Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill

Tom Brake Excerpts

Tuesday 7th June 2011 Commons Chamber

[Yvette Cooper]

As I said earlier, control orders are not ideal, and ideally we would not need them, but we do. We need to continue with control orders and this kind of protection.

I will set out my view of the Bill’s measures and where we think greater scrutiny is needed, and highlight the reduction in safeguards and checks and balances that the Home Secretary is introducing, because the point is not simply that she is weakening the powers of the police and security forces in certain areas, but that she is weakening the checks and balances, and in particular the parliamentary checks and balances, on the system that is in place. Those parliamentary checks and balances are extremely important for safeguarding our civil liberties, as well as for protecting national security.

[Tom Brake (Carshalton and Wallington) (LD)]

I rise in search of some clarity on where the right hon. Lady stands. She seems to be saying on the one hand that TPIMs are simply recreating what existed under control orders, but on the other hand that what the Government are doing is making the situation much more dangerous, but it cannot be both.

[Yvette Cooper]

I suggest that the hon. Gentleman listens more closely to what I am saying. The overall approach of the Government’s Bill, which he should read, is to reinstate most of the elements of control orders. I agree however—and I have said this clearly—that the Home Secretary is changing control orders in a series of ways, and I will address them shortly as they are significant. Some of them are justified, but others create risks, and changes will need to be made.

Overall, the Government should admit what they are doing. This is a cut-and-paste job. In place of control orders, all we have is “son of control orders”. It is irresponsible to maintain this pretence. That is not being straight with Parliament or the public on an issue of grave importance: how we safeguard our national security and our civil liberties. Debates on matters such as these should be open, transparent and considered, not fudged, fraudulent and confused. This is an area where Governments need to maintain the trust and confidence of the public, but we do not achieve that by playing these kinds of political games.

This is also a very strange use of parliamentary time. There are some limited and specific differences between control orders and “son of control orders” that I am not concerned about, but, frankly, the Home Secretary could have achieved them with about four clauses amending the 2005 Act which could have been debated as part of the Protection of Freedoms Bill. She could have covered the issues of relocation, the length of the curfew and access to phones through amendments to an existing Act. She did not need an entirely new piece of legislation to abolish control orders and then reintroduce them under another name.

Why are we not doing that? Why do we have an entire additional Bill with 27 more clauses, all redrafted, doing the same thing? Why are we here today? The answer is because the Home Secretary has lost yet another battle with her Cabinet colleagues on her policy areas, so she is forced to go through this charade of entirely new legislation; and because, once again, the Government are putting politics before good policy.

As I have made clear, some of the changes to the control orders are limited. We can support some of them, but some are very troubling. The first change is to move the burden of proof from “reasonable suspicion” to “reasonable belief”. We understand that the view of the experts is that none of the control orders that have been upheld would have failed that higher standard, and that this will not make a significant difference to the serious cases they worry about. We believe it is right to follow the evidence, and we are happy to support this change on that basis.

The second change is to alter the wording in respect of the hours. That is a bit of a joke. In place of curfews, we have a reference to overnight residence requirements, but what is the difference? The online “Oxford English Dictionary” definition of a curfew is

“a regulation requiring people to remain indoors during specified hours, typically at night.”

It is, therefore, a requirement to stay in one’s residence overnight, or, as one might say, an overnight residence requirement. The Deputy Prime Minister made great play of the fact that people would be restricted for fewer hours under TPIMs than under control orders, but that is not what the Bill actually says. In fact, there is no specified limit on the number of hours someone has to stay at home. All the Bill says is “overnight”.

Let us turn again to the OED for illumination about what that should ordinarily mean. Overnight means

“for the duration of a night”,

and night means

“the period from sunset to sunrise.”

So does the Home Secretary intend TPIMs to apply for the hours of darkness? Does she want them to be longer in winter than in summer, and longer in the north than in the south? Does she want them potentially to be used to prevent evening activities and meetings, or only to require people to sleep in their own beds? If she does not think TPIMs should be used to prevent evening meetings or people going out after dark when surveillance is much more difficult, is she confident that this will not increase the risks to the public, or make it harder for the security services and police to do their jobs?

I asked the Home Secretary this during her speech, but how does this fit with her own decisions? A number of the 14 orders she has made or renewed since she took office include curfews, several of more than 12 hours. A recent one runs from 5 pm to 9 am—it is summer, so does that count as “overnight”? She can refuse to answer all these questions, but if she does not answer them, the courts will. Her definition just invites legal challenge or judicial review and, for the sake of the Government’s legal bill alone, she should tighten it up.

Thirdly, the Home Secretary has replaced an inexhaustive list of restrictions with an exhaustive list to choose from. We will ask in Committee whether or not any case, historical or current, would have been affected by this change. Fourthly, she and the Deputy Prime Minister have said that the new Bill would prevent relocation. This matter does raise some significant concerns. Preventing people from entering an entire area, or requiring them to live somewhere else, is, in general, deeply undesirable. However, many experts have concluded that in certain limited circumstances it is extremely important and can be justified. Indeed, police officers have told me that relocation can, in some exceptional circumstances, be the most effective way to disrupt terrorist activity and break someone out of a network of dangerous contacts and associations.

The Home Secretary must think that too, because in February she imposed a control order on a suspect that banned them from entering London and less than one month ago her lawyers defended those restrictions in the High Court. I have gone through the Court papers for this case, which, like so many, is extremely serious. The individual on the order, who is known as CD, was suspected of planning forthcoming attacks using firearms in London. The Court was told that he was attending regular meetings with associates in this city to plan an attack and had previously travelled to Syria for what was alleged to be extremist training. The assessment of the security services and the Home Secretary was that it was necessary to relocate CD outside Greater London to prevent him from having these meetings and co-ordinating an attack—that is what they argued in Court just last month. The High Court judge concluded that the relocation obligation is

“a necessary and proportionate measure to protect the public from the risk of what is an immediate and real risk of a terrorist-related attack.”

All this happened just last month, so the House needs to consider why we are seeking to introduce a change to control orders that would remove a function that the Home Secretary believed, and the High Court agreed, was needed for national security only one month ago?

Fifthly, the Home Secretary is restricting individual TPIMs to two years. Control orders could be renewed repeatedly, and she has not explained what will happen to the two people currently on control orders for more than two years once this Bill comes into force. Will they transfer to TPIMs or will the Home Secretary have to apply to the courts all over again? Sixthly, she is permitting access to phones and computers. She has assured the House that that will be monitored, but we will seek assurances from the monitoring agencies as to whether sufficient safeguards are in place and whether they have the resources to manage the continued monitoring that will be involved.

A wider question is being raised because these changes—the potentially reduced hours for curfews; a potentially narrower list of restrictions; more association with others who may be causing trouble; and the greater use of phone and internet—all require greater surveillance and resources to fill the gap. The Home Secretary has refused to confirm a figure, but the figure of £20 million has been routinely used in the newspapers and, presumably, has been briefed from her Department. Yet the overall police budget is being cut by £2 billion, the police counter-terrorism budget is still being cut in real terms and experienced counter-terrorism officers are being laid off through the A19 process.

I am concerned that the Home Secretary knows that there are troubling gaps in her plans. She has said that

“in exceptional circumstances, faced with a very serious terrorist threat that we cannot manage by any other means, additional measures may be necessary…So we will publish, but not introduce, legislation allowing more stringent measures, including curfews and further restrictions on communications, association and movement…We will invite the Opposition to discuss this draft legislation with us on Privy Council terms.”—[Official Report, 26 January 2011; Vol. 522, c. 309.]

What “additional measures” are these, given that control orders are pretty far-reaching? Does this mean that she knows already that there is a potential gap in security as a result of the new TPIMs? The Home Secretary has said she would consult the Opposition about these plans, but she has not yet done so. If new emergency legislation is needed to fill the gaps her own Bill creates, Parliament needs to know about this before we get to the evidence and Committee stage; otherwise we will be debating the Bill under false pretences, legislating only to legislate again.

This Bill is a con, recreating most of control orders while pretending not to do so, and it is risky, as some elements and changes water down the protection for national security, but there is a third problem: the Bill also reduces, rather than increases, parliamentary checks and balances on the Home Secretary. As I have said, the right approach to take to ensure that we protect civil liberties and national security together is to support strong powers for the police and security services to act in difficult circumstances, and to make sure that there are strong checks and balances to prevent abuse.

The current checks and balances on control orders are both judicial and parliamentary: the High Court has to approve every control order but Parliament has to give its approval every year for the control order regime to remain in place. Democratically elected MPs have to decide every year whether the terrorism threat remains sufficiently severe, whether anyone has come up with a better alternative and whether to allow the Home Secretary to continue to use these exceptional powers. That is an important parliamentary check on the exercise of Executive power which should continue to be unusual, yet she is removing it in this Bill. The power of the Home Secretary to impose TPIMs under this Bill is not a temporary one—it is permanent. TPIMs do not have to be renewed annually, as control orders do, and the TPIMs regime does not have to be renewed annually, as the control order regime does. This is therefore a serious downgrading of parliamentary oversight of a regime which is always supposed to be exceptional. She will know that serious concerns have been raised about this by Liberty, Justice and others, who say that far from representing a positive innovation, the TPIMs regime is, in one crucial respect, more offensive than the system it is designed to replace.

The Home Secretary is now in the astonishing situation of pleasing no one. She has a Bill that fudges the issue and does not fundamentally change the control order regime in the way that she and others promised its critics. However, it does water down some measures, worrying those who monitor national security, and it waters down the checks and balances that allow Parliament to prevent abuse, and that should worry this House.

The Opposition have very serious reservations about this Bill. Where possible, we want to support the Government on counter-terrorism. That is made more difficult when neither we nor the Intelligence and Security Committee have access to more detail about the risks in individual cases that would allow us to be reassured that the Home Secretary’s judgments are right. We believe that it would have been better not to introduce this Bill at all. We believe that it is, in the main, unnecessary, that it includes elements that take risks and that it reduces accountability to Parliament. Now that the Government have introduced it, we believe that it needs a serious rethink in Committee. We will not vote against Second Reading tonight, but we will expect greater transparency on these measures, more answers to the questions we have posed and significant changes to be made to the Bill to reassure us about our concerns. Counter-terrorism is too important for us to take risks for the sake of political expediency. The Home Secretary should forget deals done to save face for the Deputy Prime Minister—it is beyond saving—and she should ignore the demands for short-term headlines from the Prime Minister, as in the longer term she has to carry the can.

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[Paul Goggins]

If the hon. Gentleman thinks that an international terrorist is sitting there thinking, “Thank goodness they have given me the internet so I can reveal all my contacts and conspiracies,” he is quite naive. We are talking about highly sophisticated people, and I am concerned that the provisions in paragraph 7(3) are not as sophisticated as they need to be to deal with the threat.

[Tom Brake]

The right hon. Gentleman has said that international terrorists are not going to use their internet access, because they will not want to reveal their deals, so what is the problem with providing internet access in the first place?

[Paul Goggins]

The hon. Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) was saying that international terrorists would rush off and use it and reveal all their sources and contacts to the authorities monitoring the measure. I shall make the point again: I do not think that the provisions as set out reflect the sophistication with which international terrorists operate.

My third difficulty relates not to the Bill but to a wider issue that is significant to the powers in the Bill—the whole business of rules on the disclosure of evidence. I welcome the fact that under the Bill there will still be closed hearings which can continue as before under control orders. That is needed, because if a judge is going to review the material or hear an appeal from a particular individual, he must consider the information available to the Home Secretary when she made the initial application. If some, if not all, of that information has to be protected, that must be done in a closed hearing. Special advocates will still be needed. The gist of the case must be provided to the individual.

As we recognise, however, the AF judgment makes it increasingly difficult to protect what in the interests of public safety and national security must remain secret information. That issue caused problems for the previous Government, and it has caused problems for this Government. It has ramifications for our relations with international partners with whom we share important information and intelligence. I applaud the fact that the Government are seeking to address that problem and deal with it in the Green Paper. May I tell all Front Benchers that we should do everything we can to resolve the issue, because if we do not do so the TPIM system will simply not work, as there will be an ever stronger demand that information that should remain secret is revealed in open court to the individual concerned? It is important that we resolve that issue so that we know what can be disclosed and what can be protected.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Brake (Carshalton and Wallington) (LD)]

It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Wythenshawe and Sale East (Paul Goggins), who drew on his experience and made some sensible contributions to the debate. I diverge from his view, however, on the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) made about communications. The point about allowing people to have access to mobile phones, the internet or fixed lines is that there are indeed some intelligent potential or actual terrorists, but equally there are some rather stupid terrorists who may use those facilities and make the sort of connections that would facilitate a prosecution. That might be one of the purposes of making communications available to them.

The Bill is welcome. It starts to tackle some of the grossest abuses of human rights that existed under the control order system, but I would like it to go further. For instance, on prosecutions, the right hon. Member for Wythenshawe and Sale East referred to the fact that there would be additional resources for covert surveillance and intelligence. My understanding is that that will be used to secure prosecutions, which is welcome. More could be done to secure prosecutions, and we may want to return to that at a later date. I am pleased that the Government are not afraid of improving Bills where and when that is necessary.

I do not agree with Liberty’s contention that the Bill is worse than the control order system that is currently in place. It is not; it is more targeted. Liberty’s argument seems to be centred on the fact that although control orders are continually on the political table because of the sunset clause that calls for an annual review and the associated parliamentary oversight, the effect of the Bill would be permanent. That is true. However, control orders have been debated annually and renewed year after year, whereas TPIMs are limited to a maximum of two years, following an initial period of one year.

The right hon. Member for Wythenshawe and Sale East argued that the Government should allow TPIMs to go beyond a two-year period. My understanding of one of the arguments deployed in favour of control orders is their ability to disrupt. One would expect that after a two-year period of a lack of communication or of controlled communication, the disruptive nature of control orders would have had an impact and broken down those networks. The right hon. Gentleman may have been arguing for TPIMs to be applied indefinitely to ensure that that disruption was permanent and took place over a longer time scale. My view is that disruption would have taken place within the first two years and the links would have been broken. To suggest that TPIMs should be extended beyond two years presents a threat from the civil liberties perspective.

[Mr Gerry Sutcliffe (Bradford South) (Lab)]

There is a case of somebody being subject to a control order that has been in effect for more than two years. If the advice of the Security Service is that it should continue, what would the hon. Gentleman say?

[Tom Brake]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. If there has been no evidence of any activity whatever during that period—TPIMs would allow for the measure to be imposed again if there was some sign of activity—and if there has been no activity, with the additional surveillance that will be provided, one must question the Security Service’s position. It might want to keep the person under a control order indefinitely, but if there is no evidence of activity surely the hon. Gentleman would agree that a line must be drawn. Given that the person had not undertaken any terrorist activities, the disruptive effect would have been felt and no further application of a control order would be appropriate.

As I said, control orders have been debated annually, and they have been renewed annually.

[Naomi Long]

Control orders having to be debated annually gives Parliament the opportunity to reconsider the situation before deciding whether to continue. The fact that up to now the control order system has been renewed on each occasion does not mean that it would be so indefinitely. Does it not make sense that we should continue to treat these measures as exceptional, rather than routine?

[Tom Brake]

I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention, which is a very sound one. I hope, and I am sure that the Minister will confirm this when he responds, that because counter-terrorism legislation is so essential, the Government will want to keep it under review, and that if, in future years, there is a need to adjust the measures, appropriate adjustments will be made.

What are the other objections to TPIMs? There is the question of whether there is any difference between reasonable belief and reasonable suspicion. It is my view that the Bill presents a higher evidential hurdle. The courts are aware of that, and they know the difference between those two. That difference is significant.

I acknowledge that TPIMs maintain a system of Executive-imposed measures that do not lie comfortably inside the judicial system. The Bill imposes measures that restrict freedom and human rights. As hon. Members know, those measures include but are not limited to overnight curfews, restrictions on travel, exclusion from certain places and buildings, and restrictions on electronic devices. It has been argued by the Opposition and by Liberty that these measures simply reflect the most offensive aspects of the control order system, but I do not think that that is the case. Clearly, in relation to relocation, internal exile, which the Soviet Union would have been very comfortable with, has gone.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

Does the hon. Gentleman not have some concerns about the successive non-debate of this issue by Parliament and the fact that a defendant with a two-year TPIM might never know why it was imposed and never have the evidence given to them? All they know is that they have a barrister who does know but is not allowed to tell them and that the judge knows but is not allowed to tell the barrister. Therefore, a circle of secrecy surrounds something that has a major impact on a person’s life, is career-changing, and so on. Is that really right in a liberal democracy?

[Tom Brake]

The hon. Gentleman might not be surprised to know that I agree with much of what he says. If my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) has an opportunity to speak, he might echo that very same point. That is why the Bill is clearly an improvement on what is in place now, but has scope for further improvement. I am sure that we will return to that in this place and perhaps in the other place.

[Pete Wishart]

Does not the hon. Gentleman understand and appreciate that those of us who cannot stand these things think that the Liberals have compromised too cheaply on these issues? I remind him that his leader said:

“A battery of curfews and tags, imposed in a legal limbo at the behest of politicians, is no surrogate for the aggressive use of the full force of the law.”

Why have the Liberals caved in so cheaply on these issues?

[Tom Brake]

I hope to explain why I do not think we have caved in cheaply, as the hon. Gentleman stated. First, relocation has gone. I accept that on overnight curfews I would be much more comfortable with what Liberal Democrats have referred to previously as residency requirements. An address would be identified at which the person would be expected to reside. I hope that the fact that there is no specific definition of overnight curfews will lead to a more flexible approach; that there might be a spectrum according to which overnight curfews may be imposed, going from what most would regard as overnight—eight or 10 hours—through to something much closer to a residency requirement. If overnight curfew was specified precisely, the risk is simply that that is what would be adopted in all cases, so there would not be the ability to consider each individual case in detail. In addition, the exclusions are specific, not geographic as previously, and there is access to telephones, computers and the internet, a matter that was raised by families in relation to their children and their ability to use computers for schoolwork, and so on. Those are real changes that are included in the Bill.

Another area of concern that has been flagged up and to which the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) referred is the extent to which the person subject to TPIMs will know what they have been accused of. The Home Secretary said that the individual will know enough about the key elements of their case to enable them to act. That is worthy of further discussion and elucidation. I see the Minister nods and perhaps when he responds he will be able to say more about what this will mean in practice. Clearly, it is an ongoing issue for Liberal Democrats, the hon. Gentleman and others to ensure that people who are subject to control orders or will be subject to TPIMs know as much as possible about the allegations against them without revealing the confidential sources that could put at risk people in the field.

[Hazel Blears (Salford and Eccles) (Lab)]

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that there have been a number of legal decisions that now require the person subject to a control order to be informed of the substance of the case against them? It is not something new; that is the legal position.

[Tom Brake]

I am aware that there have been cases where that has been the outcome.

I am sure that the Minister will want to pick up that matter when he replies. I also hope that this will give him an opportunity to update us on intercept evidence. I understand the difficulties in balancing the operational requirements with the legal requirements and in balancing the scale of benefits with the associated costs, but I hope that he will update the House.

I referred to prosecutions in relation to surveillance evidence. It might be helpful to specify a time frame within which a prosecution must be brought. There may be some scope for moving on that in future debates.

I come now to a couple of subjects that I suspect will not necessarily boost my popularity in certain quarters, but having advocated the importance of voting rights for some prisoners my popularity might not be in the ascendant in any case. It is important to treat in a civilised way those who may wish to inflict death or injury on us in order to expose their barbaric nature. That is why we need clear safeguards for those who are extradited to the UK. If people have suffered torture abroad and are subsequently moved to the UK, on their arrival the UK Government have an important role in assessing any health or mental health implications that should be taken on board. There is also the ongoing issue with regard to the role of the control order review group, which the Government will ensure continues in operation under TPIMs, in reviewing the mental health of people subject to control orders and now to TPIMs. It has that role at present, but from the discussions that I have had with those who have been subject to control orders that have subsequently been quashed it does not seem to be working very effectively.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

The hon. Gentleman makes an important point about people who may have been subject to torture in other jurisdictions. This is a controversial issue, but does he agree that we should not deport people to a jurisdiction that has not signed the UN convention on torture, and that they should remain here until such time as that jurisdiction signs it, rather than the unfortunate arrangements that were made with a number of countries in the past?

[Tom Brake]

That is a difficult point to address. I know that there are concerns about how watertight memorandums of understanding are, if that is what the hon. Gentleman is referring to. It is a tough call. I am at risk of making policy on the hoof if I give an instant response. It is a difficult issue and the hon. Gentleman is right to raise it. Perhaps when the Minister responds he will say whether the UK Government are making progress in drawing up memorandums of understanding with other countries where we believe that the safeguards are sufficient to allow that.

There are some issues around how people subject to TPIMs are dealt with, and what sort of assessment is made, particularly of their mental health, and any torture that they may have experienced in the countries that they come from.

I will support the Government on Second Reading. The Bill is better than its predecessor. Its measures are more targeted, less damaging to individuals subject to TPIMs and more observant of human rights. But it is not perfect and can be improved, and I hope that it will be during its passage here and in the other place.

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[Hazel Blears]

But that is no reason to relax the powers. If there are fears that such activities could be happening now, I should be very concerned indeed and certainly would not want to go down the path of having less control over access to electronic equipment. I require further reassurance, as do the citizens of this country, that we are not going to give people access to mobile phones and computers so that they can maintain those relationships and networks that are the very reason they are subject to a control order or, indeed, will be subject to a TPIM. We require further reassurance on that issue.

I am very concerned about the inability to renew the TPIM after two years. In the case of AM in 2007, the control order lasted for more than two and a half years. When it came up for renewal Mr Justice Wilkie, confirming its renewal after two and a half years, said that AM was

“highly intelligent, calm, cautious beyond his years. He has replied and maintains this degree of calmness and self-confidence, which in my judgment is consistent with the view of the Security Service that he is a disciplined, trained and committed person whose commitment remains unimpaired, despite the length of the control order. He was and remains prepared to be a martyr in an attack designed to take many lives. He remains highly trained, security conscious and committed.”

I am therefore concerned that if there is a blanket prohibition, in any circumstances and without the addition of new evidence of involvement in terrorism such orders will come to an end. I require further assurance. If the reason for making the TPIM in the first place were of sufficient seriousness, I would be extremely concerned about our deciding simply to say that there is an arbitrary cut-off point, as the legislation does, irrespective of the threat that the person poses.

[Tom Brake]

What does the right hon. Lady think would be a reasonable period, if there had been no activity whatever, for a TPIM to apply to somebody?

[Hazel Blears]

These are matters for careful and balanced judgment, which is why we have constant judicial oversight, why we have to return to the courts to renew our orders and why we have a legal system in this country which is capable of making such judgments. If we are in the hands of a respected, experienced and knowledgeable High Court judge, who has heard submissions on the issues, I should feel slightly more content than if an order simply came to an arbitrary end as a result of legislation passed in this House.