Defence Reform Bill

Debate between Thomas Docherty and Gerald Howarth

Wednesday 20th November 2013 Commons Chamber

[Sir Gerald Howarth]

My hon. Friend is a gallant and, indeed, very honourable friend, but party politics do come into this from time to time. I cast no aspersions on the shadow Secretary of State, the hon. Member for Gedling (Vernon Coaker), but it is a fact that, sometimes, if the Opposition see an opportunity to defeat the Government, they will use it. That is the way in which our system works, notwithstanding what the shadow Secretary of State has said about the general cross-party agreement on defence. Such agreement never existed when I first came to the House in 1983, so it is refreshing to debate matters in a much more intelligent way than in the mid-1980s.

I will conclude, because others wish to speak. We are not where I particularly would like to be, but the Army is to be commended for its professional approach. My hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury is also to be commended for the lead he has given. Our duty now is to crack on and make this work and, in the meantime, to address some of the longer-term structural issues as we approach the 2015 strategic defence review. I put my right hon. Friends on notice that I want the Conservative party to commit to giving more money to defence and it has to come out of the aid budget or any other budget—frankly, I do not care which. I think that the world is a dangerous place and we need our armed forces. The world has seen how professional they are. They are the finest armed forces in the world and they really can deliver what the Prime Minister wants, which is for this country to help shape the world in which we find ourselves.

[Thomas Docherty (Dunfermline and West Fife) (Lab)]

It is always a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Aldershot (Sir Gerald Howarth), even if I do not agree with everything he says. I wish to speak in favour of new clause 6—in my name and those of the shadow Secretary of State, my hon. Friend the Member for Gedling (Vernon Coaker), and others—and about our broader debate this afternoon.

It is worth reminding the Secretary of State and other right hon. and hon. Members that the British Army is of course Parliament’s Army; it is not the Crown’s Army. That dates back to the so-called Glorious Revolution, which is why we have to have an Armed Forces Act in every Parliament.

Maritime Surveillance

Debate between Thomas Docherty and Gerald Howarth

Thursday 7th February 2013 Westminster Hall

[Thomas Docherty]

I am sure that a previous Minister with responsibility for defence acquisition would always be happy to take responsibility for all the decisions that he made, even if he was not always fully aware of that at the time.

As our report on acquisition makes clear, the MOD must learn the lessons of past acquisition decisions. I think that I speak for the whole Committee when I say that, although we welcome the Government’s progress on acquisition, we are not convinced that they have learned all the lessons yet. There is still more work to be done. Perhaps the Minister will say more about what improvements can be made, in the light of those lessons.

The third responsible party is BAE Systems. It should not sit around and blame the MOD, the RAF and the two Governments, and try to get by without accepting some responsibility for its decisions. The Minister nods, and I welcome the fact that there is acceptance on both sides of the Chamber that BAE was not an exemplar: in much the same way as I have been critical of Lockheed Martin’s approach to the strike fighter, I consider that BAE Systems bears some blame.

[Sir Gerald Howarth (Aldershot) (Con)]

I am not sure that the hon. Gentleman is being entirely fair. The fault on the programme rests wholly and entirely with BAE Systems. It was the design authority on the aircraft and should have understood its technical capabilities. No two wing sets were the same. My right hon. Friend the Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Arbuthnot), the then Minister for Defence Procurement, was perfectly entitled to rely on the bid that was put in and on the advice of the civil servants. It is not fair to blame Ministers. I do not think that it is even fair to blame officials. I think that BAE Systems, as the design authority for that aircraft, is entirely responsible for what ended as a disaster.

[Thomas Docherty]

I am always grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s thoughtful comments. I respectfully disagree, in this sense: I was having a private dinner with members of the defence community last night, and we were talking about lack of intellectual curiosity. There were examples that I shall not go into today, but I think that far too often there is a lack of the intellectual curiosity to challenge defence procurement decisions, among those in uniform, politicians—both in the Committee and perhaps in Departments—and civil servants. Too often, Governments have simply gone along with what they are told. But I absolutely accept the hon. Gentleman’s point that BAE Systems is a major villain in this play. Nevertheless, the current Government need to take some responsibility, and I will explain why shortly.

My hon. Friend the Member for Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock (Sandra Osborne), who has had to step out briefly, talked about Nimrod and the deterrent. I was actually wondering at one point if I had wandered into a deterrent debate. She mentioned Lord Browne of Ladyton, who has been a friend of mine for more than 15 years. I typed up—I will not say that I wrote—his maiden speech for him, back in the days of 7 Millbank, Mr Brady, when you, too, first entered the House. You will remember—it is not so many years ago—Mr Browne, as he was then, as a new MP. I have a huge amount of respect for Lord Browne, but I respectfully disagree with his analysis yesterday in The Daily Telegraph. It was a thoughtful piece, but Lord Browne—who, as I say, I have known for many years and regard as a friend—has a habit of treating a conversation as a one- way talk, and I hope that what he has actually done is to help to stimulate a broader debate.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Gerald Howarth]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for providing me with my cue. It says in the few brief notes that I scribbled down, “Reasons for cancellation”. The first reason for cancellation was indeed that BAE Systems had persistently failed to deliver.

BAE Systems is headquartered in my constituency, and there are people who think that I am in BAE’s pay. Lady Thatcher once said to me, “I hope BAE is still paying you.” BAE Systems has never paid me a penny piece in my life. I think that it is a great company, but on this project, as successive major project reports and National Audit Office reports showed, it failed to deliver. For those who do not understand what I mean when I say that BAE was the design authority—I speak as an aviator—the company is responsible for the design of every bit of the aeroplane. BAE did not even know that the wingsets were about 4 inches different, so it had to more or less hand-make whole new wingsets for each aircraft. That is why I believe the company to be culpable. Yes, I take the point that perhaps more diligence should have been shown by technical officials in the Department, but Ministers cannot be expected to understand all the details of aerodynamics.

[Thomas Docherty]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Gerald Howarth]

I will not, if the hon. Gentleman will forgive me, because I feel passionately about the issue, and I want to get my comments on the record and hear what my right hon. Friend and former esteemed ministerial colleague has to say.

My right hon. Friend the Member for North East Hampshire is right: the aircraft, which was already nine years late, had not been accepted into service by the Royal Air Force. I was told, for example, that it was porpoising through the air, and that BAE was going to deal with that by installing software to make the elevator go up and down. Forgive me, but that is metal against metal. I said to the then Chief of the Air Staff, Sir Glenn Torpy, “It’s going to wear out.” He said, “You don’t need to worry, Gerald,” but I do worry, and I did at the time. I was also told, although I do not know whether it is true, that at a certain high angle of attack, the air flow into the engine intakes was disrupted, which would lead the engine to stall. There were technical problems that were not overcome.

Secondly, as the report mentions, there was a question of finance. Again, I want to put this firmly on record. Leaving aside the £36 billion, £38 billion or whatever black hole it was, whatever chaos there was in the Department’s finances—there was chaos in the MOD’s accounts long before the last Government came into office—the fact is that this Government inherited a budget deficit of £156 billion, and we had to deal with that deficit.

I would not say this to my colleagues, but it might be true of other people listening to this debate: hands up, those who knew what the budget deficit was in 2010. I addressed a land warfare conference of 300 officers. Three put up their hands, and all three got it wrong. They were intelligent people. The country needs to understand. If people do not understand the magnitude of the deficit that we inherited—that £156 billion would have bought us three Type 45 destroyers every week of the year—nothing done in the Ministry of Defence can possibly make any sense whatever.

[Thomas Docherty]

What is it now?

[Sir Gerald Howarth]

The deficit is down, but not far enough, because of the magnitude of the challenge that faced us. Instead of pointing at me, the hon. Gentleman should get up and apologise for what his ghastly, contemptible friend the then Prime Minister did to this country—

[Thomas Docherty]

On a point of order, Mr Brady. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman, for whom I have great respect, is a little over-emotional and will want to withdraw his remarks about my right hon. Friend the Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath (Mr Brown).

[Mr Graham Brady (in the Chair)]

It is always advisable to use temperate language, especially in the Chamber. I am sure that Sir Gerald will wish to do so.

[Sir Gerald Howarth]

I am most grateful, Mr Brady. I just feel nothing but contempt for him. That is a personal view, and if it is unparliamentary, I am sorry.

[Thomas Docherty]

Further to that point of order, Mr Brady. I have been gracious enough to say that I think the hon. Gentleman probably regrets it. Will he now withdraw what he said about my right hon. Friend?

Strategic Defence and Security Review

Debate between Thomas Docherty and Gerald Howarth

Thursday 26th January 2012 Commons Chamber

[Thomas Docherty]

My hon. Friend is right. The Times paints a disturbing picture today. We on the Defence Committee and the wider defence community have for some time had serious concerns about the capability of Lockheed Martin to fulfil the aspirations set out. When the Minister appeared before the Defence Committee, it was disturbing that he adopted a relatively blasé approach to the problem, in direct contradiction to the postures of Secretary Gates, who has already been name-checked, and Secretary Panetta, who have been turning the screws on Lockheed Martin. As the decision has been rushed, we might have to go back and reverse it, and go to the F-35B, which would be not only embarrassing but a vast waste of money. We have only two other options: as my hon. Friend says, the F-18 Super Hornet, a proven air frame, of which the Australians have just ordered additional quantities, and for which Secretary Panetta has announced an additional order, or the French variant, which, to be fair, would at least solve the Charles de Gaulle issue.

On the carriers themselves, it is no secret that I have absolute scorn for the decision that was taken to take the Invincible class out of service. In fact, despite the claim of a minority on the Government Benches that the Libyan operation justifies the decision, the reverse is true, as it demonstrates absolutely the need for carrier capability throughout the decade.

[Mr Gerald Howarth]

indicated dissent.

[Thomas Docherty]

The Minister shakes his head. Perhaps it would help him if I were to quote the commander of the Italian navy, Rear Admiral Treu, who said:

“Libya is really showing that these aircraft”

the Harrier—

“and their carrier are needed. They are five minutes from the operational zone, which reduces fuel consumption and wear and tear. With less reliance on in-flight refuelling, it is easier to do dynamic tasking and shift operation, and they cost less to operate than Tornados and Eurofighters”.

I have the greatest respect for the Minister and I know he cares passionately about the future of aviation. He has been a strong voice in the Government—dare I say, one of the few strong voices for the defence industry in the Government—but what does he know that our First Sea Lord, our commanders in the field and our allies do not?

[Mr Gerald Howarth]

I am most grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his kind tribute, although I am not sure whether it will be career enhancing. Nevertheless I will take it in the spirit in which it was given. Of course carriers would have been advantageous, but they were not necessary in the circumstances of Libya. The Government are going ahead with the Queen Elizabeth and Prince of Wales carriers precisely because we understand the need for carrier strike. We had endless debates about that in the SDSR and we came to that conclusion, which is the right one in my view. In Libya, however, we did not need carriers; HMS Ocean did a great job for the Army Air Corps Apaches.

[Thomas Docherty]

I am most grateful to the Minister. He is obviously very clever, because he has led me straight on to my next point, which is about the replacement for the Invincible class, the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carrier. He perhaps forgot to mention that, even some time after 2020, when we eventually get a functioning aircraft carrier, it will only be part-time. We will only be able to operate it for perhaps 150 days of the year, so we must be really hopeful that those who seek to attack us only do it on the five or six months a year when we are able to respond. It reminds me of Asterix the Gaul and the scene where he comes to Britain and the British have gone home at 5 o’clock to have their tea. That is pretty much the kind of part-time Navy that we will have if the Minister gets his way.

UK Military Basing Review

Debate between Thomas Docherty and Gerald Howarth

Tuesday 1st March 2011 Westminster Hall

[Mr Howarth]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend. I had the benefit of visiting Kinloss and Marham, so I am acutely aware of the assets of both bases. All I can say to her is that final decisions have not yet been made. I will come back to that point later on. Ministers will make the decisions based on military advice as well as detailed investment appraisals. I am afraid that that is as far as I can go to reassure her today.

I shall continue on the economic legacy we inherited. In defence, the consequences of 13 years of the catastrophic mismanagement I mentioned a moment ago are more severe than in any other area. Labour allowed a black hole of £38 billion to build up in the forward defence programme, over half of which was made up of equipment and support, with no plans in place to fund it. Restoring the nation’s finances is not only critical for the health of our economy and for the future funding of public services, but essential for national security, because a weak economy creates a national security risk.

Every Department has had to make its own contribution to reduce the staggering budget deficit we inherited, and the Ministry of Defence is required to shoulder its share of the burden. However, due to the priority we place on security, the defence budget is making a more modest contribution to deficit reduction than many other Departments. Even so, we are not immune from tough decisions. Some of the toughest decisions were about the Royal Air Force’s structure, not least the future of Nimrod.

There is no doubt that the Nimrod MRA4 would have performed an important role. It would have contributed to a wide range of military tasks. We have sought to mitigate the gap in capability through the use of other military assets such as frigates, helicopters, and C-130 Hercules aircraft. We will also request, where appropriate, assistance from allies and partners. However, it is important to remember that the country has been without Nimrod since March 2010. That was when the previous Government withdrew the Nimrod MR2 from service, so this was not a decision of this Government alone.

Why was that necessary? As the hon. Member for Moray knows only too well, the original plan conceived in 1996 was for 21 aircraft to be delivered in 2003—eight years ago. By the time the new Government took office in 2010, the programme had already been reduced to nine aircraft, was almost £800 million over budget and had seen the unit cost of each aircraft rise by 200% from £133 million to £455 million. At the time of the review, a number of design faults had been identified on the first MRA4 aircraft, which would have taken additional time and money to resolve. The headquarters of the contractor, BAE Systems, is in my constituency yet, as the hon. Member for Moray knows perfectly well, that has not stopped me being a vocal critic of its performance on this programme.

As we all know, the decision to scrap Nimrod was not the only difficult decision facing the RAF: the fast-jet fleet of Harrier and Tornado air defence was also affected. The RAF now plans to make a transition to a fast-jet force comprising the Typhoon and the joint strike fighter by 2021. Those were decisions about military capability and priorities. An inevitable consequence was that the RAF no longer requires RAF Kinloss and two other bases. I need to emphasise that—no longer required by the RAF. That does not mean that they are no longer required by defence. I will take the opportunity now to say again that we have not yet taken a decision about the long-term future of RAF Kinloss or any other air base as a result of the strategic defence and security review.

As Members will be aware, another major decision of the SDSR was to return to the UK 20,000 service personnel from Germany, with the intention of returning half by 2015 and the remaining personnel by 2020. Like all other parts of the public sector, defence is looking hard at its land holdings to ensure that we are using them as efficiently as possible. We have the cancellation of Nimrod, a rationalised fast-jet fleet, the return of large numbers of personnel from Germany, and a requirement to realise better value for money and efficiencies through broader estate rationalisation.

[Thomas Docherty (Dunfermline and West Fife) (Lab)]

I have tabled parliamentary questions on the issue of the returning personnel from Germany. I discovered from the Minister for the Armed Forces that there have been absolutely no discussions with Scottish Ministers or the Department of Education in England about the capacity of any of the RAF bases to take the 7,000 children coming back from Germany. Does the Minister not accept that it looks like this is a political decision, not a fact-based decision?

[Mr Howarth]

The hon. Gentleman makes a point that I am about to make, which is that all I have said adds up to an extremely complex piece of work. He is right. Where the children are to be educated and which base may be best suited to a land army operation are not decisions that can be made on the back of a fag packet. They clearly require considerable thought. I will come on to that again in a moment.