Public Office (Accountability) Bill (Third sitting)

Debate between Tom Morrison and Alex Davies-Jones

Committee stage
Tuesday 2nd December 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Mullan]

I emphasise that we need clarity on this. Those of us who were able to attend the meeting with the intelligence services will know that they seemed to provide quite a clear account of their individual personal responsibility and all the ways in which they thought the Bill would affect them. That was quite clearly contradicted in our evidence from other witnesses. I am grateful to the Minister for sending round a further note to Committee members this morning, and for our brief chat ahead of this sitting. Even that note raises further contradictions, however, because it says, and I quote, that “the individual public officials working for the UK intelligence services are capable of being caught by the offence of failing to comply with the duty of candour”. It lists some other ones, but it includes the duty of candour. Further down, it says, “the Bill specifies that the duty of candour and assistance can only be addressed to public authorities and not individual public officials”.

The Minister was able to give me a brief, informal explanation of that, but I do think this is extremely important. It may be that people are happy for the security services to be excluded to a certain extent, but we have to vote on a shared understanding of what exactly the Bill does in relation to them as entire organisations, as well as to the people who work for them and those who are in charge. I would be grateful if the Minister provided some clarity on that.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I thank hon. Members for raising those important points. In this Bill, we have aimed to ensure candour while protecting national security. As it stands, inquiries and investigations will be able to demand any information and assistance they require from the intelligence services. Where national security information is concerned, the agency as a whole will provide that assistance to the inquiry or investigation by complying with a compliance direction, rather than individuals directly in their own right.

To balance that, and to ensure that there are no gaps, carve-outs or exclusions, those in charge of the agencies are subject to specific requirements to put arrangements in place for individuals to maintain records of information relating to any acts that may be relevant to an inquiry or investigation, and to provide information to the authority to ensure that the duty is complied with as set out in clause 6. Rightly, a failure to have these arrangements in place will result in criminal sanctions.

Intelligence services obtain and retain sensitive security and intelligence information in order to protect the public from national security threats. Vital public interests, including national security, would be at real risk of harm from the unrestricted disclosure of this sensitive information. We all share the same aims here—ensuring that candour is in place while protecting national security and the public.

Taking on board the points raised by Hillsborough Law Now and others, we constructed clause 6 in such a way as to ensure that there is a secure process that the intelligence services can work through so that any information required by an inquiry or investigation reaches that place safely, so that there can be full candour. However, we have heard the concerns from Hillsborough Law Now and from members of this Committee about our provisions. I assure hon. Members that the Government have taken their points on board, and we will commit to working with them and others actively to consider steps to address this in time for Report.

I turn to the other amendments, which set out that the intelligence authorities are to be listed as a public authority for the purposes of the duty of candour and assistance, and the code of ethical conduct in schedule 2. Clause 6 already makes it clear that the duty applies to the intelligence services as it applies to all other public authorities; therefore, it is beyond doubt that they are included, as a public authority, in the Bill.

We have not set out an exhaustive list of public authorities in schedule 2 to avoid unintentionally excluding some bodies by failing to list them. No individual Department or arm’s length body of central Government is included in the list for that purpose. If we begin to list public bodies, there is a risk that we imply that those not listed are not covered, which could weaken the Bill. I urge the hon. Member for Cheadle to withdraw his amendment, but I reiterate my commitment to working with Members on a way forward to capture all the concerns raised both in the Committee and outside of it.

[Mr Morrison]

I thank the shadow Minister for the points that he made; he is spot on that the lack of clarity in the Bill, particularly surrounding what came out of the evidence sessions, raises more questions than answers. However, I am pleased that the Minister has said that the Government are happy to work with us on tightening those gaps before Report. This is not about unrestricted evidence; it is about getting to the truth, which must be our focus throughout. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Public Office (Accountability) Bill (Fourth sitting)

Debate between Tom Morrison and Alex Davies-Jones

Committee stage
Tuesday 2nd December 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Tom Morrison (Cheadle) (LD)]

Yes, sorry. In the last evidence session, we discussed a very similar situation when we heard from both Pete Weatherby and Daniel De Simone, one of whom is a KC trying to get to the truth through his work in the courts, and another of whom is a journalist trying to expose the truth, particularly around the Agent X story. We are not looking for a change to the Official Secrets Act or its operation. We simply want the Bill to encompass the security services explicitly.

There is a list of public authorities on the Bill. The security services are not on there, which begs the question, why? I thank the Minister for saying that further work will be done on that and that she will be engaging with all Members across the House before Report. On that basis, we are happy to withdraw the amendments.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I welcome the withdrawal of the amendments. We had a discussion earlier about why we have not listed organisations in the Bill. We did not want it to be an exhaustive list and to miss an organisation out unintentionally, which could lead them to think that the Bill does not apply to it. We have been extremely clear that intelligence services are covered by this Bill, including clause 6. I reaffirm that to reassure the hon. Gentleman.

Clause 6 sets out that the duties in the Bill apply to the intelligence services, but it requires that proper arrangements and protections are in place to safeguard national security. As subsection (2) states, the obligation in clause 2(3) for a person to notify the inquiry or investigation does not apply to

“a person who works for an intelligence service”,

or where doing so would result in the release of security or intelligence information.

To be clear, inquiries and investigations are able to demand assistance and information from the intelligence services under the obligation in clause 2(4), but appropriate arrangements need to be in place for an inquiry or investigation to receive that sensitive information, as is the norm now. Individuals revealing acts or information outside of those arrangements could be detrimental to national security, as I am sure all hon. Members would agree.

Subsection (3) places a requirement on the heads of the intelligence services to put in place internal arrangements to ensure that those who work for the service comply with the requirements to record any acts or any information that may be relevant to an inquiry or investigation. They must inform the service if they hold such information that is not already available to it. That ensures that the services have all the information they need to discharge their obligations under the duty as an authority. However, as I have already stated, I am committed to working with hon. Members, external stakeholders and the UK intelligence services to make sure that we have as a robust Bill as possible that fulfils the aims, objectives and intentions of us all.

Clause 6 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 7

Transitional provision in relation to this Chapter

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Morrison]

We spoke this morning about the issues dealt with by amendment 43, but to clarify, WhatsApp messages formed a big part of the evidence in the recent covid inquiry—it seemed to be government by WhatsApp at the time—and yet many of them seem to have disappeared. The amendment would provide an extra way of ensuring that public authorities and those responsible are keeping proper records and preventing that from happening again.

New clause 3 would prevent the deliberate concealment of evidence that could obstruct investigations, hinder fact-finding and undermine public trust. I would like the Committee to consider the element of public trust here. How people perceive what happens in this place, and in the organisations and public authorities that surround us and the power structures that are there, is vital to the legitimacy that we have and that those public authorities also have. By criminalising such conduct, the clause would reinforce the obligation on public authorities and officials to maintain and safeguard records, ensuring that inquiries and inquests can access all the information necessary to understand what happened and hold the responsible parties to account. This is a way to make sure that the truth can be found in those areas and hopefully ensure that WhatsApp messages are not deleted in future.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for raising an important issue. Amendment 43 would, as he states, make authorities set expectations for staff on how to retain and disclose their digital records in accordance with the obligations under the duty of candour. Proper record keeping is important to ensure accountability and propriety in decisions made by public authorities. That applies where records are on paper or held digitally— for example, in a WhatsApp group—and it is important that organisations have policies and processes in place to manage these effectively.

However, the Government’s view is that the code of ethical conduct is not the correct vehicle for establishing those processes. The Public Records Act 1958 already places certain requirements on public authorities. Under that Act, the Keeper of Public Records issues guidance to supervise and guide the selection of historic records —including digital records—worthy of permanent preservation.

Disclosure to inquiries and inquests will require the detailed consideration of various factors, including the fact that the authority’s legal obligations include the duty of candour and assistance, the protection of personal or sensitive information, and the relevance to the inquiry’s terms of reference or the inquest. Authorities may also require specific legal advice. Separate and bespoke policies will therefore be required. The professional duty of candour established under clause 9 is intended to focus on what candour means for each public official going about their business in their day-to-day role. I therefore request that the hon. Member for Cheadle withdraws the amendment.

On the point about whether WhatsApp messages are covered, and specifically disappearing messages or those deleted in the course of work, as they sometimes are, the duty of candour and assistance requires all public officials and authorities to provide all relevant information. If a public official was part of a WhatsApp chat in which relevant information was exchanged, they would be obliged to inform the chair of that fact, and if disappearing messages had gone or the chats had been deleted, they would have to provide an account of what was discussed, to the best of their recollection, even if the messages had since been deleted or vanished.

Public Office (Accountability) Bill (Second sitting)

Debate between Tom Morrison and Alex Davies-Jones

Thursday 27th November 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Alex Davies-Jones]

Q I want to put on the record that my brother is a senior police officer in the South Wales police. Chief Constable, can you discuss the practicalities and the impact on policing of the new offences, specifically the new offence of misleading the public? How will it be carried out and how will it be policed? What would the impact be if we removed the harm element of that offence? How would that impact policing?

Chief Constable Guildford: Having been consulted on the way through this, having thought about it quite considerably and having spoken to the director general of the IOPC, I think that the drafting at the moment is pitched at the right level, because it says that that harm needs to be of a serious nature. When it comes to setting out harm, it mentions phrases such as “departed significantly from”.

What will the impact of that be from my perspective? I think it will encourage leaders and individual officers to do the right thing. Initially, it may increase the likelihood that a narrative would be corrected earlier. Think back to some of the foundational pillars upon which this legislation rests, and a lot of the narrative that was, let us say, placed in the public domain around Hillsborough—and sometimes around other events where there is knowledge that is known to the police service and is able to be communicated, but which for whatever reason on occasions is not. Sometimes, in my opinion, that does not help with public confidence.

Going back to the question, I think this will encourage the clarification of issues at an earlier stage. But I suppose, on reflection, from a professional perspective, we have to balance some of that with an individual’s potential reluctance to say too much too early. Of course, the public quite rightly have an expectation that facts will be clarified and that information will be shared and placed in the public domain, and that is absolutely the right thing to do. That is the balancing act. It is important that it is pitched at the right level, which in my professional opinion it is. The “harm” is economic, physical or emotional, and I think it says it should be not inconsequential, which is important. On occasion—you will know this from your family perspective—we absolutely do get things wrong, but the legislation is designed to allow us to correct those things fairly expeditiously.

[Mr Tom Morrison (Cheadle) (LD)]

Q You have already mentioned the code of ethics and code of practice, and we have had a lot of people talking about potential codes of conduct. Can you describe how your various codes filter through to the workforce, and how everyone is made aware of the codes they should be working to? As an organisation, how do you measure the success of the codes?

Chief Constable Guildford: They obviously occur over a period of time. Certainly in my service—I have done over 30 years—they have come in the second half of my service, rather than the first. However, the way that we train them is very explicit: it is done on a values basis through initial training. We recruit and assess new candidates on the basis of values. We do recruit training, which in most forces happens over a period of 20 to 22 weeks, and recruits have a specific input on values-based decision making. We have something called the national decision model, which allows them to think about the consequences and the options they have in making their decisions.

The code of ethics absolutely underpins what we do. It sits in the middle of our decision-making circle. It is trained, really, from day one. I am trying to bring it to life a bit: this sits in the middle of all the specialist public order training, post Hillsborough, for commanders at public events, particularly football, and their accreditation and training. For all our bronze, silver and gold commanders, the code of ethics sits inside the wheel in which we make our decisions. To reinforce the point, the other aspect is that whenever there is a misconduct meeting or hearing for police officers, there is always reference to the code of ethics—the ethical behaviours that are expected of officers and staff.

The third bit of your question was about how we measure this. I would say that we measure it in three ways. The first is the training at the beginning. The second measure is around outcomes from our misconduct proceedings, as well as the proportionality of our misconduct proceedings and how they are used and referred to. The third measure —this is particularly important—is the measure of public opinion. As organisations, we respond to that, and we openly and candidly answer those questions.

In the consultation, we have gone through certain elements in relation to which we have said that, operationally, we may not express candour at certain times: for example, in a live situation in which we lawfully employed the services of, say, an undercover police officer or an undercover officer online; or in a live firearms operation, a live kidnap operation or a product contamination operation. In those cases we may seek to use a little bit of subterfuge to make sure we gain the lawful aim and the right public outcome for the victim at the end of it. Does that explain it?