(1 week, 1 day ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I rise briefly to support my friend, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and his string of amendments. He made the case clearly: it is simply about access, the right to redress and a clear pathway to that redress, a more efficient process and clarity and consistency across this part of our data landscape. There is precious little point in having obscure remedies or rights—or even, in some cases, as we have discussed in our debates on previous groups, no right or obvious pathways to redress. I believe that this suite of amendments addresses that issue. Again, I full-throatedly support them.
My Lords, I address the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. These proposals aim to transfer jurisdiction from courts to tribunals; to establish a new right of appeal against decisions made by the Information Commissioner; and to grant the Lord Chancellor authority to implement tribunal procedure rules. I understand and recognise the noble Lord’s intent here, of course, but I have reservations about these amendments and urge caution in accepting them.
The suggestion to transfer jurisdiction from courts to tribunals raises substantial concerns. Courts have a long-standing authority and expertise in adjudicating complex legal matters, including data protection cases. By removing these disputes from the purview of the courts, the risk is that we undermine the depth and breadth of legal oversight required in such critical areas. Tribunals, while valuable for specialised and expedited decisions, may not provide the same level of rigorous legal analysis.
Cases such as those cited by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones—Killock and another v the Information Commissioner and Delo v the Information Commissioner—demonstrate to me the intricate interplay between data protection, administrative discretion and broader legal principles. It is questionable whether tribunals, operating under less formal procedures, can consistently handle such complexities without diminishing the quality of justice. Further, I am not sure that the claim that this transfer will streamline the system and reduce burdens on the courts is fully persuasive. Shifting cases to tribunals does not eliminate complexity; it merely reallocates it, potentially at the expense of the detailed scrutiny that these cases demand.
I turn to the right of appeal against the commissioner’s decisions. Although the introduction of a right of appeal against these decisions may seem like a safeguard, it risks creating unnecessary layers of litigation. The ICO already operates within a robust framework of accountability, including judicial review for cases of legal error or improper exercise of discretion. Adding a formal right of appeal risks encouraging vexatious challenges, overwhelming the tribunal system and diverting resources from addressing genuine grievances.
I think we in my party understand the importance of regulatory accountability. However, creating additional mechanisms should not come at the expense of efficiency and proportionality. The existing legal remedies are designed to strike an appropriate balance, and further appeals risk creating a chilling effect on the ICO’s ability to act decisively in protecting data rights.
On tribunal procedure rules and centralised authority, the proposed amendment granting the Lord Chancellor authority to set tribunal procedure rules bypasses the Tribunal Procedure Committee, an independent body designed to ensure that procedural changes are developed with judicial oversight. This move raises concerns about the concentration of power and the erosion of established checks and balances. I am concerned that this is a case of expediency overriding the principles of good governance. While I acknowledge that consultation with the judiciary is included in the amendment, it is not a sufficient substitute for the independent deliberative processes currently in place. The amendment risks undermining the independence of our legal institutions and therefore I have concerns about it.
These amendments overall, while presented as technical fixes, and certainly I recognise the problem and the intent, would have far-reaching consequences for our data protection framework. The vision of my party for governance is one that prioritises stability, legal certainty and the preservation of integrity. We must avoid reforms that, whatever their intent, introduce confusion or inefficiency or undermine public trust in our system. Data protection is, needless to say, a cornerstone of our modern economy and individual rights. As such, any changes to its governance must be approached with the utmost care.
Does the Minister agree that the crux of this machinery is solely automated decision-making as a binary thing—it is or it is not—and, therefore, that the absolute key to it is making sure that the humans involved are suitably qualified and finding some way to do so, whether by writing a definition or publishing guidelines?
On the question of qualification, the Minister may wish to reflect on the broad discussions we have had in the past around certification and the role it may play. I gently her take her back to what she said on Amendment 123A about notification. Does she see notification as the same as a personalised response to an individual?
(2 weeks ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I support these amendments in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Stevenson and Lord Clement-Jones. It is a pleasure to follow the second ex-Health Minister this afternoon. In many ways, the arguments are just the same for health data as they are for all data. It is just that, understandably, it is at the sharpest end of this debate. Probably the most important point for everybody to realise, although it is espoused so often, is that there is no such thing as NHS data. It is a collection of the data of every citizen in this country, and it matters. Public trust matters significantly for all data but for health data in particular, because it goes so close to our identity—our very being.
Yet we know how to do public trust in this country. We know how to engage and have had significant success in public engagement decades ago. What we could do now with human-led technology-supported public engagement could be on such a positive and transformational scale. But, so far, there has been so little on this front. Let us not talk of NHS data; let us always come back to the fundamental principle encapsulated in this group of amendments and across so many of our discussions on the Bill. Does the Minister agree that it is about not NHS data but our data—our decisions—and, through that, if we get it right, our human-led digital futures?
Many thanks to all noble Lords who have proposed and supported these amendments. I will speak to just a few of them.
Amendment 70 looks to mitigate the lowering of the consent threshold for scientific research. As I have set out on previous groups, I too have concerns about that consent threshold. However, for me the issue is more with the definition of scientific research than with the consent threshold, so I am not yet confident that the amendment is the right way to achieve those desirable aims.
Amendment 71 would require that no NHS personal data can be made available for scientific research without the explicit consent of the patient. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara and Lord Clement-Jones, for raising this because it is such an important matter. While we will discuss this under other levels, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, points out, it is such an important thing and we need to get it right.
I regret to advise my noble friend Lord Holmes that I was going to start my next sentence with the words “Our NHS data”, but I will not. The data previously referred to is a very significant and globally unique national asset, comprising many decades of population-wide, cradle-to-grave medical data. No equivalent at anything like the same scale or richness exists anywhere, which makes it incredibly valuable. I thank my noble friend Lord Kamall for stressing this point with, as ever, the help of Jimi Hendrix.
However, that data is valuable only to the extent that it can be safely exploited for research and development purposes. The data can collectively help us develop new medicines or improve the administration and productivity of the NHS, but we need to allow it to do so properly. I am concerned that this amendment, if enacted, would create too high an operational and administrative barrier to the safe exploitation of this data. I have no interest in compromising on the safety, but we have to find a more efficient and effective way of doing it.
Amendments 79, 81 and 131 all look to clarify that the definition of consent to be used is in line with the definition in Article 4.11 of the UK GDPR:
“‘consent’ of the data subject means any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her”.
This amendment would continue the use of a definition that is well understood. However, paragraph 3(a) of new Article 8A appears sufficient, in that the purpose for which a data subject consents is “specified, explicit and legitimate”.
Finally, with respect to Clause 77 stand part, I take the point and believe that we will be spending a lot of time on these matters going forward. But, on balance and for the time being, I feel that this clause needs to remain, as there must be clear rules on what information should be provided to data subjects. We should leave it in for now, although we will no doubt be looking to polish it considerably.