Assisted Suicide

Tony Baldry Excerpts

Tuesday 27th March 2012 Commons Chamber

[Tony Baldry (Banbury) (Con)]

Having heard pretty much all the speeches this afternoon, I think there is an almost unanimous consensus on the DPP’s guidelines. On the one hand, the current law expresses and safeguards the fundamental principle of respect for life—everybody’s life—and on the other hand, the guidelines express the principle of compassion. I think there is a general agreement that the present situation gets the balance between law and compassion just about right.

During this debate a number of right hon. and hon. Members have said that the law should change and that assisted suicide should no longer be a crime. However, they should reflect on the role of doctors in all this, and what a difficult position any change in the law would place the medical profession in. The medical profession is clear on that point. In its evidence to the Commission on Assisted Dying last April, the Royal College of Surgeons made two clear statements:

“The law is it currently stands should not be changed and no system should be introduced to allow people to be assisted to die…The College does not recognise any circumstances under which it should be possible for people to be assisted to die.”

Baroness Finlay of Llandaff, who has been a hospice doctor for a number of years, reminded the other place that the Royal College of Physicians had made it clear that the doctor’s role

“does not include being, in any way, part of their suicide”.

Indeed, she observed that the guidelines put in place by the DPP have made it possible for doctors and patients to have better conversations, saying that

“conversations are now more open than ever before, ensuring that healthcare professionals work with their patients to improve living, to cease futile treatments and to support patients during dying. The vast majority of hospice doctors do not want physician-assisted suicide. The policy is clear, firm and compassionate.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 13 February 2012; Vol. 735, c. 632.]

In so far as it is humanly possible to get this right, it would seem that the law, taken together with the DPP’s guidelines, manages to achieve that.

We have not, however, spent sufficient time reflecting on the role of palliative care in easing the difficulties of people when they are dying. The fact is that, at some point, we are all going to die. The difficulty is that hospital medicine these days sees death as a failure, but we are all going to have to recognise that it is a reality. I suspect that, given the choice, we would all like to die at home. That is not always possible, but we spend very little time working out new ways of providing palliative care.

That is why I was pleased that so many right hon. and hon. Members from both sides of the House were able to attend the event in the House last week for Marie Curie Cancer Care, at which my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Health announced that the Government were funding a number of new pilot projects for innovative palliative care. That shows that the Government recognise that palliative care is not as good as it should be, and that a lot more needs to be done. Most innovation in this area in recent years has been done by the hospice movement—an excellent movement that is usually funded and run by volunteers—but we need to ensure that the national health service and all of us spend a lot more time focusing on how we can all, as far as is humanly possible, die well.

I salute my hon. Friend the Member for Congleton (Fiona Bruce) for tabling her amendment, and I think—

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)]

Order. To facilitate more Back-Bench contributions, the time limit is being reduced to four minutes.

Voting by Prisoners

Tony Baldry Excerpts

Thursday 10th February 2011 Commons Chamber

[Tony Baldry (Banbury) (Con)]

The last Labour Government spent five years dithering over this issue. They did nothing. As with so much else, the Labour party left it to the incoming coalition Government to sort out the mess. Therefore, the one thing on which we can all be agreed is that this is an issue on which we need to take no lessons from those on the Opposition Benches. They had five years to sort out this problem while in government and simply failed to do anything.

The European Court of Human Rights has not said that we have an obligation to give every prisoner the vote. What the ECHR did find was that a blanket ban was not proportionate, that

“the principle of proportionality requires a discernible and sufficient link between the sanction and the conduct and circumstances of the individual concerned”

and that

“in sentencing the criminal courts in England and Wales made no reference to disenfranchisement and it was not apparent that there was any direct link between the facts of any individual case and the removal of the right to vote.”

I think we should seek to address those issues. It would be wrong simply to put two fingers up to the Court because we did not like the implications of its judgment.

There is a perfectly straightforward way forward that deals with the ECHR points and meets the collective view of this House that prisoners should lose the right to vote while in detention, because it has always been agreed that if one commits a serious crime, one should lose the right to have a say in how one is governed. The way forward lies in the ECHR’s judgment in Hirst, but it also lies in the ECHR’s judgments in cases involving other European countries: Frodl v. Austria and Scoppola v. Italy, the No. 3 case. In Frodl, the Court said that

“the sanction of disenfranchisement...should preferably be imposed not by operation of a law but by the decision of a judge following judicial proceedings”.

In Scoppola, the Court held

“that a decision on disenfranchisement should be taken by a court and should be duly reasoned.”

When a judge sentences an individual to prison the court has to make a number of decisions: on the length of imprisonment; on whether terms for individual offences should run concurrently or consecutively; and on whether part of the sentence should be suspended. Depending on the exact nature of the offence, the court will also have to put its mind to a number of other possible consequential orders.

I see no reason why a judge should not inform the defendant when sentencing that, in addition to their term of imprisonment and as a consequence of their conduct, they would, as part of their punishment, be disfranchised in regional, national and European elections for a specific period of time. As with every other aspect of sentencing, one would expect the Lord Chief Justice, senior judges and the Supreme Court to issue sentencing guidelines. Crown Court judges and magistrates are given sentencing guidelines on every other aspect of sentencing, so I see no reason why it should not be possible to devise effective sentencing guidelines on disfranchisement that start from the general premise that those who go to prison will lose the vote while they are in prison.

[Chris Bryant]

I am sorry to stop the hon. Gentleman’s drift, but one of the problems with that argument is that many of us disagree with judges deciding who gets to vote or does not get to vote. There is another problem, because if we go over to a system where the judges decide, every current prisoner would be granted the vote.

[Tony Baldry]

I listened to the hon. Gentleman’s speech. He raised lots of problems but gave no solutions. This is an exercise in finding what might be a solution. Sentencing guidelines are effective ways of informing judges and telling them what they should do. As we have heard, the English courts have been pretty robust on this issue, so I see no reason why on devising sentencing guidelines we could not put our trust in the English judges to get it right when advising Crown Court judges and others how they should approach the issue of disfranchisement. It would of course be possible for defence counsel at the time of sentencing to make representations on this aspect of a court’s potential sentencing powers, as with any other aspect, and for the defendant to be heard before sentence was passed. Not only would it be made very clear that there was a link between the facts of the case and the removal of the right to vote, but the courts would very publicly be making it clear that, so far as the UK is concerned, those whose criminal conduct is such that it results in their having been sentenced to an immediate term of imprisonment also risk losing certain rights of citizenship, including the right to vote.

I appreciate that for many hon. Members this debacle appears to be a convenient opportunity to put two fingers up to Europe, two fingers up to human rights and two fingers up to the judges. I simply note that the motion includes the words

“acknowledges the treaty obligations of the UK”.

The motion, in rightly acknowledging our treaty obligation but arguing for the retention of a blanket ban, puts the House in the same position that the previous Government put themselves in. That resulted in the Joint Committee on Human Rights observing:

“It is also a matter for regret that the Government should seek views on retaining the current blanket ban, thereby raising expectations that this could be achieved, when in fact, this is the one option explicitly ruled out by the European Court.”

Time prevents me from arguing why this House should seek to support human rights, so I simply conclude by saying that increasing judicial review will be a feature of our lives. If this House collectively started to pick and choose which decisions of the Supreme Court we supported and which decisions of the judges we did not support, that would be a very unsatisfactory way forward. What we need to do is not only acknowledge our treaty obligations, but meet them, and we need to do so in a way that meets the concerns of everyone in this House, from the Prime Minister downwards, about having to give the vote to those in prison.