Syria (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) Regulations 2025
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The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Stephen Doughty)
I beg to move,
That the Committee has considered the Syria (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) Regulations 2025 (SI, 2025, No. 507).
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Sir Roger, and to see all right hon. and hon. Members. These regulations amend The Syria (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019.
Five months after the fall of the brutal Assad regime, Syria stands at a crossroads. The country and its economy have been decimated by more than 13 years of conflict, and vital infrastructure has been destroyed. Some 90% of Syrians live below the poverty line, so they desperately need support to recover and rebuild their country.
On 24 April, I laid a statutory instrument amending the Syria sanctions regulations to promote and support Syria’s economic recovery. It revokes specific UK sanctions measures on some sectors of the Syrian economy, including transport, trade, energy and finance. We have taken this action to help to open up the Syrian financial system and to support the flow of essential investment in energy infrastructure, above all in the electricity generation sector, which is vital for Syria’s recovery and reconstruction.
This measure is the latest step in a series of gradual actions designed to aid Syria’s recovery and benefit its citizens. On 12 February, HM Treasury’s Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation issued a general licence allowing for payments to be made to support humanitarian delivery. My statement to the House on 13 February indicated the overall direction of travel—as I said, a gradual one—for our Syria sanctions regulations. Following that, on 6 March, we announced the delisting of 24 Syrian entities that were previously used by the Assad regime to fund the oppression of the Syrian people, including the Central Bank of Syria, Syrian Arab Airlines, and several energy companies.
Reflecting the momentous changes that have taken place in Syria since December, this measure brings the 2019 regulations up to date, as well as supporting the Syrian people in rebuilding their country and economy. In the light of the fall of the Assad Government, the regulations now prioritise the promotion of peace, stability and security in Syria, while encouraging respect for democracy and human rights. At the same time, they provide accountability for gross violations of human rights carried out by or on behalf of the Assad regime.
Alongside laying this instrument, we delisted a further 12 Government and media entities that were previously sanctioned due to their links to Assad, and that we judge to no longer have an association with the former regime. Those include the Syrian Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Interior.
I want to be very clear that the Government remain determined to hold Bashar al-Assad and his associates accountable for their atrocious actions against the people of Syria. Many hon. Members present have taken part in debates in this place over many years on that issue and have exposed those horrors. As such, we will ensure that sanctions imposed on 348 individuals and entities linked to the former regime remain in place.
A number of hon. Members have rightly raised deep concerns about the horrific violence that erupted in coastal areas of Syria in early March, on which the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for Lincoln (Mr Falconer), who has responsibility for the middle east, updated the House in his statement on 10 March. We also saw further violence in southern Syria at the end of April. Rightly, therefore, hon. Members may ask why we are lifting a number of sanctions at this time.
I reassure the House that we keep all our sanctions regimes under close review to ensure that they are used as a responsive tool, targeting those who bear responsibility for repression and human rights abuses. I want to be clear that the revised regulations give the UK scope to deploy future sanctions should that become necessary.
The violence that we have seen has given us a vision of Syria’s future if its new leaders choose the wrong path. They must protect the rights of all Syrians and ensure that all Syrians are included in the political transition. Without meaningful representation of Syria’s diverse communities, there can be no lasting peace, and ultimately no better future for the country. We consistently emphasise that message in all the UK’s engagement with interim President al-Sharaa and Foreign Minister al-Shaibani.
It is important to recognise, however, that there have been some positive developments that suggest Syria could choose the right path towards peace and stability. President al-Sharaa’s actions in the aftermath of the violence in March, announcing the formation of a committee to investigate those found responsible for crimes committed during the violence, is welcome. We also welcome the formation of a new Syrian Government on 29 March and the commitment of President al-Sharaa to hold free and fair elections. We expect those appointed to the new Government to demonstrate a clear commitment to the protection of human rights, allowing unfettered access for humanitarian aid, the safe destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles, and combating terrorism and extremism.
Further, we welcome the provisions made in the constitutional declaration on 13 March on freedom of expression, freedom of belief and women’s rights. It will be vital to ensure that Syria’s diverse communities are consulted as future iterations of the draft constitution are developed. We continue to call on the Syrian Government to prioritise inclusivity and representation in the building of state institutions and in further appointments, including to the legislative committee, and to set out a clear timeline for the next phases of the transition.
We are encouraged, too, by the positive and constructive engagement that Syria has demonstrated with the United Nations Human Rights Council’s new resolution on Syria, which the UK co-tabled and which renewed the mandate of the commission of inquiry for a further 12 months. The UK will continue to maintain our resolute commitment to supporting accountability and human rights in Syria—including freedom of religion or belief—and to advocate for their foundational place at the centre of the transitional process in Syria.
The appearance of Foreign Minister al-Shaibani at the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons’ executive council on 5 March was indeed an historic moment. We welcome the commitments by the Syrian Government to protect chemical weapons sites and not to use chemical weapons under any circumstances. The OPCW’s two visits to Syria are also important steps forward. It reported that the Syrian Government extended all possible support and co-operation, including through access to sites and people. We call on Syria to now move quickly towards declaration.
The agreement made by President al-Sharaa with the Syrian Democratic Forces in north-east Syria on 10 March was also a welcome development. We continue to engage with all parties in support of an inclusive process, as implementation of the agreement progresses.
Beyond our action on sanctions, we also remain committed to helping to meet Syria’s humanitarian needs. We have pledged up to £160 million of UK support in 2025, providing lifesaving assistance to millions of Syrians, inside Syria and across the region, as well as agriculture, livelihoods and education programmes to help Syrians to rebuild their lives.
To conclude, Syria’s transition remains delicately balanced. A step in the wrong direction could lead to instability and ultimately a collapse that would only benefit Iran, Russia and others. It would have wider ramifications for our efforts to counter Daesh—we remain a member of the global coalition—and illegal migration, and would risk destabilising the wider region. Promoting stability and prosperity in Syria through economic recovery is also firmly in the UK’s national interest. It will bolster regional and UK security, in line with our plans. The UK remains committed to the people of Syria and will continue to stand with them in building a more stable, free and prosperous future. I commend the regulations to the Committee.
Wendy Morton (Aldridge-Brownhills) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Roger, and I am grateful to the Minister for his opening remarks.
I welcome this opportunity to debate sanctions on Syria and this measure that the Government have introduced, but before we get into the substance of the matter, may I raise with the Minister a point relating to the process? Will he explain why the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office press release announcing the relaxation of sanctions was issued on 24 April and the legislation was signed by the Minister on 23 April, but it took a week for a written ministerial statement to be laid to Parliament announcing these changes, on 30 April? Can he explain why this discourtesy was shown to the House, and give an assurance that statements on changes to sanctions will in future be made to the House first whenever possible, and certainly in a timelier manner?
As my right hon. Friend the shadow Foreign Secretary has said in the House on multiple occasions, the Opposition are of the view that we need to exercise extreme caution when it comes to lifting sanctions on Syria. Syria is at a fork in the road, and there is still no guarantee which path it will take. The situation is very fragile and remains volatile, as clearly demonstrated by the appalling clashes between the pro-Government and Druze communities in recent days. Millions of Syrians remain displaced, facing hardship and suffering, while the security situation on the ground is volatile, with the country still vulnerable to criminal gangs smuggling weapons, drugs and people; still at risk of continuing to be exploited by terrorists; and still exposed to the malign influence of Iran.
Few will shed tears for the end of the vile, tyrannical Assad regime, which bore responsibility for repression, torture and death on a truly horrific scale and, infamously, the use of chemical weapons against its own people. However, there is still an onus on Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham to prove that it is serious about putting Syria on the path to a future that is materially different and better than that under the monstrous tyranny of the Assads, including when it comes to the protection of all communities, groups and minorities. With that in mind, we need to judge HTS and the transitional Government solely on the basis of action, not words or statements about a future vision. Will the Minister give his latest assessment of the number of groups and militias operating in Syria, and say how he will ensure that this relaxation in sanctions benefits the people of Syria?
Co-ordination of course is also important, so I will take the opportunity to ask the Minister what co-ordination, if any, he has undertaken with both the US and European allies on the approach to sanctions. The last Conservative Government helped to lead a co-ordinated approach when it came to Syria, but the UK does not appear to be trying to lead efforts on sanctions policy in the post-Assad period. We see key players in the international community now taking different approaches to the lifting of sanctions, when what we really need is consistency of message. We understand that the US is seeking to impose conditions on the lifting of sanctions, including over the removal of chemical weapons and counter-terrorism measures—indeed, there have been reports of letters being exchanged on these matters as the US seeks assurances—but it appears that the UK is not doing so. Will the Minister explain why he does not want to apply conditions? On what basis has he made the decision not to row in behind the US approach?
We recognise that regulation 5 of these regulations contains a list of high-level and laudable purposes for the UK’s decisions, but that is not the same as a concrete condition. On this point, the Minister will be aware that page 2 of the explanatory memorandum summarises the purposes of the regulations as being,
“to promote the peace, stability and security of Syria…to promote respect for democracy, the rule of law and good governance in Syria, including in particular promoting the successful completion of Syria’s transition to a democratic country…to discourage actions, policies or activities which repress the civilian population in Syria”.
Will the Minister explain what direct discussions have taken place with HTS about the requirements that we expect it to be able to fulfil? If he has not placed conditions on this decision, will he explain why he has not done so?
The Minister will be aware that the shadow Foreign Secretary tabled a written parliamentary question on 24 February on
“conditions he”—
the Foreign Secretary—
“plans to apply to the Government of Syria in relation to the relaxation of sanctions.”
The Minister who answered on 24 March did not give a direct response to that part of the question, so I would like to give this Minister the opportunity now to give a direct answer. Is this relaxation of sanctions directly linked to a clear set of conditions placed on the transitional Government, and will any future relaxation of sanctions be directly linked to conditions too?
It is also important for the Minister to explain what assurances, if any, he has been directly given by the transitional Government of Syria on adhering to the standards that we expect of them. What measures will be put in place to ensure that this relaxation of sanctions does not lead to investments and resources being abused? Syria remains a fragmented country, with different groups and militias exercising control, and conflict and violence still taking place. How often will the Minister review the impact of the relaxation of sanctions, and will he commit to putting sanctions on entities and people in Syria if the standards that we expect in relation to protecting rights are not met?
I ask that because section 10 of the explanatory memorandum gives some details on the Government’s approach to monitoring and reviewing this legislation, but seems to suggest that the Government will look only at the effectiveness of maintaining or relaxing the sanctions regime, rather than tightening it up, and that a specific review provision is not needed. The relevant section asks,
“What is the approach to monitoring and reviewing this legislation?”
and section 10.1 states:
“If His Majesty’s Government determined that…it was no longer appropriate to maintain a sanctions regime or specific sanctions measures, that regime would be removed or amended accordingly. In the case of the 2019 Regulations, that would include the measures introduced by this instrument. As such, the Minister does not consider that a review clause in this instrument is appropriate.
Will the Minister clarify his approach to reviewing and monitoring, which is important? If the transitional Government or other entities in Syria are not acting in an appropriate way to deliver stability to Syria and protect rights, will the current sanctions regime be amended, or will the Government consider introducing a new bespoke sanctions regime and set of regulations?
Will the Minister commit to giving a regular update and statement to the House on the status of Syria and the progress, or lack of progress, being made, and whether he is considering any further amendments to sanctions? Does he expect to make any further amendments this year? On monitoring the impact, what criteria will the Minister use to judge whether the lifting of sanctions has had the effect he desires, including on the security front, which will also be important?
Turning to more specific provisions, on 25 April the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation at HM Treasury issued a financial sanctions notice that updated references to the 310 individuals and 39 entities to which sanctions apply. With the Assad regime over, can the Minister confirm whether any of those individuals are still in Syria, or have all fled? We know that Assad is in Russia, but does the Minister know the whereabouts of other individuals?
Will the Government still consider adding names of individuals and entities to the list, should evidence emerge of the complicity in Assad’s crimes and the repression of Syria by those either currently in Syria or elsewhere? We agree those sanctions must remain in place, and those responsible for heinous acts be held to account. Will the Minister give details on the work under way with international partners and the transitional Government in Syria to bring those responsible to face justice? Will he give an update on his assessment of compliance with sanctions in place?
I now turn to the impact of the amendment. Section 9.2 of the explanatory memorandum states:
“The lifting of sanctions creates trade and investment opportunities for the UK. The impact on UK growth is expected to be positive but negligible, due to the small size of the Syrian economy. Any such trade and investment with Syria will remain subject to other existing legal regulation including international sanctions.”
Does the Minister have an estimate of the impact this would have on UK businesses? Will support and assistance be provided to any UK businesses looking to invest in Syria as a result of these changes, to ensure safe operations? How will he monitor new investments in Syria, to ensure that they are for the benefit of the Syrian people and are not making their way into the hands of those who will undermine our objectives in Syria?
With regard to regulation 6 of the 2019 regulations, headed “Designation criteria: meaning of ‘involved person’”, the amendments would add references to the regulation applying to activities during the period of the Assad regime, which is defined in the regulations as the period ending on 8 December 2024. They state that those designated will be persons involved in a range of abhorrent activities, including
“repressing the civilian population in Syria”
and
“the commission of, or obstruction of an independent investigation into a serious human rights violation or abuse in Syria.”
Can the Minister confirm whether that will mean that anyone who may obstruct investigations into human rights abuses that happened under the Assad regime but where the obstructive actions took place after 8 December 2024, will not be covered by that provision? Ensuring that evidence is secured is vital to bringing criminal cases against those responsible. Anything that could compromise that must surely be a concern.
In the 2019 regulations, regulation 6 defines
“prohibited activities related to chemical weapons”
and regulation 7 lists
“stockpiling or retaining chemical weapons”
as actions that can lead to sanctions being applied. Will the Minister confirm whether those aspects of the regulations will apply to anyone who has been maintaining chemical weapons, or obstructing any efforts to investigate and dispose of chemical weapons held in Syria currently, since the fall of the Assad regime? Or does the measure apply only to persons involved in those activities up to 8 December 2024?
I am sure that the Minister will share our concerns about the risks of chemical weapons not being secured and disposed of. Can he give an update on the international efforts to deal with chemical weapons in Syria and any progress that the transitional Government are making on that issue?
Finally, only an appropriate and inclusive constitutional future will ultimately guarantee peace and stability for Syria, so we should make sure that our policy on Syria’s economic recovery, of which sanctions are of course a part, is not decoupled from ensuring that the right governance structures are in place. On that basis, what is the Minister’s latest assessment of transitional Government’s progress and the plans that they have laid out? We seek assurances on all those points, and I trust that the Minister will give full answers to all those questions when he sums up.
James MacCleary (Lewes) (LD)
The Liberal Democrats recognise the power of lifting sanctions for the rebuilding of Syria after a decade of civil war and the end of the brutal Assad regime. However, it is vital that the new transitional Syrian Government under President al-Sharaa reaffirm their commitment to political inclusion and religious and sectarian tolerance—a position they originally outlined last December. They must take concrete steps to promote and protect the rights of minority groups and women in Syria, and to ensure that they are represented in the new Administration.
Will the Minister outline today an explicit strategy for supporting the promotion of political inclusion and the protection of minorities in Syria? How will that be linked to the future lifting of any sanctions?
Stephen Doughty
I thank the shadow Minister, the right hon. Member for Aldridge-Brownhills, and the Liberal Democrats’ spokesperson, the hon. Member for Lewes, for their comments. They highlighted many of the reasonable concerns of right hon. and hon. Members about the future of Syria and how those concerns relate to our sanctions regimes.
First, on the process, I assure the Committee that absolutely no discourtesy was intended. I gently say to the shadow Minister that, as she will know from her time as a Minister, these things often move at pace. We always try to keep the House updated as soon as possible on any changes that we need to make.
The shadow Minister asked about co-ordination with the United States, the European Union and other partners. I assure her that the Minister with responsibility for the middle east and I, and others, have regular conversations with partners across the region, as well as with those in the European Union, the United States and elsewhere, to understand our approaches and assessments of this rapidly moving set of circumstances. We have been quite honest that there are a number of unknowns, but we regularly discuss those and always seek to co-ordinate.
The shadow Minister will know, but it may benefit other Committee members to say, that our sanctions regimes are all different in their scope, their legal aspects and how they operate. There is not always a direct alignment between different measures and different approaches. We also have different nexuses and points of reference with relation to the entities and individuals who were previously sanctioned.
The shadow Minister and other Committee members will understand that there is a crucial balance to be achieved. As I said at the beginning, this is a gradual process. It is about balancing support for the people, for Syria’s economic recovery and for a hopeful and positive future for the people, of which we have seen some positive signs, against ensuring the rightful caution and assessment of the circumstances on the ground and of the performance and actions, not just the words, of the new regime.
The shadow Minister will be reassured that we are regularly keeping these matters under review. Obviously—I always say this—we do not comment on future designations or the future actions that we might take, but she can rest assured that this measure and our overall regimes allow the potential, should we seek to, to impose new measures in future given the circumstances on the ground. It is worth emphasising that this measure effectively relates to defunct regulations that were no longer appropriate, because they related to the Assad regime.
The shadow Minister asked about discussions with the Syrian Government. The United Kingdom engages privately and regularly with the Syrian Government at every level, including through our Syria envoy, to support them in delivering a more stable, free and prosperous future for the Syrian people. The UK National Security Adviser spoke to President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Foreign Minister al-Shaibani on 10 April. He made clear the importance of an inclusive political transition, the need to protect all civilians, and the hope that we would work together to tackle shared concerns, including countering Daesh.
The Minister with responsibility for the middle east met Syria’s Foreign Minister al-Shaibani in Brussels on 17 March, and they discussed the importance of an inclusive political transition, the need to protect all civilians, and the security situation in northern Syria. The Foreign Secretary also met Syria’s Foreign Minister al-Shaibani at the Munich security conference, and FCDO staff, including the UK special representative for Syria, have undertaken visits to Damascus. I hope the Committee is assured that we are engaging at every level, and making clear our expectations and hopes. We will work with others to support the transition and to take the necessary steps.
On conditions, I have clearly set out our expectations. Those are then kept closely under review, in the same way that we approach all matters in relation to Syria—not just sanctions, but our support and engagement with the regime.
The shadow Minister asked about the whereabouts of previously sanctioned individuals. I will not go into that now, but I will write to her with some assurances about the measures we are taking to monitor the situation. Those hundreds of individuals rightly remain sanctioned, but it is important for the Committee to be aware that we want to hold them accountable, and to stop those who were involved in atrocities under the Assad regime from being able to prosper and thrive as a result of their actions. She also asked about the number of militant groups; I will write to her with a more detailed assessment of the situation and perhaps we can offer her some briefing as well.
The shadow Minister referred specifically to growth and economic potential. Obviously, this is a fragile and fast-moving situation, and our advice to businesses is clear that they must undertake their own legal and risk assessments of the situation. There are a range of not only UK but international measures in relation to activity in Syria. It is very important that businesses get the best advice on that before engaging in any activities. Although this measure does not specifically relate to UK companies, it should help more broadly to achieve a prosperous, peaceful and stable future for Syria.
The shadow Minister asked about measures to secure evidence, routes to justice and ways forward. I want to be clear with the Committee that accountability and the protection of human rights are critical parts of a sustainable transition. We continue to advocate for that and, as I have said, we have raised it on a number of occasions. We have committed £1.15 million to accountability and documentation-related programming, and following the collapse of the Assad regime, we announced £240,000 in funding to help to secure and preserve vital evidence.
We also continue to work with international partners and civil society to support mechanisms such as the UN’s International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism, the Independent Institution on Missing Persons, and the commission of inquiry, to ensure that they have the resources to conduct their operations and to address impunity and the suffering of the Syrian people. We directly support Syrians documenting and gathering evidence to hold the former Assad regime to account for sexual and gender-based violence, which has resulted in the first conviction for sexual crimes. That is a core part of our work with the Syrian Government and is crucially important.
I can say, as someone who highlighted many of these concerns in the House alongside our former and deeply missed colleague Jo Cox and others, that the shadow Minister should be assured of my commitment, and that of the ministerial team, to ensuring that we have accountability that does justice for victims and survivors and that fundamentally underpins a peaceful future for civilians. That will be crucial.
The shadow Minister asked about chemical weapons. We are clear that any use of chemical weapons, by anyone and under any circumstance, is unacceptable. The brutal history of chemical weapons use in Syria must never be repeated. There is now an opportunity to rid Syria of chemical weapons and we have been very clear that Syria must meet its obligations under the chemical weapons convention and United Nations Security Council resolution 2118.
We are working closely with the new regime and other partners. We welcome commitments that they are going to protect the chemical weapons sites and not use such weapons under any circumstances. As I mentioned, that appearance with the OPCW, the visits by the OPCW in March, and a range of other measures are progressing that crucial work. We have provided nearly a million—£837,000—to the OPCW Syria mission since the fall of Assad to support its immediate work, which will absolutely continue.
More broadly, I should make the point that we have not given any new humanitarian funds to the new Syrian Government. Our humanitarian assistance is provided via NGOs and UN organisations operating in Syria to meet the needs of the most vulnerable across the country. As with all of our work, to reassure both spokespeople, we have extensive controls in place to ensure that our aid reaches those who need it and is not falling into the hands of those it should not.
More widely, I hope that I have clearly set out how we are engaging at every level, how we are working with partners, and how we are focused on crucial issues related to accountability, immediate humanitarian needs, economic recovery and setting out clear positions for the new regime that we hope it will come true on. As I said, there are positive signs and important steps forward being taken.
I assure the Committee and the shadow Minister that this situation remains high focus for the UK Government. Ministers are working across the piece on it and we will keep the House updated as matters develop. It is a finely balanced situation. We hope that it will move in the right direction, but of course we always retain the right to take other action should that not be the case. We will continue to make our expectations clear. With that, I commend these regulations to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That the Committee has considered the Syria (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) Regulations 2025 (SI, 2025, No. 507 ).