Syria (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) Regulations 2025

Wendy Morton Excerpts

Tuesday 13th May 2025 General Committees

[Wendy Morton (Aldridge-Brownhills) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Roger, and I am grateful to the Minister for his opening remarks.

I welcome this opportunity to debate sanctions on Syria and this measure that the Government have introduced, but before we get into the substance of the matter, may I raise with the Minister a point relating to the process? Will he explain why the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office press release announcing the relaxation of sanctions was issued on 24 April and the legislation was signed by the Minister on 23 April, but it took a week for a written ministerial statement to be laid to Parliament announcing these changes, on 30 April? Can he explain why this discourtesy was shown to the House, and give an assurance that statements on changes to sanctions will in future be made to the House first whenever possible, and certainly in a timelier manner?

As my right hon. Friend the shadow Foreign Secretary has said in the House on multiple occasions, the Opposition are of the view that we need to exercise extreme caution when it comes to lifting sanctions on Syria. Syria is at a fork in the road, and there is still no guarantee which path it will take. The situation is very fragile and remains volatile, as clearly demonstrated by the appalling clashes between the pro-Government and Druze communities in recent days. Millions of Syrians remain displaced, facing hardship and suffering, while the security situation on the ground is volatile, with the country still vulnerable to criminal gangs smuggling weapons, drugs and people; still at risk of continuing to be exploited by terrorists; and still exposed to the malign influence of Iran.

Few will shed tears for the end of the vile, tyrannical Assad regime, which bore responsibility for repression, torture and death on a truly horrific scale and, infamously, the use of chemical weapons against its own people. However, there is still an onus on Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham to prove that it is serious about putting Syria on the path to a future that is materially different and better than that under the monstrous tyranny of the Assads, including when it comes to the protection of all communities, groups and minorities. With that in mind, we need to judge HTS and the transitional Government solely on the basis of action, not words or statements about a future vision. Will the Minister give his latest assessment of the number of groups and militias operating in Syria, and say how he will ensure that this relaxation in sanctions benefits the people of Syria?

Co-ordination of course is also important, so I will take the opportunity to ask the Minister what co-ordination, if any, he has undertaken with both the US and European allies on the approach to sanctions. The last Conservative Government helped to lead a co-ordinated approach when it came to Syria, but the UK does not appear to be trying to lead efforts on sanctions policy in the post-Assad period. We see key players in the international community now taking different approaches to the lifting of sanctions, when what we really need is consistency of message. We understand that the US is seeking to impose conditions on the lifting of sanctions, including over the removal of chemical weapons and counter-terrorism measures—indeed, there have been reports of letters being exchanged on these matters as the US seeks assurances—but it appears that the UK is not doing so. Will the Minister explain why he does not want to apply conditions? On what basis has he made the decision not to row in behind the US approach?

We recognise that regulation 5 of these regulations contains a list of high-level and laudable purposes for the UK’s decisions, but that is not the same as a concrete condition. On this point, the Minister will be aware that page 2 of the explanatory memorandum summarises the purposes of the regulations as being,

“to promote the peace, stability and security of Syria…to promote respect for democracy, the rule of law and good governance in Syria, including in particular promoting the successful completion of Syria’s transition to a democratic country…to discourage actions, policies or activities which repress the civilian population in Syria”.

Will the Minister explain what direct discussions have taken place with HTS about the requirements that we expect it to be able to fulfil? If he has not placed conditions on this decision, will he explain why he has not done so?

The Minister will be aware that the shadow Foreign Secretary tabled a written parliamentary question on 24 February on

“conditions he”—

the Foreign Secretary—

“plans to apply to the Government of Syria in relation to the relaxation of sanctions.”

The Minister who answered on 24 March did not give a direct response to that part of the question, so I would like to give this Minister the opportunity now to give a direct answer. Is this relaxation of sanctions directly linked to a clear set of conditions placed on the transitional Government, and will any future relaxation of sanctions be directly linked to conditions too?

It is also important for the Minister to explain what assurances, if any, he has been directly given by the transitional Government of Syria on adhering to the standards that we expect of them. What measures will be put in place to ensure that this relaxation of sanctions does not lead to investments and resources being abused? Syria remains a fragmented country, with different groups and militias exercising control, and conflict and violence still taking place. How often will the Minister review the impact of the relaxation of sanctions, and will he commit to putting sanctions on entities and people in Syria if the standards that we expect in relation to protecting rights are not met?

I ask that because section 10 of the explanatory memorandum gives some details on the Government’s approach to monitoring and reviewing this legislation, but seems to suggest that the Government will look only at the effectiveness of maintaining or relaxing the sanctions regime, rather than tightening it up, and that a specific review provision is not needed. The relevant section asks,

“What is the approach to monitoring and reviewing this legislation?”

and section 10.1 states:

“If His Majesty’s Government determined that…it was no longer appropriate to maintain a sanctions regime or specific sanctions measures, that regime would be removed or amended accordingly. In the case of the 2019 Regulations, that would include the measures introduced by this instrument. As such, the Minister does not consider that a review clause in this instrument is appropriate.

Will the Minister clarify his approach to reviewing and monitoring, which is important? If the transitional Government or other entities in Syria are not acting in an appropriate way to deliver stability to Syria and protect rights, will the current sanctions regime be amended, or will the Government consider introducing a new bespoke sanctions regime and set of regulations?

Will the Minister commit to giving a regular update and statement to the House on the status of Syria and the progress, or lack of progress, being made, and whether he is considering any further amendments to sanctions? Does he expect to make any further amendments this year? On monitoring the impact, what criteria will the Minister use to judge whether the lifting of sanctions has had the effect he desires, including on the security front, which will also be important?

Turning to more specific provisions, on 25 April the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation at HM Treasury issued a financial sanctions notice that updated references to the 310 individuals and 39 entities to which sanctions apply. With the Assad regime over, can the Minister confirm whether any of those individuals are still in Syria, or have all fled? We know that Assad is in Russia, but does the Minister know the whereabouts of other individuals?

Will the Government still consider adding names of individuals and entities to the list, should evidence emerge of the complicity in Assad’s crimes and the repression of Syria by those either currently in Syria or elsewhere? We agree those sanctions must remain in place, and those responsible for heinous acts be held to account. Will the Minister give details on the work under way with international partners and the transitional Government in Syria to bring those responsible to face justice? Will he give an update on his assessment of compliance with sanctions in place?

I now turn to the impact of the amendment. Section 9.2 of the explanatory memorandum states:

“The lifting of sanctions creates trade and investment opportunities for the UK. The impact on UK growth is expected to be positive but negligible, due to the small size of the Syrian economy. Any such trade and investment with Syria will remain subject to other existing legal regulation including international sanctions.”

Does the Minister have an estimate of the impact this would have on UK businesses? Will support and assistance be provided to any UK businesses looking to invest in Syria as a result of these changes, to ensure safe operations? How will he monitor new investments in Syria, to ensure that they are for the benefit of the Syrian people and are not making their way into the hands of those who will undermine our objectives in Syria?

With regard to regulation 6 of the 2019 regulations, headed “Designation criteria: meaning of ‘involved person’”, the amendments would add references to the regulation applying to activities during the period of the Assad regime, which is defined in the regulations as the period ending on 8 December 2024. They state that those designated will be persons involved in a range of abhorrent activities, including

“repressing the civilian population in Syria”

and

“the commission of, or obstruction of an independent investigation into a serious human rights violation or abuse in Syria.”

Can the Minister confirm whether that will mean that anyone who may obstruct investigations into human rights abuses that happened under the Assad regime but where the obstructive actions took place after 8 December 2024, will not be covered by that provision? Ensuring that evidence is secured is vital to bringing criminal cases against those responsible. Anything that could compromise that must surely be a concern.

In the 2019 regulations, regulation 6 defines

“prohibited activities related to chemical weapons”

and regulation 7 lists

“stockpiling or retaining chemical weapons”

as actions that can lead to sanctions being applied. Will the Minister confirm whether those aspects of the regulations will apply to anyone who has been maintaining chemical weapons, or obstructing any efforts to investigate and dispose of chemical weapons held in Syria currently, since the fall of the Assad regime? Or does the measure apply only to persons involved in those activities up to 8 December 2024?

I am sure that the Minister will share our concerns about the risks of chemical weapons not being secured and disposed of. Can he give an update on the international efforts to deal with chemical weapons in Syria and any progress that the transitional Government are making on that issue?

Finally, only an appropriate and inclusive constitutional future will ultimately guarantee peace and stability for Syria, so we should make sure that our policy on Syria’s economic recovery, of which sanctions are of course a part, is not decoupled from ensuring that the right governance structures are in place. On that basis, what is the Minister’s latest assessment of transitional Government’s progress and the plans that they have laid out? We seek assurances on all those points, and I trust that the Minister will give full answers to all those questions when he sums up.