Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill

Hazel Blears Excerpts

Tuesday 7th June 2011 Commons Chamber

[Tom Brake]

I hope to explain why I do not think we have caved in cheaply, as the hon. Gentleman stated. First, relocation has gone. I accept that on overnight curfews I would be much more comfortable with what Liberal Democrats have referred to previously as residency requirements. An address would be identified at which the person would be expected to reside. I hope that the fact that there is no specific definition of overnight curfews will lead to a more flexible approach; that there might be a spectrum according to which overnight curfews may be imposed, going from what most would regard as overnight—eight or 10 hours—through to something much closer to a residency requirement. If overnight curfew was specified precisely, the risk is simply that that is what would be adopted in all cases, so there would not be the ability to consider each individual case in detail. In addition, the exclusions are specific, not geographic as previously, and there is access to telephones, computers and the internet, a matter that was raised by families in relation to their children and their ability to use computers for schoolwork, and so on. Those are real changes that are included in the Bill.

Another area of concern that has been flagged up and to which the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) referred is the extent to which the person subject to TPIMs will know what they have been accused of. The Home Secretary said that the individual will know enough about the key elements of their case to enable them to act. That is worthy of further discussion and elucidation. I see the Minister nods and perhaps when he responds he will be able to say more about what this will mean in practice. Clearly, it is an ongoing issue for Liberal Democrats, the hon. Gentleman and others to ensure that people who are subject to control orders or will be subject to TPIMs know as much as possible about the allegations against them without revealing the confidential sources that could put at risk people in the field.

[Hazel Blears (Salford and Eccles) (Lab)]

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that there have been a number of legal decisions that now require the person subject to a control order to be informed of the substance of the case against them? It is not something new; that is the legal position.

[Tom Brake]

I am aware that there have been cases where that has been the outcome.

I am sure that the Minister will want to pick up that matter when he replies. I also hope that this will give him an opportunity to update us on intercept evidence. I understand the difficulties in balancing the operational requirements with the legal requirements and in balancing the scale of benefits with the associated costs, but I hope that he will update the House.

I referred to prosecutions in relation to surveillance evidence. It might be helpful to specify a time frame within which a prosecution must be brought. There may be some scope for moving on that in future debates.

I come now to a couple of subjects that I suspect will not necessarily boost my popularity in certain quarters, but having advocated the importance of voting rights for some prisoners my popularity might not be in the ascendant in any case. It is important to treat in a civilised way those who may wish to inflict death or injury on us in order to expose their barbaric nature. That is why we need clear safeguards for those who are extradited to the UK. If people have suffered torture abroad and are subsequently moved to the UK, on their arrival the UK Government have an important role in assessing any health or mental health implications that should be taken on board. There is also the ongoing issue with regard to the role of the control order review group, which the Government will ensure continues in operation under TPIMs, in reviewing the mental health of people subject to control orders and now to TPIMs. It has that role at present, but from the discussions that I have had with those who have been subject to control orders that have subsequently been quashed it does not seem to be working very effectively.

--- Later in debate ---

[Hazel Blears (Salford and Eccles) (Lab)]

I am grateful for the opportunity to contribute to the debate this evening and I think that all the contributions made so far indicate how serious the issues we are dealing with are and how difficult for everyone, whichever side of the House they are on, because it is a case of trying to weigh the balance and make some very difficult judgments. When dealing with matters of national security, it is important that we try as far as possible to reach a consensus, because these matters are incredibly important for the country, and that we try to start from the evidence base, which in my experience leads to better decisions on where the balance of judgment should rightly lie.

I want to think about the evidence we face at the moment. First, that concerns the nature of the threat. Sometimes these issues are discussed in the abstract and are not necessarily rooted in the reality of the threat that the country faces. For some years the threat level has been “severe”, which is only one step down from “imminent”. That means that this country faces a very significant threat from al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism, often originating abroad but also involving people who were born and brought up in this country and are enmeshed in a series of worrying plots. It is important to put on the record the nature of the threat that the country faces.

Secondly, we should consider the extent of the problem. People sometimes feel that, because we have been dealing with this threat for 10 years and have had the control order regime in place for the past six, the extent of that threat has somehow reduced. At any one time, the security services are dealing with tens of plots, which are often very complex and interrelated, with a web of international and domestic actors and many technologies, and involving incredibly complex organisations. Between 1,600 and 2,000 known terrorist suspects are involved in these plots, and those are the ones we know about. There may well be other organisations, other plots and other individuals who, as we speak, are intent on organising the kind of terror that can wreak mayhem and destruction on our communities. The sustained nature of the threat and its extent ought to be a backdrop to some of the difficult decisions that we have to make with regard to this legislation.

There is therefore a clear need for surveillance and the gathering of intelligence and evidence on the intentions and actions of those involved in planning and conducting terrorist operations. It is of course right, as my hon. Friend the Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) and others point out in an eloquent and genuine way, that in a free democracy such as ours we should always seek to bring those involved in terrorism before the criminal courts. That should be our starting point. We should bring prosecutions where the evidence can be adduced and tested, where witnesses can be cross-examined and where a jury can reach a verdict on whether the accused is guilty or innocent. That must be the starting point in any democracy—that we have a criminal system that allows all that to be done as openly and transparently as possible.

One of the reasons we brought in some of the new offences now on the statute book, such as committing acts preparatory to terrorism, was to enable us to interrupt plots at the earliest possible stage and still be able to bring a criminal prosecution and go through the conventional criminal system and bring those people to justice. Those offences have been very useful in giving the police powers to interrupt early and ensure that they disrupt the plot and prevent any damage while still using the conventional criminal justice system, which is obviously what we want to encourage.

However, we must recognise that there are—and, unfortunately, likely to be for the foreseeable future—a small number of people involved in terrorism who pose a serious threat to the safety of our citizens and country and who cannot be brought within the ambit of the conventional criminal justice system. Much as we may dislike it, that is the situation we face. For several years there have been discussions, or attempts at discussions, between various Home Secretaries and Ministers and the judicial system, and in many cases the judiciary have been reluctant to engage in any discussions on whether the way the criminal justice system operates can be amended. I understand their reluctance because of the separation of the Executive and the judiciary, and they want to avoid confusion, but I feel that the criminal justice system is not necessarily able to cope with the nature of the threat and the offences we face in the world we now live in.

Many of the suspects cannot be subjected to the traditional judicial system because to do so would mean bringing forward intelligence and evidence that could put at risk the lives of those who seek to protect us. We cannot allow that intelligence to be revealed as doing so would reveal those agents and their personal security would be jeopardised. Those people put their lives on the line for the people of this country and we have a duty to protect them. Bringing forward that intelligence would also reveal the surveillance methods and techniques that the security services often use to gain it, which would also undermine their ability to keep us all safe.

Control orders have been used in a small number of cases and I think that we should get that number to its irreducible minimum. We imposed only 48 control orders in the six years that they have existed and there are only eight or 10 now in place. It is a very tightly managed and controlled regime, so those powers are not sprayed around and used loosely as a way of rounding up the usual suspects. That is absolutely not the intention. I am afraid that the reality, which we should all be grown up enough to acknowledge, is that the threat we face is such that we have to have a system that, however distasteful we as democrats find it, can protect the people for whom we are responsible.

It was for that reason that in 2005 the then Home Secretary and I, as the Minister responsible for policing and counter-terrorism, brought forward the original control order legislation, which the Bill seeks to alter in some significant respects. I will never forget bringing forward that legislation. I remember being in this House at 4 o’clock in the morning debating that hugely contested legislation. In some ways that was very difficult, but in others it was very encouraging as it indicated the depth of commitment on both sides of the House to a free democracy in which people felt strongly about those issues. I was very glad when we finished at 10 o’clock that morning; nevertheless, it was an inspiring occasion and a good one for the House.

I want make it crystal clear to the House that, whatever some Members might say, that original legislation was not introduced in some kind of knee-jerk overreaction to the events of 9/11 or 7/7. It was a genuine recognition of the inability of the criminal justice system to accommodate the situation we faced. I am a lawyer and I have huge respect for the rule of law—

[Paul Goggins]

Steady.

[Hazel Blears]

Steady on, absolutely.

I also know how important it is to have a practical and workable system in place. We must ensure that those who pose a significant threat to ordinary people’s safety can be tracked and prevented from pursuing their plans to cause death and serious harm in pursuit of their warped political ideology.

We all want to achieve consensus where we can, but I have some serious concerns about some of the Bill’s proposals, with regard to their effectiveness, their ability to disrupt those who will be subject to TPIMs, as they are so elegantly called, and whether they will provide us with a proper level of security. Lord Carlile is always called in aid in these debates, and I want to place on the record my thanks to him for the fabulous job he has done over the years as the Government’s independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. He said just last year:

“In stark terms, the potential cost of losing control orders is that the UK would be more vulnerable to a successful terrorist attack.”

He does not say such things lightly. He has huge experience in trying to weigh the balance and get the judgment right. He also said:

“Unless control orders were replaced by some equally disruptive and practicable system… the repeal of control orders would create a worryingly higher level of public risk.”

We ought to have serious and close regard to what Lord Carlile has said and test the Bill against the concerns he has expressed.

In a powerful contribution, my right hon. Friend the shadow Home Secretary expressed her concerns about some of those issues, so I will not speak about them at length. The relocation issue is a genuine concern. It may be characterised as internal exile or a soviet-style imposition, but if it is necessary for someone to be located away from the networks that they have established in order to improve the safety of ordinary citizens, I do not think it should simply be ruled out on principle.

We have discussed whether access to mobile phones and computers might enable us to obtain further evidence for prosecution, but I am very doubtful that it will. I am concerned that people will have access not simply to one mobile phone: once they have one, it will be very easy indeed for experienced people not to dupe the security services, as I hope they are not capable of being duped, but to create the sense that it is normal to have access to a computer and a mobile phone. The prospect of a security risk is therefore higher than I would feel comfortable with, so I seek reassurance from the Minister on access to electronic equipment. We know how much terrorist business is done online and with technology. It is a massive issue for us, and this measure could present us with an increased risk.

[Dr Huppert]

Has the right hon. Lady spoken to the right hon. Member for Wythenshawe and Sale East (Paul Goggins)? He was concerned that those people simply would not use such equipment so we would not get any information. One cannot have it both ways. If those people are going to use such equipment and are capable of duping the security services, or whatever term the right hon. Lady wishes to use, they might be doing it now, just like those who abscond. Surely this is a more liberal measure that will also help with prosecutions.

[Hazel Blears]

But that is no reason to relax the powers. If there are fears that such activities could be happening now, I should be very concerned indeed and certainly would not want to go down the path of having less control over access to electronic equipment. I require further reassurance, as do the citizens of this country, that we are not going to give people access to mobile phones and computers so that they can maintain those relationships and networks that are the very reason they are subject to a control order or, indeed, will be subject to a TPIM. We require further reassurance on that issue.

I am very concerned about the inability to renew the TPIM after two years. In the case of AM in 2007, the control order lasted for more than two and a half years. When it came up for renewal Mr Justice Wilkie, confirming its renewal after two and a half years, said that AM was

“highly intelligent, calm, cautious beyond his years. He has replied and maintains this degree of calmness and self-confidence, which in my judgment is consistent with the view of the Security Service that he is a disciplined, trained and committed person whose commitment remains unimpaired, despite the length of the control order. He was and remains prepared to be a martyr in an attack designed to take many lives. He remains highly trained, security conscious and committed.”

I am therefore concerned that if there is a blanket prohibition, in any circumstances and without the addition of new evidence of involvement in terrorism such orders will come to an end. I require further assurance. If the reason for making the TPIM in the first place were of sufficient seriousness, I would be extremely concerned about our deciding simply to say that there is an arbitrary cut-off point, as the legislation does, irrespective of the threat that the person poses.

[Tom Brake]

What does the right hon. Lady think would be a reasonable period, if there had been no activity whatever, for a TPIM to apply to somebody?

[Hazel Blears]

These are matters for careful and balanced judgment, which is why we have constant judicial oversight, why we have to return to the courts to renew our orders and why we have a legal system in this country which is capable of making such judgments. If we are in the hands of a respected, experienced and knowledgeable High Court judge, who has heard submissions on the issues, I should feel slightly more content than if an order simply came to an arbitrary end as a result of legislation passed in this House.

[Pete Wishart]

If that individual is so dangerous, why do we not just arrest him, charge him and throw the full force of the judicial system at him?

[Hazel Blears]

I am delighted that the hon. Gentleman has asked me that question, because this is where we end up in a sort of tortuous circle. That individual has not been charged because the intelligence against him does not comprise evidence, has been gained by covert surveillance and cannot be revealed in court, as it will put at risk either the lives of the agents or their techniques. We know that this person, as Mr Justice Wilkie said, remains a trained and committed martyr to the cause and is prepared to carry out further attacks, but, because the individual cannot be prosecuted through the conventional criminal justice system, the hon. Gentleman’s decision would be to let him walk free.

That is the judgment that has to be made, and that is why these issues weigh so heavily on the people who have to make the decisions, people such as the Home Secretary, who has to make those decisions in individual cases. They weigh incredibly heavily on all of us and are not lightly taken, and that is why we need a system of checks and balances. An arbitrary limit of a two-year TPIM in every single case would cause me concern if the original threat still existed.

My final concern, on which I have not received reassurance, is the extra costs of surveillance, because there will need to be greater surveillance if TPIMs conditions are substantially lighter and less invasive than those of control orders. Next year we have the Olympics, which will be a massive drain on the resources of the security services. That is acknowledged throughout the system, so I want significant reassurance from the Minister about the ability of the security services to maintain the same assurance to the citizens of our country through TPIMs as they have through the control orders system. I am not satisfied that that is the case.

The control order system had more measures to disrupt people’s ability to organise their networks. Surveillance does not take the place of disruption, because it is a different technique of a different order, and, as Lord Carlile says, unless there is a system of disruption as well as surveillance, he has concerns about the effectiveness of the regime, as do I. The security services say that the extra resources would mitigate the risk, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Wythenshawe and Sale East (Paul Goggins) has said, and it is incumbent on the Government to give us such reassurance.

We must remind ourselves that the people who have been the subject of control orders are not law-abiding, innocent citizens going freely about their business. By their very nature, they are dangerous people who pose a real threat to our safety, and the measures must be sufficient to reassure people properly that the system is sufficient to control the movements of such individuals. Surveillance is not as effective as disruption, so we need to do more to ensure that disruption takes place.

In all my years as a Home Office Minister, and through my work in the Communities and Local Government Department, control orders have represented some of the most difficult decisions I have had to make, because they go to the heart of our democracy. Our freedoms are incredibly hard won, and none of us wants to give them up lightly at all. I talked to a senior member of the judiciary a few weeks ago, who said passionately and in a very committed way, “Hazel, whenever there’s a decision to be made between liberty and security, I will always, always err on the side of liberty,” but it is more complicated than that.

We cannot simply say that we would always make the decisions in that way. We might do in theory, in academic practice and, certainly, in terms of our values, but we are faced with making a decision that must balance security and liberty, the security of ordinary people seeking to go about their daily lives, as against the liberty of people for whom there is a great deal of intelligence to say that they are dangerous and dedicated, because of their political ideology, to causing mass harm and death among the community at large. That is an incredibly difficult decision, but sometimes it is portrayed as an easy one.

Of course, we do not want to restrict people’s civil liberties or to introduce a punitive, repressive or oppressive regime, but the alternative is to allow people who pose a severe and dangerous threat to our country to walk our streets. Those decisions are hard to make, and I just ask the Home Secretary and the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (James Brokenshire), who is on the Treasury Bench tonight, to think really hard, as I know they will, about whether their proposed regime is sufficient to give the people of this country the reassurance that they deserve, and to ensure that that tiny minority of people who are subject to a regime are not able to continue to pose the threat of damage, death and destruction to the people of this country. I look forward in Committee to the Minister giving us a great deal more reassurance than I have had this evening.