Ukraine

Tom Hayes Excerpts

Wednesday 14th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Tom Hayes (Bournemouth East) (Lab)]

At the outset, may I acknowledge your staunch and consistent support for the people of Ukraine, Madam Deputy Speaker? You have most recently represented Mr Speaker at the international Crimea platform to reinforce Ukraine’s sovereignty.

My heart goes out to the people of Ukraine both in Ukraine and in Bournemouth. I commend Ukraine Relief, which has a donation centre at Castlepoint shopping centre in my constituency, and the work of Karol Swiacki and other Ukrainians across Bournemouth.

Whether the peace that President Trump creates is durable will depend on whether he applies sufficient pressure to Vladimir Putin to secure it. We do not yet know the final outline of a peace deal or even a ceasefire, but we know that the Trump Administration have pressed Ukraine before to make concessions. When granted a summit with President Trump in Alaska, Putin demanded more territory than he had already seized in his war of aggression to date. The Administration responded not by pressuring Russia, but by putting more pressure on Ukraine. Arms were withheld and intelligence was withdrawn, and the assistance that remained was limited and slow. Kyiv has been left perpetually uncertain about the reliability of US support, and the offer of a 15-year US security guarantee as part of a peace plan should give us pause, too. Fifteen years will go by in the blink of an eye unless the guarantee is exceptionally robust, and unless the armed forces of Europe’s democracies—ours included—are integral to enforcing it. Otherwise, I fear that Moscow will wait, rebuild, and return when the clock runs out. As the hon. Member for South Shropshire (Stuart Anderson) was saying, we need to be mindful about what a deployment looks like, and we need to ask the serious questions. I know that the Prime Minister—a good, serious and patriotic man, having to deal with the insanity abroad and difficult conditions at home—is charting that course as best he and this Government can, and I know that he puts the safety of British troops at the heart of what he does.

Without genuine stability, Ukraine cannot rebuild in peace; boardrooms will not make investments over the long term. We know, too, that this would not be peace; it would be merely a ceasefire, a temporary pause. Given the temptation to renew aggression—a temptation that we know Putin cannot resist—brutish competition for continental dominance would define this decade and, sadly, the next. We have to keep the peace, as well as make it, and the only way that we can do that is through robust security guarantees. Unfortunately, that means that we need to come to terms with a changed world. We have not known this fear for a long time, but it is a feeling that Ukraine knows every single day in its bones.

Uniquely, although the United States has been the richest and most capable country in world history, nations have not chosen to balance against it; they have chosen to ally with it—this is a reversal of all we have known in history—because America sought collective security, self-determination, open trade, institutions, legitimacy and purposeful democracy. However, today, that strategic capital is being diminished consciously, as a matter of policy, by the Trump Administration. That is not happening everywhere in the US security apparatus, it should be said, but it is happening at the highest level, where political decisions are being taken. I have lived in America, I have travelled it widely, I have had the privilege of studying international security at one of its universities, and I have a deep affection for its dynamism and its democracy. However, we must face the fact that in its national security strategy, Ukraine and Europe are less of a priority than other parts of the world. European defence planners now have to spend their days tracking Russian troop movements; calculating whether Putin might, before the end of the decade, order an attack against a NATO member, as he did against Ukraine; and wondering whether the United States will come to our defence. We need to rearm faster, and we need to improve and significantly increase our weapons manufacture.

We also need to move closer to European democracies on defence and security—not closer to the EU per se, which may be too inflexible, but closer to our like-minded European democratic friends who care about peace and democracy, and who will themselves put forward a programme of rearmament. In facing the world as it is, and trying to rearm and increase our diplomatic influence to meet it, we need to recognise that there will be people in our country who do not like this. In France and Germany, we see the rise of the far right and the populist right, who are seeking to make an issue of rearmament. We in this House need to be united. We know that there are those on the Opposition Benches, but not in attendance today, who will protest against our rearmament and our commitment to Ukraine. We in this House need to be united behind Ukraine, democracy and peace. As far as we can, we should not play party politics; we should rebuild the consensus that has lasted for so many years. To me, that consensus seems to be under threat today.