War in Ukraine: Third Anniversary

Debate between Wera Hobhouse and Iain Duncan Smith

Thursday 27th February 2025 Commons Chamber

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

I completely agree with the hon. Gentleman. That justice will take time, but part of the point that I made is that we cannot have a peace, if it is a peace without justice. Justice has to prevail, because if it does not, we encourage everyone else to think, “Whatever we do, we will get away with it next time, because they do not have the courage to pursue the justice angle of peace.” We know that, and we have known that over the past 60 or 70 years. It is what the Nuremberg trials were all about, where the idea was for the first time to pursue the aggressors. That stands in the hon. Gentleman’s case. I served in Northern Ireland, as he knows, and I lost good friends. I still wonder what happened to them, even to this day. Justice for Ukraine will take a long while, and I accept that.

The most interesting thing about the sanctions is that some of the LNG shipments were done by UK firms. I see that Shell was involved, which made it peculiar why we did not step in earlier.

I will bring my speech to a close, because I know that others wish to speak. The problem is that there is an incorrect view and assumption about the importance of defending Ukraine that has got lost in the back-and-forth row that took place over the past week and a half. The idea that just meeting Putin’s demand for territory that he may or may not have at the moment will somehow appease him and satisfy his requirements is completely wrong. I note that in the telephone call between President Trump and Putin, that is what President Trump said was important. The truth is that Putin is an ex-KGB man. Once KGB, always KGB. He is not interested in territory; he is interested in sovereignty, which is a key difference.

[Wera Hobhouse (Bath) (LD)]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his powerful speech. I am originally from West Germany, as most people know, and I remind everybody that I would not be here without the US presence in Germany. Is it not a shame that, despite living memory, people seem to have forgotten the powerful status of the US in western Europe? We need to remind the American President of that.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

I think President Trump is being reminded of that now in America, because arguments are taking place about this issue, but I do not think that he has forgotten. What we have to get lined up is the real nature of what Putin wants. It is not territory, but sovereignty. We know that he has always wanted to recreate the full borders of the old Soviet Union in a greater Russia. The war with Ukraine is not about getting 20% of its territory. For him, it is about getting all of Ukraine. If we have a peace deal that is not stable, he will be back. He will build up his armed forces, which he can do quite quickly now with the support of countries like North Korea, and he will be back in double-quick time.

Who is to say that Ukraine will be in any fit state to be able to defend itself? It was only able to defend itself because in the period between the seizure of Crimea in 2014 and the war, we and the Americans set out about training and arming Ukrainian troops in a way that made them much better when the Russians came in the next time round, which is why they did not take Kyiv and were driven back. That was because we had got ahead of the game with the Ukrainians, who had much better armed forces than they did when Russia walked into Crimea.

The reality for us is that there need to be guarantees on anything that happens, and I do not think that we can separate the Americans from the guarantees. As the hon. Member for Bath (Wera Hobhouse) says, America is the ultimate guarantor at the end of the day. By the way, I agree with the Americans that the west has ridden on the coat tails of the United States for far too long—we have been guilty of that. We have lived a life that has allowed us to say, “We’ll claim that defence spending is this amount,” but it is not really. That is one of the reasons why President Trump is angry about the idea that the Americans should be expected to take on this matter, so we have to step up.

I am pleased that the Prime Minister has started the process, and I wish him all the best in Washington, but increased defence spending absolutely has to happen. The last time we spoke, I pointed out to him that we faced the greatest threat that we have ever faced when the Soviet Union put SS-20 missiles in Europe. It was Reagan and Thatcher, supported by Helmut Kohl and others, who helped lead western Europe to take the tough decision to put Pershing and cruise missiles in order to counter the threat. That was a brave decision by the leadership, and it centred on the UK and the US. The Prime Minister needs to remind President Trump that when the UK and the US come together for a just cause, the world is a safer place. When we are divided, it is less safe—I do not care what anybody else says. That relationship is critical to peace and justice in the world, and I hope that he succeeds in achieving that.

We know that President Putin is keen only on sovereignty, and the reality is that this is critical for our understanding of what peace would amount to. We must not lose sight of the fact that Ukraine is important. It is important to the Americans in a way that sometimes I do not think they fully understand. I spoke earlier about the road to Taiwan and the threats to Taiwan. The war in Ukraine has damaged the global economy, at a cost of about $1 trillion, but any seizure of Taiwan would cost the economy nearer $10 trillion. To those who say, “Why should we in this country be worried about Taiwan?”, I say that 72% of everything produced in the world today is made in the area around Taiwan. People cannot tell me that Taiwan is not as important as Kent is to the United Kingdom—it is exactly the same.

Why does the road to Taiwan run through Ukraine? It is because if we fail Ukraine and it gets a terrible deal, China will look at the situation and say, “Do you know what? They’re never going to step in here, because it’s too far away. They won’t do it—they never do. They fell out of Afghanistan. They didn’t do anything when Crimea was taken. They’ve given in completely over Ukraine, and they will do the same over Taiwan.” That is why the road goes to Taiwan, and we will be left behind, because we will not have taken the right decision.

I hope the Prime Minister reminds President Trump that if we fail on Ukraine, it will open up the world again to the rule of totalitarian states, which will come again and again. As Churchill said, the

“bitter cup…will be proffered to us”

again and again. Every time we fail, and every time we do not stand up for those who struggle for freedom, democracy or justice, they will take that and move on. We have learned this lesson so many times, but we seem to forget it and have to learn it again.

We must stand with the brave Ukrainian men and women, who have lost so much and are going to lose even more. If we are not with them and do not find a way for Ukraine to remain a free nation of free people and of choice, we are not worth the thousands of years of experience that we have gained from the fights that we have put up previously. All will become naught, because totalitarianism will rule the day.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Wera Hobhouse and Iain Duncan Smith

Committee: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 14th November 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Duncan Smith]

I have not tabled any amendments, but I will briefly comment on one set of amendments before making a point about the drafting of clause 6. For me and many of my colleagues, that is the most important clause because the clear definition of being in or out of the European Union ultimately comes down to the Court of Justice’s ability to change the United Kingdom’s laws by direct reference as a result of a clash with European law.

Twenty-five years ago, I stood in almost the same place, during the House’s consideration of the Maastricht treaty, to make the point that the Court of Justice is more political than courts in the UK, even by its appointments and by the nature of its judgments. Judicial activism is a process that came directly from the Court of Justice, and it eventually percolated, to a much lesser extent, into the UK courts.

It is through those judgments that the Court of Justice has widened the concept of where the Commission is able to rule. A good example is that, through Court reference, whole areas of social security that were never in the original treaties were widened dramatically. Rulings have been made on the application of social security payments to individuals from countries that were never referenced in the original treaties, which is a good point about the Court’s power.

This is so critical because, after the referendum, the Centre for Social Justice, the Legatum Institute and others came together to do a lot of polling asking the public why they supported the vote to leave the European Union. The single most powerful reason—more than money and more than migration—was to take back control of our laws. I was slightly surprised because I thought it was an esoteric point for most members of the public, but they said it was their most powerful reason for voting. Some people said that, even if it meant they would be worse off for a period, it was still the overriding principle behind their vote to take back control and leave the European Union.

With that as the key, the Government are right to drive this policy. It is absolutely right for them to make it clear that, on the day we leave, the European Court of Justice will cease to have direct effect in the United Kingdom. I will return to the drafting on how long some of the other principles will continue.

The hon. Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie) is not here at the moment but, in line with the earlier statement by the Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Dominic Raab), it would be wrong to support new clause 14 and amendment 278. There is a simple principle behind the Bill, and the Government have now accepted that there will be primary legislation on the agreement, or lack of agreement, as we leave the European Union with regard to our trade and other arrangements. The new clause and the amendment are wrong because they would seek to bind the hand of the Government as they sought to negotiate, and that is not the purpose of this.

Let me give an example. Not so long ago, the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union said clearly that his view was that during the implementation period—at the beginning, we hope—we would want to have those elements of the eventual agreement in place. One of those would be a process of arbitration between the UK and the EU. If that was agreed and was part of the process, and then became part of the implementation period, the new clause and the amendment would prevent our being able to make that arrangement—they would be bound into law and we would not be allowed to go into the implementation period with these arrangements. That would immediately knock out any opportunity we have to accelerate the process of where we would eventually be by getting into the implementation period and applying an arbitration process agreed between the EU and the UK for those areas of disagreement on areas of law and other interpretations. That is why these proposals are wrong and would damage the prospects of the negotiations that are likely to take place.

[Wera Hobhouse]

I asked a couple of days ago about this idea of an arbitration court. Now that the right hon. Gentleman is here, will he clarify how it would be different for ordinary people in the street in comparison with what the ECJ is currently doing?

[Mr Duncan Smith]

The whole process of arbitration is a natural one in all trade arrangements between two different groups: they agree to an arbitration process when there are clashes of interpretation about what they have agreed. That is standard practice; it has been in pretty much every free trade arrangement.

If we seek a free trade arrangement, the way to have that governed is through such an arbitration process, where differences—when things cannot be agreed between the two—are taken for a final process of examination and some kind of judgment about the matter. That would not be done by the Court of Justice sitting in the European Union, or by a UK court; it would be outwith both of those, but in the agreement.

The point I am making is that if such an arrangement was agreed in a free trade arrangement, we would want to start it as soon as possible, because if there is an implementation period, we would want to start implementing what we have agreed as soon as possible. The hon. Lady needs to look up most of the other trade arrangements to see what I am saying. We want to give the greatest flexibility to the Government. It is crucial that as we leave, we leave the Court of Justice in that sense.

I want now to deal with some of the arrangements in clause 6. I say to Ministers that there is a certain amount of confusion over where the courts are meant to reference the ECJ, including in respect of its previous judgments. As has been mentioned by some of my colleagues, including my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), there remains a confusion as to where the courts will reference judgments from the ECJ, both past and existing. I come back to the point of clause 6(2), where they are told not to have regard to anything. However, the Bill later goes on to modify that quite a lot. I am particularly concerned—this has been raised elsewhere—by the definition that

“’retained EU case law’ means any principles laid down by, and any decisions of, the European Court, as they have effect in EU law immediately before exit day and so far as they”.

The Bill goes on to reference exactly how that will work.

My point is that those principles will themselves be modified by the European Court of Justice as it goes forward. My question really is: as they are modified, at what point will UK courts consider those principles to be no longer relevant to their judgments as they refer to them? I do not expect an answer right now, but I hope to get one as we go forward. Lord Neuberger has made the point that it is unclear to the courts how strong their reference should be—whether they should reference the principles or not. The point about the principles is the more powerful point, because I have no idea when the cut-off comes or whether it ever comes—whether we will ever break free, as it were, from continuing judgments and changes to the European Court principles.