Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism

Debate between Suella Braverman and Layla Moran

Wednesday 13th September 2023 Commons Chamber

[The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Suella Braverman)]

I beg to move,

That the draft Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2023, which was laid before this House on 6 September, be approved.

Before getting into the detail of the order, I take this opportunity to apologise to the House and to you, Mr Deputy Speaker, for the fact that news of my decision, which we are here to debate, became public before the order was laid.

I am grateful to hon. Members for their consideration of the order, which will see the Wagner Group, a truly brutal organisation, proscribed. Having just met Ukrainian Interior Minister Klymenko, I am proud to reiterate the United Kingdom’s commitment to Ukraine, as it resists and defeats Putin’s war of aggression.

Some 78 terrorist organisations are currently proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000. Proscription is not only a powerful tool for degrading terrorist organisations; it sends a strong message about the UK’s commitment to tackling terrorist activity globally.

Wagner Group are terrorists, plain and simple. I therefore propose amending schedule 2 to the Terrorism Act 2000 by adding Wagner Group, also referred to as the Wagner Network, to the list of proscribed organisations. In referring to Wagner Group, the order encompasses all Wagner’s activities across the globe.

For an organisation to be proscribed, I as the Home Secretary must reasonably believe that it is currently involved in terrorism, as set out in section 3 of the 2000 Act. If the statutory test is met, I must then consider the proportionality of proscription and decide whether to exercise my discretion.

Proscription is a powerful tool with severe penalties. It criminalises being a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation and wearing articles of a proscribed organisation in a way that arouses suspicion. Penalties are a maximum of 14 years in prison and/or an unlimited fine. Proscription also supports other disruptive activity, such as immigration disruptions and terrorist financing offences. The resources of a proscribed organisation are terrorist property and therefore liable to be seized.

The order builds on sanctions that are already in place against Wagner Group. Terrorist financing incurs criminal rather than civil penalties, which allow the Government ultimately to forfeit terrorist property, rather than just freezing an individual’s assets. I am supported in my decision making by the cross-Government proscription review group, and a decision to proscribe is taken only after great care and consideration, given its wide-ranging impact. It must be approved by both Houses.

A great deal of carnage and blame can be laid at the feet of Wagner Group, a Russian private military company, which emerged following Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and Putin’s first illegal invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014. Wagner have acted as a proxy military force on behalf of the Russian state, operating in a range of theatres including Ukraine, Syria, Central African Republic, Sudan, Libya, Mozambique and Mali. They have pursued Russia’s foreign policy objectives and those of other Governments who have contracted their services.

In the hours following Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine, Wagner Group were reportedly tasked with assassinating President Zelensky. They failed in that task, thanks to the heroism and bravery of the Ukrainian security forces. Wagner Group describe themselves in heroic terms, even suggesting, revoltingly, that they are saviours of Africa. That private military companies remain illegal under Russian law has never particularly concerned Putin.

Putin can distort the truth to suit himself all he likes, but Wagner Group are terrorists. Wherever they go, instability, misery and violence follow. With the House’s consent, Wagner Group will therefore be proscribed. Having carefully considered all the evidence, including advice from the cross-Government proscription review group, I have decided that there is sufficient evidence to reasonably believe that Wagner Group are concerned in terrorism and that proscription is proportionate.

Although I am unable to comment on specific intelligence, I can provide the House with a summary of Wagner Group’s activities, which supports the decision. Wagner Group commit and participate in terrorism. That is based on evidence of their use of serious violence against Ukrainian armed forces and civilians to advance Russia’s political cause.

Wagner Group played a central role in combat operations against Ukrainian armed forces to seize the city of Popasna in May 2022 and during the assault on Bakhmut, which was largely occupied by Russian forces this year. The horrific assault on Bakhmut resulted in the virtual destruction of a city that was once home to 70,000 people. Those are 70,000 innocent civilians whose homes happened to be in the way of Putin’s neo-imperial ambitions.

Wagner employed the same inhumane and senseless tactics that Russian forces had previously used in Chechnya, killing innocent civilians and destroying an entire city in the process. They barely showed any more concern for the lives of their own side. Defence intelligence has assessed that up to 20,000 convicts, recruited directly from Russian prisons on the promise of a pardon and early release, were killed within a few months of the attack on Bakhmut. Wagner’s relentless bombardment of Bakhmut was one of the bloodiest episodes in modern military history.

Hon. Members will also be aware of multiple reports that allege unbelievable brutality by Wagner Group commanders against their own troops who retreat, desert or otherwise refuse to carry out their leaders’ murderous orders. The most notorious of those events, the killing of a purported deserter, who was murdered by a sledgehammer blow to the head, has even been glorified by Wagner’s leaders and Russian ultra-nationalists. That macabre culture and brutality are indicative of an organisation that is more than just a private military company. There is a reason for that: it is a terrorist organisation.

Ukrainian prosecutors have accused Wagner Group fighters of war crimes near Kyiv. The tortured bodies of civilians were found with their hands tied behind their backs in the village of Motyzhyn. I visited Ukraine last year in my role as Attorney General and I saw at first hand those prosecutors’ unrelenting commitment to seeking justice. We stand with Ukraine in that mission.

Wagner Group have also been implicated in serious acts of violence in several countries in Africa. A UN report published in May this year implicated Wagner in the massacre of at least 500 people in the central Malian town of Moura in March 2022, including summary executions, as well as rape and torture. In June 2021, a panel of experts convened by the UN Security Council detailed atrocities in the Central African Republic, including excessive use of force, indiscriminate killings, the occupation of schools and looting on a large scale, including of humanitarian organisations.

Despite their mutiny in June of this year and the reported death of their leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, last month, Wagner remain a violent and destructive organisation. Proscription sends a strong message of the UK’s commitment to tackle terrorist activity and builds on our existing cross-Government work to counter Wagner’s destabilising activities. Their leadership’s recent feud with senior Russian military figures is a predictable consequence of Putin’s disastrous decision to invade Ukraine, but it is fundamentally a distraction from the fact that Wagner continue to commit violent acts around the world. While Putin’s regime wavers over what to do with the monster that it created, Wagner’s destabilising activities only continue to serve the Kremlin’s political goals.

[Layla Moran (Oxford West and Abingdon) (LD)]

I am listening carefully to what the Home Secretary is saying about the timeline for all this. Although I certainly welcome this proscription, the frustration is that it did not happen sooner. Although she cannot go into the detail of the intelligence that she has heard, could she perhaps expand on why it has taken this long, because much of what she has said refers to 2021 and early 2022. Why did we not we do this sooner?

[Suella Braverman]

The decision has not been taken in isolation; it builds on a strong response to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and Wagner’s wider destabilising activity, including extensive sanctions. Decisions on whether and when to proscribe a particular organisation are taken after extensive consideration and in the light of a full assessment of the available information. Significant events have taken place recently, including the mutiny in June, the alleged death of the core Wagner Group leadership in August, and it is right that we consider the impact of those key events when taking the decision.

The real fact remains that this group present a serious risk to security around the world, and their increasing activities in Ukraine affect European stability and our security, which is why the case for action is now stronger than ever. Wagner are vulnerable. A leadership vacuum and questions about their future provide a unique opportunity to truly disrupt their operations and the threat they pose. That is why this House must proscribe Wagner now.

This decision comes after public calls from President Zelensky for international allies to take action and list Wagner as a terrorist organisation. In doing so, we stand alongside our allies in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and France, whose Parliaments have all called for Wagner Group to be labelled as a terrorist organisation on the EU’s list of terrorist groups. We continue to work in close co-ordination with the US, which designated Wagner under its transnational criminal organisation sanctions programme earlier this year.

In formally proscribing, we will be leading the international effort by taking concrete legal action against Wagner. I urge our allies to follow suit. This decision demonstrates that the UK will maintain its unwavering support for Ukraine, in co-ordination with our allies. It shows that we stand with the people of Ukraine against Russia’s aggression.

To conclude, wherever Wagner operate, they have a catastrophic effect on communities, worsening conflicts and damaging the reputations of countries that host them. Wagner may be at their most vulnerable and Russia’s military leaders may be grappling to regain control of the organisation, but the brutal methods they have employed will undoubtedly remain a tool of the Russian state. Let there be no misunderstanding: in whatever form Wagner take, we and our allies will pursue them. We will expose them and we will disrupt them. Wagner are a terrorist organisation and we must not be afraid of saying so. We will hold Russia to account for its use of these malign groups—these international gangsters—and the destruction they bring around the world. We will continue to support Ukraine in the face of Russia’s aggression, and we will confront and challenge terrorism however and wherever it occurs.

--- Later in debate ---

[Suella Braverman]

I am grateful to all who have contributed to this debate. Many important issues have been raised, and I am encouraged by the supportive atmosphere in which the discussion has taken place. We all agree that Wagner Group are terrorists plain and simple, and I am confident that this House recognises, as the British people recognise, that we have a moral responsibility to act. We must and we will confront terrorism wherever and however it occurs, and that is why we are taking this action.

Hon. Members have all made very powerful points, and let me attempt to take them in some kind of logical order. The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis), raised the issue of comparisons with other international allies. I gently say that we have been working intensively to build international consensus, but also to work closely in a cohesive way with our allies.

The US designation to which the hon. Gentleman refers is equivalent to the sanctions that the UK imposed in March last year. It was not equivalent to our proscription power that we are taking right now. The French Parliament supported a non-binding resolution to call Wagner terrorists, but it has not formally proscribed. That is why I emphasised that we are taking a leadership role in formally proscribing Wagner as a terrorist organisation. I will continue to work with international partners to create a broader consensus.

[Layla Moran]

I agree with everything that the Home Secretary has said. We are taking a lead, and that is brilliant. Has she had specific conversations on this matter with her counterparts and also with the EU? The EU can also proscribe and designate Wagner as a terrorist organisation, which itself has financial implications. Will she bring that up with the European Union, too?

[Suella Braverman]

The threat posed by terrorist organisations, including Wagner Group, has been on the agenda in many of my dialogues with international partners because of its wholesale destructive nature and the enormity of the threat that it poses.

The shadow Minister also asked about our broader strategy on Russia and our approach to state threats. What I turn to first is our integrated review, which sets out in the most pressing terms that the most urgent national security and foreign policy priority in the short to medium term is to address the threat posed by Russia to European security. We will continue to work with our allies and partners to defend the rules-based international order, and we stand united in condemning Russia’s reprehensible actions, which are an egregious violation of international law and the UN charter.

When the integrated review was published, it made clear that we are dealing head-on with the threat posed by Russia. We take it extremely seriously, and we have responded to it. We have called out Russian aggression wherever it occurs. The National Security Act 2023—a landmark piece of legislation that overhauls our outdated espionage rules—already creates a wide range of new offences, tools and powers to counter state threats and their activities. In many respects, those cover similar grounds to a proscription-like power of the kind that the shadow Minister was referring to, but the Act will give us and, importantly, equip our agencies with wide-ranging tools to specify a foreign power, or part of a foreign power, or an entity controlled by a foreign power, under the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme, for example. It will mean that persons in those arrangements will have to register their activities or risk prosecution. That is a groundbreaking tool that we will be equipped with thanks to the passage of that landmark legislation.

The defending democracy taskforce, to which the shadow Minister referred, is leading cross-government work. It is chaired and led by the Minister for Security, my right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat), but that cross-government work is taking place to drive forward the taskforce’s priorities with Parliament, our security and intelligence community, the devolved Administrations, local authorities, the private sector and civil society. It has been incredibly extensive in its coverage so far, and we look forward to its having a tangible impact on those agencies to which I referred.

Several Members asked about sanctions, and in particular the sanctions in place against Wagner Group. In 2020, the UK designated Prigozhin through the Libya sanctions regime. That was for his and Wagner Group’s involvement in activities that threatened the peace, stability and security of Libya, including defying the UN arms embargoes. In March 2022, the UK also designated the Wagner Group for their role in actions that destabilised Ukraine. Asset freezes were imposed on funds identified as belonging to the Wagner Group in the UK, as well as travel bans on any of their members.

In July this year, the Foreign Secretary announced 13 new UK sanctions targeting a range of individuals and businesses linked to the actions of the Wagner Group in Africa. That included individuals from the Wagner Group associated with executions and torture in Mali and the Central African Republic, and threats to peace and security in Sudan. Those sanctions have had an impact: they constrained the ability to utilise assets and limited the ability to travel. As I said, the framework has constrained the freedoms and abilities of these organisations and individuals. Of course, the broad-ranging set of sanctions has been one of the largest sets of sanctions imposed on a modern economy.

Several hon. Members asked what more the Government are doing to monitor the risk that the Wagner Group and other Russian private military companies or mercenaries fragment and reform in different moulds. Our approach to tackling Wagner and other Russian PMCs has three core strands: military, sanctions and state building. The extensive military support we have given to Ukraine seeks to counter the threat that Wagner pose there, and our sanctions constrain their ability to utilise assets and to travel.

Our diplomatic engagement with partners around the world focuses on supporting fragile states to build their own capacity and discourage Wagner from taking root. Several hon. Members referenced how Wagner trade in violence and benefit through Governments, para-governments or paramilitary groups plundering resources, assets and other forms of wealth in those nations. If those states are robust and resilient in the first place, groups such as Wagner will not be able to take root. That work relating to private military companies is extensive, and our cross-Government Russia unit brings our full range of capabilities to bear against the malign influences of these contractors, in concert with our allies.

Several hon. Members referenced Africa. For many years, Wagner have had a destabilising effect on the African continent. They have been reportedly responsible for multiple breaches of international humanitarian law and abuses of human rights, including numerous reports of indiscriminate killings of unarmed civilians, summary executions and rape. We have again sought to take a leading role in reducing opportunities for Wagner to operate in Africa and holding them to account for the atrocities they commit.

Lastly, several hon. Members—notably my right hon. Friend the Member for North Somerset (Dr Fox)—referenced the IRGC. It is clear that Iran continues to pose a persistent threat to UK-based individuals, which is unacceptable. There has obviously been significant parliamentary, media and public interest in a potential proscription decision on the IRGC. Both the House of Commons and the House of Lords have discussed IRGC proscription, with the House of Commons unanimously passing a motion in January to urge the Government to proscribe it. It is clear that the Iranian regime continues to occupy a serious and worrying role in our global order. We continue to condemn Iran’s role as one of the top military backers of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Since August last year, Tehran has transferred hundreds of unmanned aerial vehicles to Moscow, in violation of UN Security Council resolution 2231. We work tirelessly with our international partners to hold Iran to account for the sale of drones to Russia, and we have imposed three rounds of sanctions on Iranian individuals and entities involved in the illegal transfers to Russia. They add to the already extensive sanctions on Iran’s drone programmes. We have also publicly raised this matter twice at the UN Security Council, alongside France, Germany and the US, and we support Ukraine’s request for a UN investigation.

It is clear that Iran continues to pose a persistent threat to UK-based individuals, which is unacceptable. The Department keeps the list of proscribed organisations under review. I know I will frustrate colleagues to say that our policy is not to comment on the specifics of individual proscription cases, and that I am unable to provide further details on this issue. I have heard the comments of Members here and the sentiment of the House. Ministers previously confirmed to this House that the decision was under active consideration but that we would not provide a running commentary. I know that will disappoint Members, but we are cognisant and open-eyed about the threat that the IRGC poses to the UK.

I am very grateful for this House’s support for the decision to proscribe the Wagner Group as a terrorist organisation. The brutality and the enormity of destruction and devastation wreaked by this group is unspeakable. It is right that we act now. I commend this order to the House.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That the draft Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2023, which was laid before this House on 6 September, be approved.

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill

Debate between Suella Braverman and Layla Moran

2nd reading
Thursday 13th October 2022 Commons Chamber

[Suella Braverman]

I am very pleased that we are taking this action now. I take on board the point that this has been a long-standing matter that Members and Administrations have been talking about for some time. There has been progress over several years. We have the National Economic Crime Centre and new legislation, so there are greater powers, but I am focused on ensuring that the reforms in the Bill are implemented as quickly as possible. On reforms to Companies House, we seek to ensure that the level of change is balanced to avoid causing any confusion for legitimate customers and to ensure effective implementation. So yes, speed is essential, but not at the expense of undue disruption.

Some of the action we have already undertaken includes being the first G20 country to establish, in 2016, a public register of domestic company beneficial ownership; the publication of the economic crime plan in 2019 and the progress made against it; and establishing, as I said to the hon. Lady, the National Economic Crime Centre and the combating kleptocracy cell in the National Crime Agency. The Bill is just one component of a wider Government approach to tackling economic crime, including fraud. It sits alongside the National Security Bill and the Online Safety Bill, and the forthcoming second economic crime plan and fraud strategy.

[Layla Moran (Oxford West and Abingdon) (LD)]

One of the areas this place will struggle to scrutinise is golden visas. It has now been four years since that review was commissioned. We understand it is ready, yet we have not seen it to be able to scrutinise it and hold the Government to account on it. Will the right hon. and learned Lady be the Home Secretary who finally releases that review?

[Suella Braverman]

When it comes to golden visas, I was very proud of the action the Government took in relation to Russian individuals following the invasion, where we stopped the sale of golden visas to particular individuals—