Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill

Naomi Long Excerpts

Tuesday 7th June 2011 Commons Chamber

[Naomi Long (Belfast East) (Alliance)]

The power to use control orders has always extended to Northern Ireland, but has never been used. What discussions has the Home Secretary had about the availability of special advocates in Northern Ireland? There are very few at present, and the imposition of TPIMs could present a problem.

[Mrs May]

One of the issues that we are examining is the more general issue of special advocates and the information available to them, but I take the hon. Lady’s point. As she says, the current regime is not being used in Northern Ireland, but we will be very aware of the issue of special advocates and their availability there. The Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (James Brokenshire)—who is responsible for crime and security matters—is involved in wider Government work in relation to the availability of sensitive information in cases relating to terrorist activity.

In practice, individuals subject to terrorism prevention and investigation measures will know the key elements of the case against them, even if it is not possible for them to see all the underlying intelligence. Once a TPIMs notice has been imposed, there will be a further right of appeal against subsequent decisions—for example, decisions to extend or vary the terms of the notice. The package in the Bill will assure individuals subject to TPIMs notices of a significant and appropriate level of judicial oversight of their cases. As well as providing for rigorous consideration by the courts, the Bill contains a formal statutory requirement for the Secretary of State to keep under review whether a TPIMs notice, and all its restrictions, remains necessary to protect the public from a risk of terrorism. That will remove any doubt about whether such notices are assessed to ensure that they remain necessary at all times.

The Bill provides a number of further safeguards. The Secretary of State will be required to make a quarterly report to Parliament on the exercise of the powers in the Bill. That mirrors the current practice in relation to control orders, and will ensure appropriate visibility, and public accountability, of the TPIMs regime. The Secretary of State must also appoint an independent person to review the operation of the enacted legislation. That, too, mirrors the current control order regime.

As the House will know, David Anderson QC recently took on the role of independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, which was previously undertaken so effectively and for so many years by Lord Carlile of Berriew. As independent reviewer, David Anderson would undertake the statutory reviews of the TPIMs legislation, just as he currently reviews control order powers.

The final part of the Bill relates to enforcement. It provides for a criminal offence of breaching measures specified in a TPIM notice without reasonable excuse. The maximum penalty will be five years’ imprisonment. The Bill also contains detailed provisions relating to powers of search and entry, which build on the existing powers relating to control orders. There will be an explicit power for the police to undertake a search for compliance purposes—for example, to check that the individual has no prohibited communications devices—but they will be required to obtain a warrant first.

The final part of our approach is to combine the new preventive measures with significantly increased resources for the police and the Security Service, over and above those agreed in the spending review, to help with investigation and prosecution. For security reasons I cannot give the House a full breakdown of the funds provided for specific security activities, but I can reassure Members that this is new money that has not been taken from any existing counter-terrorism programmes. These additional investigative capabilities and resources will help the police and MI5 to gather evidence with a view, as always, to prosecution. The commitment to prosecution is also reflected in clause 10, which requires prior consultation with the police on whether evidence is available that could realistically be used for prosecution in relation to a terrorist offence. It also requires the police to keep the individual's conduct under review while a TPIMs notice is in force, and to report to the Home Secretary on that review.

I have discussed the new arrangements in detail with Jonathan Evans, the director general of the Security Service. He has told me that he considers that the changes provide an acceptable balance between the needs of security and those of civil liberties, and that the overall package mitigates risk.

The Bill is a vital part of the Government's new, more effective and more proportionate approach to counter-terrorism. This afternoon I announced to the House a new and more effective strategy for countering radicalisation; the Bill is, perhaps, as important as that new strategy in restoring trust in Britain's approach to counter-terrorism. The repeal of control orders, their replacement with TPIMs, and extra resources for covert surveillance and investigation constitute the right approach. It is an approach that is necessary and proportionate, that will do a great deal to protect the public from the risk of terrorism, and that deserves support from all parties. I commend the Bill to the House.

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[Paul Goggins]

My hon. Friend has well-known views on this issue and has expressed them frequently in the Chamber from both the Government and Opposition sides over the years. He forms his own conclusions but my conclusions about such individuals is that they are a small group of people for whom it is necessary to have some form of control outside the normal judicial process because of the risks that they pose. My hon. Friend has put forward his point of view on this before and he has strong views—I respect that.

[Naomi Long]

The right hon. Gentleman’s experience in Northern Ireland will also colour his view on these issues. One of the experiences that we had is that the use of unusual measures can often act as a rallying point for radicalising other young people, rallying them behind the cause, because people are seen as being persecuted rather than being tried under the law. Does he agree that such experiences show that these measures should be seen as unusual and that, for this reason, their ratification each year in Parliament is an important part of reinforcing that?

[Paul Goggins]

The hon. Lady speaks with great authority on this issue and I agree with every word she says. These powers—whether the control order powers that have been in place up to now or the new powers that the Home Secretary is bringing forward—should be used absolutely exceptionally and we should always bear in mind the risk that the hon. Lady mentions that their use can become a rallying point and can assist in the radicalisation of people whom we are trying desperately to keep in the mainstream of society. That should always be kept in mind. These powers should not be used generally; they are very specific powers to be used in very specific circumstances.

Let me deal with the circumstances in which the powers should be used. We are talking about a small group of individuals who are suspected of involvement in terrorist activities and who are either foreign nationals who cannot be deported because of a ruling of the European Court of Human Rights or they are individuals who cannot be prosecuted successfully because, as I said earlier, the compelling information about them is secret intelligence that could not alone sustain a successful prosecution. Over the past six years, control orders have been the best—some have used the expression “least worst”—set of powers to deal with that group of people.

As I have said before, we should always seek to gain consensus in the House on the important issue of counter-terrorism. The formation of the new Government last year gave us all an opportunity to reflect on the previous decade and see whether changes were required that would bring greater consensus and get an even better balance between individual liberty and collective security. I have changed my mind about pre-charge detention, having previously voted for 28 days and, indeed, for 42 days. I agree that the normal maximum should now be 14 days, provided that in exceptional circumstances it can be extended to 28 days. I am currently serving on the Joint Committee that is considering the emergency legislation that the Government have brought forward on this, and I have changed my mind on this issue.

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[Tom Brake]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. If there has been no evidence of any activity whatever during that period—TPIMs would allow for the measure to be imposed again if there was some sign of activity—and if there has been no activity, with the additional surveillance that will be provided, one must question the Security Service’s position. It might want to keep the person under a control order indefinitely, but if there is no evidence of activity surely the hon. Gentleman would agree that a line must be drawn. Given that the person had not undertaken any terrorist activities, the disruptive effect would have been felt and no further application of a control order would be appropriate.

As I said, control orders have been debated annually, and they have been renewed annually.

[Naomi Long]

Control orders having to be debated annually gives Parliament the opportunity to reconsider the situation before deciding whether to continue. The fact that up to now the control order system has been renewed on each occasion does not mean that it would be so indefinitely. Does it not make sense that we should continue to treat these measures as exceptional, rather than routine?

[Tom Brake]

I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention, which is a very sound one. I hope, and I am sure that the Minister will confirm this when he responds, that because counter-terrorism legislation is so essential, the Government will want to keep it under review, and that if, in future years, there is a need to adjust the measures, appropriate adjustments will be made.

What are the other objections to TPIMs? There is the question of whether there is any difference between reasonable belief and reasonable suspicion. It is my view that the Bill presents a higher evidential hurdle. The courts are aware of that, and they know the difference between those two. That difference is significant.

I acknowledge that TPIMs maintain a system of Executive-imposed measures that do not lie comfortably inside the judicial system. The Bill imposes measures that restrict freedom and human rights. As hon. Members know, those measures include but are not limited to overnight curfews, restrictions on travel, exclusion from certain places and buildings, and restrictions on electronic devices. It has been argued by the Opposition and by Liberty that these measures simply reflect the most offensive aspects of the control order system, but I do not think that that is the case. Clearly, in relation to relocation, internal exile, which the Soviet Union would have been very comfortable with, has gone.

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[Pete Wishart]

That is exactly what is said, and we have heard from a number of contributors this evening that these are people against whom there is not sufficient evidence or evidence of good enough quality for a successful prosecution. We heard the example of an individual who has had a control order against him for two years. His liberty has been compromised for two years because he has not been able to prove his innocence in a court and the state has not been able to prove his guilt. That is at the heart of the matter, which was why the hon. Member for Newark was spot on in his observations about how control orders are operating.

[Naomi Long]

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the debate has been framed in the context of whether we put security before liberty or liberty before security, but that in fact there is a fine balance between the two? By denying liberty we not only radicalise young people into terrorism—we have seen that in Northern Ireland, although I accept that the parallels are not perfect—but provide a concession to terrorists, who are out to remove our liberty.

[Pete Wishart]

The hon. Lady is spot on. I know that every Government do their best to balance the security requirements of the nation and civil liberties. I think that most of what the Labour Government did on civil liberties was totally wrong, and I opposed most of the measures that they took, but I believe that they acted in the best interests of security. However, with the invasion of Iraq they radicalised a generation of international Islamists and Muslims, and they took measures that seemed to be targeted against one specific community in the UK. They fostered resentment and created massive community divisions. They got that utterly and totally wrong.

I thought that the new Government would come in with a new broom. They have done a lot of good things in dismantling the apparatus that Labour put in place, but I wish that they had spent a bit more time on this subject. They still have the opportunity to improve the Bill, and I hope that they will do so in Committee.