Draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Exemptions for Certain Foreign Power Investment Funds, Education, Government Administration and Public Bodies) Regulations 2025 Draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Publication) Regulations 2025 Draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Specified Persons) (Iran) Regulations 2025 Draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Specified Persons) (Russia) Regulations 2025

Dan Jarvis Excerpts

Tuesday 13th May 2025 General Committees

[The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)]

I beg to move,

That the Committee has considered the draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Exemptions for Certain Foreign Power Investment Funds, Education, Government Administration and Public Bodies) Regulations 2025.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider the draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Publication) Regulations, the draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Specified Persons) (Iran) Regulations 2025 and the draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Specified Persons) (Russia) Regulations 2025.

[Dan Jarvis]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Stringer. I beg leave to speak for slightly longer than is customary, as we are debating four separate statutory instruments today.

On 1 April, I announced that FIRS—the foreign influence registration scheme—would go live on 1 July 2025, with Russia and Iran specified on the enhanced tier of the scheme. FIRS, which is contained in part 4 of the National Security Act 2023, will be an invaluable tool for deterring and disrupting state threats and providing transparency of foreign power influence in our democracy.

The scheme serves three principal aims. The first aim is transparency: the scheme will require those carrying out certain activities for foreign powers to declare them, and details of any political influence activities will be included on a public register. The second aim is deterrence: those carrying out malign activities for foreign powers will need either to cease their activities or to register them with the Government. The third aim is disruption: those who fail to declare their links to foreign powers will be at risk of criminal penalties.

The draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Specified Persons) (Iran) Regulations and the draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Specified Persons) (Russia) Regulations specify the entirety of the Iranian and Russian states on the enhanced tier of the scheme. For Iran, that includes the Supreme Leader, the whole of the Government, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran and the judiciary of Iran. For Russia, it includes the President of Russia, Cabinet Ministers, Government Ministries, regional governments, the judiciary and the legislature.

As I set out in a statement to the House on 4 March, the Iranian regime is targeting dissidents, media organisations and journalists reporting on the regime’s violent oppression. There is also a long-standing pattern of Jewish and Israeli people being targeted internationally by the Iranian intelligence services. Russia also poses an acute threat to UK security: in recent years, its hostile acts have ranged from the use of a deadly nerve agent in Salisbury to espionage, arson and cyber-attacks, including the targeting of UK parliamentarians through spear-phishing campaigns. Specifying Russia and Iran on the enhanced tier will mean that anyone acting for the Russian or Iranian state in the UK will face a choice: either they declare their activities to the UK Government, or they will face up to five years’ imprisonment.

Both instruments include a statutory five-year review period and a grace period for those who are in ongoing arrangements at the point of the scheme going live, to allow them to register arrangements without an impact on legitimate activities.

The draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Exemptions for Certain Foreign Power Investment Funds, Education, Government Administration and Public Bodies) Regulations introduce four new exemptions to the scheme. These exemptions, as well as those contained in primary legislation, are designed to ensure the proportionality of the scheme by reducing the amount of routine activity, and activity which is already transparent, that needs to be registered with the scheme.

First, the instrument introduces an exemption from the political influence tier of the scheme for foreign power investment funds, which is intended to cover sovereign wealth funds and certain public pension funds. Secondly, it introduces an exemption for funded study arrangements, such as foreign Government scholarships. Thirdly, it introduces an exemption from the enhanced tier for activities related to Government administrative and technical services, such as nationality, immigration and tax-related services. Finally, it introduces an exemption from an enhanced tier for public bodies and arrangements to which they are a party.

All these exemptions have been carefully crafted to ensure that they apply only to a narrow set of activities to avoid creating loopholes that could be exploited for malign purposes. For example, Russian or Iranian students under scholarship programmes will be exempt only in relation to activities related to their course of study. Any other activity that they carry out for the Russian or Iranian states must be registered.

The draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Publication) Regulations sets out how the public register will work. The register is essential to achieving the transparency aims of the scheme. This instrument sets out details about what categories of registered information will be published, limited to that which is necessary to achieve the scheme’s transparency aims, while protecting individuals’ privacy.

Registrations under the scheme that relate to political influence activities will, by default, be included on the public register. Wider registrations under the enhanced tier that go beyond political influence activities will not be published.

It is important to point out that those who register with the scheme and those who appear on the public register are doing the right thing and supporting transparency through the scheme. The instrument sets out that the information will be retained on the public register for 10 years after the end date of activities to enable trends and patterns of foreign influence to be monitored over time, and to achieve the scheme’s transparency objectives. The instrument also sets out that information may not appear on the register where it has been demonstrated that publication would be prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK, or to the prevention of a crime, a criminal investigation, or criminal proceedings; where it would put an individual’s safety at risk; and where it could result in the disclosure of commercially sensitive information.

Under this Government, national security will always come first, because nothing matters more than keeping our country and our people safe. In this era of growing and evolving state-based threats, it is a task that requires unflinching vigilance and constant renewal of the tools available to our world-class police and intelligence services. That is why we have placed national security at the heart of our plan for change; and it is why we are acting to operationalise the foreign influence registration scheme, including through the measures that we are debating. I hope and trust that we will have the support of all Members in this critical endeavour. I commend the instruments to the Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dan Jarvis]

First, let me offer my thanks for two very helpful, constructive and pertinent contributions from the Opposition, and also more generally for the collegiate atmosphere in which these instruments have been discussed today. That is important, and it does make a difference, because the presence of a cross-party consensus on matters relating to national security does send a powerful message to our adversaries that we are united in our determination to root out and repel their hostile activities. I am grateful, therefore, for the broad support that has been shown for FIRS today, and on previous occasions when it has been discussed in this House. I am grateful to the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Weald of Kent, for her broad welcome for these regulations.

Let me take a moment to pay tribute to the work that was done by the previous Government in the previous Parliament. The 2023 Act was a landmark piece of legislation; as Security Ministers today, we feel the benefit of the work that was done in the previous Parliament. I have mentioned this to the shadow Minister previously, but I say it again for the benefit of the House: this Government are grateful for the efforts of all those who went before who put in place this legislative framework, which is now delivering real operational benefit for the United Kingdom. I join her in the comments that she made about Russia and Iran. The work that we are doing with the implementation of FIRS will make a difference in terms of ensuring that the United Kingdom is the hardest possible operating environment for these countries, and all—all—activities carried out under the direction of the Russian or the Iranian state will require registration. That is to ensure that the scheme provides assurance for the full range of activities that those two countries are directing at the United Kingdom.

For reasons that I understand, the shadow Minister also asked about China. Let me say to her—this will come as no great surprise—that countries are considered separately for specification on the enhanced tier, and it would not be appropriate for me today to speculate about whether other countries might be added to the enhanced tier in the future.

On the issue of China more broadly, I think it is absolutely fair to say that this Government have been crystal clear about what our approach to China will be. We are taking a consistent, long-term and strategic approach to managing the UK’s relationship with China. We will co-operate where we can, compete where we need to and challenge where we must, including on issues relating to national security.

We want a consistent and robust relationship with China that works in the best interests of the United Kingdom, but that cannot be boiled down to one word or one decision. We are not naive to the challenges that China poses to the UK, but FIRS is not a tool to formally designate particular countries as being a threat to the UK interests or to our security. It is designed to create transparency around the influence of foreign powers in the UK.

Let me end my responses to the shadow Minister’s comments on what I hope is a point of consensus. She rightly said that there can be absolutely no compromise with regard to national security, and that is absolutely right: that is absolutely the approach of this Government, and I can give her that categorical assurance that national security will always come first.

It is always very good to hear from the right hon. Member for South West Wiltshire and he knows that his part of the world and his constituency has a special place in my heart. I do not know whether I have been around this place for too long, but I did mention to officials that he might ask me about North Korea, and I am pleased that he did not disappoint. Decisions are made on a country-by-country basis. We very carefully consider these matters and we keep these under close review, but we have not made any specific decision with regard to North Korea. However, I am very happy to debate these points with him, today or on any other occasion.

Let me finally join the right hon. Gentleman in agreeing with the characterisation that he made, and has made previously, about the terrible attack that took place in Salisbury in 2018. These are the most repugnant and unacceptable acts. He is absolutely right to say—he is much closer to it than I am and knows better than I do—that these matters are still raw for the people of Salisbury. They are not matters that we will ever forget and we take them incredibly seriously.

With that, there is nothing more to add other than to commend the regulations to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Publication) Regulations 2025

Resolved,

That the Committee has considered the draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Publication) Regulations 2025.—(Dan Jarvis.)

Draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Specified Persons) (Iran) Regulations 2025

Resolved,

That the Committee has considered the draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Specified Persons) (Iran) Regulations 2025.—(Dan Jarvis.)

Draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Specified Persons) (Russia) Regulations 2025

Resolved,

That the Committee has considered the draft National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Specified Persons) (Russia) Regulations 2025.—(Dan Jarvis.)