Informal European Council

William Cash Excerpts

Tuesday 31st January 2012 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

It is not an EU treaty, because it does not amend EU law; it is not a treaty within all of the treaties of the EU, and that is very important, because it would have been wrong to sign up for that without the safeguards for the single market, financial services and the other things that I set out. Let me just explain how important article 2 is in this agreement of the other countries. Let me read it in full:

“The provisions of this Treaty shall apply insofar as they are compatible with the Treaties on which the Union is founded and with European Union law. They shall not encroach upon the competences of the Union to act in the area of the economic union”—

that is, this treaty is outside EU law. Why is it outside EU law? It is because I made it outside EU law.

[Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend will know that the European Scrutiny Committee is making an inquiry into the nature and lawfulness of the agreement otherwise known as this non-EU treaty. Will he accept that the problem we have in European policy making is that it is on a slippery slope towards a more coercive, more federal and less democratic Europe? Will he give us his assurance that never, while he is Prime Minister, will we fold this non-EU treaty into the treaties as a whole?

[The Prime Minister]

To answer my hon. Friend’s second question first, obviously this treaty cannot be folded back into the EU without the agreement of every EU member state. We did not sign this treaty, because we did not get the safeguards that we wanted, and that position absolutely remains. My hon. Friend is right to make the point about the danger of a slippery slope that can be created by signing EU treaties and the use of the EU institutions. The whole point is that because this is not an EU treaty—because it is outside EU law—we are not in danger of that happening.

EU Council

William Cash Excerpts

Monday 12th December 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

And it all started so well! The hon. Gentleman is right to say that there is a crisis of jobs and opportunity across Europe, and a lot of that is linked to the chilling effect of the eurozone crisis. Some of that crisis needs to be resolved by better fiscal integration, and we can argue about whether that requires the treaty change being pushed for by France and Germany, but the real agenda—to help the eurozone and to help growth and jobs—is about competitiveness and the single market, and about ensuring that, even in the short term, there is the big bazooka, the re-capitalisation of the banks and the proper programme for Greece, which are all things that Britain has been pushing for.

[Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

On the protection of the national interest, will my right hon. Friend gently remind the Deputy Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition that even Edward Heath’s 1970 White Paper confirmed that we have to maintain and use the veto in the national interest and to protect the fabric of the European Union—then the European Community—as a whole? To adapt William Pitt’s phrase, my right hon. Friend has exerted all his influence to ensure that Britain is protected. Does he take it that Europe will learn from his example?

[The Prime Minister]

I am grateful for my hon. Friend’s support. I agree that it is important that, when considering changing the institutions of the EU, there must be unanimity, and the veto is there for a purpose—if you feel that the national interests are not being protected. It is important that we maintain that in the EU.

G20

William Cash Excerpts

Monday 7th November 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

I do not agree with the right hon. Gentleman, for this reason: I have managed to assemble a coalition for budgetary restraint in the European Union, and this year Britain, France, Germany and others have all agreed to freeze the EU budget in real terms. I would like to go much further, but I have to say that a freeze in the budget in real terms is not something we have been able to achieve in recent years, and is a breakthrough, so I do not accept the point about looking at rebalancing powers in Europe and fighting for a deal on the budget. We can do both.

[Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

Given that the single market, including the City of London, is governed by qualified majority voting, how does the Prime Minister propose to achieve a majority to protect our interests in the context of the fiscal union that he advocates?

[The Prime Minister]

First, we need to disconnect the issues that my hon. Friend raises. The issue of the single market and the threat to the City of London and Britain’s financial services is a real threat. We have to work extremely hard to build alliances in the single market and in the European Council to stop directives that would damage our interests. I think it is extremely important that we do that work. Financial services matter hugely to this country, and this is one of the areas that I want to ensure we can better safeguard in future.

I do not support fiscal union. I do not think that Britain ought to join a fiscal union, as I do not think that is the right move for us. However, we have a single currency that is quite dysfunctional, and one way in which it could be made more functional is greater fiscal union. That is a statement of fact rather than our saying that we want in any way to join it: we do not. We want to safeguard the interests of Britain by making sure that the single market works for us.

European Council

William Cash Excerpts

Monday 24th October 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

I have probably made more statements on European Councils over the last 16 months than many Prime Ministers, and I have always committed to come back and report to the House.

The point that the hon. Lady makes is absolutely right. Greece is just the most glaring problem that the eurozone has to deal with. As I have said, that has to be dealt with decisively. It needs to be backed by a firewall, and it needs to be backed by the recapitalisation of banks. But the fundamental problem of the eurozone is the issue of competitiveness and the very large current imbalances that are building up in some of the member states, particularly those in the south. As a result, what needs to happen above all, as I said in my statement, is an advance in competitiveness, in trade, and in completing the single market, which will help all those economies in the longer term.

[Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

The Prime Minister has made it clear that he advocates fiscal union within the eurozone. Can he explain to the House how it is that fiscal union of that kind is not a fundamental change in our relationship with the European Union, bearing in mind that it is established that the constitutional position is clear that where there is fundamental change, there must be a referendum? How can he square that circle?

[The Prime Minister]

Let me be clear with my hon. Friend. I think that fundamental changes are coming in Europe; they are clearly coming in the eurozone. That may lead to pressures, as we saw over the weekend, for treaty change. That will present opportunities for Britain and we should respond to those opportunities. The question for the House tonight is whether it is right to go off down the path of having a referendum that includes an in/out option, just when there are big opportunities as the eurozone and the EU are changing.

Public Confidence in the Media and Police

William Cash Excerpts

Wednesday 20th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

Order. I would like to accommodate many more colleagues on this important subject, but in order for me to do so, I require brevity. I call Mr William Cash—[Laughter.]

[Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

Thank you, Mr Speaker. The Prime Minister has referred several times to the future of the regulation of the media, not just the press. About the terms of reference that we have been told about, he says that “the inquiry should look not just at the press, but at other media organisations, including broadcasters and social media if there is any evidence that they have been involved in criminal activities.” Does that preclude what the 17 Select Committee Chairmen and others have called for, which is an extension of the terms of reference to deal with regulation of all the media, not merely the press alone?

[The Prime Minister]

The change in the terms of reference was a direct response to the 17 Select Committee Chairmen, because we wanted to listen to their views and to say that broadcasters and social media could be included if there was evidence of wrongdoing. We are not trying to have an inquiry that becomes so wide that it cannot make progress on these vital issues—but we have listened to what my hon. Friend has said, and responded very positively.

Public Confidence in the Media and Police

William Cash Excerpts

Wednesday 20th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

Let me make a bit of progress, and then I will give way to the hon. Lady.

The relationship between the police and the media is a problem the world over, too, but we have to ask—and hon. Members have been asking this today—why ours seems to have become quite so cosy, so leaky and so potentially compromised. Similarly, there is nothing peculiar to Britain about the potentially unhealthy relationship developing between media proprietors and politicians.

That leads to my third point, about trying to turn these noble sentiments of “never again” into action. None of this is easy, and a point that must not be lost in this debate is that to over-regulate the media could have profoundly detrimental effects on our country and our society. We must not miss this in the frenzy about the dreadfulness of hacking at this point. Without a public interest defence, the so-called “cod fax” that uncovered Jonathan Aitken’s wrongdoing might never have emerged. To give another example, are we seriously going to argue in this House that the expenses scandal should not have come to light because it could have involved some data that were obtained illegally? So, we need to step very carefully into this area.

[Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

Will my right hon. Friend give way?

[The Prime Minister]

I have got a feeling that it will be a question about the Bill of Rights that I will not be able to answer—but I am going to try it anyway.

[Mr Cash]

I am glad to say that it is about not the Bill of Rights but the terms of reference that are now in the Library. I simply wanted to ask the Prime Minister to answer this question, if he would be good enough, on the recommendations that can be made by the judge-led inquiry with reference to the question of media policy, regulation and cross-media ownership. Is this intended to cover the whole media, in a way that would ensure that the kind of standards expected of the media in relation to future regulation would be included in the judge-led recommendations?

[The Prime Minister]

I think the terms of reference are pretty clear. The point about cross-media ownership is not about conduct; it is about not just market power, but power of voice. What you are trying to do with cross-media ownership is, if one organisation has a very powerful television station, a number of newspapers, and perhaps some radio stations and some internet sites, how do you agglomerate that and try to measure its power? I can bore for Britain on this subject because I used to work for ITV, in competition with BSkyB and the BBC. It is a very difficult thing to do, but that does not mean we should not try. On the terms of reference, that is what the cross-media ownership part is about, but clearly it is looking at media regulation more broadly, specifically of the printed press, but it can go further.

--- Later in debate ---

[Damian Collins]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right, and that is an important point. Going back to what I said about the importance of good structures of corporate governance there are victims within organisations that fail the test of corporate governance—innocent people who have done their jobs well lose out as a result of the mistakes of others. That is why it is so important that those structures should be there. Whatever lessons have been drawn from the scandal so far, that surely must be one lesson that the Murdochs have to learn from it; that is of the greatest importance.

Models of self-regulation can work, but clearly there is a need for total reform of the regulation of the press. The principle of a free press is, of course, of the highest importance. That must continue, but that does not mean that journalists can operate outside the law.

[Mr Cash]

Does my hon. Friend agree that the self-regulation of the press in the 21st century has to be regarded as self-regulation, or regulation, of the media as a whole?

[Damian Collins]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend, who makes an important point. The media and the news, in particular, work across multiple platforms; people get their news not just from newspapers, but from television and the internet, so there is a case for that, although that is quite a big and broad challenge. Certainly, among the regulators there should be people who have experience of multiple media platforms, and an understanding of what is acceptable. That is something to consider.

In the short time left to me, I want to raise a second point. We all agree that there is a good, strong, and important case for free media and a free press, but there is also a strong role for the regulators with regard to mergers involving media organisations. There was discussion earlier about whether politicians should be taken out of the process. It would be wrong for politicians to exercise independent judgment outside of legitimate advice about what companies are fit and proper, and what companies should, or should not, be merged. That should be based on a good high degree of technical and professional knowledge.

The right hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark (Simon Hughes) spoke, in answer to an intervention, about the application of a “fit and proper person” test. We on the Select Committee had a briefing about that from Ofcom, in whose eyes it is a real test. It has applied it in the past, and has removed broadcast licences from digital broadcasters in the past. I am sure that if Ofcom is monitoring this debate, it would be happy to send information about that to any hon. Members who have an interest in the issue.

We have an obligation to ensure that there is a free and open marketplace for media. The Leader of the Opposition raised his concern about the dominance of Sky in the pay TV market, but we have to look at that market as a whole, and not just one area of it. Yes, Sky is dominant in pay TV; ITV is also dominant when it comes to traditional advertising revenue generated from television. Most people probably get their news and content from the BBC. In the digital media age, all those will be accessible from one platform. When YouView launches next year, there will be more choice more easily available to consumers than ever before.

Although media companies are very different, it is right that we consider them as part of the same entity. We also have to consider that in the internet age, people will increasingly get their news from powerful online organisations such as Google, and social networking sites such as Facebook, which are out of the scope of the regulation of the UK media. We have to consider how media organisations in this country can compete with added pressure from those platforms, so we have to look at the totality of the media market.

We should recognise that newspapers are an enormously important part of our national life; many millions of people still enjoy buying and reading physical newspapers every week, as well as accessing them online, but newspapers, as a business model, struggle. They often succeed better when they are part of integrated media companies with the financial muscle to support them. To refer to remarks made earlier, that is why it is important that there should be oversight of the whole market, and that we consider the competitiveness and regulation of the whole market, and see it as a single entity producing news and taking it to people. When it is well run, healthy and respectable, it is of the greatest importance to a free society and a great democracy.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Buckland]

Absolutely right. I am grateful to my hon. Friend for making that point.

There is a sense of something old and something new about this debate. The old aspect of it is the ever-present role of the press baron in our public life. A hundred years ago it was Lord Harmsworth, then it was Beaverbrook, then Maxwell and Murdoch in latter times. That is not new. It is lamentable and wrong, and the House seems to agree that it is time for a change. I welcome that.

There is also something new—the unprecedented vulnerability of private data. Information is the new valuable property of the modern age. We have spent our years guarding our homes and our possessions against theft and burglary, but have forgotten and neglected the sometimes even more valuable private information that can be used in a way that can seriously prejudice the lives of ordinary people. My hon. Friend is right to mention communications companies and the ease of access that there seems to be to telephone data and other personal information. That is wrong, and there is now an historic opportunity to get things right.

I welcome the judicial inquiry, and I remind the House that we have set up a Joint Committee of both Houses to look at privacy, super-injunctions and the future role of the Press Complaints Commission and the media in that context.

[Mr Cash]

Is my hon. Friend aware that the terms of reference of that Joint Committee refer to media regulation as a whole? We therefore need to concentrate on that in relation to the inquiry as well, as set out in part 1, paragraph 2(b) of the terms of reference.

[Mr Buckland]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend. He makes the point that I was about to make. There is a link. There is a direct role for both Houses of Parliament through the Committee to do some valuable work to produce recommendations for changes to media regulation. The Committee has been set up and will report by the end of February 2012. We have an opportunity as parliamentarians in the Chamber and in Committee to make constructive and proper proposals.

I was interested in the suggestions and observations of the Leader of the Opposition earlier about the form of some of the changes that could take place. He rightly talked about redress of grievance. The question is how we build that. If it takes the form of damages, we have to think about how that will be funded. Will there be a contingent fund organised by the newspapers and the media? We must bear in mind that for all the big beasts in the jungle, there are small local newspapers that are struggling to make ends meet. We must be mindful of the ability of the industry to fund a proper system of damages. The right hon. Gentleman and the Prime Minister are right to emphasise the need for a new regulatory body to have teeth and to give ordinary people the chance to see their grievances properly redressed.

For far too long, it has been a case of the big beasts of the jungle trampling over the rights of ordinary people. I do not say that in a spirit of arrogance or anger. I say it in a sense of deep humility and sadness that we have reached this stage in our public life. We have an opportunity. Let us seize it together.

Phone Hacking

William Cash Excerpts

Wednesday 13th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

Order. I would like to accommodate a few more colleagues, but to do so I require brevity. I call Mr William Cash.

[Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

Thank you for that, Mr Speaker.

The Prime Minister has referred repeatedly to media organisations and media executives and he has noted the fact that the word “media” covers a wide range. Does he agree that to be fully comprehensive the terms of reference should also be extended to sound and visual media? It is not impossible, given the uncertainty and unexpected turns of events, that that side of things might be involved, too.

[The Prime Minister]

As I said, whatever terms of reference are agreed with a judge they are free to pursue the evidence. If it takes them to different places, they can follow it and I am sure they will consider carefully what my hon. Friend says.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

William Cash Excerpts

Wednesday 13th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

rose—

[Mr Harper]

I will give way in a moment.

If the Lords amendments were accepted, the electorate would have no certainty as to how long the Parliament that they will elect on 7 May 2015 would last. Such certainty, and the principle behind the Bill, have been welcomed by many electoral administrators and by members of the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Harper]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his intervention. The polling that has been carried out suggests that the public support fixed-term Parliaments. Indeed, if we think back to the previous Parliament, there was a general sense, both in the House and among the public and commentators, that the “will he, won’t he” debate about whether the right hon. Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath (Mr Brown) would call an election on becoming Prime Minister was not helpful to good Government or to good democratic accountability. It will be helpful to have greater certainty, as that will benefit us all. Let us ask ourselves this question: if the Bill became law, and fixed-term Parliaments became the norm, would any Minister realistically be able to come to the Dispatch Box and suggest with a straight face that we should change the position and give the power back to the Prime Minister to hold an election at a time of his choosing to suit his political party? Would anyone take that proposition seriously? I suggest that they would not.

[Mr Cash]

Has it occurred to the Minister that part of the problem with this wretched Bill is that it is trying to organise things to suit the requirements of this coalition? Decisions on the future should actually be down to the public at large, and if they want to get rid of a Parliament, they will do so in their own way. That is where the question of a confidence motion starts to kick in.

[Mr Deputy Speaker]

Order. We are not dealing with the whole Bill; we are dealing with the amendments. I am sure that the Minister will take that into account in his answer.

[Mr Harper]

To be fair to my hon. Friend, Mr Deputy Speaker, he was speaking to the amendments that we are discussing. He made the assertion that our proposals would suit this particular Government during this particular Parliament, but that is simply not the case. If the Prime Minister wanted to ensure that this Parliament ran for the full five years and that the general election took place on 7 May 2015, he would need to do only one thing—namely, not approach Her Majesty the Queen to seek a Dissolution before that date. We could thereby achieve a five-year Parliament for this Parliament, but we want to make a change to our constitutional processes—I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) does not agree with it—to remove from Prime Ministers the ability to choose the date of a general election.

The second part of my hon. Friend’s question effectively suggested that a sunset provision would be a good thing. Under our democratic system, the public elect Members of Parliament for a term. At the moment, they do not have a choice about when the general election will be; the sole decision about that sits with the Prime Minister. The Bill seeks to give that power to Members of this democratically elected House. I would have thought that my hon. Friend, as a champion of parliamentary control of the Executive, would welcome that proposition.

[Mr Cash]

I can assure my hon. Friend that the real question is not whether the Prime Minister wants to call a general election, but what the state of the country is and whether there is a sense of urgency among the public at large. That can force a general election, irrespective of whether a Prime Minister wants to pull the plug.

[Mr Harper]

I am afraid that my hon. Friend is simply not right. That is not the current constitutional position. The current position is that for a period of time during which a Government have the confidence of this House, the only person who decides whether there should be a general election—assuming that we have not reached the end of the Parliament—is the Prime Minister, who seeks a Dissolution from Her Majesty the Queen. Members of Parliament, unless they vote down the Government on a vote of confidence, do not have that power. The general public certainly do not have that power.

[Mr Harper]

I am not sure that I want to conjure up visions of Cabinet Ministers throwing themselves in front of prime ministerial cars, which is not a happy thought—[Interruption.] Some of the comments from Opposition Members are unworthy of them. Let me explain what I do not understand about my hon. Friend’s point. He is arguing, I think, for decisions about the timing of general elections to be a more collegiate effort, rather than just the choice of the Prime Minister—but that is exactly what the Bill does. It takes away from the Prime Minister the power to call a general election by asking the Queen for a Dissolution and gives that power to Members. Two thirds of them can choose to have an early election for any reason, including general concerns about the state of the country, which deals with the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Stone. Having this Bill in place would allow that to happen, which cannot be done today. The other way of bringing about an election is the Government losing a vote of confidence. That is why the Government believe that the Bill should be in place; it should not be up to each individual Parliament to decide whether the Bill should remain in force. That is why we oppose these sunset clauses.

We think that the real threat presented by the amendments is that they could create a scenario in which political parties, and specifically the Government party, could choose in each Parliament, even at its beginning, whether that Parliament should be a fixed-term one. As the Bill is currently drafted, both Houses would have to vote in favour of the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill kicking into place at any time during the Parliament. I simply do not think that that is a very sensible proposition. It would mean that Governments would have a way of manipulating the timetable. We should think it through. If both Houses have to vote in favour of a motion for a fixed-term Parliament to be in place, a Government with a majority could simply refuse to pass that motion—and we would effectively have given back to the Prime Minister the ability to call an election. That would not be a positive step forward.

It is important to note that when this House and the other place were legislating for the fixed terms of the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and the Northern Ireland Assembly, it was not thought appropriate to have sunset clauses. We did not give those legislatures the opportunity to pick and choose each time how long their terms of office should be. I do not believe that doing so makes sense now.

[Mr Cash]

When it comes to these Assemblies and other devolved organisations, we respect them, but the analogy the Minister is making could just as well be applied to a parish council.

[Mr Harper]

That is not an analogy I would make with the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and the Northern Ireland Assembly. When this House made decisions about setting up those bodies, we did not think it appropriate to give them the power to pick and choose their term of office. We set it out in the legislation that set the bodies up.

I am curious to know what the supporters of the Lords amendment think would happen if the next Parliament decided that it did not want a fixed term. It is not very clear from the amendments, how exactly the mechanisms would work. I shall take Members through the Lords amendments shortly and explain how I think they would work.

It has been suggested that a sunset clause would ensure that the issue of fixed-term Parliaments and the merits of this particular Bill would be subject to post-legislative scrutiny. That is not necessary, however. This legislation has already been scrutinised by four Select Committees: the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, the Lords Constitution Committee, the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. I am sure that any one of those Select Committees or another Select Committee will subject the Bill to some form of post-legislative scrutiny, which is something that the Government would welcome. I do not think that these sunset clauses, however, would lead to that type of sensible scrutiny.

I said that I would look at the effect of the Lords amendments on the working of the Bill. Lords amendment 9 talks about a resolution having to be

“approved by each House of Parliament”.

That is fairly straightforward. The most unclear provisions relate to clause 7(4), stating that a number of parts of the Bill will have effect

“only until the first meeting of the… Parliament”,

which would then decide whether to bring those provisions in. The provisions on early elections and confidence votes would not be clear and it would not be clear how Parliament would be dissolved. The schedule, which has a number of consequential amendments, would also not be in force. The schedule, which repeals the Septennial Act and a whole load of other provisions, would effectively cease to be in force and, presumably, all the repeals and amendments would be unrepealed and unamended. We would then end up with a very complicated constitutional proposition.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Harper]

The hon. Gentleman confuses the will of the House and the will of the Prime Minister. The scenario that I set out stands. If the other place had chosen not to vote for fixed-term Parliaments, we would not have a fixed-term Parliament, despite this House having voted in favour, and that would give back to the Prime Minister the ability solely to decide whether there should be an election. We would have taken powers away from Members of this House who had voted, perhaps overwhelmingly, to ensure that the Bill was in force. We would have been thwarted by their lordships. Given the importance to Members of the primacy of this House, that effectively moves power in the opposite direction, which Members will find unwelcome.

[Mr Cash]

I appreciate that the Minister is a Minister of the Crown, but he would get into difficult territory if he suggested that the Prime Minister is a Prime Minister without the confidence of the House of Commons, which is more or less what he has just been saying.

[Mr Harper]

That is not what I said at all. My specific point is about the relative powers of the two Houses, but the point stands that if we do not have a fixed-term Parliament, we give back to the Prime Minister the power to call an early election. To repeat my example, the amendments would mean that both Houses must vote positively in favour of resurrecting the provisions of the Bill. I want the other place also to be elected—I know that my hon. Friend does not—but under the amendments the elected House, despite having voted by an overwhelming margin, could be thwarted by the unelected House, and the provisions of the Bill would not be in force. The will of the House of Commons, having said that it did not want the Prime Minister to have the power to call an early election, and that it wanted that power to be held by Members of this House, would have been thwarted by the other place. I am sure that my hon. Friend would not agree with that.

[Mr Cash]

I am grateful to the Minister for engaging in dialogue on this question, but the assumption, at any rate in the mind of the Deputy Prime Minister, is that proposals for reform of the House of Lords will go through by the end of this Parliament. The arguments to which the Minister refers, therefore, will effectively expire when the arrangements for this fixed-year Parliament come to an end.

[Mr Harper]

I disagree with my hon. Friend. Even if we successfully push our proposals through in their current form, and we have the first set of such elections in 2015, most Members of the other place will still be unelected. Secondly, regardless of how many Members of the other place are elected, we are talking about primacy. Effectively, the amendments would move power away from this House to the other place. Whatever one’s views about House of Lords reform, I picked up clearly from our earlier debate that most Members of this place want it to be clear that this place has primacy over their lordships’ House. The amendments, perhaps inadvertently, would lead to a different situation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Harper]

The hon. Gentleman has put his finger on it. The provisions are completely silent about that. They do not say who would table the motion, or whether the same question could be continually repeated.

The amendments are not very well drafted. I think that they are wrong in principle, because under the normal procedure legislation that is passed stays in force unless it is changed by a future Parliament, but even if we liked the concept of a sunset provision, such a provision ought to be much better drafted and much more effective. This House can choose only between accepting the amendments and disagreeing with them, and I think I have almost made my case that we should disagree with them.

It has been argued that we are trying to bind future Parliaments. That is not what we are trying to do at all. We are merely trying to re-establish the normal constitutional position. We are passing legislation which we hope will become the established position, but if a future Parliament, perhaps the next one, decides that the fixed-term Parliament experiment—an experiment that is common to many countries around the world—has not been successful and has not led to better government, it will be perfectly free to pass another piece of legislation that repeals these measures either in full or in part. We do not have an arrangement whereby we “sunset” every piece of legislation, and an incoming Government then find that the rules are unwritten and they can choose what those rules should be. That would not be a very sensible constitutional position.

[Mr Cash]

Without going into all the questions relating to judicial supremacy and the claims of ultimate authority by certain members of the judiciary, I am afraid to say that through this measure and a number of others the Government have opened the door to the possibility—indeed the likelihood, as Lord Bingham made clear—of certain members of the Supreme Court interpreting legislation in a way that suits their ultimate authority, as they claim it.

[Mr Harper]

rose—

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Cash]

I have no doubt that my hon. Friend will say that the sensible basis on which this amazing commitment has suddenly emerged is that the Liberal Democrats were in favour of fixed-term Parliaments. So here we go again with the tail wagging the dog.

[Mr Harper]

I would not characterise the relationship like that at all. A good case was made, and on this particular issue the Prime Minister has demonstrated tremendous leadership. He is the first Prime Minister to give up the power—a power that was his personally—to seek a Dissolution from Her Majesty the Queen. That improves our arrangements, because we now know the date of the election and so for the last year of this Parliament we will not have the “will he, won’t he” proposition, where everyone is trying to second-guess when the election will be and people are arguing about when the best time is for the party or parties in government. That is an incredibly powerful step forward and it is very welcome.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Bryant]

I am afraid that the Minister did not impress me with his arguments. In particular, he referred to the fact that the Conservative manifesto did not contain anything about introducing fixed-term Parliaments and then said that when good arguments come along people should bow to them. As far as I can see, the only good argument that came along was that the Liberal Democrats would not support the Government unless there was a fixed-term Parliament element in the coalition agreement. So the only reason why we have this Bill, particularly in its current form, is because of the attempt to create the coalition and then to keep it going for five years.

The Minister then tried to tease me a little with the idea that the former Prime Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath (Mr Brown), said that he wanted people who voted for Labour to be voting for fixed-term Parliaments. This amendment would allow us to vote in every Parliament for fixed-term Parliaments, so it gives more opportunities for people to vote for them, rather than fewer.

[Mr Cash]

Does the shadow Minister agree that the Bill has all the elements of an attempt to achieve a sort of permanent coalition arrangement? In fact, if one were to look at the current state of affairs, one might feel some sympathy for those on our side of the House who have found as a result of the mistakes that have been made by them and by others that they are now low in the polls and that the 56 seats that they won at the last general election might by all accounts be fewer than 20 if those opinion polls were to be believed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Bryant]

I have sympathy with that argument, but I also think that this is one of the changes towards a fixed-term Parliament that would assist in that and would be another part of the steady progress of parliamentary evolution to which he referred.

[Mr Cash]

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that there are really interesting historical analogies? I am thinking of the vote of 311 to 310 that led to Lady Thatcher’s becoming Prime Minister and of the debate after Munich on 10 May 1940. If we had had fixed-term Parliaments at those times, the whole thing would have been completely undermined despite the fact that the country was in uproar and wanted change. That would have been the case with a fixed-term Parliament of the kind that he wants as well as with one of five years.

[Chris Bryant]

No, I disagree, but we will come to that issue when we debate the second set of amendments about the measures concerning early general election. We have some disagreements with the Government, as the hon. Gentleman knows, but that is a matter for us to debate later.

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[Mr Charles Walker]

Fixed-term Parliaments: constitutional vandalism.

[Mr Cash]

This was not in our manifesto. The people who voted for us certainly did not vote for fixed-term Parliaments.

In 1940, as I have said, the Government won the vote in May, but the public would not countenance that Government remaining in power for another day. That was what got rid of Neville Chamberlain, and Leo Amery said:

“In the name of God, go.”—[Official Report, 7 May 1940; Vol. 360, c. 1150.]

[Mr Shepherd]

Quoting Cromwell.

[Mr Cash]

There was a similar example in the Cromwellian period. There are great events taking place in the world today, and the whole question of the sustainability of government ultimately depends on the continuing will of the people as a whole. The idea of fixed-term Parliaments is intrinsically wrong, because it defies the gravity of the views of the public at large. If the public were to turn against fixed-term Parliaments, under the Bill they could not succeed because fixed-term Parliaments would have been entrenched by statute, which would be upheld by the judiciary. That is fundamentally an attack on our sovereignty and the sovereignty of the people of this country. That is why I object so strongly to the whole idea of fixed-term Parliaments, whether of five years or four. It is unconstitutional, wrong and prevents the people from being able to demand a general election irrespective of the views of a Prime Minister or a coalition that is cobbled together despite the views expressed in the respective manifestos.

Question put, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 1.

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Those events show the importance of allowing time to seek alternatives before resolving to call an election. That was the point that my hon. Friends the Members for Stone (Mr Cash) and for Aldridge-Brownhills were making in the debate on the earlier group of amendments. It explains why there was a 14-day period in the original clause 2 and why it is important that the same 14-day period remains in the newer clause 2.

[Mr Cash]

This 14-day period is simply a ruse, cobbled together by moving various Ministers around, in order simply to keep the existing Government in power. If a Government have a confidence motion and lose it by a majority of one, that is it—as happened with Lady Thatcher when a motion was passed by 311 to 310. That was the end of it; then a general election, leading to another Government, took place. That is how the system should function—the rest of it just cobbled together, as I say, for the sake of keeping a coalition moving under all circumstances. I am sure that the Prime Minister’s tutor, Vernon Bogdanor—also the Minister’s tutor—could have explained all that to him.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)]

I think we get the point.

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[Mr Harper]

I am grateful, Madam Deputy Speaker.

The new version of clause 2 set out in the amendment spells out the exact wording of motions of no confidence, motions of confidence, and motions for an early Dissolution. Whether the conditions have been met would therefore be plain for everyone to see, and it would be clear from the Votes and Proceedings and the Journal, and the Speaker would not need to be drawn into certifying whether the motions had been passed. That was the reason why the amendment was supported by the former Speakers, the Opposition and the other place. The amendment delivers what we had originally intended—that the power to trigger an early Dissolution should lie with this House—but adds clarity and does not risk drawing the Speaker into controversy.

Amendments 7 and 8 are very important, especially for those Members who represent parts of the United Kingdom with devolved legislatures. When the Bill left this House, I told Members that we were in discussions with the parties in the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly about how to deal with the coincidence of elections in 2015. I wrote to the Presiding Officers of the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly on 17 February, and proposed that if they passed a resolution with the support of at least two thirds of their Members, ensuring that there was consensus across the parties, we would agree to legislate to move the dates of the 2015 Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly general elections up to one year later. The Scottish Parliament passed a unanimous motion on 3 March confirming that it wished the UK Government to bring forward a provision to defer the 2015 election to 5 May 2016, and a similar motion was passed by the Welsh Assembly on 16 March.

We have said that if the House accepts the amendments, in the longer term we will conduct a detailed assessment—this issue arose during the debate on the earlier group of amendments—of the implications of the two sets of elections coinciding at a later date. Once we have conducted that assessment, if we think that there is a case for changing the cycle of elections, we will carry out a public consultation in Scotland and Wales on whether the devolved legislatures should be subject to permanent five-year terms.

[Mr Cash]

Does the Minister not agree that, whether we adopted the original proposals in the Bill or the proposals of the former Speakers and others, the matter would be justiciable? The Speaker would indeed be drawn into controversy, but there would also be a risk of the whole question being adjudicated by the courts.

[Mr Harper]

We debated the issues of privilege, justiciability and whether the courts would seek to intervene in these matters at length in Committee and on Report, and they were also debated in the other place. I think that the general view was that the risk of intervention by the courts was very slight. It did not seem to concern Members of either House, although I accept that my hon. Friend still has concerns about it.

[Mr Cash]

rose—

[Mr Harper]

I will take one more intervention.

[Mr Cash]

The Clerk of the House, in his careful consideration of the issue, took the view, very strongly, that it would lead to justiciability. That is not just the view of one humble Back Bencher; it is also the view of the Clerk of the House, to whom fulsome tributes were paid yesterday for his wise advice.

European Council

William Cash Excerpts

Monday 27th June 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

Order. There is extensive interest in this statement, but there is another statement to follow, and a heavily subscribed debate thereafter. What is required, I say hopefully, is brevity.

[Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

Will the Prime Minister be good enough to put on record his appreciation of the support and encouragement of the British people and Members of Parliament in securing the terms from the negotiations on the Greek bail-out, and will he now take that further and do whatever is necessary to take the lead in both the United Kingdom and Europe to get us out of the mess the existing treaties got us into?

[The Prime Minister]

I am grateful for my hon. Friend’s support, and for his question. I have got us out of the mechanism from 2013, because Britain is excluded from the treaty change that is going through putting in place the new permanent bail-out mechanism. It took negotiation to get that deal, because we were in a mess beforehand.

House of Lords Reform (Draft Bill)

William Cash Excerpts

Tuesday 17th May 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Deputy Prime Minister]

As I have said, we are very keen to proceed on as consensual and pragmatic a basis as possible. [Interruption.] If I may just finish, we are presenting the Bill and the White Paper today. We hope the Joint Committee will be established before the summer, and it can then do a thorough job of applying pre-legislative scrutiny to the proposals we are publishing today, with a view to our submitting final draft legislation in the next Session. The Bill will be treated in the same way as any other Government legislation. It was part of all our manifestos and features in the coalition agreement, and if we cannot make headway by any other means, we will use all the legitimate instruments at our disposal to get the Bill implemented before the next general election. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman about Robin Cook: I am very happy to recognise that it was an omission not to acknowledge the very significant role played by Robin Cook—and also, dare I say, by the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) and many other Opposition Members, who have for many years argued precisely the case we are seeking to promote today.

[Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

The Deputy Prime Minister will know that the draft Bill states that nothing in these proposals shall affect the primacy of the House of Commons. As nobody else has been able to define what “primacy” means, how does the Deputy Prime Minister propose to define it?

[The Deputy Prime Minister]

Primacy is clearly set out in the two Parliament Acts, and was also clearly set out in my earlier statement. My view is that the fact of greater election to another Chamber does not in and of itself mean the balance between the two Houses is seriously disturbed. That is confirmed by examples of bicameral systems elsewhere in the democratic world.