Streatham Incident

Debate between Suella Braverman and Robert Buckland

Monday 3rd February 2020 Commons Chamber

[Robert Buckland]

I am very glad that the right hon. Gentleman asked me that question because it allows me to develop part two of the point. He will have noticed in the years since the debate on TPIMs a welcome increase in the number of prosecutions for offences of terrorism. I have always believed, as I think he does, that the best way to deal with this type of offender is prosecution. The number of returning foreign fighters who have been prosecuted—I personally granted consent to a large number of prosecutions when I was Solicitor General—means that we have had an increasing number of that cohort in our prisons. It is as a result of conviction that they are on sentences, rather than part of that control order regime. I am afraid that he is choosing to ignore this point: it was a system that we had to change and I do not think it was the wrong thing to do.

[Suella Braverman (Fareham) (Con)]

When I was Treasury counsel, I acted for the Government in various parole cases in which the Human Rights Act 1998 was often a feature. Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that strained interpretations of the Human Rights Act have served to undermine the delicate balance of rights versus responsibility, and that we now need an approach that means that national security and public safety will never be jeopardised?

[Robert Buckland]

My hon. Friend speaks with considerable experience. Human rights are there to protect us all. They should never be a means of enhancing the rights of those who would wish us ill. Therefore, while it is important that we have that underpinning framework, we must make sure that the balance is always struck in the interests of the protection of the public when it comes to serious violent and terrorist offenders.

Investigatory Powers Bill (Fifteenth sitting)

Debate between Suella Braverman and Robert Buckland

Committee Debate: 15th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 3rd May 2016 Public Bill Committees

[The Solicitor General]

On the face of it, that has to follow. If any clarification is needed on that, I am sure I can assist as I further develop my remarks.

I was dealing with the process of consultation before the giving of a notice, and we have had the Apple example. I would like to develop the importance of the draft codes of practice, which the hon. and learned Gentleman has referred to.

[Suella Fernandes (Fareham) (Con)]

The Solicitor General is talking about the power of review in clause 220, which should be read with the power to issue notices. That is important because it obliges the Secretary of State to consult the technical advisory board and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. That process was endorsed by EE, a communications service provider, in its evidence to the Joint Committee on this very point.

[The Solicitor General]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend, who provides an example of the sort of dialogue that will be very much part of the process. There will not be mere diktat without further discussion. I was about to develop that point in the context of the draft codes of practice, because they make it clear that should a telecoms operator have concerns about the reasonableness, cost or technical feasibility of any requirements set out in a notice, which of course would include any obligations to remove encryption, they should be raised during the consultation process. That is the dialogue that we have talked about. Also, a telecommunications operator that is given a technical capability notice may refer any aspect of it—again, I gave an example earlier—including obligations relating to removal of encryption, back to the Secretary of State for review. We have dealt with the consultation process set out in the Bill.

The Bill makes it absolutely clear that in line with current practice, obligations placed on telecommunications operators to remove encryption may relate only to encryption by or on behalf of the Government. That is the point I was making about subsection (4).

Investigatory Powers Bill (Fourteenth sitting)

Debate between Suella Braverman and Robert Buckland

Committee Debate: 14th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 28th April 2016 Public Bill Committees

[The Solicitor General]

I am grateful to the hon. and learned Lady for the way in which she has sought to persuade the Committee of her case. She is quite right that the IPT has an inquisitorial procedure rather than an adversarial one, but it still needs a claimant. It would be wholly inappropriate if the commissioner ended up being the complainant and therefore a party to the proceedings. With respect to her and those who proposed the amendment, although I appreciate their intentions, they mischaracterise the process. There will indeed be a claimant, but that will be the individual or body that is the subject of the error. Where the error is serious, the judicial commissioner will inform that person or body of their right to apply to the IPT for a remedy. As all authorities are already required to provide the IPT with all the information it needs in the course of its investigations, it is difficult to see the benefit of the amendment.

[Suella Fernandes (Fareham) (Con)]

Does my hon. and learned Friend agree that the heavy common law duty of candour on the authorities that will be the subject of such inquiries is applicable to these jurisdictions? Those authorities will have to disclose everything, even if that militates against the applicability of their evidence. That position was endorsed by the divisional court in the case of Chatwani.

[The Solicitor General]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for reminding us about the duty of candour that applies to public bodies, which is of course material.

In addition, the clause has already been amended, pursuant to the Joint Committee’s recommendation 59, to make it clear that a commissioner does not need to consult the Secretary of State before sharing information with or providing assistance to the IPT. That is provided for in clause 199(4) and may well address many of the concerns raised by the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West about the Secretary of State being some sort of bar to proper disclosure and sharing of information. That is not the case under the Bill as already amended. As for providing the IPT with all information relating to relevant errors, as I have said, courts and tribunals cannot and will not consider those issues without a party first having brought a claim.

Within the framework of the clause, we have the necessary structure for proper and frank disclosure to the IPT by the commissioners of relevant material that will assist any party in bringing an action where they have been subject to an error or some form of wrong. To conflate the two would lead to more confusion and would be unnecessary. With respect, I urge the hon. and learned Lady to withdraw the amendment.

Investigatory Powers Bill (Seventh sitting)

Debate between Suella Braverman and Robert Buckland

Committee Debate: 7th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 19th April 2016 Public Bill Committees

[The Solicitor General]

I am grateful to the hon. and learned Lady for her amendment and her observations, because they give me an opportunity to remind the Committee how important the single point of contact system is, and how envied it is by other parts of the world. Those are not just my words; paragraph 9.93 of David Anderson’s important report, “A Question of Trust” states:

“As to the authorisation of communications data requests, the police took a good deal of pride in the SPoC system, which was said to be ‘the envy of many friendly countries’.”

Mr Anderson makes a particularly important observation in paragraph 9.94, when he states:

“Within law enforcement generally, it was felt that SPoCs should have strong relationships with the investigators and this was more likely to happen where they were part of the same organisation, working to the same goal (albeit with distinct and independent responsibilities).”

I will finish the paragraph:

“Their effectiveness as a ‘guardian and gatekeeper’ could however diminish were they to become simply part of the investigation team”.

Here the hon. and learned Lady’s point is a strong one, but it has to be observed in the right context, which is that of the investigation. I absolutely agree with her about the importance of having an arm’s length approach, which is why the designated senior officer who is allowed to authorise an application must not be part of that operation. The draft code of practice contains helpful guidance from paragraph 4.28 to paragraph 4.47, and paragraph 4.48 then deals with the question of the designation of a single responsible officer.

Therefore, in the light of all the careful consideration that has been given to this tried and tested system, I argue that the balance is being properly struck here. Indeed, the extensive benefit and the safeguarding mechanism which the SPOC role brings to this process has been recognised by the Interception of Communications Commissioner, who in his report of March 2015 described the SPOC role as “a stringent safeguard”. These are people who are specially trained in the acquisition of communications data.

[Suella Fernandes (Fareham) (Con)]

I reiterate that this point was made very clearly by Michael Atkinson of the National Police Council’s Data Communications Group. He described the role of the SPOC as being “independent of the investigation” and subject to IOCCO inspections. They would also be regularly overseen, scrutinised and challenged on their work. So there is a very robust system of oversight and review, is there not?

[The Solicitor General]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. It is that oversight which I argue establishes the essential checks and balances here, to prevent the sort of abuse about which all of us on the Committee would, rightly, be worried. These are sensitive matters.

Investigatory Powers Bill (Fifth sitting)

Debate between Suella Braverman and Robert Buckland

Committee Debate: 5th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 14th April 2016 Public Bill Committees

[The Solicitor General]

What I would say to the hon. and learned Gentleman is that I am afraid we are forgetting the context. The mischief that he wants to deal with is that somehow an applicant for a warrant has got something in through the back door—it is too loose, too wide, and modification therefore becomes, in effect, a way of getting round the whole system. I do not believe, given my understanding of both the code of practice as drafted and of the proposed legislation as drafted, that we will get near to that nightmare scenario.

A section 15 warrant can be about an organisation. The point that I am seeking to make is that we are already in the realms of thematics, and therefore if someone has a warrant that has been drafted specifically, the process must be started again if they want to include other individuals.

May I deal with the question of the ability to modify warrants themselves? I do not think anybody is saying there should not be an ability to modify warrants; that was not part of the recommendations of any of the Committees that we know about. Also, of course, such a change would be a very significant reduction in the operational effectiveness of the warrantry process. It would mean, for example, that it would be necessary to seek new warrants each and every time it was identified that an intercepted target got a new telephone or a new phone number. I am afraid that would slow down the process, and we think there is a significant danger that investigative and intelligence opportunities would be lost.

I am not accusing anybody on this Committee of wanting to do anything to endanger an investigation or indeed lives, but we have got to think about this issue in that context. Therefore, getting the balance right is quite clearly what we all want to do.

[Suella Fernandes (Fareham) (Con)]

I sat on the Joint Committee that took evidence from the professionals on the front line, so I know that that very point was emphasised time and again. To quote some of the senior police officers, they are struggling to keep up with the serious criminals and the terrorists, who change their numbers and set up new email addresses and new technological addresses and identities. It is absolutely vital that we do not tie the hands of the police even further.

[The Solicitor General]

I thank my hon. Friend for the work she did with other colleagues on that important Committee. Of course, the context is that applications will be made on the basis of a warrant that has itself already gone through the double-lock procedure and that has already passed the tests that we know will be applied—that it is necessary and proportionate in the particular context of the case that is being dealt with.

Investigatory Powers Bill (Fourth sitting)

Debate between Suella Braverman and Robert Buckland

Committee Debate: 4th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 12th April 2016 Public Bill Committees

[The Solicitor General]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Owen, for the first time in what I am sure will be a number of important sittings.

May I address the amendment moved by the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras? I am grateful to him for rightly pointing our way to paragraph 4.7 of the draft code. Indeed, by reference, paragraph 4.8 gives a clear basis for the decision maker to assess the nature of the proportionality. Therein lies something of the problem with regard to the approach to be taken in the clause. It is tempting, on the face of it, to include the test in the primary legislation, but it might provoke more questions than answers.

Naturally, when one makes a bald statement about proportionality, people want to know more, so where does one end in terms of adding to the primary legislation the detail that is necessary for decision makers to reach a considered conclusion? My simple argument is that the amendments therefore are not necessary. What makes this the right balance is the combination of the primary legislation that sets out the framework and a living document—the code of practice—that will be more easily amendable and accessible in terms of any changes that need to be made in the light of experience and practice.

We do not want to end up with a situation where this type of warrantry can only be obtained when all other avenues have been exhausted, a bit like the position when one comes to an ombudsman. That would be an artificial scenario to end up with and would cause problems operationally. I can think of examples where the exhaustion of other avenues will just not be practicable. For example, in a kidnap situation where an individual’s life might be in danger, this type of warrantry would probably be the most appropriate step to take before any other type of intervention. Of course, there are occasions where other means of intelligence gathering, such as live human intelligence sources, might be high-risk or result in a higher degree of collateral inclusion.

I am concerned that we do not end up, despite the best intentions of the hon. and learned Gentleman, with an inflexible approach on the face of primary legislation. It is far better, in my submission, to keep the balance as it is, as clearly outlined in the code of practice and the framework within the clause.

[Suella Fernandes]

I echo everything that the Solicitor General says. Is not the amendment trite, in that it is clear for any practitioner, judge or decision maker that the question in the amendment—whether the information sought could reasonably be obtained by other less intrusive means—is part and parcel of, and essential to, the proportionality test?

[The Solicitor General]

My hon. Friend makes a powerful point. There is a danger when dealing with primary legislation of gilding the lily. I mean that in the spirit of co-operation that I know we have managed to engender in these debates, in the main. For those reasons, I respectfully ask the hon. and learned Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

They will have access to all the material that the primary decision maker has. The hon. and learned Lady is right to ask the question but, simply speaking, the judicial commissioner will have access to the material that the Secretary of State has. In fact, the judicial commissioner will be able to ask for more material, so there should not be any fear that the vacuum she mentioned will exist in relation to the judicial lock.

Returning to the obvious experience of judicial commissioners, I am keen to ensure that we end up in a position where commissioners feel that, on a case-by-case basis, they are not only free to agree with the Secretary of State, but are absolutely free to disagree. If there is not that element of flexibility, this double lock will be meaningless. Again, without casting any imputation upon the good intentions of those who have tabled amendments, my concern is that, first, this amendment is based on a difference of opinion on the nature of the judicial commissioner stage. Secondly, there is a danger that we might end up in a position where decisions are being second-guessed in a way with which the judiciary would feel uncomfortable, and where the balance between the actions of the Executive and proper scrutiny by the judiciary is not clearly delineated.

[Suella Fernandes]

Does my hon. and learned Friend agree that a similar inclusion of a reference to judicial review has worked well in other legislation and in other regimes, such as in relation to control orders and terrorism prevention and investigation measures? We have a history of such references not causing major problems.

[The Solicitor General]

I entirely agree with my hon. Friend. It would not be right for me to make an easy draw-across to the TPIM regime. The hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras has experience of TPIMs, and I was on the Bill Committee that passed the TPIM law back in 2011, so I have a keen interest in the evolution from what were control orders to TPIMs. The point is staring us all in the face: myriad different circumstances will confront judicial commissioners. It would be too easy for the Committee to come to a conclusion that, somehow, we should create an artificially hard and fast set of criteria that would prevent the judicial commissioners from exercising their duties when considering the varying scale and nature of the applications that they will receive.

Investigatory Powers Bill (Second sitting)

Debate between Suella Braverman and Robert Buckland

Thursday 24th March 2016 Public Bill Committees

[The Solicitor General]

Q But you appreciate the problem that we have in getting this right.

Lord Judge: I do, but that is what Parliament is for. We have to decide what the law should be. I myself would like the law on this issue to be absolutely unequivocal, whatever Parliament or the House of Commons ultimately want.

Sir Stanley Burnton: We wonder what the function of clause 196(6) is. It is either telling a judge the obvious or it is a big stick to wave at the judge, to say, “You have to approve this because if you don’t, you’ll be jeopardising the success of an intelligence operation.”

[Suella Fernandes]

Q Building on the point made by the Solicitor General, clause 21 sets out the “necessary” and “proportionate” tests. We have heard a lot about those words. What questions do you ask when you are assessing proportionality? What is that analysis?

Sir Stanley Burnton: You are looking at the effect of the measure in question as against alternatives and as against the mischief that is aimed at—are we talking about saving life, or it just a matter of money? If it is money, is it a lot of money? Is it pensioners’ money or the Government’s? You weigh one up against the other, and in the end, it is a matter of assessment—looking at one and looking at the other.