The Economy

Nick Raynsford Excerpts

Wednesday 22nd June 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Nick Raynsford (Greenwich and Woolwich) (Lab)]

May I draw attention to my interests as registered in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests?

My remarks will concentrate on the housing market, their theme being that that sector, which is fundamental to the healthy operation of the overall British economy, and after showing good signs of a recovery a year ago, is currently stagnant. It is in an extremely parlous position, and there is no evidence of the growth that is fundamental to delivering the jobs and the future prosperity that we need, but while the Government continue with their current policies, we will continue to see a seriously underperforming housing market which, in turn, will contribute to a seriously underperforming British economy.

The interrelationship between the housing market and the wider economy is widely understood. The recession of 2008 had its origins very much in housing. We saw the beginnings in the American subprime housing crisis; the contagion spread rapidly; and it was no coincidence that Northern Rock constituted the first evidence in the UK of the problems that were to engulf us. The crisis was the product of unsustainable lending that had fuelled an unsustainable bubble in this country and a number of others, and the consequences were dire.

That was not the first time we have seen such a process of adjustment after unsustainable growth in the housing market. It has been a pattern over the past 40 years, because there were growth bubbles in the 1970s, the 1980s and the mid-2000s. However, unlike the adjustment after the bubble of the Lawson boom in the late 1980s, the consequences for the public of the recent adjustment—which was painful in many ways and had a dramatic impact, as house prices fell by some 20% and the output of new homes fell by slightly more than a half—were far less damaging and severe than those of the previous recession of 1990-91.

Repossessions have been mentioned, and the following is very telling. Although in 1990-91 repossessions reached some 75,000 annually, with the disaster and tragedy for all people affected matched of course by a huge incidence of negative equity, this time, although the fall in the value of houses was more extreme, the level of repossessions was very much lower—peaking at about 40,000 and falling away, although, sadly, the evidence is that it is rising again—and the problem of negative equity did not blight the lives of millions of people as it did during the 1990s. The difference was that the Government and the Monetary Policy Committee had recognised the importance of swift and clear action to respond to the unprecedented challenges of the recession—through low interest rates plus a series of measures designed to restore confidence in the market, and through public sector investment to help to mitigate the impacts of the declines of private investment and people to retain their homes rather than suffering repossession. All those actions helped to mitigate the impacts of recession.

[Dr Thérèse Coffey (Suffolk Coastal) (Con)]

I recognise that the low interest rate is one of the reasons that the number of repossessions was so low. On the other hand, the Monetary Policy Committee’s remit was to tackle inflation, and yet we are now seeing the challenges that an ongoing low interest rate present to people on fixed incomes, whom he seeks to defend because they are suffering as a result.

[Mr Raynsford]

I will not go into a detailed diversion on the whole issue of inflation. The Governor of the Bank of England has made very clear his view that the inflationary factors are not such as to create a fear of long-term damaging consequences and that it is right and appropriate to maintain the low-interest regime to ensure that we do not damage further the prospects for growth—the main theme of my remarks.

[Kelvin Hopkins]

I am listening to my right hon. Friend with interest, and I agree with what he is saying. While the interest rate reduction has helped on this occasion, on the previous occasion under the exchange rate mechanism strategy the deflationary effects of high interest rates created 1 million extra unemployed, and that unemployment, certainly in my constituency, caused many people to hand over their keys and walk away from their mortgages.

[Mr Raynsford]

My hon. Friend makes an important point. These factors are all interrelated. The lower impact of unemployment in this latest recession, compared with those of the 1980s and the 1990s, is undoubtedly one of the factors that has contributed to its having less severe consequences.

A year ago, before the Chancellor presented his first Budget, we were seeing recovery in the housing market. New housing starts were beginning to rise and confidence was returning, and it was reasonable to expect that real growth would be sustained through 2010 and 2011. Instead, the market has stalled. Prices are static or slightly falling. There has been a continuing very low level of starts, and consumer confidence is at catastrophic levels. For only the third time in its 37-year history, the GfK NOP consumer confidence barometer has been below the -30% level. That is an indication of just how devastating is the lack of confidence in current market circumstances.

Why are we in this situation? In part, it is the consequence of the Chancellor’s overall economic strategy and the way in which he is managing the British economy and damaging confidence. The confidence issue is not unique to the housing market. It is a much wider issue, as everyone will recognise, although it has a devastating consequence for the housing market. The situation is also the consequence of maladroit policies being pursued by the Government. I would be interested to know how the Chancellor approaches the Localism Bill, which his colleagues from the Department for Communities and Local Government are taking through Parliament with the confident claim that it will devolve more and more control to local neighbourhoods to be able to say no to developments that they do not like. As we heard in his latest Budget, he wants the default position on housing and other planning applications to be yes, but I am afraid that the truth is that most of the communities who have been given the prospect of far greater control over planning decisions want the default position to be no. There is a fundamental tension between the growth aspirations that he talks about and the actions of this Government, which are in many ways damaging growth.

[Henry Smith (Crawley) (Con)]

Does the right hon. Gentleman concede that during the last decade of the Labour Government housing starts were at their lowest since the 1920s because of top-down planning control that did not work?

[Mr Raynsford]

The hon. Gentleman should be aware that during the period leading up to the recession we saw a continual increase in housing output. Net additions to the housing stock—the measure favoured by the DCLG as the best and most accurate measure—showed growth of 10,000 to 15,000 a year from 2001 to 2007. In 2007, net additions to the housing stock, at over 200,000, were the highest for 20 years. That was the position: there was a growth trend. We were seeing increased housing output and getting near to the target of 230,000 homes that the Barker report had indicated was necessary. All that has been put at risk. The number of new starts is now only just over 100,000; consumer confidence is absolutely shattered, as I have described; and the confidence of developers is severely damaged by the fear of such maladroit changes to the planning regime.

We have also seen inept cuts in public expenditure. The Homes and Communities Agency played an absolutely vital role in helping the housing sector through the crisis of the recession and giving confidence back to developers through schemes such as Kickstart and HomeBuy Direct and investment in housing associations. All those programmes have been cut back, except one. Six months after HomeBuy Direct was cut, the Government realised that they had made a terrible mistake, so they rebadged it as Firststart, or something like that. However, I am afraid that the others have gone, and the investment levels of the Homes and Communities Agency, at 65% below what they were under the previous Government, mean that the outlook for affordable and social housing is extremely grim.

We have a Government who talk about growth, but their actions are damaging to growth. The housing market, as a microcosm of the overall economy, shows that while current policies continue we have no prospect of getting the growth we need, the homes we need, and the jobs that will come from that, because the housing market has huge multiplier consequences for the economy as a whole. I hope that the Chancellor will not continue to base his case merely on the arithmetic of deficit and will look at what is happening in the real economy and the damage that his policies are doing.