(8 years, 7 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThis is a general point. Although we are examining this Bill in detail, there will of course be an ongoing debate, particularly as the technical companies tussle with the public, about what the public find acceptable. Those companies should not think that the debate ends here; they will have to justify their actions to the public in future.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The code of practice has been drafted in that real-life context. It will no doubt be amended and looked at—it will be a living document—as this technology develops and as we move forward. With this clause, we are trying—I do not like this phrase, but I have to use it—to future-proof the legislation to make it resilient so that it lasts and to ensure that this House does not have to return to it time and again to respond to the challenges that increased and enhanced IT present.
(8 years, 8 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI thank my hon. Friend for the work she did with other colleagues on that important Committee. Of course, the context is that applications will be made on the basis of a warrant that has itself already gone through the double-lock procedure and that has already passed the tests that we know will be applied—that it is necessary and proportionate in the particular context of the case that is being dealt with.
I wanted to emphasise that point. If a warrant has in the first instance been granted, it has met the tests of necessity and proportionality, and if a telephone number attributed to a person is added, it seems to me that the purpose of the warrant that was originally granted by the Home Secretary and the judicial commissioner does not change. Am I correct in my understanding of that?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right, and to try to manipulate this process to undermine that important procedure would be immediately spotted as a misuse of the processes and the safeguards that we are incorporating into this Bill.
I want to deal with the practicalities because, tempting though it is to impose a requirement on a judicial commissioner to authorise the day-to-day or sometimes minute-by-minute tactical operation of a warrant, it would be unnecessary and operationally damaging. There must be an element of agility when operating the system of investigation and there is real concern that we would fail to do the job of detecting crime and making sure the interests of everyone we represent are protected.
Ordinarily, such modifications will be made by a senior official in the warrant-granting Department, but when, for example, the identity of a gang member becomes apparent only in the middle of the night, it is right that the intercepting agency should be able to make the modification. That deals with the point about the fast-moving threat and the immediacy of the situation.
I will deal with as many as possible of the points the hon. and learned Gentleman raised, starting with the minor rather than major modifications in amendment 69. The amendment would prevent either the head of an agency or a senior official within that agency from making a minor amendment. We are dealing with minor modifications relating to adding a new communication address for warranted targets. An example is MI5 discovering a new mobile telephone number for a warranted target who is plotting to kill someone. The Bill enables the intercepting agency—MI5 in this case—to make the minor modification to the warrant, which will have been through the double-lock procedure, and to add that new mobile number. The danger of the amendment is that it would remove the ability to act swiftly to get coverage of the new subject’s communications. With respect, I do not think it is necessary because the Secretary of State and the judicial commissioner will already have considered the necessity and proportionality of targeting interception against the individual. I will not repeat the point, but it is important for public safety.
On parliamentary and legal privilege, I have already indicated that a major modification would not be sought to a warrant against a Member of Parliament or in relation to any warrant that names a specific individual. The code of practice makes it crystal clear that major modifications can be made only to warrants that apply to a group of persons or an organisation.
Am I correct in understanding that there is also a further oversight provision, namely the general oversight provisions of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and the other commissioners under part 8 of the Bill? They have main oversight functions to look at how the powers are being exercised generally, as well as in every single double lock instance.
My hon. Friend is quite right about that, and I think commissioners would be concerned if for some reason there was an inappropriate overuse of mechanisms such as the one in question, which might appear in future evidence. I believe that we are getting the balance right and therefore the review will, I think, be a useful backstop, but nothing more, I hope.
This is just a gentle observation to those who have lobbied the hon. and learned Gentleman. It is a very great shame that they did not feel able to give oral evidence to the Joint Committee to explain those points themselves. They declined our invitation, and now they are relying on the hon. and learned Gentleman to make those points for them. Is it not a shame that they declined the opportunity to make those points themselves?
I am afraid I am not in a position to answer one way or the other. I do not know the background to that. I will make the points to the best of my ability in the time available, but I will also encourage them—
(8 years, 8 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI oppose the inclusion of the clause in the Bill. Clause 48, with schedule 3, broadly replicates the existing procedure in section 17(1) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, whereby material obtained by way of an intercept warrant cannot be used as evidence in ordinary criminal proceedings.
Schedule 3 makes a number of exceptions to allow intercept evidence to be considered in civil proceedings where there is a closed material procedure in place—that is where a party and his or her legal team are excluded. Those proceedings would include, for example, proceedings under section 6 of the Justice and Security Act 2013, proceedings in the Special Immigration Appeals Commission or under the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011. Schedule 3 makes no exception for criminal proceedings, except in so far as material may be disclosed to the prosecution and to the judge so that the judge might determine whether admissions by the Crown are necessary for the trial to proceed in a manner that is fair. Deleting clause 48 would remove that exclusion, so that there would be an exception for criminal proceedings. It would also permit intercept material to be treated as admissible in both ordinary civil and ordinary criminal proceedings, subject to the ordinary exclusionary rules applicable to other proceedings, including public interest immunity and the provisions of the Justice and Security Act in civil proceedings.
I am indebted to Justice, the human rights group of lawyers that includes members of all parties and none, for its help in formulating my argument for deleting the clause. Justice has long recommended the lifting of the bar on the admission of intercept material as evidence in civil and criminal proceedings. In 2006, it published a document “Intercept Evidence: Lifting the ban”, in which it argued that the statutory bar on the use of intercept as evidence was “archaic, unnecessary and counterproductive”.
The United Kingdom’s ban on intercept evidence in criminal proceedings reflects long-standing Government practice, but it is out of step with the position in many other Commonwealth and European countries, and it has proved increasingly controversial over time. Importantly, the European Court of Human Rights has recognised the value placed on admissible intercept material, in countries where it is available. It has said that admissible intercept material constitutes
“an important safeguard; against arbitrary and unlawful surveillance, as material obtained unlawfully will not be available to found the basis of any prosecution”.
Has the hon. and learned Lady taken into account the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, which ensures fairness of disclosure in English and Welsh courts, as practised by many Members of the Committee, and is at the centre of the arguments against admission of this evidence?
I have considered it, but we are not talking about disclosure, we are talking about the admissibility of evidence. As the hon. Lady will very well know, things may be disclosed to lawyers in the course of proceedings to try, as I said earlier, to make sure that there is a fair trial, but they are not necessarily admissible. I am talking about lifting the ban on the admissibility of intercept evidence.
If there is something under the code that assists the defence or may undermine the prosecution, the prosecutor is obliged to make that known to the judge. A decision is then taken as to whether the disclosure of that material is so necessary that, in effect, the trial cannot continue.
Of course the hon. Lady is absolutely right. I said that that was the case earlier, but that is not the end of the matter. As the European Court of Human Rights has recognised, where intercept material is admissible, its admissibility constitutes
“an important safeguard: against arbitrary and unlawful surveillance”.
I know many Government Members are not too keen on the European Court of Human Rights; they might find the Privy Council report published December 2014, “Intercept as Evidence”, more palatable. In paragraph 84, it confirmed that a fully funded model for the removal of the ban could result in a
“significant increase in the number of successful prosecutions.”
That report also reflected concerns of agencies and law enforcement bodies that removing the ban without full funding could reduce its effectiveness. I acknowledge there is a funding issue and I am sure the Government will want to talk about that.
What I am really saying is that the Bill is a lost opportunity to remove the ban on admissibility of intercept material in criminal proceedings, which could benefit all. The Committee has heard what the Privy Council and the European Court of Human Rights have said on that. Many other countries manage to operate effective surveillance systems in which intercept material is admissible in criminal proceedings in certain circumstances. As I said, there will always be public interest immunity and the provisions of the 2013 Act in civil proceedings to allay some of the concerns Government Members might have.
The Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill recommended that the matter should remain under review, and in paragraph 675 of its report invited the Government to take note of the “significant perceived benefits” of using intercept material in criminal proceedings. There are other arguments in favour of removing this ban. Members may want to think about how the current bar on the use of targeted intercept material relates to a new focus in the Bill on expanded and untargeted access to communications data.
How would the hon. and learned Lady recommend that prosecuting counsel deal with an application from the defence to reveal the methodology used by the security services in obtaining intercept material? If the ban is removed, how is prosecuting counsel to answer that?
It is not about the methodology; it is about the admissibility of the material itself. Far be it from me to lay down rules, at this stage of proceedings, for the Crown Prosecution Service or the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service in Scotland. That is something that will have to be worked out, but it will not be worked out in a vacuum, because the Privy Council has looked at this detail and many other countries have a system such as this that works.
It comes back to a continuing theme in my concerns about the Bill. Let us not be inward-looking. Members of my party are sometimes accused of being narrow nationalists, but I often think that is an allegation more accurately directed at the Conservatives. We should look at practice elsewhere in the world. Britain is not uniquely placed to decide how to have the best and fairest surveillance system. Our security services probably are world leading—I recognise that, and I mean no disrespect to them—but we are not here just to please them; we are here to protect our constituents’ interests, as well as human rights in general, and to produce legislation that is balanced and fair.
I oppose the clause because I think there are good arguments in favour of making intercept material admissible in criminal proceedings. As the hon. Lady has indicated complex procedural rules would have to be built up—we have had a ban in our two legal systems in Scotland and England for so long that we would have to go back to the drawing board and think very carefully. She is right to say that this is not an easy matter, but we are not starting with a blank slate. If we do not want to look to Europe—I know that people are not too keen on Europe at the moment—we can look to the experience of other Commonwealth countries.
The reason I keep rising when the hon. and learned Lady mentions other countries is that England and Wales have an extraordinarily thorough—I want to say “generous,” but that is not the right word—disclosure regime, which is not mirrored elsewhere in the world. Look at the United States: the disclosure tests that occur in this country have very little relationship to what happens in America, so it is not right to compare the two.
The hon. Lady makes a fair point that England and Wales have very clear disclosure procedures. Now, thank goodness, so does Scotland as a result of a number of Supreme Court decisions. We had a long way to go 10 years ago, but we have since come a long way. This is not about disclosure; it is about admissibility. Those are two very different things, as she well knows. Frequently things are disclosed that are not admissible.
If evidence is admissible, the defence is quite within its rights to ask that question of prosecuting counsel. It is a question that is asked in a different form when a defendant suspects that there is an informant. How is prosecuting counsel to argue against that?
Order. If the hon. Lady wishes to make interventions, they are to be short. She has an opportunity to make a contribution afterwards.
(8 years, 8 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI have heard Opposition Members’ arguments. Some thought has been given to this point and clause 49 puts a duty not only on people who work in public services but on postal operators, telecommunications operators and any person employed therein to not make unauthorised disclosures in relation to intercept warrants. That might help.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend, who served with distinction on the Joint Committee. That provision relates to creating a statutory duty, which, with respect to her, is slightly different from some of the arguments we are having about criminal sanctions. However, it is important to pray that in aid, bearing in mind the mixed approach we need to take in order to hold public office holders and public authorities to account when dealing with this sensitive area.
The Bill provides a great opportunity for us to put into statute a new offence, which will, together with the other agencies, provide a robust regime that will add to the checks and balances needed in this area in order to ensure that our rights to privacy are maintained wherever possible, consistent with the Government’s duty towards the protection of our national security and the detection and prevention of crime.
I must say that I do not like the approach of traducing witnesses. If I do not like a witness’s evidence, I will not traduce them; I will just try to forensically dissect their evidence. This is a distinguished witness with significant experience in this field.
Hon. Members may “Ah” and “Um”, but Mr King has relevant technical expertise. I invite hon. Members to consider his CV.
No, I will not. I will continue to make my point. The amendment was tabled because there should be a requirement to apply for an examination warrant when seeking to examine secondary data. That would protect the privacy of our constituents—I am looking at Government Members—and us. It is not some idle attempt of the chattering classes to be difficult about the Bill; it is an attempt to make the Bill compliant with the rule of law and with the requirement to protect the privacy of our constituents. That is all it is about. Criticising and making ad hominem comments about a witness are not going to undermine the moderate—
No, I will not give way. There will be plenty of opportunity for the hon. Lady to contribute later. I am conscious of the time, Chair, so I will briefly—
(9 years, 5 months ago)
Commons Chamber5. What steps he is taking to ensure that the rule of law continues to be upheld in line with the principles of Magna Carta.
7. What steps he is taking to ensure the rule of law continues to be upheld in line with Magna Carta.
Last month, along with guests from many other countries, I attended the commemoration of the sealing of Magna Carta 800 years ago at Runnymede. In the centuries since, the rule of law has played a fundamental part in our national identity. The Lord Chancellor and the Law Officers share a particular responsibility to promote it in Government—one that we all take extremely seriously.
I declare that I am a barrister. The county of Lincolnshire holds one of only four copies of Magna Carta. What steps is my right hon. and learned Friend taking to ensure that the principles that have been developed in this country since 1215 are promoted abroad?
I welcome my hon. Friend to her place—another lawyer; this is good news, we are heading in the right direction. She is right to point out that the rule of law is important not just in this country but across the globe, and this country has a proud record of doing what it can to promote it. We are a leading member of the United Nations Human Rights Council. She will be aware of the efforts of our former right hon. Friend, William Hague, in relation to sexual violence in conflict. We are the first state in the world to implement the UN’s guiding principles on business and human rights, and there are other examples.