Strategic Defence and Security Review

Tobias Ellwood Excerpts

Thursday 26th January 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Murphy]

I am sure the hon. Gentleman will appreciate that I said right at the beginning that I am keen to have a bipartisan approach in Afghanistan, and that will continue. There is sometimes a temptation with these very difficult, often impractical, problems to give in to the temptation to seek and find synthetic differences, but as I have said before at the Dispatch Box it is important that this year there should be a genuine political process to match the military might of the past decade. That did not happen last year, and it should be compulsory this year. The Bonn conference was a failure in that regard, but I did not attack our Government for that from the Dispatch Box because it was an international failure to formulate the political strategy that that country so badly needs.

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

I appreciate that the right hon. Gentleman was not in post during the relevant period, but does he regret not conducting a defence review in the past decade? A review might have helped to identify the fact that Snatch Land Rovers were not appropriate in Afghanistan. We went through a period of bizarre procurement in which the Ridgback, the Cougar, the Vector, the Jackal and the Mastiff were produced one after another and bought off the shelf to try to identify something that would work in Afghanistan. If we had held a defence review, perhaps we would have seen that the conduct and style of war was changing before our eyes and we could then have ensured that we sent our armed forces to Afghanistan with the right equipment.

[Mr Murphy]

The hon. Gentleman has great and varied experience, but I think he will fairly accept that the urgent operational requirements worked well in Afghanistan, and after 9/11 we updated our defence review with a new chapter. In a debate that is intended to be relatively thoughtful rather than our traditional cut and thrust, it is fair to say that the nature of the conflict in Afghanistan changed and surprised many people, including those who were engaged in it day to day. As we reflect on what happened in Afghanistan, it is crucial that we learn deeply the lessons of the conflict, in the hope that we never have to deploy them, but in the fear that on occasion it might become necessary.

I was making the wider point that events in north Africa and the middle east continue to prove the uncertainty and unpredictability of the future shape of conflict. Coupled with the Arab spring, the growing global population, the threat of climate change, new information technology and biotechnologies, nuclear proliferation and cyber-attack, we live in what is, by consensus, an era of dramatic new global security challenges. All that means that it is sensible for the Government to invest the £650 million they have announced for cyber-security. The continuing emphasis on soft power and multilateralism to supplant the inevitable capability shortfalls resulting from spending constraint is vital. It was crucial in good times, but it is compulsory in these difficult times of budget cuts in a world of flux.

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[Thomas Docherty]

I am most grateful to the Minister. He is obviously very clever, because he has led me straight on to my next point, which is about the replacement for the Invincible class, the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carrier. He perhaps forgot to mention that, even some time after 2020, when we eventually get a functioning aircraft carrier, it will only be part-time. We will only be able to operate it for perhaps 150 days of the year, so we must be really hopeful that those who seek to attack us only do it on the five or six months a year when we are able to respond. It reminds me of Asterix the Gaul and the scene where he comes to Britain and the British have gone home at 5 o’clock to have their tea. That is pretty much the kind of part-time Navy that we will have if the Minister gets his way.

[Mr Ellwood]

I was hoping to resist the temptation to intervene, but I want to back up my hon. Friend the Minister and put in perspective the hon. Gentleman’s argument. He is trying to get into the tactics of how a battle is operated. What does he want to fly off these aircraft carriers? I am afraid his Government got rid of the Sea Harriers, so he would not be able to use the Storm Shadow, the Brimstone or any of the guns, because the Harriers did not exist—[Interruption.]

[Thomas Docherty]

I am going to continue with my speech, because it is my time that I am sacrificing. The hon. Gentleman tries to make it a false choice, as he always does, but he was at the heart of the decision making. Let us not forget that he was the Parliamentary Private Secretary to the former Secretary of State. It was his bright idea, I suspect, to get rid of the carrier, because the other Ministers are all far too clever to do that.

The choice between Typhoon, Tornado and Harrier is a false one. I have never accepted and the Defence Committee has never accepted the false choice made by the current Government, following the Treasury-driven cuts. We will see price gouging and there will be a significant rise in the cost of the Queen Elizabeth class carrier, not because of the Aircraft Carrier Alliance—I have some fantastic workers in my constituency, whom the Ministers and others have been to see, and they are delivering in Plymouth, in the north-east, on the Clyde and over at Birkenhead—but because of the rushed decision. We will have to buy cats and traps off-the-shelf from the Americans at a price-gouged cost of up to £2 billion because due diligence was not done on whether it would work. The prices are going up because of the short-term decisions. We have no idea how we will refuel the aircraft because of the decision to switch from the short take off, vertical landing—or STOVL—variant to carriers and that will also involve significant costs.

In the last minute of my time, I want briefly to talk about Scotland. The Scottish National party is not here today because its Members have gone into hiding. The SNP defence policy unravelled last week within hours of its being unveiled. Sheer anger was felt by communities around Scotland at the betrayal by that party, which, after years of claiming that Scotland did not receive what it called its fair share of spending, has admitted that it would spend even less on defence. After campaigning, as the SNP claimed, to save RAF Leuchars, it has announced that it would close RAF Leuchars and RAF Kinloss. In a separate Scotland, there would be no Rosyth dockyard and no Clyde shipbuilding. Companies would be pulling out of Scotland. There are also serious concerns for the rest of the United Kingdom. How would we deliver the deterrent? How would we secure the high north? How would the military be put together?

I hope that one of the Committees of the House will find an opportunity in the months ahead to scrutinise those very important issues.

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[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

I am grateful to catch your eye, Mr Deputy Speaker. Like others, I declare my interest as a member of the Territorial Army. There seem to be enough of us here to form a small platoon, which would perhaps be interesting, although such a platoon would come only from this side of the Chamber. Indeed, there is a noticeable absence of support for today’s debate from the Opposition Benches—[Interruption]—other than from the right hon. Member for Rotherham (Mr MacShane), who has just walked into the Chamber.

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth North (Penny Mordaunt), as well as my hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Rory Stewart), who, with his eloquent speech, raised the standard of this debate—we were getting into the weeds a little bit, talking about the tactics of the SDSR rather than the strategy. We were starting to talk about the individual bits of kit that we enjoy, like or are in love with—we are always quick to quote a retired general or admiral saying, “This is exactly what we need”—rather than stepping back and asking what the strategy is and where we fit in the bigger picture. Fundamentally, the SDSR is about how we protect our people, our allies, our economy and our infrastructure—indeed, our way of life—from the potential risks that we face. It is about how, on occasions working with our allies, we apply the instruments of power to influence and shape the global environment, and how potential tactical threats affect us.

The shadow Secretary of State did not want to get partisan when I intervened on him, but it is important to reflect on what happened over the last decade. Not only did the previous Government not have an SDSR, which was bad time management, but not having one affected our military’s ability to perform. During that decade we saw the September 11 attacks, we were involved in enormous campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, and we had the July 2005 bombings. The type of threat changed, compared with the cold war stance that we were used to. There were huge changes in operational tactics too, with the introduction of drone warfare, advances in missile systems and stealth technology—ways to introduce force multipliers that did not exist before. The conduct of war also changed, with an emphasis on stabilisation operations as much as war fighting, as illustrated in Iraq and Afghanistan. The kinetic phases of those campaigns were over very quickly, but the lack of an unconditional surrender meant that we then got into protracted stabilisation and peacekeeping operations.

I was saddened to visit Sandhurst not long ago and find that it had only just introduced courses in CIMIC—civil-military co-operation—which are required to enable the military to liaise and work with civilian counterparts, NGOs and the Department for International Development in those other operations, which start in the aftermath of the war fighting. That is what we now need to get good at; that is what was missing in Afghanistan and Iraq. Had the Labour Government held a defence review, those issues would have been identified. However, they did not, and we failed to take the opportunity to fundamentally modernise our armed forces. I think the Chilcot inquiry will reflect that. It will show that our armed forces found themselves in two campaigns with the wrong numbers and the wrong equipment, and without a clear strategy.

I firmly agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border about our ability to work more cohesively with other Departments. We need to be able to work with DFID and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to ensure that our strategy—the purpose of sending our military into danger—is absolutely crystal clear. It is clear from General Petraeus’s book on counter-insurgency that it is not enough simply to defeat the enemy; we now have to win over the hearts and minds of the locals—the friends that we are trying to support.

The triangle consisting of security at the top, then governance, followed by development and reconstruction has still not been developed. In Afghanistan, the security aspects took far too long to get right. Huge questions still arise as to why we ended up in Helmand province anyway. Those of us who know the history of that country will be aware of the treaty of Gandamak and the battle of Kandahar. Events such as those tell us that we are not particularly welcome in that patch of Afghanistan, given the history there. There might have been other places in which we could have been more strategically helpful. Lessons have been learned from those engagements and put into practice in Libya, where there has been a far more coherent effort, not only within our own Departments but in regard to whom we work with, including our NATO allies.

Labour missed a massive opportunity to understand what exactly our military are expected to do. Our armed forces were placed in danger and given kit that was out of date. I mentioned Snatch Land Rovers in an intervention. Too often at that time, other bits of kit were thrown at the military for testing, to see whether they would work. They included vehicles such as the Jackal, the Cougar, the Vector and the Ridgback. Eventually, the Mastiff came along and proved to be the most suitable for use in those operations. Things should not have had to work in that way, however. A security strategy could have helped in that context.

Procurement errors have been made. The Nimrod has been mentioned many times in the debate. The contract for its development was signed in 1996, and it was due for delivery in 2003, yet not one aircraft ever received a certificate of airworthiness. The Sea Harriers have been cut, which means that there is now no chance of us ever putting a carrier in. The existing Harriers do not have guns; they do not have the Mauser weapon systems. They cannot carry the Brimstone or the Storm Shadow, yet those missiles were critical to the success of the action in Libya.

We get stuck with certain favourite bits of kit. The Apache is now in a new dimension. It travels at two thirds the speed of the Harrier and fires the Hellfire missile, which is just as potent as any of our other weapons. We hear that the Falklands are under threat. We have an aircraft carrier there, so the base already exists, and it has the Typhoon and the Tornado. The Argentines spend only £3 billion on their defence budget, compared with our £30 billion. I believe that we should place the question of Argentina in a separate context in relation to the SDSR. It is a distraction from where we are going.

Finally, I should like to congratulate the Defence team on what it is doing. I think that we are finally progressing—

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)]

Order.