced tier for activities related to Government administrative and technical services, such as nationality, immigration and tax-related services. Finally, it introduces an exemption from an enhanced tier for public bodies and arrangements to which they are a party.
All these exemptions have been carefully crafted to ensure that they apply only to a narrow set of activities to avoid creating loopholes that could be exploited for malign purposes. For example, Russian or Iranian students under scholarship programmes will be exempt only in relation to activities related to their course of study. Any other activity that they carry out for the Russian or Iranian states must be registered.
The draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Publication) Regulations sets out how the public register will work. The register is essential to achieving the transparency aims of the scheme. This instrument sets out details about what categories of registered information will be published, limited to that which is necessary to achieve the scheme’s transparency aims, while protecting individuals’ privacy.
Registrations under the scheme that relate to political influence activities will, by default, be included on the public register. Wider registrations under the enhanced tier that go beyond political influence activities will not be published.
It is important to point out that those who register with the scheme and those who appear on the public register are doing the right thing and supporting transparency through the scheme. The instrument sets out that the information will be retained on the public register for 10 years after the end date of activities to enable trends and patterns of foreign influence to be monitored over time, and to achieve the scheme’s transparency objectives. The instrument also sets out that information may not appear on the register where it has been demonstrated that publication would be prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK, or to the prevention of a crime, a criminal investigation, or criminal proceedings; where it would put an individual’s safety at risk; and where it could result in the disclosure of commercially sensitive information.
Under this Government, national security will always come first, because nothing matters more than keeping our country and our people safe. In this era of growing and evolving state-based threats, it is a task that requires unflinching vigilance and constant renewal of the tools available to our world-class police and intelligence services. That is why we have placed national security at the heart of our plan for change; and it is why we are acting to operationalise the foreign influence registration scheme, including through the measures that we are debating. I hope and trust that we will have the support of all Members in this critical endeavour. I commend the instruments to the Committee.
Katie Lam (Weald of Kent) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair this afternoon, Mr Stringer. It is a basic moral requirement of Governments to act in their country’s interest. They do that at home and abroad, overtly and covertly. Unsurprisingly, the interests of different countries are not always the same, so to protect our national security, we must take decisive action against those who engage in covert lobbying on behalf of hostile foreign powers, whether they are acting directly or indirectly, including through other foreign entities. These efforts seek to disrupt our democracy, undermine our national sovereignty and erode the precious freedoms that we have built in this country over so many centuries. Part 4 of the National Security Act was a necessary step towards tackling this malign foreign influence.
We welcome the Government’s draft regulations, which build on the previous Government’s work. It is right that by using the enhanced tier to apply additional scrutiny, we recognise the threat posed by particular foreign states. Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, which has rightly horrified millions of people across this country, underscores the threat that it poses to our way of life. In recent years, Russia and its agents have sought to disrupt our economy and political system; in 2018, for example, they attempted to poison Sergei Skripal and his daughter in Salisbury. The Government’s efforts to step up our efforts to target Russian influence in the UK are welcome.
Likewise, Iran rightly belongs on the enhanced tier. The UK security services have responded to more than 20 Iran-backed plots since 2022. The Minister has made multiple statements to the House regarding malign Iranian activity in the UK, including cases that have involved the arrest of Iranian nationals. I know that he is very familiar with the threat; I thank him and our security services for everything that they do to protect us.
However, the Government’s guidance on the Act points to one glaring omission in the draft regulations before the Committee. It states:
“The heads of MI5 and SIS have spoken about the growing threat from states, with the Director General of MI5 previously confirming that the threat predominantly comes from Russia, Iran and China.”
Notwithstanding representations from the Opposition, the Government have chosen not to include China in the enhanced tier, despite having created bespoke regulations for the two other countries identified. Do the Government really believe that the threat posed by China is less severe than that posed by Russia or by Iran?
The Chinese Government continue to impose sanctions on Members of this House. In 2021, Chinese state-affiliated actors targeted the private emails of British MPs. In the same year, agents of the Chinese Government targeted the computer systems of our Electoral Commission. In recent months, we have heard about bounties of up to £100,000 for “information leading to the arrest” of advocates of democracy in Hong Kong who live here in Britain. This is an appalling attempt to extend the jurisdiction of China’s authoritarian national security law to the streets of the UK, violating the most basic principles of national sovereignty.
The charge sheet goes on and on. The Chinese Government are actively involved in interfering with our political system and have not been shy about their intent to target people they consider a threat, even when they are living in this country. Regardless of the UK Government’s efforts to maintain constructive relations with China, we must be absolutely clear that there can be no compromise when it comes to our fundamental national security.
Does the Minister agree with the director general of MI5 about the threat that China poses to our national security? If so, does he feel that China should be included in the enhanced tier? If not, why not?
Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)
It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer. I absolutely agree that the measures before the Committee are unobjectionable, particularly as I have the privilege of being sanctioned by the Russian Federation. Salisbury is close to my constituency, and the memory of the 2018 Novichok poisoning is still very raw in my part of the country.
Beyond China, which my hon. Friend the Member for Weald of Kent rightly cited, there is an omission from the list: North Korea, which was a member of George Bush’s “axis of evil”. That country has shown itself to be a willing confederate of Russia in recent times. Why has the Minister not included North Korea? Can we expect a further measure that specifically cites North Korea under the arrangements that he has described?
Dan Jarvis
First, let me offer my thanks for two very helpful, constructive and pertinent contributions from the Opposition, and also more generally for the collegiate atmosphere in which these instruments have been discussed today. That is important, and it does make a difference, because the presence of a cross-party consensus on matters relating to national security does send a powerful message to our adversaries that we are united in our determination to root out and repel their hostile activities. I am grateful, therefore, for the broad support that has been shown for FIRS today, and on previous occasions when it has been discussed in this House. I am grateful to the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Weald of Kent, for her broad welcome for these regulations.
Let me take a moment to pay tribute to the work that was done by the previous Government in the previous Parliament. The 2023 Act was a landmark piece of legislation; as Security Ministers today, we feel the benefit of the work that was done in the previous Parliament. I have mentioned this to the shadow Minister previously, but I say it again for the benefit of the House: this Government are grateful for the efforts of all those who went before who put in place this legislative framework, which is now delivering real operational benefit for the United Kingdom. I join her in the comments that she made about Russia and Iran. The work that we are doing with the implementation of FIRS will make a difference in terms of ensuring that the United Kingdom is the hardest possible operating environment for these countries, and all—all—activities carried out under the direction of the Russian or the Iranian state will require registration. That is to ensure that the scheme provides assurance for the full range of activities that those two countries are directing at the United Kingdom.
For reasons that I understand, the shadow Minister also asked about China. Let me say to her—this will come as no great surprise—that countries are considered separately for specification on the enhanced tier, and it would not be appropriate for me today to speculate about whether other countries might be added to the enhanced tier in the future.
On the issue of China more broadly, I think it is absolutely fair to say that this Government have been crystal clear about what our approach to China will be. We are taking a consistent, long-term and strategic approach to managing the UK’s relationship with China. We will co-operate where we can, compete where we need to and challenge where we must, including on issues relating to national security.
We want a consistent and robust relationship with China that works in the best interests of the United Kingdom, but that cannot be boiled down to one word or one decision. We are not naive to the challenges that China poses to the UK, but FIRS is not a tool to formally designate particular countries as being a threat to the UK interests or to our security. It is designed to create transparency around the influence of foreign powers in the UK.
Let me end my responses to the shadow Minister’s comments on what I hope is a point of consensus. She rightly said that there can be absolutely no compromise with regard to national security, and that is absolutely right: that is absolutely the approach of this Government, and I can give her that categorical assurance that national security will always come first.
It is always very good to hear from the right hon. Member for South West Wiltshire and he knows that his part of the world and his constituency has a special place in my heart. I do not know whether I have been around this place for too long, but I did mention to officials that he might ask me about North Korea, and I am pleased that he did not disappoint. Decisions are made on a country-by-country basis. We very carefully consider these matters and we keep these under close review, but we have not made any specific decision with regard to North Korea. However, I am very happy to debate these points with him, today or on any other occasion.
Let me finally join the right hon. Gentleman in agreeing with the characterisation that he made, and has made previously, about the terrible attack that took place in Salisbury in 2018. These are the most repugnant and unacceptable acts. He is absolutely right to say—he is much closer to it than I am and knows better than I do—that these matters are still raw for the people of Salisbury. They are not matters that we will ever forget and we take them incredibly seriously.
With that, there is nothing more to add other than to commend the regulations to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Publication) Regulations 2025
Resolved,
That the Committee has considered the draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Publication) Regulations 2025.—(Dan Jarvis.)
Draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Specified Persons) (Iran) Regulations 2025
Resolved,
That the Committee has considered the draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Specified Persons) (Iran) Regulations 2025.—(Dan Jarvis.)
Draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Specified Persons) (Russia) Regulations 2025
Resolved,
That the Committee has considered the draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Specified Persons) (Russia) Regulations 2025.—(Dan Jarvis.)