The Economy

Kelvin Hopkins Excerpts

Wednesday 22nd June 2011 Commons Chamber

[Ed Balls]

In a moment I will deal with the parallel with the United Kingdom. Let me say first, however, that the lesson of history shows that it is not possible to deal with a solvency crisis by providing liquidity package after liquidity package, because that does not reach the heart of the issue. On the contrary, it makes the position worse and worse. At some point people will have to face up to that. Package after package has been agreed, but that has not worked. The debt has not gone down; it has gone up.

History teaches us that three things are necessary to the credibility of a plan, whether it involves monetary policy or fiscal policy. First, the plan must be for the medium term; secondly, there must be political support for it; and thirdly, it must work. If it does not work, that will eventually rebound on political support, as we have seen in Greece in recent weeks.

[Kelvin Hopkins (Luton North) (Lab)]

I entirely agree with what my right hon. Friend has said about both Greece and the need for a plan, but if a plan is to be implemented the country concerned must have control of its exchange rates, interest rates and fiscal policy, and that is not possible inside the eurozone.

[Ed Balls]

Let me deal with precisely that point by returning to the subject of the United Kingdom. Notwithstanding what I consider to be a rather tawdry attempt to use what seems to be a political claim that a sovereign debt crisis exists here in the UK to give the Liberal Democrats an excuse to ditch everything in their manifesto and support a Conservative party policy, the fact is that the plan is not working here either.

The Chancellor likes to play this game. A few weeks ago, he told the “Politics Show” that if he “abandoned” his plan,

“Within minutes Britain would be in financial turmoil.”

As I have just said, the Greek Prime Minister’s experience shows that simply talking tough does not make someone credible and does not boost market confidence if the plan is not working.

The reason why there is now a question mark over the Chancellor’s credibility is that in recent weeks and months we have had an economy that has not been growing; fewer people in work and paying tax than there should be; and more people on benefits than there should be. That makes it harder to get the deficit down. We have had stagnant output for six months and we have forecasts being downgraded left, right and centre. This is not about bad news now and short-term pain. All that makes it harder to get the deficit down and undermines our long-term credibility, investment and confidence. As the former chief economist at the Cabinet Office, who is now head of the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, said:

“You do not gain credibility by sticking to a strategy that isn’t working.”

That is the situation we are now in.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Osborne]

We all read those papers in The Daily Telegraph. They revealed that the shadow Chancellor knew before the then Chancellor of the Exchequer came to the House of Commons that the 10p tax rate that Labour Members all voted for would hit the poorest in our country.

[Kelvin Hopkins]

rose—

[Mr Osborne]

The hon. Gentleman may not have voted for it, but the rest of his colleagues did. That is the absolutely astonishing revelation from those papers.

[Kelvin Hopkins]

I hope the Chancellor will not describe me as a henchman. Writing yesterday, Lord Skidelsky said that taking £112 billion out of the economy in the next four years will be a massive fiscal contraction, and he described it as

“the royal road to stagnation, not recovery.”

What does the right hon. Gentleman have to say to Lord Skidelsky?

--- Later in debate ---

[Kelvin Hopkins]

I am listening to my right hon. Friend with interest, and I agree with what he is saying. While the interest rate reduction has helped on this occasion, on the previous occasion under the exchange rate mechanism strategy the deflationary effects of high interest rates created 1 million extra unemployed, and that unemployment, certainly in my constituency, caused many people to hand over their keys and walk away from their mortgages.

[Mr Raynsford]

My hon. Friend makes an important point. These factors are all interrelated. The lower impact of unemployment in this latest recession, compared with those of the 1980s and the 1990s, is undoubtedly one of the factors that has contributed to its having less severe consequences.

A year ago, before the Chancellor presented his first Budget, we were seeing recovery in the housing market. New housing starts were beginning to rise and confidence was returning, and it was reasonable to expect that real growth would be sustained through 2010 and 2011. Instead, the market has stalled. Prices are static or slightly falling. There has been a continuing very low level of starts, and consumer confidence is at catastrophic levels. For only the third time in its 37-year history, the GfK NOP consumer confidence barometer has been below the -30% level. That is an indication of just how devastating is the lack of confidence in current market circumstances.

Why are we in this situation? In part, it is the consequence of the Chancellor’s overall economic strategy and the way in which he is managing the British economy and damaging confidence. The confidence issue is not unique to the housing market. It is a much wider issue, as everyone will recognise, although it has a devastating consequence for the housing market. The situation is also the consequence of maladroit policies being pursued by the Government. I would be interested to know how the Chancellor approaches the Localism Bill, which his colleagues from the Department for Communities and Local Government are taking through Parliament with the confident claim that it will devolve more and more control to local neighbourhoods to be able to say no to developments that they do not like. As we heard in his latest Budget, he wants the default position on housing and other planning applications to be yes, but I am afraid that the truth is that most of the communities who have been given the prospect of far greater control over planning decisions want the default position to be no. There is a fundamental tension between the growth aspirations that he talks about and the actions of this Government, which are in many ways damaging growth.