Lord Grocott
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what would be the effect of an elected House of Lords on relations between the two Houses of Parliament.
Lord Grocott
My Lords, this Question seeks the Government’s view on the effect of an elected House of Lords on the relationship between the two Houses of Parliament. I hope it does not sound presumptuous of me to say that I think this is a matter of fundamental constitutional importance, albeit that we have only an hour and a half in which to debate it. It needs to be addressed, not least because the present relationship between the two Houses is the right one and works very well. That is not just my judgment; it is shared by a committee of this House, the Cunningham committee, which reported a few years ago and whose report was adopted unanimously by both Houses of Parliament. Therefore, if my judgment is not considered sufficiently strong, I hope I can persuade the House that that committee’s report is conclusive.
The basis of the relationship could not be simpler; the primacy of the Commons is secured by the fact that it is elected and we are not. That is the conclusion of the report, which explains the current relationship. My argument is very simple and I shall try to develop it. An elected upper Chamber—whatever you call it—would fundamentally change that relationship for the worse. This question has been disgracefully neglected or ignored by the previous and present Governments. Every time I have attempted to raise it on various occasions it has been dismissed as something we should not spend too much time worrying about.
First, I wish to look at the key arguments of those who say that this does not constitute a major problem, that the two Houses will be fine after any reorganisation of the House of Lords and that we are worrying unnecessarily. They use two arguments most frequently. The first is that the Parliament Acts are supposed to be the absolute guarantor of the supremacy of the Commons over the Lords because in the last resort the Commons can insist on its legislation going through. People who recite that mantra do not know, or do not want to know, anything at all about the practical day in, day out consequences of the ways in which the two Houses relate to one another, which is demonstrated most vividly when ping-pong occurs. That is rather a dismissive title for a fundamentally important part of our constitution but we all know what I am talking about. I recall that ping-pong between the two Houses has occurred six, seven or eight times, but it always concludes in the same way in my experience, which is that the Commons defers to the Lords.
Lord Grocott
I am sorry. I should have said that the Lords defers to the Commons. I remind the House of a much admired Peer whom we remember with great affection, the late Lord Kingsland, who took many Bills through the House that were subject to ping-pong. On one occasion when the Lords finally deferred to the Commons, he said to the House that this procedure would not happen if the House of Lords was elected. That is obvious to me but I wished to cite a higher authority than myself to demonstrate that point. Frankly, it would be bound to be the case. People who say that there is nothing to worry about do not even begin to imagine what it would be like to stand as a senator for this House—I refer to senators for the sake of argument—and say to one’s electorate, “I very strongly oppose the poll tax”, or, “I very strongly oppose the imposition of an identity card system and will do so as strongly as I can as a senator in the House of Lords but ultimately I will stop opposing it if the Commons insists”. That would be a very peculiar plea to put to your electorate when you are hoping to be elected to this House.
I wish to dismiss the other common argument reasonably quickly: that is, when people say that there is nothing to worry about because other parliaments across the world have no difficulty whatever in having two elected Houses. The answer to that question is so obvious that I am almost embarrassed to repeat it; they started with a blank sheet of paper. We have a House with existing powers, which in most respects are identical to those of the House of Commons. That is the difference between us and other parliaments. If we were starting with a blank sheet of paper, of course we could define what the Lords does and what the Commons does and away we go—there would be no problem. It clearly would be a problem if you had an elected House taking over the powers that we enjoy but which—this is crucial—we choose not to enforce. That is the difference between the present position and the one that would apply if this House were elected.
I am more than half way through my time, so I shall recount quickly what I think are the inevitable, predictable consequences for the relationship between the two Houses of an elected second Chamber. First, there would be a constant battle for legitimacy between the two Houses and constant arguments about which represented the most authoritative voice of the British people. Would noble Lords on the Lib Dem Benches who are so passionately in favour of proportional representation—we are told that we will have proportional representation in the upper House—declare that an upper House elected on the basis of proportional representation is not as legitimate as the other House down the Corridor, which is elected on first past the post? Of course they would not say that. There would be endless debates and arguments about which was the most legitimate Chamber.
The second inevitable consequence would be that this House would demand more powers. I do not know of any House anywhere, whether it is the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly or the European Parliament, where people, once they are elected and in situ, do not demand more, not fewer, powers. I say that to people who argue that the only answer is to have a written constitution. I ask them whether they can really imagine sitting down and writing a constitution, the first few paragraphs of which would have to state, “We are now going to have an elected upper House instead of the appointed upper House, but we think it is important to start by reducing its powers”. That would be quite a difficult argument to get across in any rational debate.
I wish to ask two more questions to which I do not know the answers, but perhaps brainy people in the Deputy Prime Minister’s Constitution Unit will have worked them out. In a situation in which there are two elected Houses and a Motion of no confidence in the Government, what is to stop both the Houses having Motions of no confidence in the Government? What happens if one says, “We have confidence in the Government”, but the other says that it does not? I should like to know the answer to that question. I do not know what it is. I should have mentioned earlier that, if this were an elected House, there is no question whatever of its having far more Secretaries of State. There is no reason why any of the key offices of state should not be held by Members of this House, except, I suppose, that of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. In the 19th century, the Prime Minister sat in this House, when it was an hereditary House and a Prime Minister could do so again if the House were fully elected.
We have had the Deputy Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Business and the Secretary of State for Transport in this House. What is to stop this elected House having a roughly coincident number of Secretaries of State, or even more, than the other House? The question about the votes of confidence is not mischievous, but it would be an odd thing if this House had passed a Motion of no confidence in the Government, and half the members of the Government were in it, while the other House thought the Government were wonderful. Even more seriously—this is not frivolous—we have now decided that it is pretty important for the elected House of Commons to make a judgment before our troops are committed in battle. If one House, democratically elected, said yes it is right to go ahead, and the other House, also democratically elected, said no it is not, I would not like to be the lawyer to work that one out. Those are the kinds of questions, when there are two elected Houses with equally democratic legitimacy, that simply have not been sensibly addressed.
The only reason why I wanted to raise this issue today is that I believe it is the absolute duty of the Government to think not only about whether the House of Lords should be elected or not elected, but about the consequences not just for the House of Lords but for the House of Commons, for MPs’ relations with their constituents, and for relations between the two Houses. That needs to be addressed before any fundamental change is made. If this debate makes a small contribution towards that, it will be time well spent.
Lord Howe of Aberavon
My Lords, three questions ought to be answered in light of the prospect of the arrival of elected Members in this House. First, will any fault be corrected thereby? Secondly, will any improvement be achieved thereby? Both those questions have so far secured only absolutely void answers. On the contrary, virtually all the judgments on the performance of this House have been strongly positive. The House will remember the Jay White Paper—as I call it—in 1999, which stated:
“The most valued features of the present House”,
are summarised by the following epithets:
“distinctive … real expertise … well regarded … distinguished … particularly valuable”.
More important than that, perhaps, the fifth report of the Commons Public Administration Select Committee—the Wright committee—stresses the considerable virtues that should be preserved, and sets the objective of building upon the strength of the present Chamber.
I come to the third question: is there therefore any reason for change in the direction of elected Members? Only one answer is actually offered by any of the champions of change, to the effect that the present membership of the Lords lacks legitimacy, on the assumed basis that only election can confer true legitimacy. This presumption sits uneasily alongside the Wright committee finding that the principal cause of today’s widespread public disillusionment with our political system is the virtually untrammelled control by the Executive of the elected House. Hence the two conclusions of the Wright committee: first, that there is a need to ensure that the dominance of Parliament by the Executive, including the political party machines, is reduced, not increased; secondly, that the second Chamber must be neither rival nor replica but genuinely complementary to the Commons and therefore as different as possible. On that basis, it surely cannot make sense that the most fundamental change proposed for the second Chamber—the introduction of elected Members—is the most likely to extend the influence of the elective dictatorship that so manifestly provokes disenchantment with the present elected House.
The Prime Minister said a few years ago that we keep what is good and we change what needs to be changed. Let him be sure that we keep what is good.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Grocott for securing this important debate. Sadly, I cannot go all the way with the implications behind some of the questions he was asking, which seemed to me to be extremely leading towards a particular set of conclusions. I think there are answers to some of the points he raised. I particularly want to stress that the problem with having a legislature that is not elected is that it is simply both unacceptable in principle and unsustainable in practice.
There are three answers to the question that is implied in the Question. First, relations between the Houses will certainly be affected by the way in which the House is elected. It surely must be common ground that the way in which the House is elected will determine its legitimacy, perhaps not just in absolute terms but in the way in which that legitimacy is perceived. That may be key to whether we have the authority to act when we come to do so.
Secondly, relations will be affected by the powers that are allocated to the House after it becomes an elected House, and not necessarily a straight continuation of them. My noble friend referred to the Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949. According to Professor Vernon Bogdanor and others, this has established a unicameral system in this country in the sense that a determined Government can always get their business through, irrespective of the wishes of this House, except in two very narrow cases: extending the term of the elected House, and the dismissal of judges. On the other hand, as we learnt to a considerable extent yesterday, the Parliament Acts do not affect secondary legislation, so this House has powers over those. In practice, although it is a restraint, we really have not used the powers that are allocated to us. It will be interesting to see whether they will develop in time. Between 1911 and 1949, the Parliament Act was invoked three times; since 1949, it has been applied only four times.
Thirdly, relations should not be affected in the areas in which the House has earned a fantastic reputation—I have certainly enjoyed in my short time here the sort of debates we have just experienced. Committee work seems to be the envy of the world. It is one of the most extraordinary features of this House when you first come into it, it goes on virtually unnoticed and yet is of terrific quality, and in the specialist debates often arising from that committee work we hear contributions from noble Lords on all sides of the House that are of the highest quality. Indeed, that third function—in addition to legislative scrutiny and efficient government—is what really sets out this House as different.
In closing, I suggest simply that we might think about separating out the functions along the lines suggested by my noble friend Lord Maclennan of Rogart and the late Lord Bingham, who made proposals for a council of state that could deal with issues that are separate from the legislative processes we have been talking about.
Lord Tyler
My Lords, I am a great fan of the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, but I really think he ought to be more frank about his motives. This is going to be seen to be yet another attempt to delay long-overdue reform. The idea that somehow or other these issues have not been properly examined in the past is frankly nonsense. They were constantly and exhaustively examined.
In 2002, the Joint Committee on House of Lords Reform envisaged,
“a continuation of the present role of the House of Lords, and of the existing conventions governing its relations with the House of Commons”.
That is clear enough.
Then there was the Joint Committee on Conventions—the Cunningham committee—which has been referred to and which I also sat on, which looked at those conventions and spelled them out very carefully. Under the leadership of the noble Lord, Lord Cunningham, we rejected any idea that there should be a cut in its powers and set out very clearly the present relationship. It, too, could not be clearer.
Even more important, the Government responded to that report. I know I have the support of the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, in this contention because it was his Government who said in response to the Committee’s report:
“the Committee’s report shows that there is general agreement about the current role of the Lords in Parliament. The Government—
that is, his Government—
“believes that whatever further reform of the Lords takes place, that role is the right one. The question of composition of the House of Lords does not dictate its role”.
I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Grocott—who was Chief Whip at the time—would have signed off on that particular point.
The truth is that the relative responsibilities and roles of the two Houses have been constantly re-examined. Yes it is true that when we get the draft Bill in the new year and there is again pre-legislative scrutiny, we will have to face up to the fact that all three parties have committed themselves to thoroughgoing democratic reform of your Lordships’ House. If we believe in the primacy of the Commons—and I know the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, does—that cross-party consensus must surely be extremely important. Our challenge as a House is to look at that draft Bill when it is published and do our best to make sure that it produces a new House that is worthy of its predecessor.
The Lord Bishop of Bath and Wells
My Lords, the issue of relationships between the two Houses is important, whether or not there is to be an elected upper Chamber. Election to the House of Lords has its attractions, but election to the upper House, whether 100 per cent or less would involve considerable constitutional upheaval, for which we must ask: are we ready? We might equally ask: how would it serve the people better? The general public understand something of their MP; would they so easily identify with their Peer?
Four areas concern me. First, on the potential for conflict between the two Houses, we do not have the kind of situation that exists, for example, in the United States of America, where the major institutions of government are held by different parties for a time. However, as President Mitterand once said when describing the relationship between a socialist President with a right-wing parliament, cohabitation does not make for easy government. Here, two elected bodies of the same political persuasion could be disastrous without parliamentary checks and balances. Equally, two elected bodies of different persuasions could deadlock the country, even if Parliaments had fixed terms.
Secondly, I am concerned about the cost. In the current climate of recession and in the wake of the expenses scandal, is this a wise time to increase spending on Parliament?
Thirdly, while the present system undoubtedly has faults, your Lordships’ Chamber provides space for scrutiny of legislation; and the range of experience in the present Chamber provides some very expert scrutiny indeed.
Finally, a fully elected House of Lords would inevitably contain more active politicians whose loyalty to the Government or Opposition would, without doubt, prevent the kind of dispassionate and well informed testing of legislation that is one of the features of our present system. If the House is to be reformed, we need in the first instance to set out its powers and codify the relationship it should have with the Commons. Only then can we decide who should sit within the reformed upper House.
Baroness Shephard of Northwold
My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, on securing this debate, which strikes at the heart of reform of this House. His remarks reinforce the point, so well understood in this House, that our legislative structure rests on the fact that we have two Houses in our Parliament and their work is complementary, not competitive. It follows, therefore, that reform of one of the Houses cannot be undertaken without considering the impact on the other; and it seems to me that we are in danger of doing just that.
It seems equally obvious that if we have two elected Houses, instead of one, there will at some point be a struggle between them for electoral supremacy, as the noble Lord said, along the lines of which kind of elected Member is more accountable than the other, and which House has the greater legitimacy. I am not sure whether such a struggle will enhance the quality of law-making, but it certainly will not enhance relations between the Houses.
I can well understand, as we all can, that the easy answer to the question, “Should all legislators be elected?” is, “Yes, of course”. However, the next questions are not quite so easy. For example, would that make the legislative process better or more transparent? What happens if the Houses clash? Or even—we really need to face up to this—whether there is an unquenchable desire on the part of the public for more elected politicians. However, these questions will have to be tackled if there is to be any kind of credible attempt at reform of the House of Lords.
After those questions, we should ask this one: if we proceed to reform this House without a thoroughgoing examination of all our process in both Houses, will the result be a more accountable, and above all—as the right reverend Prelate mentioned, at man-in-the-street level—a more comprehensible system of government? That is because, in comprehensibility lies accountability.
Lord Sewel
My Lords, my earlier speech was on Somali pirates; my second is on reform of your Lordships’ House. There is no connection.
With this question we come to the nub of the issue which was highlighted immediately. It is quite simply: how can you have an elected second Chamber without fundamentally changing the relationship between the two Houses? The primacy of the House of Commons rests on its monopoly of democratic legitimacy. That principle underpins the restrictions on the House of Lords’ powers brought in by the Parliament Act 1911. You have that Act only because you accept that principle.
Give the second Chamber democratic authority and you change everything—not immediately, but inevitably. The elected second Chamber will become more and more assertive. Indeed, if elected by STV, as my noble friend Lord Grocott said, some will argue that the second Chamber has greater legitimacy than a House of Commons elected on first past the post or even AV—God forbid. Create a legislature that has democratic authority, and it will push for more and more power. You do not have to have a crystal ball for this; look at what is happening in Scotland or in Wales. We are promised a Calman Bill, we have already done something for Wales, and there is to be a referendum on more powers for the Welsh Assembly.
The previous Government thought that they could get out of this issue in their draft Bill, which admittedly received limited circulation, by including a clause which stated that the powers and—listen to this—the conventions of the House of Lords would not be changed. That is simply not good enough. It will not work because it lacks any underpinning principle. If you are doing constitutional reform, you actually need an informing and uniting underlying principle, and there is not one in this debate.
Baroness Howe of Idlicote
My Lords, what is particularly frustrating in trying to dissuade the Government from implementing their ill-conceived plans to legislate for a fully or partially elected second Chamber is that your Lordships still do not have a clear idea of the number of Members envisaged for it or, indeed, the method of election that will be proposed.
What is equally confusing is why on earth the coalition Government, who are rightly or wrongly determined to achieve significant changes to the Commons covering the size and boundaries of parliamentary constituencies, should at the same time want to take on the replacement of the House of Lords with a second Chamber that will inevitably become a serious challenge to the supremacy of the Commons. Surely it would be more logical to deal with the Commons, and only then turn to trying to achieve whatever changes to the House of Lords make sense.
It is of course acknowledged that some changes are needed. The Steel Bill proposes to make the House of Lords Appointments Commission statutory and end replacing hereditary Peers, for example. However, to plan simultaneously for a completely new Chamber, either wholly or mainly elected, is surely asking for trouble.
Perhaps, as one of the first tranche of 14 of that new breed of life Peers selected by the Appointments Commission, I can offer a relevant insight into how things might develop. Inevitably at first, we sought and took the advice of the established Cross-Benchers that, like them, we should stick to those issues where we had the expertise and experience for which we had been selected. It did not stay like that for long, and we became more interested in wider and more politically sensitive issues. We gained confidence and wanted to play a more active part. Our contributions and votes have therefore played a growing part in the decisions made on amendments to Bills in your Lordships’ House.
Against that background, consider just how, in a so-called reformed House, with Members who claim they are more legitimate because they are elected, this new wave of elected Members would be likely to behave. Even if they have originally accepted a Commons decision that the second Chamber, elected or not, should have only the same or broadly similar powers as your Lordships' House possesses today, how long will that restraint last before a challenge is mounted? The conflict will assuredly become a battle between two tribes, each with an equal claim to legitimacy. What, if anything, will our so-called mother of Parliaments have gained from that?
Lastly, we should remember that the Prime Minister has forbidden MPs to continue with any job or profession outside their parliamentary role. In these circumstances, how can it make any kind of sense to do away with an appointed House, containing as it does this incredible range of experience and expertise that has contributed effectively to our legislative process?
To give one recent example of that, the noble Lord, Lord Puttnam—
Earl Ferrers
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, for introducing this debate, because it seems elementary not to realise the huge problems that there will be between the two Houses if your Lordships’ House becomes an elected Chamber. It seems obvious.
People—particularly our dear friends the Liberal Democrats—always say, “Reform the House of Lords”. It is as if they feel they are in the sixth form and have been told to write an essay on how you make a democratic Parliament and the answer is “Two elected Chambers”. Of course that may be so, but as the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, said, we are not starting from there. That is what the dear Liberal Democrats do not ever seem to understand; we are not starting from scratch. We have inherited a constitution, which is the envy of all other countries, and it works. It works. Yet we are now out to try to destroy it. It is a great privilege. It has worked for 600 years and the answer is that you want to build on it, and not destroy it. Whatever Members of another place may say about wanting an elected second Chamber, their successors will hate it because there will be another Chamber saying, “We have been elected too, we have got just as much right as you have to have our views prevail and our votes too”. Are people going to offer themselves for election to a House which has the powers that we have? The answer is no. The power between the Houses is finite and if your Lordships’ House gets any more powers, another place will have to give up some of their powers. Is it likely to do that? No.
How do you get an elected Chamber? The first thing is to throw out all the Members of the present Chamber. You cannot get the elected ones in as well. I see my noble friend Lord Attlee is getting all bouncy. The next thing is you are going to have to pay them to leave. That is grotesque. I suggest to your Lordships that it is far better to retain what we have got and build on it—not destroy it.
Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws
My Lords, I chaired the Power inquiry into our democracy. We took evidence around the country and a high percentage of the public thought that the House of Lords should be reformed. There were many things about the current House that people liked, especially our role over the last few decades—not just with the previous Government, but with the one before—in holding the Government to account and challenging policies which might have slid through without sufficient scrutiny. However, they still wanted this House to be elected. Here is the rub. When you asked them what sort of person they wanted to see in this House, they said independent-minded people with expertise. That is the problem. They did not want it to be full of people embedded in party-political machines; they wanted people who were going to contribute some wisdom—perhaps a tall order. They wanted a House that took the long view and was not just looking over its shoulder. They were making a high demand.
We ultimately made a recommendation. It was because of the concern of the public to square that circle that we recommended that there should be a 70 per cent elected and a 30 per cent appointed element. Many have sought to complain about a hybrid House but in fact that was what we recommended. We thought that retaining a cohort of appointed independents would help to maintain the culture of this House as a forum of independents, as a forum that protected the constitution and would guard future generations’ interest when there was a rush to legislation because of demands, particularly of the tabloid press.
You cannot imagine what it feels like to people outside to hear what sounds like self-interest when we all say that we should be left as we are, that we are wonderful. It really is too self-congratulatory. For this reason, I suggest that one of the recommendations that we should be making is that there should be a role for the public in considering the way forward. Why should parliamentarians be the ones to decide how they should be reformed? There should be a deliberative poll where you have a cross-section of the public and you organise it in a way that has been done in other jurisdictions—in Canada and elsewhere. That cross-section of the public would hear evidence about the role of this House and how it might affect the Commons. It may be that the public would opt for little or no change, because they would understand how you all worked. I suggest that that should be done.
We should be very careful in constitutional change, but caution is not a recipe for resisting change. It is important that we recognise that there is a desire out there for this House to change; we should go at this with some care, but we should listen to the public and not just our own voices.
Lord Maclennan of Rogart
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, made points which I hope will be considered by those who are drafting the legislation that we are going to see in the early new year. But he is somewhat too complacent in suggesting that our constitution could not be improved in the balance of duties and responsibilities which are discharged by the two Houses. The overriding criticism of the constitutional arrangements we have is that our Executive is too dominant. That is largely because the Government consist of those who are Members of the House of Commons, predominantly, and they are too acquiescent in what the Government put forward.
The House of Commons, furthermore, is seriously overburdened. It has grown in the number of committees that it has established, which were sensible in the form of departmental select committees under the St John Stevas reforms. There should be a proper distribution of functions between the two Houses of Parliament. The Commons should have primacy in respect of money Bills, but why should this House not have primacy in respect of the ratification of treaties? That is not something which exercises a constituency Member of Parliament as much as other things closer to home.
All responsible Ministers should be required to account to the relevant Chamber. That a member of the Government is in one or other Chamber seems to me to be old-fashioned and something that deserves to be changed. The second Chamber could have a function which is predominantly bringing the regional attitudes of the country to bear on legislation. If we want to have scrutiny and expertise of the kind that this House is so distinguished at delivering, then let us think of separation; let us think of a council of state that could have such appointed people without the power to block or amend legislation, but which, because of its composition, would be listened to.
Lord Norton of Louth
My Lords, if there is a change in the composition of this House with Members being elected, then that has consequences for the power of the House—a fact recognised by those responsible for the passage of the Parliament Bill in 1911. A Cabinet committee in 1907 rejected a reform of the composition of the House because it accepted that this would strengthen the House of Lords against the Commons. As Chris Ballinger notes in a forthcoming article on the Parliament Act 1911, members of the Cabinet were reluctant to consider going further. As he writes:
“Any reform to composition would have augmented the power of the Upper House, and thereby its ability to impede the enactment of the social welfare policies to which the Liberals had become committed.”
I also remind the House of the resolution passed by the House of Commons on 26 June 1907, which stated that,
“in order to give effect to the will of the people as expressed by their elected representatives, it is necessary that the power of the other House to alter or reject Bills passed by this House should be so restricted by Law as to secure that within the limits of a single Parliament the final decision of the Commons shall prevail. [Official Report, Commons, 27/6/07; col. 1523.]
In other words, the supremacy of the Commons rested on its Members being the elected representatives of the people—that is what they were asserting. There were no elected representatives of the people in the other Chamber. Once one has Members elected to the second Chamber, then the rationale for the Parliament Act disappears. The Government may seek to maintain it, but they will have problems maintaining their claims for its legitimacy. Its foundations will have been kicked away.
Lord Cobbold
My Lords, I am one of those who feels strongly that the proposal to turn the present House of Lords into a wholly or partly elected Chamber is not reform but abolition. It is the abolition of an institution that has a unique history and performs a valuable function in the scrutiny of new legislation, while at the same time recognising the supremacy of the House of Commons. An elected senate would be bound to challenge that supremacy. The strength of the House of Lords is the experience and expertise of its Members in most walks of life. They have made a mark in life and would be reluctant to stand for election. A new senate would be more party political and considerably more expensive.
Another question is whether the public are ready for yet another election. The Deputy Prime Minister said in his Statement on 5 July that it is important to avoid asking people to keep traipsing to the ballot box. There is room for some reform measures—for example, those set out in the Bill of the noble Lord, Lord Steel—but I do not believe that an elected Chamber would improve relations between the two Houses.
Baroness Noakes
My Lords, when we speed-debated House of Lords reform last month, I said that the purpose of your Lordships' House was to protect the public interest. While I am sure that the public interest will dominate whether the House is elected or appointed, it is inevitable that an elected House will have a different interpretation of how assertive it should be against the other place in order to protect the public interest.
The noble Lord, Lord Grocott, raised the primacy of the other place. Clearly, if different parties dominate each elected House, as will be entirely possible, each House will claim a different democratic mandate, and there will inevitably be less willingness to give way on legislation. The game of bluff known as ping-pong will become more like a war game. While the Parliament Act will remain the ultimate weapon to protect the primacy of the other place, it is a blunt weapon. We saw with the Hunting Act what a mess can be made when the Parliament Act is used.
By convention, we do not vote down statutory instruments. However, as recently as 1994, your Lordships' House reaffirmed its power to do so, as set out in the Companion. Why should an elected upper House be content with non-fatal Motions on secondary legislation that is poorly drafted, insufficiently consulted on or just plain wrong? We must expect more fatal Motions.
The coalition Government need to wise up to the fact that creating a wholly or mainly elected House of Lords is full of problems. My noble friend knows that the Government will have huge difficulty in getting legislation for an elected House through your Lordships' House. More importantly, the Government need to recognise that they are playing a dangerous game with the constitutional balance between the two Houses, for which history may well condemn them.
Lord Wills
My Lords, I congratulate my noble friend Lord Grocott on securing this debate. I am afraid that I agree with very few of his views on the issue, but his continuing focus on it should be welcomed by all of us who care about our constitutional arrangements. He is right about its importance, and everyone should care about this because it concerns the very distribution of power in our country.
I recognise the force of my noble friend's arguments. It is logical to assume that a democratically elected second Chamber would acquire greater legitimacy and would challenge the pre-eminence of the House of Commons, which could lead to all sorts of undesirable outcomes. However, when the argument is scrutinised it becomes a little less compelling. It is predicated on the assumption that this House as currently constituted knows its place and seeks only—and meekly—to tweak legislation in order to improve it. This is not exactly so. The power of this House to delay, especially at the end of a Parliament, can lead to significant legislation—as all noble Lords have seen—being abandoned by the democratically elected Government of the day.
Conflict between the two Chambers is nothing new. However, for those who worry—and I understand their worry—that the current tension between the two Chambers will become fiercer and less reconcilable if this House is elected, comfort is available. I agree that the pre-eminence of the House of Commons is essential, but retaining appointment for this House is not the only way of securing this. An indispensable part of any democratic reform of this House must be the codification of its functions, to put beyond doubt the respective roles of the two Chambers and their relationship. Nor would such a codification—as my noble friend Lord Grocott suggested—reduce the powers of this House. It could simply entrench its current powers, which so many noble Lords have celebrated today.
I conclude with a plea to the Minister that I have already made to his noble friend Lord McNally. Will he reconvene the working group of experts that the previous Government set up but never got under way, to look at the codification of this House and report to the Government within three months on how such a codification of functions might be achieved?
Lord Eden of Winton
My Lords, on the issue of what is in my view incorrectly referred to as reform of the House of Lords, a collective madness seems to have taken hold of the leadership of our three main political parties. It appears bent on destroying what is here, which is good, and on replacing it with a variant of the Commons, which would be bad. Democratic legitimacy is the parrot cry. However, conflict would arise and both of our much-prized parliamentary institutions would be damaged. I emphasise the example given by my noble friend Lord Norton. The 1911 Act limits the blocking powers of the upper House on the grounds that the unelected House should not prevail over the elected one. However, if both Houses are elected, there will presumably be pressure to repeal the Act, and consequences will inevitably flow from that.
What could be more legitimate than the wide range of expertise and experience on which this House is now able to draw? What could be more in the interests of the people in our democracy than having a Chamber of Parliament able to hold the Government of the day to account and competent to scrutinise and revise complex pieces of legislation? Those qualities that we now possess are too precious to lose.
Lord Steel of Aikwood
My Lords, it is time we were more frank about the vocabulary that we use in dealing with the future of the upper House. There seem to be two schools of thought. One is in favour of reform and the other is in favour of abolition. I say straightaway that if the committee of both Houses comes up with a proposal for a small, elected senate of, say, 200 Members, elected by proportional representation, not first past the post or party lists, with no constituency responsibilities, representing the devolved nations and the great regions of England, I will happily go along with that, because it would lead us towards a written federal constitution of the kind that has long been the policy of my party. However, my fear is that that is not what we will be offered. We will be offered some kind of fudge.
The phrase “wholly or mainly elected” has been co-opted from the previous Government. The words “or mainly” suggest that they have some doubts about whether they are doing the right thing and think that perhaps they should keep some of the expertise that is here already. However, simply adding nominated Members because they fear they may be making a mistake would itself be a fundamental mistake. Both the Labour and Conservative Parties believe in first past the post elections. That, too, would be a mistake.
I will repeat something I said before in this House. When I became Presiding Officer of the Scottish Parliament, I presided over a system that we had legislated for in which we had regional elected Members in addition to constituency Members. I spent a lot of my time sorting out differences, both in the Chamber and in my office, between Members who were elected from the regions and constituency Members—usually of different political parties, but even sometimes of the same party. The minute we have elected Members here, trespassing on the territory of constituency Members of the House of Commons, we will be in real difficulty, and the Commons will come to rue the day that it agreed to an elected upper Chamber.
Lord Stoddart of Swindon
My Lords, it is completely naive to think that we could have an elected second Chamber without additional powers—or, indeed, with even fewer. Not only would the inhabitants of the Chamber demand more power, but their constituents would demand more power. They would say: “What on earth are we paying these people salaries and expenses for when they have no power?”. The drive would come not only from the Chamber but from constituents as well, who would demand value for money.
My second point is that the present situation is unique and virtually perfect. You have a unicameral system posing as a bicameral system, under which the House of Commons is all-powerful but is assisted by a group of people who are very well qualified to advise it, to slow it down a bit but not to usurp its sovereignty. My advice is, quite frankly, that if something works leave it alone.
Baroness Knight of Collingtree
My Lords, good legislation is rarely produced without the House of Lords. Often whole sections of Bills sail through the Commons with no debate at all. Disaster is avoided because this House works on those neglected parts—it holds debates, it moves amendments, it sets things right. As the Lord Speaker said last week, second Houses are for second thoughts and those are often essential. An elected or partly elected Lords may keep that rule but it would alter profoundly the quality of suggestions for improvements.
We have here a truly astonishing powerhouse of experience—former ambassadors, former leaders of industry and trade unions, heads of police forces, Cabinet Ministers, judges, service chiefs, education experts, professors. There is no end to the depth of experience here and I can confirm from long experience in both Houses that the level of expertise in debate is far higher here than it is at the other end of the Corridor. Whatever the subject under discussion, at least five or six top experts in that subject will contribute. These people have reached the top of their particular ladders. They would never stand for election. Can you see a professor facing a political election committee or a Bishop banging on doors to get votes? Those raring to do so may have star-studded futures but it is past experience which guides judgment and wisdom, not experience which is yet to come.
Some advocate only some Peers being elected but to have a mixed fish and fowl House would be hopeless. Every elected Peer would have to work hard in their constituency, seeing voters, visiting factories, schools and old people’s homes, mirroring and duplicating what the MP for the area would have to do anyway. They would not have time to do any scrutinising of Bills as they do at the moment. They could not be expected to do the same job as an MP voluntarily. Surely they would have to have the same rate of pay as an MP. You could not then have a House some of whose Members were salaried and some of whom were not. That would give big problems to any Government needing to cut public expenditure.
If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it. The Lords, contrary to being broke, gives hugely valuable service to Britain for no salary at all. Let’s not throw it away.
Lord Grenfell
My Lords, when the last Government set out their vision of what an elected second Chamber would be like, they imagined,
“A second chamber that is more assertive than the current House of Lords”,
to quote from their July 2008 White Paper. Such a reformed Chamber,
“operating against the background of the current arrangements for its powers, would not threaten primacy”.
That is precisely the argument which the present Government advance, among others, to convince us of the merits of an elected Chamber. They advocate, within the constraints set by the Parliament Acts, a more assertive House of Lords but one which does not threaten the primacy of the other place. This is a smokescreen and one in which they themselves now seem to be stumbling about in some confusion.
The danger in establishing an elected second Chamber lies not in some imagined threat to the primacy of the House of Commons because, as in the case of other countries where there is a wholly or partially elected second Chamber, constitutional arrangements and conventions are set in place to protect that primacy. In our case, we have the Parliament Acts and the Salisbury convention. Our focus instead should be on the relationship change because there can be a substantial change in the relationship between the two Chambers, as my noble friend Lord Grocott most convincingly said, without primacy being threatened.
With an elected senate, the relationship that will see the most significant change will be that Chamber’s relationship not with the other Chamber, although that will be significant enough, but with the Executive. Within the confines of respect for the primacy of the other place, an elected senate will seek the means to be more assertive in its efforts to hold the Government to account. In the interests of there being a better check on the Executive, that is in principle good but, shorn of the expertise to be found in this present House, I do not see the new assertiveness of an elected senate adding much if any value to the effort of Parliament as a whole to hold the Government better to account. The second Chamber will replicate the first and its relationship with the Executive will change accordingly, from an expert scrutinising House much to be reckoned with, as it is now, to a pale, unthreatening junior partner to the House still enjoying its primacy. The beneficiary of this change in relations will be the Executive. Is that really what we parliamentarians want?
Lord Kilclooney
My Lords, I have served in five different parliamentary institutions—seven years in the Northern Ireland Parliament, 10 years in the European Parliament, seven years in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 18 years in the other place and now nine years in your Lordships’ House. The worst of these was the European Parliament; the best is your Lordships’ House, in so far as quality of debate is concerned.
First, if we have an elected upper House, irrespective of the electoral system or the size of constituencies, there will be competition between the elected Members here and the elected Members in the other place. Secondly, there will be political yes-men and no independence. That will be a severe loss to this House—the loss of the independent voice. Most important of all, as I saw during my experience in the European Parliament, it had been a nominated Parliament and then became an elected Parliament. It spent every day struggling to take powers away from the European Commission in Brussels. The same would happen here with an elected body. It would spend every day fighting to take powers away from the other place. I hope that Members in the other place recognise that if they vote for an elected upper House they are diminishing their own status and it will truly become the lower House in the United Kingdom Parliament.
It is important that the public know what the role of the House of Lords is. Last night, as a taxi driver took me out, he said, “Are you a Labour Peer or a Conservative Peer?”. I said, “Neither, I’m an independent Peer—non-party”. To which he said, “I didn’t know there were independent Peers in the House of Lords”. The sooner we get the public educated, the sooner will the cry for an elected upper House disappear.
Viscount Younger of Leckie
My Lords, I believe that an elected upper Chamber would have a detrimental effect on the delicate and subtle balance of power between this House and another place. Furthermore, it would impact adversely on the decision-making process of government and diminish the broad skills base in this House that is so important for our effective role within the constitution.
We must first understand and agree our collective purpose within the relationship. Our mandate is to examine, advise and revise but not challenge the supremacy of another place. The Executive must ultimately be given the chance to carry out their manifesto, as mandated by the people but not without the power of the upper Chamber as the quality control department.
If your Lordships were wholly elected, the terms of reference for complementary coexistence would change substantially for several negative reasons. First, there would be a divided accountability if the second Chamber was also answerable to constituencies; there would be the danger of a tug of war between factions—inter-Chamber, more equal in power—claiming a mandate for its preferred legislation. This could lead to paralysis of decision-making, but more probably decision-making where the lowest common denominator prevailed, with protracted negotiations as a means for agreeing legislation. This would surely be undesirable and undemocratic. The system could be open to influence by party faction and by interest groups in both Houses. There could be a lack of accountability.
An elected upper House would create the danger of more confrontational politics in this Chamber, with stronger Whips, which would detract from the necessity for complementarity. The Salisbury convention would undoubtedly be challenged, as would Bills of aid and supplies.
Your Lordships sit in this House as individuals, not Members representing a particular constituency. This allows for independent consideration and scrutiny. The breadth and depth of skills and experience in this House across a range of professions, sectors and regions, built up over time, would be compromised with election.
An election process would not replicate; it would more naturally attract candidates who were politically ambitious and who would see the route into the upper Chamber as a means to an end, with less focus on its purpose.
It is an easy but slack argument to say that an upper Chamber is legitimate only if it is democratic. Its legitimacy is confirmed only if it is “fit for purpose” in relation to the Executive. That is the point.
Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe
My Lords, I congratulate my noble friend Lord Grocott on securing this debate. We hold different views on whether we should have an elected or non-elected Chamber but I agree with one view that he expressed: if we had an elected Chamber, I would not wish to see a great change in the nature of the relationship between this House and the Commons, although there would be some change.
I believe that the key to that rests in two areas: first, the Parliament Act; and, secondly—my noble friend Lord Sewel pointed to this and it was also focused on by my noble friend Lord Wills—the conventions. The conventions need to be codified. In the 2002 Joint Committee on which the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, sat, we spent time talking about that but no progress was made. That Joint Committee was chaired by my noble friend Lord Cunningham, who subsequently chaired the committee that looked at the nature of the relationship, but again the question of codifying the conventions was not addressed. It was decided that, in the event of there being an elected Chamber, we might have to return to having codification of the conventions or changes to them.
On the last occasion that we had a debate on this matter, I asked the Benches opposite—and I particularly thank my noble friend Lord Grocott for giving me the chance to come back to this question—whether they had commenced work on codifying the conventions. I got no reply, so I ask the question again. If work has not started, I should like to know why not. I should also like to know whether they will make a start on it, because such a change is most certainly needed to ensure a proper relationship between the two Houses when we have elections.
Lord Scott of Foscote
My Lords, I rise to make a few short remarks in the gap. The issue being debated this evening was considered in 1999 and 2000 by the Wakeham commission, whose report came before the House in 2000. For the purposes of its deliberations, the commission engaged an eminent academic at UCL, Meg Russell, who wrote a report for it on each of the western European democracies with two elected Houses. She also wrote a report on the United States, Canada and Australia.
The Library very kindly downloaded for me all the reports that she wrote. However, I could not reach the end of them without feeling great gloom at the prospect of this country going through the same troubles and processes that the countries with two elected Houses have had. Moreover, I do not think that anyone could read the reports produced by Meg Russell and still think it a good idea to replace the current system in this country of a healthy constitutional equilibrium between the largely appointed House here and the elected House in the Commons. Those reports by the lady in question are important reading for anyone who retains any lingering wish to have an elected House of Lords.
Baroness Royall of Blaisdon
My Lords, this is a debate of fundamental importance to both the House of Commons and the House of Lords. I pay tribute to the continuing force and validity of the considerations and conclusions of the Joint Committee on Conventions, chaired by my noble friend Lord Cunningham of Felling, to which many noble Lords have referred today.
I have to disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, about the conclusions of that report—they were approved by all parties in both Houses—on the implications of any future change in composition for the relations between the two Houses:
“If the Lords acquired an electoral mandate, then in our view their role as the revising chamber, and their relationship with the Commons, would inevitably be called into question, codified or not ... should any firm proposals come forward to change the composition of the House of Lords, the conventions between the Houses would have to be examined again”.
That conclusion was right when the committee reported in October 2006 and it is right now. I am the only member speaking in tonight’s debate of the Government’s committee on further reform of your Lordships’ House, chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister. I can tell the House that the committee has given some consideration to this point, although not much, and that as yet it has come to no clear conclusion.
My own view, in addition to a point that I have repeatedly made—that the issue of any further substantive reform of your Lordships’ House is of such constitutional significance that it should be put to the people of this country in a referendum—is that, if the group chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister does come up with firm proposals to change the composition of the House of Lords, as specified by the Joint Committee, then the conventions between the Houses should indeed be examined again, in line with the agreed recommendation of the Joint Committee.
I believe that the right body for such an examination would, again, be a Joint Committee of both Houses and I roundly reject those, including the Deputy Leader of your Lordships’ House, who claim that such a view is the last refuge of reform refuseniks. I am a reformer; I want an elected House and I do not want to delay the process. For that reason, I suggest that a Joint Committee on conventions be convened to meet in parallel with the pre-legislative scrutiny committee on the draft Bill. I should be grateful for the Minister’s views on that. As I said, I am not a reform refusenik but I believe that the relationship between the two Houses and their powers is fundamental to the successful reform of this Chamber.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, for bringing forward this short debate and to other noble Lords who have spoken this afternoon. We appear to be beginning a series of these rapid-fire debates. Brief the contributions may have to be in accordance with the requirements in the Companion, but that does not lessen the quality or, indeed, the value of the debate.
The Government value highly the views of your Lordships on the implications of reform of this House. This afternoon’s debate has concentrated on one aspect of the reform—the relationship between the two Houses—and I am very pleased that the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, has given us the opportunity to respond.
We recognise that this House has an important role, distinctive from that of the other place. I confirmed the Government’s view of the House’s role on 11 October, in response to a similar Question for Short Debate tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath. This is, and we intend that it will remain, a scrutinising and revising Chamber, holding the Government of the day to account.
Many noble Lords—I should probably change my notes to read “most noble Lords”—took the opportunity once again to question the Government’s case for a wholly or mainly elected reformed second Chamber. However, this Government are committed to reform and I do not want to rehearse the arguments about that today. Those who make the laws must be democratically legitimate, and legitimacy must come from a significant element of election to provide a direct link between those who make legislation and those who must live by it.
The right reverend prelate the Bishop of Bath and Wells asked whether we can afford such a change. The Government will of course carefully consider the costs of reforming the House of Lords. We believe that it is worth paying more for a legitimate second Chamber and we are still considering the size of a reformed second Chamber—an issue that will determine the overall cost of such a Chamber.
The Government recognise that their proposals for a wholly or mainly elected second Chamber will have implications for the relationship between the two Houses. I assure noble Lords that this is an issue that the Government and the cross-party committee are taking seriously. The Government are mindful that their plans for reform must allow the second Chamber to maintain its complementary role relative to the other place. The second Chamber must become neither a competitor to the other place nor a replica of it—a point reiterated by a number of noble Lords. Currently, the primacy of the other place does not rest solely on the fact that it is an elected Chamber while this House is not; it also rests in the Parliament Acts and in the financial privilege of the House of Commons—a matter to which I do not think any noble Lord referred. The Prime Minister and most senior Ministers are also drawn from the other place.
Most noble Lords have suggested that democratic legitimacy will embolden the second Chamber to act to the limit of its powers. However, the Government are clear that the other place should continue to remain the primary Chamber. Many noble Lords referred to the report of the Joint Committee on Conventions, which considered the practicality of codifying the key conventions on the relationship between the two Houses of Parliament. That committee concluded that, if this House were elected, its relationship with the other place would inevitably be called into question. The noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe, asked me whether work was already beginning on the codification of conventions. I believe that that would be putting the cart before the horse in the sense that we need to see the horse—the draft Bill—before we are able to debate in detail the codification of the conventions and how they might apply to a reformed House.
The Joint Committee also concluded that, should any firm proposals come forward to change the composition of the House of Lords, the conventions of the two Houses would have to be examined again. I can reassure noble Lords that the cross-party committee is giving careful consideration to the issue of the powers of the reformed second Chamber and the relationship between the two Houses, including the conventions.
The noble Lord, Lord Grocott, raised two matters that are fundamental to the conventions. He asked whether questions of votes of confidence had been considered by the Government. I can assure him that the cross-party committee will consider this type of issue in its deliberations. He also asked about debates on treaties and the declaration of war. These matters are for the committee to consider and it will no doubt consider them and report on its conclusions with the draft Bill. However, we have only one member of that committee present—the noble Baroness, Lady Royall of Blaisdon. She has given us as much detail as she could on the committee’s progress. I am not privy to its detailed discussions, nor should I be.
Earl Ferrers
My Lords, could I interrupt my noble friend? I was following what he was saying and I wanted to get it absolutely right because I could not believe what I heard. Is he saying that the Government are in favour of a fully elected House of Lords?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
No, a mainly elected House of Lords is the phraseology that I think—and hope—that I have used, because that is the Government’s position. It may well be that the draft Bill will allow for the retention of unelected Members on an appointed basis. We know that the likelihood is that there will be a long transition period during which a large percentage of the existing House of Lords will remain to work alongside elected Members. That is an important aspect of House of Lords reform, to which we have not given full consideration in this debate but to which I am sure, when it comes to the draft Bill, we will probably find ourselves giving considerable thought.
As I said, there will be a process of transition. It will be a long process and it is likely to mean that the relationship between the two Houses, including the conventions, will develop over the time of transition. This is not big bang; we are talking about evolution. This House will have the opportunity to discuss these issues during pre-legislative scrutiny of the draft Bill. The Government hope that pre-legislative scrutiny will be carried out by a Joint Committee of both Houses.
The cross-party committee is also considering other issues that will reinforce the differences between the two Chambers. The Government’s proposal for a proportional electoral system will set up a different relationship between voter and representative in the second Chamber compared with the link between a constituent and an MP. As set out in the coalition agreement, the cross-party committee is likely to advocate single, long terms of office for Members of the reformed second Chamber. This again would reinforce the differences between the two Chambers. Of course, the House will retain control over its affairs and, in particular, its committee system and it will be for both Houses to agree the degree to which they work jointly.
Many noble Lords have argued that the present House of Lords has expertise and experience to a degree that sets it apart from the other place and which makes it especially qualified to scrutinise and improve the legislation from the other place. This, they say, will be lost as a result of reform. The Government do not accept that the present means of joining this House are the only ways of securing expertise and experience. Elected Members are capable of possessing and drawing on their own experience. Moreover, the House already has in place a widely respected committee system that allows it to call on the evidence of outside experts.
The Government believe that the British people must be allowed a say in who makes the laws to which they are subject and that the character and design of the political institutions of this country should reflect the society that they serve. We consider that this House must be constituted on a more democratic basis. We recognise the implications for the relationship between the two Houses and we will consider these implications carefully.
Lord Tyler
My Lords, I wonder whether the noble Lord would confirm that it is the Government’s view that it would be better for one Joint Committee both to undertake pre-legislative scrutiny of the Bill and to consider the relationship between the two Houses, rather than—as I understand the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, has suggested—for a separate Joint Committee to look at that issue. Would it not be better that that issue is looked at comprehensively by one Joint Committee in pre-legislative scrutiny over the full period to the Queen’s Speech in 2012 rather than that two exercises should act separately?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I thank my noble friend for that interruption. I think that I said earlier that the Government have it in mind that there should be a Joint Committee of both Houses, but in the end it is up to Parliament to decide how it scrutinises this legislation. The Government and the committee are accountable to Parliament and I have no doubt that there will be many debates on any draft Bill that is produced early in the new year.
Lord Wills
Will the noble Lord confirm when in the new year this draft Bill will appear? Will it be in the first half of the year or the second half of the year?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
The new year that is yet to come. I have been advised that early in the new year is the likely time of arrival. The noble Baroness, Lady Royall of Blaisdon, no doubt has a better idea than I have on the timing. She is shaking her head, so I suggest that the authority that I have in giving the House the timing is as good as we can have for today. However, we are engaged in a long process—I can hear my noble friend the Leader of the House by my side saying exactly that, as I think I said last time. We are engaged in a long process with much debate, and much of the detail—the noble Lord, Lord Brooke, rightly reminded the House of the conventions and their codification—is very much further down the track, given the type of reform that the committee is likely to bring forward.
I believe that I was saying that the House should be constituted on a more democratic basis. We recognise the implications for the relationship between the two Houses and we will consider them carefully. The Government and the cross-party committee will be mindful of the House’s view as expressed in this and previous debates. A draft Bill will be brought forward early in the new year, which will allow all sides to examine and discuss in greater detail the Government’s plans for reform.
I am sorry that I have not been able to answer or even refer to all noble Lords who have spoken. The free expression of opinion demonstrates the challenge that there will be for those of us who are charged with the task of presenting reform to this House. We welcome debates of this nature in preparing us for the task ahead. It has been a valuable and thought-provoking debate and I am grateful for your Lordships’ contributions.