Oral Answers to Questions

William Bain Excerpts

Tuesday 21st December 2010 Commons Chamber

The Chancellor of the Exchequer was asked—

[Mr William Bain (Glasgow North East) (Lab)]

1. What estimate he has made of the potential effects on the level of demand and output in the manufacturing sector of the outcomes of the comprehensive spending review.

[The Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr George Osborne)]

I am happy to report today that annual growth in manufacturing output is the fastest in 16 years, and the Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply reported the strongest manufacturing employment balance on record last month. This is a crucial contribution to rebalancing the British economy away from its dependence on debt. The Budget and the spending review will help to sustain that by cutting tax rates for manufacturers, investing in transport infrastructure and skilled apprenticeships, and providing the economic stability that our deficit reduction plan has delivered in an unstable world.

[Mr Bain]

I thank the Chancellor for that reply, and I wish him and his fellow Ministers on the Treasury Bench, and all right hon. and hon. Members, including you, Mr Speaker, a happy and peaceful Christmas. Does the Chancellor agree that the best Christmas present he can give manufacturers in my constituency and throughout the country is a proper White Paper on growth? He has often promised to publish one. When exactly will he be bringing it before this Chamber for debate?

[Mr Osborne]

We have a specific review of advanced manufacturing to see what more we can do to help it, and I intend the Budget on 23 March to focus very much on supporting economic growth and removing the barriers to the expansion of manufacturing businesses and others. We are looking both at specific sectors, such as advanced manufacturing and pharmaceuticals, and at cross-government issues, such as planning and employment law, so that we provide not only the economic stability that we have delivered in recent months, but the platform for economic growth.

Banking Reform

William Bain Excerpts

Monday 29th November 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr William Bain (Glasgow North East) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to be able to contribute to this important debate. I thank my right hon. Friend the Member for Oldham West and Royton (Mr Meacher) for having the good sense to persuade the Backbench Business Committee to secure it. It is also a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Clacton (Mr Carswell). I agreed with some of his remarks, particularly the one about breaking up the banks.

When I was preparing for the debate, I had occasion—and a little more time than I expected, owing to my difficult journey from Scotland to London today—to examine an excellent study of the banking crisis by three major economists in a book entitled “Balancing the Banks”, by Mathias Dewatripont, Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole. Jean Tirole’s chapter in particular details, in very precise order, the reasons for the crisis and makes several points. First, it deals with the crisis in United States home loans, which spread to other sectors and other countries. The staggering expansion in the level of securitisation partly explains the difficulties that the US banks got into. Between 1995 and 2006 the proportion of loans that were securitised rose from 30% to 80%, and the proportion of sub-prime loans that were securitised increased from 46% in 2001 to 81% in 2006. Jean Tirole also points out the lack of high-quality collateral backing many of these loans, which particularly came to our attention when the inter-bank bond and derivatives markets simply froze up. Added to that, excessive liquidity fed the demand for securitisation. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Oldham West and Royton pointed out, monetary policy was also very loose, particularly in the United States, and the performance of credit rating agencies hardly covered them in glory.

Another important point in understanding what went wrong is the failure of international regulation of the banks. For example, the level of off-balance-sheet liquidity support increased hugely, especially in America. There has also been a need to rediscover what prudential regulation of the banking system should be about. It should be about, first and foremost, protecting small depositors and investors, but also containing the domino effects of systemic risk.

We should therefore welcome some of the recommendations of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The key failure of Basel II was its reliance on pro-cyclical capital controls, and one of the Basel III reforms we should welcome is the introduction of counter-cyclical buffers. I think it is also true to say that Basel II was too complex. It was based on a pillar structure that was both difficult to understand and unable to anticipate systemic risks to the banking system or, indeed, manage financial innovation. As my right hon. Friend pointed out, it was unable to predict the chaos that credit default swaps and collateralised debt obligations would create throughout the world. There needs, therefore, to be an increase in the capital and liquidity banks should hold.

I disagree, although only slightly, with my right hon. Friend in one respect, however. Basel III does introduce a powerful counter-cyclical element of up to 2.5%, which may be significant in preventing future problems. There is also a balance to be struck.

[Charlie Elphicke (Dover) (Con)]

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that Basel III also seems to introduce an incentive for increased invoice discounting and trade factoring, and is that not slightly undesirable?

[Mr Bain]

The hon. Gentleman raises an interesting point. I was about to make the point that Basel III strikes a balance between protecting the taxpayer and the state and promoting economic growth. I understand the banks have been lobbying to try to diminish some of the effects of holding extra capital. Indeed, when I met a representative from Lloyds Banking Group in Glasgow on Friday, he lobbied me to take that position.

What we have witnessed is a crisis that began in the housing and asset price markets in America. It spread to other countries and to the banks of other countries, and it has now also spread to the state. It is important that the taxpayer can see that there are buffers to prevent the state from having to bail out banks across the globe. Having a counter-cyclical element should help achieve that.

The Government should continue the work the previous Government did in pursuing the issue of getting a global deal on bankers’ bonuses. If they do not, or if they are unable to achieve a global deal, the UK and the EU should be prepared to take a lead in giving greater transparency and reducing some of the terrible incentives to sharp practices in the last decade.

Across the world, we are seeing the terrible effects of a credit crunch causing a banking crisis, in turn causing a deficit crisis and then a growth crisis. In the coming months and years, we need to put in place a policy that sorts out the system for good. We need a policy that learns the lessons from the crisis and ensures the taxpayer never has to foot a huge bill for the terrible behaviour of a greedy few.

Financial Assistance (Ireland)

William Bain Excerpts

Monday 22nd November 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr William Bain (Glasgow North East) (Lab)]

What assessment have the Chancellor and his counterparts in the eurozone made of the capacity of the European financial stability fund to withstand further calls on finance from Italy, Spain or Portugal? If the assessment is that the fund is not big enough, would he be prepared to see it increased?

[Mr Osborne]

As I say, I do not think that it is sensible for me to speculate about any other country in Europe or anywhere else in the world in the current environment. I would make two observations. One is that the IMF is well resourced and is now on the road to reform, so that it properly reflects the balance of economic power in the world. It is therefore well placed to deal with whatever situation emerges, in whatever part of the world. As for the eurozone stability facility, that has to be a decision for members of the eurozone. They contribute to the facility, and they have set aside a considerable sum of money—€440 billion.