The Economy

Debate between Thérèse Coffey and Nick Raynsford

Wednesday 22nd June 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Nick Raynsford (Greenwich and Woolwich) (Lab)]

May I draw attention to my interests as registered in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests?

My remarks will concentrate on the housing market, their theme being that that sector, which is fundamental to the healthy operation of the overall British economy, and after showing good signs of a recovery a year ago, is currently stagnant. It is in an extremely parlous position, and there is no evidence of the growth that is fundamental to delivering the jobs and the future prosperity that we need, but while the Government continue with their current policies, we will continue to see a seriously underperforming housing market which, in turn, will contribute to a seriously underperforming British economy.

The interrelationship between the housing market and the wider economy is widely understood. The recession of 2008 had its origins very much in housing. We saw the beginnings in the American subprime housing crisis; the contagion spread rapidly; and it was no coincidence that Northern Rock constituted the first evidence in the UK of the problems that were to engulf us. The crisis was the product of unsustainable lending that had fuelled an unsustainable bubble in this country and a number of others, and the consequences were dire.

That was not the first time we have seen such a process of adjustment after unsustainable growth in the housing market. It has been a pattern over the past 40 years, because there were growth bubbles in the 1970s, the 1980s and the mid-2000s. However, unlike the adjustment after the bubble of the Lawson boom in the late 1980s, the consequences for the public of the recent adjustment—which was painful in many ways and had a dramatic impact, as house prices fell by some 20% and the output of new homes fell by slightly more than a half—were far less damaging and severe than those of the previous recession of 1990-91.

Repossessions have been mentioned, and the following is very telling. Although in 1990-91 repossessions reached some 75,000 annually, with the disaster and tragedy for all people affected matched of course by a huge incidence of negative equity, this time, although the fall in the value of houses was more extreme, the level of repossessions was very much lower—peaking at about 40,000 and falling away, although, sadly, the evidence is that it is rising again—and the problem of negative equity did not blight the lives of millions of people as it did during the 1990s. The difference was that the Government and the Monetary Policy Committee had recognised the importance of swift and clear action to respond to the unprecedented challenges of the recession—through low interest rates plus a series of measures designed to restore confidence in the market, and through public sector investment to help to mitigate the impacts of the declines of private investment and people to retain their homes rather than suffering repossession. All those actions helped to mitigate the impacts of recession.

[Dr Thérèse Coffey (Suffolk Coastal) (Con)]

I recognise that the low interest rate is one of the reasons that the number of repossessions was so low. On the other hand, the Monetary Policy Committee’s remit was to tackle inflation, and yet we are now seeing the challenges that an ongoing low interest rate present to people on fixed incomes, whom he seeks to defend because they are suffering as a result.

[Mr Raynsford]

I will not go into a detailed diversion on the whole issue of inflation. The Governor of the Bank of England has made very clear his view that the inflationary factors are not such as to create a fear of long-term damaging consequences and that it is right and appropriate to maintain the low-interest regime to ensure that we do not damage further the prospects for growth—the main theme of my remarks.