Nationality and Borders Bill (Fourteenth sitting)

Debate between Stuart C McDonald and Robert Goodwill

Committee stage
Tuesday 2nd November 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Goodwill]

I have just had a look at the NHS website and it says that having an X-ray is equivalent to one or two days of background radiation. If someone takes a short-haul flight, the amount of radiation they are likely to be exposed to is probably more than an X-ray, particularly if it is on a limb and not on the main body.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I do not have access to that webpage, but the right hon. Gentleman has access to the extensive evidence submitted to the Committee by the BDA. It is a two-sided issue. First, it is not appropriate to subject people to radiation, and in this case there is no informed consent. The evidence is clear. The Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health is clear that an assessment can be no more accurate than two years either side. The British Society for Paediatric Endocrinology and Diabetes is clear that we cannot assess a child’s age just physically or by analysing bones.

In short, if a decision maker says that somebody is 18 years old, the person is just as likely to be 16 or 20. These new clauses leave the Secretary of State with powers that are far too broad. She should at least be required to have consent and approval from professional bodies, whether medical, dental or scientific. The insistence that so-called scientific methods can be used anyway if the decision maker considers it appropriate—as enabled by new clause 32(9)—totally undermines the other safeguards. It must be removed.

[Mr Goodwill]

The hon. Member is very generous in giving way. Is he saying, in effect, that in every case we should take the person’s word for how old they are and treat them as children, even if there is scientific evidence that they may be many years older than 18?

[Stuart C. McDonald]

No, I am not saying that. What I am advocating is the position at present—that the decision maker looks at all the evidence that is available in the round. If somebody is 50, I cannot imagine them needing an invasive scientific procedure to establish that they are over 18. I am not by any stretch of the imagination saying that we just take somebody’s word for it. I am advocating for the status quo. By all means the Government can introduce some sort of advisory board, but that should not supplant and take over the functions of local authorities—but that, unfortunately, is how I see these new clauses working.

The new clauses suggest that there will be implications for a person’s credibility if they choose not to undergo the medical procedures. I object, as a point of principle, to Parliament telling decision makers what to think about someone’s credibility when it is those decision makers—not us—who know the circumstances of the decision that they have to make. It is particularly objectionable given that professional medical bodies thoroughly object to these so-called scientific procedures. Despite the fact that professional bodies have said that these tests are inappropriate, the Government are telling decision makers that, if a young person says, “Well, the medical professionals say this is inappropriate, so I won’t undergo this,” they must find that young person lacking in credibility.

I repeat the point I made in relation to earlier clauses about the impugning of the credibility of those making statements on someone’s behalf. It is especially bizarre that a medical report by a multi-disciplinary panel of experts could have its credibility maligned simple because a child or young adult refuses to undergo one of these so-called scientific methods of testing introduced through regulations by the Secretary of State. Not only is it bizarre; it also undermines the fundamental idea that people should be able to give free consent to medical procedures and examinations, and not be pressured into them. Similarly, it undermines the principle that such a procedure should happen only if it delivers a scientific benefit for that person.

What consultation has there been? We have not been able properly to scrutinise or ask questions of relevant witnesses in relation to these specific provisions. Is consent to be sought from devolved Governments on the basis that large tracts of these new clauses relate to how local authorities should exercise functions related to devolved legislation? In the absence of assurances on any of those fronts—the evidence of problems, proper consultation and devolved consent—the case for change is absolutely not made. On the contrary, there are all sorts of dangers in these clauses that could have serious consequences for children.

Nationality and Borders Bill (Fourteenth sitting)

Debate between Stuart C McDonald and Robert Goodwill

Tuesday 2nd November 2021 Public Bill Committees

Mr Goodwill

- - Excerpts

I have just had a look at the NHS website and it says that having an X-ray is equivalent to one or two days of background radiation. If someone takes a short-haul flight, the amount of radiation they are likely to be exposed to is probably more than an X-ray, particularly if it is on a limb and not on the main body.

Stuart C. McDonald

-

I do not have access to that webpage, but the right hon. Gentleman has access to the extensive evidence submitted to the Committee by the BDA. It is a two-sided issue. First, it is not appropriate to subject people to radiation, and in this case there is no informed consent. The evidence is clear. The Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health is clear that an assessment can be no more accurate than two years either side. The British Society for Paediatric Endocrinology and Diabetes is clear that we cannot assess a child’s age just physically or by analysing bones.

In short, if a decision maker says that somebody is 18 years old, the person is just as likely to be 16 or 20. These new clauses leave the Secretary of State with powers that are far too broad. She should at least be required to have consent and approval from professional bodies, whether medical, dental or scientific. The insistence that so-called scientific methods can be used anyway if the decision maker considers it appropriate—as enabled by new clause 32(9)—totally undermines the other safeguards. It must be removed.

Mr Goodwill

- - Excerpts

The hon. Member is very generous in giving way. Is he saying, in effect, that in every case we should take the person’s word for how old they are and treat them as children, even if there is scientific evidence that they may be many years older than 18?

Stuart C. McDonald

-

No, I am not saying that. What I am advocating is the position at present—that the decision maker looks at all the evidence that is available in the round. If somebody is 50, I cannot imagine them needing an invasive scientific procedure to establish that they are over 18. I am not by any stretch of the imagination saying that we just take somebody’s word for it. I am advocating for the status quo. By all means the Government can introduce some sort of advisory board, but that should not supplant and take over the functions of local authorities—but that, unfortunately, is how I see these new clauses working.

The new clauses suggest that there will be implications for a person’s credibility if they choose not to undergo the medical procedures. I object, as a point of principle, to Parliament telling decision makers what to think about someone’s credibility when it is those decision makers—not us—who know the circumstances of the decision that they have to make. It is particularly objectionable given that professional medical bodies thoroughly object to these so-called scientific procedures. Despite the fact that professional bodies have said that these tests are inappropriate, the Government are telling decision makers that, if a young person says, “Well, the medical professionals say this is inappropriate, so I won’t undergo this,” they must find that young person lacking in credibility.

I repeat the point I made in relation to earlier clauses about the impugning of the credibility of those making statements on someone’s behalf. It is especially bizarre that a medical report by a multi-disciplinary panel of experts could have its credibility maligned simple because a child or young adult refuses to undergo one of these so-called scientific methods of testing introduced through regulations by the Secretary of State. Not only is it bizarre; it also undermines the fundamental idea that people should be able to give free consent to medical procedures and examinations, and not be pressured into them. Similarly, it undermines the principle that such a procedure should happen only if it delivers a scientific benefit for that person.

What consultation has there been? We have not been able properly to scrutinise or ask questions of relevant witnesses in relation to these specific provisions. Is consent to be sought from devolved Governments on the basis that large tracts of these new clauses relate to how local authorities should exercise functions related to devolved legislation? In the absence of assurances on any of those fronts—the evidence of problems, proper consultation and devolved consent—the case for change is absolutely not made. On the contrary, there are all sorts of dangers in these clauses that could have serious consequences for children.

Nationality and Borders Bill (Tenth sitting)

Debate between Stuart C McDonald and Robert Goodwill

Committee stage
Tuesday 26th October 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The clause makes fundamental changes to important aspects of what it means to be a refugee under the convention. It seeks to require that important elements of the claim are to be established on the balance of probabilities before the decision maker goes on to make an overall assessment of real risk. Previously an overall assessment of the reasonable degree of likelihood of persecution was applied.

We regard this as a hugely dangerous and possibly very confusing clause. It fails to take into account the challenge of evidence and facts that arise many thousands of miles away, or facts to which only the claimant’s testimony can speak to. If, for example, a claim is made on the grounds that a person is LGBT, it can be hugely challenging to prove that to the standard of the balance of probabilities. As the UNHCR has explained:

“Some claimants, because of the shame they feel over what has happened to them, or due to trauma, may be reluctant to identify the true extent of the persecution suffered or feared.”

Similar issues will arise with many other groups that we have already spoken about this morning.

What is proposed is really dangerous. If a decision maker is certain, for example, that LGBT people in general are at risk of persecution on return to a particular country, and even if that decision maker thinks that there is a reasonable likelihood that this particular applicant is LGBT, that would no longer be enough to justify an award of refugee status.

[Mr Goodwill]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right that it is very difficult to prove some of these things. It is also difficult to disprove them. Is he aware that asylum seekers from places such as Uganda may well claim to be gay when they are not because they see that as the route to getting a good result quickly?

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am not aware of the evidence of that, so I cannot comment. At the end of the day we are talking about people who are at risk. We are not talking about a road traffic case, a minor bump or the small claims court. We are talking about people whose lives are at risk, or they are at risk of serious harm and persecution. That is why we have to be very, very careful about requiring evidence beyond the standard that is internationally accepted.

Let us say that a decision maker is certain that LGBT people in general are at risk of persecution on return to a particular country. Even though the decision maker thinks there is a reasonable likelihood that a particular applicant is LGBT, that will not be enough to secure refugee status. The decision maker could be 49% certain that the applicant is LGBT and 100% certain that an LGBT person returned to a particular country will be tortured and killed, but that 1%—that tiny little bit of doubt—means that the balance of probabilities threshold will not be met, and that case will be rejected. The implications are huge.

Amendment 152 seeks to maintain the status quo. Let us not mess with a long-established principle, and let us be very, very careful that we are not denying refugee status to people who we know should be awarded it.

Nationality and Borders Bill (Ninth sitting)

Debate between Stuart C McDonald and Robert Goodwill

Committee stage
Tuesday 26th October 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Stuart C. McDonald]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Sir Roger. I will speak to amendment 56 and the other amendments in the group, and against the clause, as currently drafted, standing part of the Bill. The clause allows the Secretary of State to declare asylum claims inadmissible on the grounds that she considers the person has a connection to a safe third state. That brings us to another provision in the Bill in relation to which we allege profound inconsistencies with the refugee convention—no doubt those will have been discussed when the Minister met with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees last week.

That inconsistency is one of the reasons why we believe the clause should not stand part of the Bill. Another reason is that we already know it does not work, because a version of this scheme has been in place in the immigration rules since the start of the year. It is incumbent on the Minister to provide the evidence that the provision has achieved anything remotely along the lines of what was intended. From the information that I have seen, it has achieved nothing of the sort.

Those immigration rules were put in place because, with the end of the transition period, the applicability of the EU’s Dublin rules came to an end. That created a significant problem for the Government as they had no replacement agreement in place with the EU under which individuals who would more appropriately have their asylum claim processed elsewhere could have their case transferred there. The clause is not a replacement for Dublin, but a dreadful, one-sided, pale imitation of it, and it is incompatible with the refugee convention.

The Dublin regulations were far from perfect but, first, they included important safeguards that are totally absent from the Government’s scheme, and they contained some restrictions on the grounds for transfer, whereas here the connection can be flimsy indeed, including mere transmit. Secondly, the Dublin rules are two-way. People could be transferred here from the EU or could remain here if they had connections to the UK, such as family, that made it appropriate for asylum claims to be considered in this country. Under the rules that the Government are offering, it is one-way only. The absence of such provision means that, unlike Dublin, this is not about responsibility sharing; it is about responsibility offloading.

The UK is failing to live up to its international obligations and hoping that somebody else will pick up the slack. More often than not, that will be a country that already supports larger numbers of refugees and processes far more asylum claims, including France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and Greece—all highlighted by the Home Secretary at Second Reading.

Thirdly, the Dublin rules represented an agreed framework between member nations. Other countries had actually agreed in principle to take people back. In contract, the scheme set out in the immigration rules and in this Bill, as it stands, is a Home Office pipe dream. There are no agreements with our neighbours to take back those whose claims have been deemed inadmissible. In essence, the Home Office is suspending consideration of asylum claims for six months, even with no realistic prospect of removing more than an handful of people to have their claims considered by other countries. It simply adds another six months of limbo to these people’s lives, at a time when there is already a massive waiting time.

The latest figures I have read showed that something like 4,500 asylum seekers had been subject to the inadmissibility procedures since they came into effect in January. I think seven had ultimately been found inadmissible, and nobody had been removed. Those figures will have changed since then, and I look forward to receiving the updated figures, but what a disaster that represents. Freedom of information requests have confirmed that thousands of cases, including hundreds of Eritreans, Syrians and Afghans, have been served with inadmissibility notices, even though the Home Office knows that, for all intents and purposes, it will not be possible to remove them to so-called connected safe third states.

This is a waste of officials’ time, adds six months to the backlog and adds to, rather than resolves, the problems with the UK asylum system. I would ask the Minister, in responding, if he has calculated how much money the Home Office has spent supporting and accommodating people declared inadmissible only for the Home Office then to start assessing their claims six months down the line. As it stands, clause 14 should not form part of the Bill.

The amendments in this group prompt the Government to think about safeguards that could enable the clause to be consistent with the refugee convention, including restrictions and reciprocity. Amendment 26 tries to do that in a comprehensive but succinct way, while the other amendments probe more deeply into certain aspects of the clause as drafted.

Amendment 26 would basically add a new clause into the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, alongside the Home Office clauses, to fix the failures highlighted. Subsections (1) to (3) would require that an arrangement is in place with the third country, so there is no mass service of inadmissibility notices on people who there is no prospect of removing. Subsection (1) would also address the absence of reciprocity by ensuring that the agreement is a reciprocal one, so the Home Secretary can operate an inadmissibility regime only in relation to countries that are able to send people here or transfer claims here as well. Thus, for example, people with a family connection to the UK are able to have their claims considered in this country, and other examples are given in the amendment. As it stands, people’s connections, such as with family—even their closest family members—as well as language, previous residence in the UK or working for UK entities, including the British Army, are all totally overlooked by the Government’s scheme.

The remaining amendments in this group probe in more detail how the Government will ensure various other vital protections are in place. They take into account the published legal opinion of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on the concept of inadmissibility and some of the criticisms raised there. Amendment 56 seeks to ensure that the rights of asylum seekers will be fully protected in the country to which the Government are seeking to transfer the claim.

As it stands, the definition of a safe third state is really pretty pathetic. So long as your life and liberty are not at risk for a refugee convention reason and that some sort of asylum process is in existence, off you go. There could be an almost certain risk of human rights breaches, albeit falling short of a threat to life or liberty, and that would not matter. There could be a threat to life, but for a non-convention reason, and again it seems that it does not matter, and the country is still deemed safe.

The wording of the safe third state definition is troubling from all sorts of angles. For example, the clause states that a country is safe if “a person” can apply for refugee status and “a person” will not be removed in contravention of the convention, without specifically asking the question, “Will this individual that we want to declare inadmissible be at such a risk?” It is not robust enough either in what it requires for access to asylum and refugee procedures. It simply says that a person may apply and receive protection in accordance with unspecified principles of the convention.

As I read clause 14 just now, if I was at risk in a proposed country I had a connection to because of new autocratic rules or a ruler who decided they wanted capital punishment for people with red hair, it would still very likely meet the definition of a safe country, because my life would not be threatened for a convention reason—arguably, it could be a particular social group, but it is not clear—and if I had previously made a claim there and it had been refused, apparently I am connected enough to be required to go back there. If I am wrong about that, I look forward to the explanation of how that would apply in these particular circumstances.

Amendment 56 therefore surely sets out totally unobjectionable safeguards about which we can all agree, so that—not just on paper, but in practice—fundamental rights are going to be respected, there are appropriate reception arrangements for asylum seekers, there is access to fair and appropriate asylum procedures, and the full convention of refugees must be available if accepted as a refugee.

Amendment 19 again seeks information from Ministers about their intentions in relation to a new provision that allows them to deny an asylum claim on the basis of a connection to country A, but instead remove that person to country B, even when, it seems, there is no connection. I guess that is a foretaste of the debate we will have on clause 26, but this is an extraordinarily wide provision and it is not constrained by any assessment of the appropriateness or otherwise of the transfer in the circumstances of the individual person.

[Mr Robert Goodwill (Scarborough and Whitby) (Con)]

Does the hon. Gentleman accept that any country that meets the Copenhagen criteria, by virtue of being either a member of the European Union or an accession country, would be, by definition, a safe country?

[Stuart C. McDonald]

It almost certainly would, and it would meet the criteria in the Bill. However, that is not really the issue, because, as drafted, the definition of “safe country” goes way beyond who would meet those criteria in the EU. That is what I am driving at. Again, we struggle to see how clause 14 can be justified and how it can possibly be said to be appropriate or consistent with the convention. As the UNHCR put it:

“This would be a significant break from…international practice”.

Amendment 20 would simply mean that if there is no reasonable likelihood of removal to a third country in a reasonable period or there are exceptional circumstances that mean that the Home Secretary should consider the claim, then she “must” do so. As it stands, she “may” do so, but she also may not. Surely it is odd to want to give the Secretary of State the power not to consider a claim when she has decided that

“the claim should be considered”.

The amendment should probably also have taken out the reference to “exceptional circumstances”. After all, if the unexceptional circumstances suggest that the claim should be decided here, where is the logic in not doing that?

Amendment 21 sets out circumstances in which claims should, on any reasonable view, be processed here rather than attempts made to move them elsewhere. In short, if there is not an agreement with a third country that will allow for the transfer of cases, the Home Office should just get on with considering it. If the third country refuses the transfer or does not reply in three months, the Home Office should, again, just get on with considering the case. And if in the circumstances, including the best interests of any children affected, it is better for the claim to be decided here, the Home Office should get on and do it.

Amendments 18 and 22 to 24 take us to the current definition of “connection” to be introduced into law by clause 14. Amendments 23 and 24 remove from the Bill two circumstances in which it is currently said that a connection is sufficient for the purpose of the inadmissibility regime. Amendment 24 would remove what is termed “condition 5”, which is so vague as to be almost incomprehensible and allows the Secretary of State to decide that a connection has been established in an almost unlimited number of scenarios. There is reference to “the claimant’s particular circumstances” but no explanation of what is meant by that.

Amendment 23 takes out “condition 2”, so that a connection can be provided only by proper and full-blown refugee status in accordance with the convention, and not a substandard or pale imitation of it. Amendment 22 puts the full-blown refugee status as a possible connection in the clause.

Amendment 25 is similarly motivated. In short, if the making of an asylum claim in another country is to establish the connection necessary for an inadmissibility declaration, it must be the case that the protection status offered in that other country to a refugee is fully compatible with the 1951 UN refugee convention. Again, it is absolutely not enough for a substandard asylum regime to be in place, and it would be outrageous for the UK Government to say otherwise and to be seen to be tolerating the watering down of refugee rights across the globe.

All these amendments provide ways to fix the flaws in the scheme. We could also have tabled other amendments to fix the inability of anyone to challenge inadmissibility decisions on any grounds. The Government say that this is all about deterring onward movements from France and other neighbours, but the clause is drafted in a way to allow removal to any old regime, regardless of how they treat asylum seekers and refugees. That is not remotely good enough, so the Minister must accept the flaws in the drafting and engage with the UNHCR on changing them.

Nationality and Borders Bill (Seventh sitting)

Debate between Stuart C McDonald and Robert Goodwill

Committee stage
Thursday 21st October 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Stuart C. McDonald]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair again, Ms McDonagh. I will also speak to the other amendments in the group.

We have now come to one of the most fundamental clauses of one of the most fundamental parts of the Bill. As my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow North East and I set out on Second Reading, we regard both as totally outrageous. In essence, the avowed policy aim is to give the Secretary of State powers to treat certain refugees dreadfully in order to deter others from coming to this country. I find it extraordinary just to be saying that.

Over the course of this debate and the three to follow, we will ask lots of questions in the hope that the Minister will explain a little more what the Government intend to do with these extraordinary powers. We will also challenge the legal policy and, indeed, the ethical basis. We will make the case that in fact the clause will make the asylum system worse, not better. To all intents and purposes, the measure is an attempt to close the asylum system down to a large degree.

There are all sorts of problems with the asylum system: 70,000 asylum applicants were waiting for a decision as of June 2021, more than three quarters of them outstanding for longer than six months. Work has to be done to fix the system, but this measure is not what is required. In fact, as I said, the clause will make it worse.

Most of the broad discussion will take place in the stand part debate; the amendments are designed more to get the Government to flesh out exactly what they want to do with the powers. In doing so, as on Second Reading, I will speak about the implications for a Uyghur asylum seeker, a Syrian asylum seeker and a persecuted Christian seeking asylum, because I want to ensure that the Home Office is tested on its assertion now, and later on Windrush, that it is looking at the face behind the case—it is important to keep in mind who we are talking about. The clause will be particularly disastrous, allowing the Secretary of State almost to punish the individual, to make an example of them, as a form of deterrence.

Of the amendments in the group, amendments 88 and 93 would remove the power to grant so-called group 2 refugees and their families shorter periods of leave to enter or remain. Currently, refugees receive five years’ leave before becoming eligible for settlement. Nothing in the Bill or the explanatory notes tells us what the Government intend to do with the powers. The new plan talks vaguely of no longer than 30 months, with continual assessments thereafter of potential return to a country of origin or of removal to another safe country. My first question is, what is the Government’s proposal? Is it 30 months or, as dreadful as that prospect is, is it worse? Will it be a shorter period?

That is my first question, but the key point is that reducing leave to 30 months or less will have dreadful consequences for our three refugees. Having fled serious persecution, having endured a dreadful journey and having survived six months or more of going through the tortuous inadmissibility procedure—perhaps even an asylum claim—within an accommodation centre, our refugees require stability, a sense of home and the possibility of putting down roots, finding work and rebuilding their lives. All that is being taken away if the powers in the Bill are used as proposed in the new plan.

[Mr Robert Goodwill (Scarborough and Whitby) (Con)]

Would the hon. Gentleman describe a person who has come directly to the UK from France as a person escaping persecution? If so, will he describe the sort of persecution that that person might have experienced in France?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Goodwill]

Does the hon. Gentleman not agree that these amendments play into the business model of the people smugglers in that they would discourage people from claiming asylum in the first safe country they reach, tempting them to make the hazardous journey in a non-seaworthy craft across the channel, feeding into the organised criminals who prey on those poor vulnerable people?

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I have absolutely no problem with measures that go after the people smugglers. We all share the goal of disrupting their model. We draw the line at punishing the victims and going after them in an attempt to disrupt and undermine people smuggling. First, I find that morally indefensible. Secondly, as I will come to later, there is no evidence that it will work.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I absolutely agree. The hon. Gentleman makes two points. Yes, safe legal routes can and will make an impact. If people have safe legal routes, they do not need to turn to people smugglers. The Government acknowledge this when they speak about the safe legal routes they support.

There are various other measures we have to take. Our intelligence and police and security forces need to do everything they can to interrupt these networks. It is about international co-operation, including with France, as the Minister alluded to at Home Office questions on Monday. We support those measures, but we do not support deliberately impoverishing the Syrian, the Uyghur and the persecuted Christian and denying them universal credit, homelessness assistance or the child benefit that other citizens in this country get if they need it. I will come back to that in the clause stand part debate.

The Home Office knows this. It did research 20 years ago. If it has done any more since, it is not published. There is no evidence to show that people sit down with a nice table comparing family reunion rights and asylum procedures in all the different countries and then say, “Let’s go for that one.” They come here for a whole host of reasons. Many go to other countries for a whole host of reasons—language, family links, the influence of people smugglers, or they may have a friend or colleague here. Perhaps they just identify with the culture. There are myriad reasons why people end up in France or the United Kingdom, but it is not for these reasons. That is why these provisions will not work.

[Mr Goodwill]

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that one of the other reasons people come to the UK is that the payment to the people smugglers is only the deposit and the main payment is through modern slavery, forced labour or other ways in which those people are being exploited when they get here? Often, for example, Vietnamese people coming here are put into prostitution or nail bars and that type of work. That is why they want to get here, because that is the business deal. They come here to work in the black economy.

Nationality and Borders Bill (Fifth sitting)

Debate between Stuart C McDonald and Robert Goodwill

Committee stage
Tuesday 19th October 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Robert Goodwill (Scarborough and Whitby) (Con)]

I understand some of what the hon. Gentleman is saying but, by way of clarification, may I point out that there is never any doubt as to who the mother of a child is, but there are occasionally questions over the paternity? Does the wording of the amendment make it easier to define who the father is? Sometimes someone’s parent may not be the biological father. Is the difference between a father, and someone who is married to the mother who may have thought he was the father when the child was born?

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for the intervention but I am not sure that I followed every aspect of it. All I can say is that the definition of father in the amendment is exactly the same as the definition that the Government have used. It is not changing that at all. I will explain exactly what the amendment does in a moment.

We are talking about getting rid of the unacceptable discrimination against women and children. A correction, albeit an imperfect one, to the laws of British citizenship that does exactly the same thing has already happened. In clause 5, there is a provision that actually fixes that. However, that correction was not made to British overseas territories citizenship. The Government have already fixed it for British citizenship; the amendment is now trying to fix it for British overseas territories citizenship. In a nutshell, the question we are asking the Government is, “Why are they using slightly different wording this time round compared with last time?” That is the crux of the debate and I will come back to that point.

My amendment would allow people who have suffered injustice to register as British overseas territories citizens. That is good, but two issues arise. The first is cost and we will come to that when we consider the next group of amendments. The second is about the language used and whether it really makes sense. Amendment 29 would challenge the Government on the use of the language to correct the injustice. Slightly surprisingly, the Government have not just copied, or used copy and paste, from the fix used for British citizenship that is found in section 4C of the British Nationality Act 1981. Section 4C allows for the correction of injustices by registration if someone missed out on citizenship because citizenship by descent was not provided for mothers “in the same terms” as for fathers or if someone missed out because it could not be acquired because it could not be obtained “in the same terms” for mothers as for fathers.

The Bill, in doing the same job for British overseas territories citizens, uses the terminology

“had P’s parents been treated equally”.

The key questions for the Minister have been pointed out by Amnesty International and the Project for the Registration of Children as British Citizens in their written submissions. Why are the Government not using the same language as they used to fix the problem for British citizenship? If there is a good reason for not using that language—if there is some sort of problem with the language that was used in the case of British citizenship and the fix used for that—do we not need to go back and fix that fix, as it were? Even assuming that there is a problem and the language used has to be different, why have the Government chosen to use this language, which seems rather clunky and problematic?

Speaking about hypothetical circumstances when parents are treated equally does not make it clear, unlike the section 4C version, whether we are, to coin a phrase, “levelling up” rather than levelling down. P’s parents could be treated equally badly, as well as equally well, so the drafting leaves a lack of clarity about the fact that we want mothers to be treated the same as fathers and not the other way round. The Government like to talk about “levelling up”, so here is a chance for the Minister to do some of that and make what appears on the face of the Bill absolutely clear.

Amendment 29 provides the best wording and addresses all the points in amendment 84. It flags up another place where the issue arises and if we wound back the clock a few days, I would probably copy amendment 29 that the shadow Minister has tabled. I believe it is the best version. I will therefore not press amendment 84 to a Division, but I fully support amendment 29. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Goodwill]

As I was saying, I would always scrutinise the officials and say, “Does it actually cost this much to apply?” They gave me evidence that this was indeed an expensive operation. As I said, often fake documents are presented, and forensic work needs to be done to ensure that the identity of the person is as stated, and that the documents provided in evidence are correct.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The figures that I gave in terms of the cost to the Home Office came from, I think, freedom of information requests, so they have been carefully calculated. It is beyond doubt—I do not think the Home Office disputes this—that it makes something like £700 profit on an application that costs just over £1,000. We are talking about kids, so it is, as the former Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Bromsgrove (Sajid Javid), said, a huge sum of money.

[Mr Goodwill]

As I said, I hope that the Minister will reassure us of the principle that was certainly in effect when I was in the Home Office: that this is not an opportunity to make a profit out of these people, but merely to recover the cost.

I believe that the amendments will place a greater burden on taxpayers as a whole for a service that is being provided to these applicants. I am also a little concerned about new clause 16(3), which talks about whether a person can afford the fee. I am not clear whether that means that it should be set at a level that anyone can afford, which in effect would have to be zero, or whether the proposal is for some sort of means testing, which of course would add the cost of getting financial information from the applicant. The cost of the process could end up being greater overall, although if the new clause were accepted the costs for some would be lower than for others.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The fundamental point is that a kid’s British citizenship is not a service; it is a right. I am happy to have a discussion about the wording of the new clause, but I understand that the language has been borrowed from elsewhere. The Home Office has fee waiver schemes, for example in the long route to settlement, as the right hon. Member will well know, so it is not something that the Home Office will not understand. It will be able to put in place a scheme that allows people who are generally unable to pay the fee because of their impoverished circumstances not to have to pay it. I am happy to discuss the wording if he accepts the principle.

[Mr Goodwill]

I hear what the hon. Gentleman says, but I maintain my view that the Government have it right on this occasion: the fees should reflect the cost of delivering those services, and should not fall more widely on taxpayers as a whole. Of course I have a right to a British passport, but that does not mean that I should not pay the fee to ensure that the passport is applied to me, not to somebody who is pretending to be me or trying to impersonate another citizen.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

To echo the point made by the hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark, no big profits are made on passports. Of course, people still have British citizenship even without a passport. A passport is a useful thing to have to prove citizenship in many circumstances. In a way, that could almost be described as a service. I think it is a pretty important one, and it is right that the Home Office does not make a huge profit on it, but the right hon. Member was not charged a fee for his British citizenship. None of us were. It is not a service that has been provided to us; it is a right, and it is a right for these kids as well.

We have had lots of support on these arguments from Conservative MPs over the years. It is very strange that it is a Scottish National party MP who tends to stand up and champion British citizenship. I thought that this would be made for Conservative MPs. Even if folk will not support us today, I encourage them to please go away and think about this, and speak to their colleagues. I think many hon. Members would have sympathy for this cause if they just looked closely.

[Mr Goodwill]

I completely understand the hon. Gentleman’s point, but I maintain my position that although it is a right for these people to apply for citizenship, the cost of their doing so, and indeed the cost of ensuring that people who may be fraudulently trying to avail themselves of citizenship, should not fall disproportionately on taxpayers as a whole but on the applicants. As long as the Minister can reassure us that the fees reflect the cost, and that any high fees can be justified by the man hours spent and the time needed to check those applications, the Government should be supported on the wording in the Bill.

Nationality and Borders Bill (Third sitting)

Debate between Stuart C McDonald and Robert Goodwill

Committee stage
Thursday 23rd September 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q You have mentioned that a certain number of boats could not be turned back, because it would not have been safe to push them back. One of several issues with the pushback policy here is that we are talking about small dinghies, and that lives would be put at risk by attempting to push them back. There is nothing in the Australian policy that would have seen Australian vessels putting lives in danger by attempting to push back small dinghies, for example.

George Brandis: No, but because the distances involved are so different. Embarkations from the southern shores of Indonesia, across the Timor sea, were not in dinghies; they were largely in dilapidated wooden fishing boats.

[Mr Robert Goodwill (Scarborough and Whitby) (Con)]

Q Welcome, Your Excellency. You said that in 2014 your policies had successfully stemmed the flow of illegal migrants. In September 2015 you announced that you would take 12,000 Syrians and Iraqis into Australia. Do you feel that you would have been in a position to do that, and had the capacity to do that, had you not stemmed the flow of illegal migrants into your country?

George Brandis: I remember that decision very well; it was an NSC decision and I remember the debate as if it were yesterday. I am very proud that Australia did that. Sir, let me answer your question in this way. What we have found in Australia—this is both the view of those who have studied the issue and empirically verified by many public opinion surveys—is that there is a very direct correlation between the public’s willingness to accept a big immigration programme, with a big humanitarian and refugee element, and public confidence that the Government are in control of the borders. When the public have that confidence, they back a big immigration programme. When that confidence is eroded, they are less enthusiastic about it.

That sentiment was captured by former Prime Minister Howard in words that became almost a mantra in Australian politics of the day. He said in 2004, “We will always fulfil our humanitarian obligations, but we will decide who comes into this country and the circumstances in which they come.” Australia is a big immigration nation. To give some figures, in the year in which the Syrian refugee programme was at its most ambitious, 2016-17, Australia accepted 21,968 refugees under our various humanitarian programmes. We also accepted, under our other immigration programmes—skilled migration; family reunions—183,608 people. More than 200,000 people came that year, of whom about 10% came under humanitarian and refugee programmes.

The numbers have gone up and down a bit. That was the biggest year because of the Syrian element, which was an additional element to the normal humanitarian and refugee programme. In the most recent year, 2019-20, we accepted 140,366 people—13,171 people under our humanitarian and refugee programme. The numbers over the last several years have fluctuated between more than 13,000 and almost 22,000 per year under our humanitarian and refugee programme. In most of those years that is per capita the most generous humanitarian and refugee programme in the world, second only to Canada.

Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill (Eighth sitting)

Debate between Stuart C McDonald and Robert Goodwill

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 8th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 18th June 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Stuart C. McDonald]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer. In tabling new clauses 45 and 56, my party wants to set out our opposition to how the no recourse to public funds regime is working, both in general and specifically during the current covid crisis. We think it is having some drastic effects, and therefore refuse to extend it to EEA nationals during the current public health crisis, or indeed more generally. Of course, we urge the Government to go further by also disapplying NRPF rules in relation to other migrants.

Because of this Bill, any EEA migrants coming to the UK under the new system will face the same problems as those coming from outside the EEA. They will be prohibited from accessing public funds until they are granted permanent residence, something that will take five years for some migrants and 10 for others, if it is granted at all. No recourse to public funds conditions will be applied to the family members of UK citizens and settled persons, as well as those to whom we have extended an invitation to come on a work visa. That means that individuals, families and children are prevented from accessing most in-work and out-of-work benefits, including child benefit, tax credits, universal credit, income-related employment support allowance, income support, local welfare assistance schemes, housing benefit and social security.

[Mr Goodwill]

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the term “no recourse to public funds” is slightly misleading, because there are a number of benefits that people are entitled to, including the furlough scheme, should they be entitled to that?

[Stuart C. McDonald]

It is welcome that the furlough scheme is extended to these individuals, but it is nowhere near enough. I will come to specific problems in relation to covid later in my short speech.

In short, if these new clauses are not agreed, many thousands more people who are here because they are family members or because they are wanted for their work will be put at risk of poverty and insecurity.

Those who come here with limited leave visas certainly do not expect to have to rely on public funds, but as we have seen all too well in recent months, unforeseeable events that are completely beyond their control can have a dramatic impact on their capacity to sustain themselves and their family. I am talking about coronavirus, but the ability of individuals to support themselves can be affected for reasons that are many and varied. It could be economics, illness within the family, relationship breakdown, accidents or the death of a loved one.

We have allowed and welcomed people who come to work here or to join their families. There is no reason or justification for denying them the safety net and security that we regard as essential for everybody else.

Included in those impacted by the NRPF rules are parents who are working hard in roles that are absolutely crucial at this time, including care workers, NHS staff, cleaners and people involved in food preparation. Some are working extraordinarily long hours but still cannot access even limited top-up benefits to help them meet the needs of their children.

Thanks to the Children’s Society, we know that many of the families detrimentally impacted by the rules are headed by single mothers, often from black, Asian and minority ethnic backgrounds. There are also significant numbers of families that include children with special educational needs who require additional help from supporting agencies.

It is also important to note that many of the children who will be victims of the NRPF rules will have been born and brought up here. I link back to my amendment on fees for registering British citizens; some of these children would be entitled to British citizenship, but cannot access it, either because they are not aware of it or because they are priced out of it. There will even be British citizens among those children, who are being punished because their parents’ immigration status prevents them from accessing support.

The disastrous impacts of all the rules are well established. People who are prohibited from accessing public funds are clearly at risk of destitution, with no access to the social safety net. The impact on children can be particularly devastating, in so far as deprivation is clearly detrimental to their long-term growth and development. As the Children’s Society points out, living in poverty even for short periods of time has significant detrimental effects on children’s outcomes, both in childhood and in later life, affecting their school attainment, cognitive and behavioural development, and physical and mental health.

Recently, the High Court found no recourse to public funds policies to be unlawful, holding that the relevant immigration rules and casework instructions did not adequately account for human rights obligations. That case was brought by an eight-year-old boy whose mother was subject to NRPF conditions and on the 10-year route to settlement. She was a carer for mentally disabled clients, before the imposition of the NRPF conditions led her and her son to experience periods of destitution. They moved house repeatedly, with the boy having been moved five times before the age of eight, and at one point they were street homeless. The court found that the Home Secretary must not impose or should lift NRPF conditions when it is clear that a person is at risk of imminent destitution in the absence of public funds, rather than waiting for that destitution to take place. As legislators, we should be doing better than that; we should avoid families being at risk of destitution at all. We invite families and individuals to come to undertake vital work here, and we should extend the safety net that we enjoy ourselves.

As in other areas, the Home Office sometimes attempts to pass the buck to local authorities and argues that support under legislation relating to children should mean a safety net of sorts is provided, but the number able to access such support is extremely limited, and the support is also incredibly restricted—sometimes as little as £3 per day per child. As I understand it, children are not even allowed to access free school meals.

The Home Office will also point out that, on application, NRPF conditions can be lifted, but those on the frontline say that such applications are incredibly difficult to have success with and have to be repeated multiple times. Those who apply who are currently on five-year routes to settlement will instead be placed on a 10-year route to settlement, with none of their residence to date being counted towards that target. The price of access to that safety net is insecurity.

[Mr Goodwill]

Does the hon. Gentleman not accept that benefits that people are entitled to by virtue of their paying national insurance contributions are able to be paid, including important ones such as contribution-based jobseeker’s allowance, incapacity benefit and, of course, retirement pension?

Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill (Fifth sitting)

Debate between Stuart C McDonald and Robert Goodwill

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 5th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 16th June 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Clause 7 sets out the extent of the Bill, so here we come to how it impacts Scotland and the other devolved nations. Amendment 17 would disapply provisions ending free movement to Scotland. The new clause simply calls for the Government to consult on, and to review, establishing a differentiated set of immigration rules focused on Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales, and lists a set of issues that we want the UK Government to consult upon. The Government would then report and lay that report before Parliament. There is little here that is too onerous. It is a perfectly reasonable request of the UK Government.

We heard plenty of concern about the implications of the Bill during evidence last Tuesday. It is fair to say that that concern is felt acutely in Scotland and Northern Ireland, but also in Wales and some regions of England. Scotland needs in-migration, and free movement of people has been a significant benefit to that country. The Government’s own risk assessments indicate a huge impact on the number of EEA workers who would qualify under the proposed new salary and skills requirements of the new regime. That is before we take into account the visa fees and the red tape, which I regard as ludicrous, that businesses will be bound up in. That has profound implications for Scotland’s economy, demographics, public finances and devolved public services.

Scotland’s economy relies significantly on small and medium-sized enterprises, which, as we heard last Tuesday, will find the tier 2 system very difficult. Small tourism or food and drink businesses, for example, that have regularly relied on the EU labour market are finding it well-nigh impossible to fill posts domestically. Instead of being able to interview a Portuguese food-processing worker or a Polish hotel worker, there is a significant chance that they will not be able to employ them at all. If they are able to employ them somehow, processes will be very different indeed.

The worker will have to seek entry clearance from their home country, so recruitment practice will have to change. Business will have to shell out for a sponsor licence and possibly on legal advice on how to do all that. The worker will have to pay visa fees plus upfront NHS health surcharges, not just for the main applicant but for the whole family. A skills charge will also be levied. As we heard last week, that could take the costs to the applicant to many thousands of pounds.

[Mr Goodwill]

I understand the point the hon. Gentleman is trying to make, but would it not attract more people to stay and work in Scotland if it was not the highest-taxed part of the United Kingdom?

[Stuart C. McDonald]

That is factually not true, so that is the end to that point. If the right hon. Gentleman is referring to the changes to the rate of income tax that we have made in recent years, there is no evidence that they have made a blind bit of difference. In fact, there are more people in Scotland paying less income tax, and that is before taking into account council tax and various other matters, so that point does not arise at all.

It seems that a huge proportion of the burden of all these fees falls to be paid by the individual worker. Realistically, however, why would a Portuguese food-processing worker or a Polish hotel worker pay £10,000 for the privilege of working in Scotland when they face no charge to work anywhere else in the European Union? The lower income tax that we pay in Scotland would be attractive, but it does not outweigh the £10,000-plus they would have to pay just to turn up.

Scotland has become a country of regular net in-migration, largely thanks to the free movement of people. But for in-migration, our population would have again been in decline since 2015—something that is projected into the future, with more deaths than births. Ending free movement risks pushing Scotland back to a future of population decline. Like other countries, our population of older people is increasing. That is not unique to us, but unlike other countries, in the UK in particular, our working-age population will rise only fractionally in the years ahead, according to various projections.

That brings us to the issue of public finances and devolved public services. There has been a welcome devolution of tax-raising powers in recent years, to which the right hon. Member for Scarborough and Whitby referred. However, with those tax powers now in place, the problem is that we are suddenly seeing the tax base shrunk by immigration policies. That has a direct impact on income tax receipts and also on the economic growth and tax revenue that companies’ VAT.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I have no problem in outlining the paper. This point was got up on Twitter, as if it was a gotcha for the SNP. In that White Paper we advocated a points-based immigration system for those coming from outside the EEA, but we also advocated for the free movement of people. [Interruption.] The Minister looks as if I have been caught in some sort of trap. I am perfectly happy to support a points-based system for Scotland for people coming from outside the EEA. That is not a problem at all. But there are points-based systems and there are points-based systems. [Interruption.] People are chuckling away as if I am talking nonsense, but the Canadian points-based system is significantly different from the points-based system in Australia. The system proposed by the UK Government is barely a points system, and if hon. Members speak to anyone who knows the first thing about immigration law policy, they will say that there is barely a resemblance. Despite all the rhetoric, there is a tiny resemblance between what the UK Government are proposing and what the Australian points-based system is proposing.

On the issue of flexibility and regionality, the Australian points system includes some variation to take account of the different needs of different provinces. If the Australian points-based system is so wonderful, why has it not been replicated in any meaningful sense by the UK Government, including in respect of regional flexibility? Yes, the 2014 White Paper did refer to a points-based system for people from outside the EU—one that would be tailored for Scotland’s circumstances, not one that is completely inappropriate for it.

Ian Robinson and Fragomen, leading international practitioners, looked at the example of Canada, Australia, Switzerland and New Zealand and put forward a whole host of possible options. As they said last week, one of those options would be simply to allow the free movement rules to continue to apply in Scotland. If a hotel in the highlands of Perthshire is recruiting, it can continue to recruit from the EEA just as it does now.

However, there is a huge range of possibilities, from more radical suggestions, such as retaining free movement, all the way down to tailoring the points-based system to suit Scotland’s needs. That brings me to a very modest suggestion that I am bound to bring up; it is a suggestion from my hon. Friend the Member for Na h-Eileanan an Iar (Angus Brendan MacNeil) that I think he may have raised directly with the Minister. It is simply to ensure that points are awarded in this system for Gaelic language skills as well as for English.

This is not just about Scotland, however. The challenges in Northern Ireland will also be unbelievably acute and perhaps even more so, given the land border that it shares with a country not only where businesses benefit from free movement of people, but that runs a completely independent immigration system, tailored to meet its own needs, while still being part of the common travel area. Business in Northern Ireland may face thousands of pounds in immigration fees just to try to attract the very same people who, a few miles down the road, could take up the position totally free of cost and bureaucracy. Merely saying that this system will work for all of the UK does nothing to address that problem.

Even if the Government do not want to properly engage in debate and discussion with SNP MPs or Ministers in the Scottish Government, I urge the Minister to listen to and engage with other voices who are speaking out on this issue. Businesses, business groups, think-tanks, civic society, universities and public sector organisations are all hugely concerned about it. The Minister just needs to do a Google search for commentary in Scotland and Northern Ireland in particular on their response to the Government’s most recent proposals.

[Mr Goodwill]

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that figures released only this morning show that the unemployment rate in Scotland is now the highest in the United Kingdom, at 4.6%, compared with a UK rate of 3%? That means that unemployment has risen by 30,000 to 127,000. Does he not think that those are the sort of people we should be getting into jobs in Scotland and that we should not be looking to the EEA to provide the people?

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The economic impact of coronavirus is of course a tragedy, and every lost job is an absolute tragedy as well. Yes, of course we will focus our efforts on ensuring that people are back in work as soon as we can do that, but we cannot design our immigration system for the next decades based on this calamity. If the only reason Conservative Members can come up with to support this system being implemented in Scotland is that we are going through a pandemic, that is pretty farcical, given that these proposals have been in existence for the last few months, so no, I do not accept that it is any reason for shying away from the points that I am making. The system will cause huge long-term damage to Scotland’s economy and Scotland’s public finances. It is not just me saying that; a whole host of organisations have real concerns.

Again, I am not expecting the Government to do a 180-degree U-turn today, but I do want at least some recognition that there are genuine issues that require more than just our being told that this system will somehow work for Scotland, Northern Ireland or any other devolved nation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move amendment 11, in clause 8, page 5, line 41, leave out subsection (5) and insert—

‘(5) This Part of the Act shall not come into effect until a Minister of the Crown has laid a report before each House of Parliament setting out the impact of this Act on faith communities in the UK.

(6) A report under subsection (5) must consider in particular the ability of members and representatives of faith communities from the EEA and Switzerland to enter the UK for purposes related to their faith.

(7) A Minister of the Crown must, not later than six months after the report has been laid before Parliament, make a motion in the House of Commons in relation to the report.

(8) In this section,

“faith communities” means a group of individuals united by a clear structure and system of religious or spiritual beliefs.”

This amendment requires the government to report to Parliament on the implications of this Bill for faith communities, including the ability of members of faith communities to come to the UK for reasons connected with their faith.

Some 18 months or so ago, the then Minister of State for Immigration issued a written statement announcing changes to immigration rules. Apparently, those changes were to ensure that ministers of religion could no longer apply for a tier 5 religious worker visa; instead, they would have to apply for a tier 2 minister of religion visa. As I understand it, that was done because of a fear at the Home Office that people were coming in under the tier 5 visa route and leading worship while not having the level of English that the Home Office decided would be necessary to perform such a function. The explanatory memorandum said:

“The Immigration Rules currently permit Tier 5 Religious Workers to fill roles which ‘may include preaching, pastoral work and non-pastoral work’. This allows a migrant to come to the UK and fill a role as a Minister of Religion without demonstrating an ability to speak English.”

For some reason, the Home Office also decided to introduce a cooling-off period. The explanatory memorandum said:

“The ‘cooling off’ period will ensure Tier 5 Religious workers and Charity Workers spend a minimum of 12 months outside the UK before returning in either category. This will prevent migrants from applying for consecutive visas, thereby using the routes to live in the UK for extended periods, so as to reflect the temporary purpose of the routes better.”

I have been in discussions with representatives of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference about migration to both Scotland and England. They tell me that most Catholic dioceses previously used tier 5 religious worker visas for priests to come here on supply placements while parish priests were away for short periods because of sickness, training or annual leave. Those supply placements were essential, as they allow Catholics to continue attending mass while keeping parish activities running smoothly. That allows the parish to continue to function while the parish priest is off through illness, going on a retreat or accompanying parish groups on outings, or even just taking a holiday.

A supply placement priest will lead the celebration of holy mass, including the celebration of the sacrament of marriage. He will lead funerals, including supporting bereaved family members, and visit the sick and elderly of the local community. In an age when social isolation and loneliness are increasing, the parish is a place where people can gather as a community to support one another and engage in friendship. It is not just about worship, but about the community hub that the church provides by offering spiritual and practical help and supporting the sick, the elderly, the needy and the vulnerable.

[Mr Goodwill]

In my own constituency there is a Coptic Christian community; it is a closed order, so they do not preach. The system already works very well for non-EEA residents. Is the hon. Gentleman suggesting that, if we do not extend the scheme to the EEA, there will be barriers for people coming to the UK in the way that he describes?

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I will come to that point in a minute. In short, the point made to me by the Catholic Church and other faith groups—we had a debate on this issue in Westminster Hall around the time of the changes—is that, actually, the system for non-EEA nationals used to work but does not work now, precisely because of the changes that the Home Office made 18 months or so ago.

The system is much more expensive now, and it is beyond most parishes’ ability to pay the fees for ministers to come in and lead worship. If they come in under tier 5, which is the much cheaper option, they are no longer allowed to lead worship or whatever else. They can perform a range of functions, but not the ones that are really needed, including leading worship.

The issue is already a problem now and it will be made infinitely worse, because at the moment parishes can still rely on priests or other leaders coming from the EEA. They do not have to pay for the expensive tier 2 visa; they can just come in under the free movement of people. When free movement comes to an end, the same regime will apply and parishes will have to pay all sorts of fees, even to have priests come in from France, Italy, Poland or wherever else. They are not looking forward to that prospect at all.

As I was saying, visiting clergy not only allow the local community to continue to function, but benefit and enrich the whole community, as the community gains from cultural exchange and from sharing the knowledge and experience of priests from other parts of the world. They educate new communities about life in their country, and they open up avenues for local parishes to support communities in need. What was most surprising about the changes was that, as far as the SNP was aware, there had been no problems with visas for the Catholic Church or any of the other faith organisations that made use of the tier 5 route. The new requirement introduced in 2019 for anyone preaching to use tier 2 minister of religion visas has instead more than doubled the costs incurred by parishes arranging supply cover. For some parishes that is unsustainable, compromising people’s opportunity to practise their faith.

Furthermore, they point out that seminaries conducting formation in English are not necessarily recognised by the Home Office as meeting the English requirement under the tier 2 route, meaning that many priests educated to postgraduate level in English are nevertheless required to take a language test, with the extra logistical and cost implications. The new arrangements more than double the costs, making supply cover essentially unaffordable. I have heard directly from religious leaders in my constituency that that is the impact of those arrangements. Unless reforms are made, the situation will be worsened by the end of free movement, as I said in response to the intervention from the right hon. Member for Scarborough and Whitby (Robert Goodwill). I simply ask the Government to engage with faith communities about the challenges that this is causing them to face, and to see if we might be able to come to a solution that makes these sorts of arrangements continue to function in the years ahead.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

With new clause 9, which stands principally in the names of my hon. Friends in Plaid Cymru, we turn to the central matter of the Bill: what will happen to EEA and Swiss nationals who are already here? The new clause simply calls on the Government to report on what the implications for EEA and Swiss nationals will be. That includes reporting on the impact of no recourse to public funds, NHS charging, the granting of citizenship to all EEA and Swiss health and social care workers working in the UK during covid-19, and certain fees. It also includes—we will probably not discuss this in great detail—the merits of the devolution of powers over immigration from the EEA and Switzerland to different parts of the United Kingdom. Those are all perfectly reasonable requests.

I want to focus on new clauses 10 and 11, which bring us back to the settlement scheme. We touched on that on Thursday, when Opposition Members made the case for a declaratory system, meaning that people would have their rights automatically enshrined in law. It would still apply to the settlement scheme so that they could prove their status and navigate employment, social security and other rights. I regret that the Government and the Committee rejected that proposal, but I have taken that on the chin and moved on. However, that puts the Government under a greater obligation to spell out what should happen to eligible individuals who do not apply for the settlement scheme by 30 June 2021. I have tried on a huge number of occasions to get them to reveal what work they have done to estimate how many people might not apply, even in broad-brush terms, and how they would respond.

As we heard in evidence, it is blindingly obvious that, even with all the good work that is going on, the Government will struggle to get above 90% of the target population. Getting above 90% would be a great success, given the international comparison. If the Government fall just 5%, 6% or 7% short of the target, hundreds of thousands of people will suddenly be without status and will lose any right to be in this country on 1 July 2021. By all accounts, this is a huge issue and we need to push the Home Office further to set out how it will address it. So far, all we have been told is that it will take a reasonable approach. That is fine, but it is not enough. We need much more detail, and new clauses 10 and 11 are designed to push the Government on that.

[Mr Goodwill]

Does the hon. Gentleman share my concern that extending the deadline by six months would encourage those who have been putting it off to put it off for another six months?

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Not really. People still have every incentive to apply for the scheme. On 1 July next year the deadline will have passed. People might put it off for six months, but I would far rather that than subject tens and probably hundreds of thousands of people to not having any rights at all. It is much the lesser of two evils. As I say, there are different ways in which we can do this. New clause 11 would allow people to apply after the deadline. I will turn to that in a moment. I want to set out exactly what new clauses 10 and 11 are designed to do.

New clause 10 would ensure that the EU settlement scheme was not closed to new applications until Parliament had approved its closure. We want to see what the plans are and scrutinise how the situation will be handled. Until we are satisfied, we will keep extending the scheme in order to protect people from the loss of their rights and from the hostile environment and the threat of removal. Why on earth should MPs give the Home Office a blank cheque to deal with this as it pleases? We will have that debate and the right hon. Member for Scarborough and Whitby can make his point that it will lead to a delay in people making applications, but I am firmly of the view that that is much the lesser of two evils.

On the closure of the settlement scheme, people who have not applied for a status will have no legal basis to remain in the UK after the grace period, no matter how long they have lived in the UK. They will be liable to removal and will face the hostile environment. After the grace period, a huge group of people will still not have applied. No similar scheme has ever reached 100% of its target audience. New clause 11 would bring back control of the situation to Parliament and allow us to be fully informed as to where the settlement scheme has got and what the Government’s plans are for dealing with this huge issue before we sign off on closure of the scheme. It is a modest proposal, but hugely important.

New clause 11 would ensure that late applications to the EU settlement scheme would still be considered unless reasons of public policy, public security or public health apply. In tabling the new clause, we are asking the Minister who he thinks does not deserve a second chance after 30 June next year. Who does not deserve the reasonable response that he has spoken about in the past? Under the new clause, applications made after the deadline could be ignored for restricted reasons relating to public policy, public security or public health. However, we want to know who, on top of that, the Minister thinks should be deprived of their rights and the ability to remedy the situation in which they find themselves. People will be unable to live in this country and they will be liable to removal. We need to know much more about the grounds on which people will be able to make a late application. What are the reasonable grounds that the Home Office will accept? They have yet to be defined. As far as we can tell, they will comprise only a very narrow list of exemptions, including, for example, for those with a physical or mental incapacity, and for children whose parents have failed to apply on their behalf.

As I have said many times, the deadline will be missed by many people for good reasons beyond those that I have just outlined. People will simply not be aware of the need to apply, and people with pre-settled status might forget to reapply for full settled status. I have set out a million times why people will not understand that the settlement scheme applies to them. Rules on nationality and immigration status in this country are hugely complicated. There will undoubtedly be people from all walks of life who think that they are British citizens and who already have a right of residence in this country. They will not appreciate that, in fact, they need to apply to the scheme. The consequences of making such a mistake can be dreadful. If we simply leave the Bill as it is, people will lose the right to be in this country and will be removed and subject to the hostile environment. Alternatively, we could at least leave open to them the option of being able to apply to the scheme after the deadline has passed. They would still have every incentive to apply, because they would need to evidence the rights that they access through the settled status process.

I ask the Government to look positively on these new clauses, and at the very least to provide much more information and assurance about how they are going to approach this issue. Up to this point, there has been barely a flicker of recognition that this is something that needs to be addressed, but we are talking about tens, possibly hundreds, of thousands of people being left in an appalling situation.

Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill (Sixth sitting)

Debate between Stuart C McDonald and Robert Goodwill

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 6th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 16th June 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Robert Goodwill (Scarborough and Whitby) (Con)]

I thank the hon. Member for Halifax for making the point about the contribution that overseas workers make to our health service and the way the Government have responded to that by suspending the immigration health charge. However, I have some concerns about new clause 12 and its discriminatory nature.

For example, it would extend an exemption to Poland, which has a 0.1% black and minority ethnic population, but not to other countries, particularly Commonwealth countries, which have very close links to the UK. If one looks at the European Union as a whole, its record on inclusivity is not good. For example, all 28 commissioners are white. Following the departure of the UK from the European Union, the number of Members of the European Parliament dropped by 20% as our MEPs left Strasbourg and Brussels, and only 24 of the 705 MEPs are from black and minority ethnic groups.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The simple problem that I face here—again—is the scope of the Bill. I would love to abolish the immigration health surcharge altogether. If that is the only problem that the right hon. Gentleman has, I urge him to get in behind the new clause and we can work to scrap it for everybody else as well.

Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill (First sitting)

Debate between Stuart C McDonald and Robert Goodwill

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 9th June 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Robert Goodwill (Scarborough and Whitby) (Con)]

Q When the Bill was being formulated and opinion was being sought, the UK jobs market was entirely different from the one we shall see from the summer onwards, with many skills in very short supply—particularly for things like engineering, or even for people working in care homes or picking fruit. Do you not think that we shall see a situation in which a lot more British workers come into the jobs market, and that some of the concerns expressed in the past about the bureaucratic hurdles that might need to be coped with will actually not be such a great problem, because we will have a lot of very well-qualified and well-skilled British people? Is it right that the costs that we have just heard of from the Federation of Small Businesses will be a real incentive for companies to employ British people who are now, sadly, in many cases being thrown back on to the jobs market, in a situation in which we do not have, in effect, full employment? I think the FSB should be the first to answer that.

Martin McTague: I can see that there will be more incentive to look for indigenous employees, but the reality is that a lot of the shake-out, or the potential shake-out, that we are hearing is likely to happen will be among the least-skilled people. Companies are going to enormous lengths to try to hang on to the rare skills that they have. If they have managed to recruit somebody from, say, the European Union, they are going to enormous lengths to try to get them to apply for settled status and to reassure them about the covid situation. I do not think that a new influx of unemployed people, many of whom will have poor skills, will solve a lot of the problems for these companies.

Richard Burge: From a London point of view, I think the jury is out, literally. I do not think we really know what to expect as we come out of covid-19. The critical thing for London, and probably for all metropolitan areas, is the mobility of people, and the willingness of people to be physically mobile to go and find new work, possibly earning less than they were earning before. However, it is also about emotional mobility, too. Are people emotionally prepared to go and do new work, taking completely new tangents in their lives and probably earning less? That will be a real challenge. I think there will be greater opportunities, but not necessarily in a career path that people might have been expecting.

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

Q May I go first to the London Chamber of Commerce and then to the FSB? You have both spoken eloquently about the new challenges and red tape that the system will impose upon businesses. Looking at the other side of the coin, is there also not an extent to which this process puts some red tape and expense on potential employees from the European Union? It risks making coming to the UK to work less attractive. For example, I am from Germany and I have a job offer in London or I have a job offer in Dublin. Going to Dublin does not involve any charge or bureaucracy; going to London involves a visa, a health surcharge, and so on and so forth. Is there a danger that we are going to make this country much less attractive for skilled workers to come to?

Richard Burge: I think it is inevitable that it is going to be more difficult for people from the European Union; that is the consequence of leaving the European Union and not having an immigration policy for people from there. It is no longer an internal market; it is now a normal external market.

I think what we need to do is to make the red tape manageable. I think part of that is umbrella licensing. Part of that will be border clearance that is rapid and smooth, so it needs to be digitised and there needs to be e-clearance, and that also means that it cannot get cluttered up with tourism. We hope that everyone from the European Union will be able to come without a visa and not get caught in that process. Part of this process is the mechanism, and I think that one of the big challenges for the Home Office is to ensure that, while there may be more bureaucracy, it tries to make that process as smooth and as digitised as possible, and that is going to be a big ask before 1 January.

Martin McTague: I am really sorry; I can barely hear the conversation. Is there anybody closer to the microphone who could just repeat the essence of that question for me?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Goodwill]

Q Is it more likely that EU workers will come and stay? If they are deterred from doing so, we might have more workers from outside the EU, who might not stay so long.

Brian Bell: I certainly have not seen any evidence of that. It is a difficult one, because there has been a different rule up until this point in time. I have not seen any evidence that suggests European Union workers are more or less likely to stay on a long-term basis than non-EU workers. The data are not very good on that kind of thing, but it would be an interesting thing to look at.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q Professor Bell, may I take you back to what the Minister asked you about regional variations? It is important to be precise about exactly what the MAC recommended. The Minister suggested that the report recommended against regional variations, but you were very careful to say that your report addressed regional variations and salary thresholds. The MAC was not looking at the broader issue of regional visas or devolution of immigration control.

Brian Bell: That is correct. Immigration is a reserved matter, so we were asked to report just on that.

Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill (Second sitting)

Debate between Stuart C McDonald and Robert Goodwill

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 2nd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 9th June 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Goodwill]

Q I have a question for British in Europe. You talked about inequalities. Is it not the case that there is currently an inequality whereby EU or EEA citizens living in the UK have better rights than British citizens in terms of bringing spouses into the country, because the £18,600 income rule does not apply? Indeed, if a British citizen can determine that they are resident in the EU under the so-called Surinder Singh case, they can apply to have that rule addressed. Would you say that by addressing that inequality, we are ensuring that British citizens would have the same rights as everyone else, rather than the current unusual situation in which it is easier for an EU citizen to bring a spouse into the UK?

Jeremy Morgan: I did not understand the beginning of the question. I think the question was: would this equalise the rights between EU citizens living in the UK and UK citizens living in the EU? The answer is yes.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q Professor Ryan, while we have the opportunity, I want to ask you further about the third group of issues you addressed in your briefing paper—the provisions of the Good Friday agreement. It seems from your paper that the issue is that, in order to assert certain rights—protection against deportation, for example, or perhaps access to some family rights—people would have to assert their British citizenship, which, reading between the lines, you say is not really consistent with the Belfast agreement. Your solution is to put some sort of equivalence in the Bill for all persons of Northern Ireland. Is that a fair summary?

Professor Bernard Ryan: Yes. Actually, I am borrowing that idea to some extent from Alison Harvey, from whom I believe you are hearing evidence later on. She has written a paper for the two human rights commissions in Ireland on the birthright provisions in the Belfast agreement, and her eventual solution is that people of Northern Ireland should be granted the right of abode—the status given to British citizens—which takes away their need to identify as British in order to get the equivalent outcomes. Both the things I raised—family sponsorship and deportation/exclusion—would be addressed by that route. I come at it from thinking about Irish citizens or people identifying as Irish citizens and how they should be protected, so I would say that an alternative route is to focus on that and somehow put in additional protections for the people of Northern Ireland to address the Irish citizens within them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q Mr Goodhart, should we all be doing more to have a strategy for integration, for citizenship?

David Goodhart: Yes. That is something I have been interested in for a very long time. We should almost have an immigration and integration Department. The problem is, integration is very easy to talk about but, in a liberal society, it is very difficult to tell people where to live or to send their children to school. There are parts of the country where integration is a real problem; there are other parts of the country where it is not at all. You mentioned Canada, but it is a slightly special case; compared with comparable European countries, we do not do too badly.

The thing that I worry about at the moment is schools. Integration in schools is going backwards in most parts of England. In other words, schools are becoming less well integrated. In any given town, you are more likely to have a school that is overwhelmingly one ethnic minority, or ethnic minorities in general, and then another, almost entirely white school. That problem is getting worse, not better. That is something that is in our power to do something about.

We have ways of counting this, of measuring it. We have where people live and where they go to school, and we can measure that by different ethnic group. We can tell which areas are getting better, and which worse. It would be a really helpful thing, not necessarily every year, but every two or three years, to publish some kind of list of what has been happening in different places—some kind of integration/segregation list of local authorities. That would be a huge incentive for all the most segregated local authorities not to be right at the bottom—not to be the most segregated local authority in the country. There are things you can do, and I think we should focus attention on schools, because it is possible to play with boundaries and nudge people into a better school mix.

[Mr Goodwill]

Q Thank you very much, everyone. This session so far has been useful in exploring what factors influence public opinion on immigration, which of course becomes a very political issue in a referendum or a general election; in fact, that was Stuart’s line of questioning. How much does the media affect that, and how much is an altruistic wish to do the best thing for the UK economy?

Jill, I note that you are a co-author of a document published in September 2018, “The National Conversation on Immigration”. I wonder how much that document reflected some of the feeling in the north of England and parts of the country that maybe do not see immigration as allowing somebody to make your coffee in the morning, clean your house or work as your au pair; those that, as we heard this morning, see it more as a limitless supply of Romanians and Bulgarians who can fill your job if you want a pay rise. Do we have a north-south divide on attitudes to immigration, and do you think that was a factor in the fall of red wall seats at the last general election?

Jill Rutter: It is not so much a north-south divide as an inner city-town divide, or a city-town divide. There are some differences in attitudes between the more diverse cities and the less diverse towns, and that can be partly put down to social contact, but there are other factors. In some of those so-called red wall towns, people have relatively little social contact with migrants, and where they do, people have perhaps come to do specific jobs in specific industries. For example, the distribution sector is heavily reliant on a migrant workforce, and poor management of some of those local issues has perhaps impacted on public concerns.

In England, we have the controlling migration fund, which is quite a successful way of dealing with those local impacts: I think its money has been well spent. However, that funding will end, and no successor to that fund has yet been announced. It is vital that that fund is continued, and that its funding is increased if we can manage to do so.

David Goodhart: One of the problems with free movement was that it was so difficult to plan infrastructure: you had huge waves of immigration, and then it fell. We had that experience in 2011-12, when immigration came right down—I seem to remember that the Government almost hit their 100,000 target; net immigration was about 130,000 or 140,000—and then went whizzing up again when the impact of the eurozone crisis hit. That may not be a huge amount when spread across the whole country or lots of big urban centres, but it makes it very difficult to plan your doctors’ surgeries, your school intakes and so on at a micro level. That has been one of the really big problems with free movement, and I think it ought to be more manageable in the future. That has been one of the really big problems with free movement, and I think it ought to be more manageable in the future.

Schengen and EU-Turkey Co-operation on Migration

Debate between Stuart C McDonald and Robert Goodwill

Wednesday 22nd March 2017 General Committees

[Mr Goodwill]

I could not really comment on any future deals until the details of those deals were known. However, if a similar deal with a north African state was possible, it could prevent large numbers of people who are currently doing so from putting their lives at risk. In some cases, they are being forced at gunpoint on to vessels that are clearly not seaworthy. A similar deal throughout the Mediterranean would, I am sure, be welcomed by the international community.

The deal is saving lives and ensuring that people are being cared for. Let us not forget that those who can afford to pay the people smugglers are by definition not the most vulnerable; they have that resource. Our schemes, particularly the Syrian vulnerable person resettlement programme, delivers for those whom the UNHCR selects as being the most vulnerable, rather than those who can afford to pay the people smugglers.

The EU-Turkey deal continues to represent a critical opportunity to manage migratory flows effectively, to tackle people smugglers and to prevent people from making perilous crossings. The deal has, along with other measures, resulted in a substantial reduction in the number of migrants arriving in Greece since it was agreed. Flows across the Aegean during the last four months of 2016 were only 2% of what they were during the same period the year before. That is a testament to the effect of the joint working under way.

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

I have three short questions for the Minister—

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Sure. First, to go back to what the hon. Member for South Thanet said, this is perhaps the second time that I have been to a European Committee in which we have been talking about fundamental issues and documents that are a year out of date. Is there an explanation for why that has happened? May we have an assurance for the future that when such documents are published, we will be able to debate them quickly, preferably on the Floor of the House?

[Mr Goodwill]

I did make a solemn undertaking, when called before the European Scrutiny Committee to account for myself, that we would work off the backlog, and we have made considerable progress in doing that. I have to say, however, that this is a very good point in time at which to review the operation of the Turkey deal and what is happening in the Schengen area. In the coming months, a number of critical decisions will need to be made by the European Union, not least because this is a two-way deal. There were suggestions that visa restrictions could be eased for Turks wishing to come to the European Union, and there is the issue of more progress on Turkey’s wishes to become a member. It is therefore a good time to have the debate and to review the measures, albeit that we are not a member of the Schengen area.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

May I press the Minister, secondly, on the lawfulness of the EU-Turkey agreement? We need to be clear what we are talking about, which is the European Union saying, “We are not going to consider the substantive claim for asylum that you have made. We are going to say that it is inadmissible and return you to a country that does not fully implement the Geneva convention, on the basis that you have travelled from there.” Peter Sutherland, the UN Secretary-General’s special representative for international migration, suggested that the deal was illegal. Did the Government seek legal advice? How have they come to the conclusion that it is lawful to say, “You can have your asylum claim processed in Turkey”?

[Mr Goodwill]

I repeat the point that the “first safe country” principle is well accepted and has been for many years. Turkey, as a safe country, is one in which people may claim asylum. It offers sufficient protection in law and in practice to returnees. We are confident that all returns will take place in full accordance with EU and international law. Every quarter, the European Commission carries out a review that considers human rights. There have been five to date, the most recent one published in early March.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I thank the Minister for that answer. I will return to that issue in a moment, but finally, may I press him on what he said about using the deal as a model for other deals, perhaps with north African countries? I cannot for a minute think that he is suggesting that he would implement a similar deal with Libya, under which people claiming asylum in Europe would be told that we would not consider their claim, but it would instead be considered and processed in Libya, which clearly has no implementation of the Geneva refugee convention.

[Mr Goodwill]

The point I was making was that no deal is on the table, but certainly Libya can never be considered a country to which it is safe to return people. In any case, there are serious problems with organised criminals and people traffickers operating in Libya. The lack of rule of law in Libya is also of great concern to the international community. As I said, no deal is on the table, and no model can be delivered, but overall, the Turkey deal has saved lives and resulted in people smugglers’ business being curtailed. We can certainly learn lessons from it, if we look at similar types of deal in future.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Stuart C McDonald and Robert Goodwill

Monday 6th March 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Goodwill]

We seek to minimise the time for which people are kept in detention, and that is done for the purposes of removal. We have, of course, introduced a new adults at risk policy, which seeks to minimise the use of detention for those considered vulnerable.

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

16. What steps she is taking to support refugees in the UK and other European countries.

[Margaret Ferrier (Rutherglen and Hamilton West) (SNP)]

18. What steps she is taking to support refugees in the UK and other European countries.

[The Minister for Immigration (Mr Robert Goodwill)]

The UK provides protection for refugees here, in accordance with our international obligations. The Government have established a £10 million refugee children fund for Europe, provided significant assistance via the European Asylum Support Office, and allocated up to £39 million to the humanitarian response in Greece.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Why is it that only a solitary Home Office official in each of Greece and Italy is working on the Dubs and Dublin schemes? According to non-governmental organisations on the ground, the result is that the schemes are barely functioning there at all.

[Mr Goodwill]

We work very closely with our colleagues in France, Greece and Italy. We committed 115 staff into Greece, 75 of whom are already there, including one embedded member of the Home Office staff who is helping with Dublin applications in Athens. Of course, we also have our Border Force commitment in the Mediterranean, which ensures that we save people’s lives should they make that perilous journey across the Mediterranean.

Unaccompanied Children (Greece and Italy)

Debate between Stuart C McDonald and Robert Goodwill

Thursday 23rd February 2017 Commons Chamber

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

rose—

[Mr Goodwill]

I should like to make a bit of progress on section 67, which has been raised in the debate.

I am pleased to update the House today by announcing that the Home Secretary will be writing to her counterparts in France, Greece and Italy to ask for referrals of eligible children to the specified number of 350. The basis on which these transfers will be made will be published in due course. The Government have always been clear that we do not want to incentivise perilous journeys to Europe, particularly by the most vulnerable children. It is not and has never been the case, as has been suggested, that the Government would accept 3,000 children from Europe under section 67 of the Immigration Act 2016—

Immigration Rules: Spouses and Partners

Debate between Stuart C McDonald and Robert Goodwill

Tuesday 31st January 2017 Westminster Hall

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The hon. Gentleman makes a fair point. I will come to the disproportionate impact of the threshold in just a moment.

When those two rules are combined, astonishingly almost half the UK population would be excluded from ever being able to sponsor the person they love to come and join them, if that person happened to be from outside the EU. As the hon. Gentleman just said, there are disproportionate impacts on some segments of the population, for fairly obvious reasons related to average incomes, so even higher proportions of young people, women and some ethnic minorities, and essentially all those who live outside London and the south-east, are affected.

Tens of thousands of adults have been forced by the Government to choose between the country that is their home and that they love and the people who they want to share their home with and who they love even more. That is a horrible and cruel choice. What is the Government’s justification for that? The official Government position is that it serves to protect the public purse and encourage integration. The first of those is of dubious accuracy and questionable relevance. The second I fail completely to understand at all, so I will listen with interest to what the Minister has to say if he wants to maintain that argument. I simply note that it was comprehensively rebutted in a report for the Children’s Commissioner that I will consider shortly.

On the public purse issue, the Government claimed that the requirement would save £660 million over 10 years —it would be good to know if they are doing up-to-date research on that—but Middlesex University has persuasively argued that the coalition Government, who introduced the rules, did not take into account the loss of the wider economic benefits of migrant partners’ economic activity. In fact, its model suggested a cost to the taxpayer over that period of £850 million.

Needless to say, the Government did not accept that analysis and pressed ahead, fixing a threshold at the level that the Migration Advisory Committee said would be the annual gross pay required for a couple at which they would not receive income-related benefits, assuming weekly rent of £100. I am not criticising the MAC, which functions like a finely tuned, high-spec computer performing some amazing analysis. However, as with such a computer, the principle of “garbage in, garbage out” applies: if a half-baked question is asked, a half-baked answer is given.

As the MAC pointed out, its deliberations were based purely on economic considerations and did not take into account wider legal, social or moral issues related to family migration. That was absolutely correct. Of course, in implementing its recommendation, the Government did not think to factor in that even if £18,600 was the right threshold, both halves of the marriage or partnership should be allowed to contribute to meeting it, not just the UK sponsor. A talented non-EU national could have a job offer—they might even have worked in the UK in the past under a different visa—yet they cannot join their spouse or partner here if their UK spouse or partner is, agonisingly, just a few hundred pounds short of the income threshold. That makes absolutely no sense.

[The Minister for Immigration (Mr Robert Goodwill)]

I, too, pay tribute to the MAC for its work. Does the hon. Gentleman recognise that the MAC recommended a range between £18,600 and £25,700 and that, given that range, the Government chose the lowest figure they could?

[Stuart C. McDonald]

It is true the Government chose the lesser of two evils, but I go back to the point I made before: it all depended on the question that the Government asked of MAC, which dictated the answer that came back. They could have looked at a million different alternatives. For example, in some litigation before the courts, reference has been made to the minimum wage, which is considerably less than £18,600. In my view, there was nothing wrong with the threshold previously in place, which was broadly £5,500—a rate that equated to income support at that time. There is even a case for removing the financial threshold altogether. So, yes, the Government chose the lesser of two evils, but that was from the question they asked in the first place.

The all-party parliamentary group on migration rightly pointed out that there will be many cases where the separation of parents leads to increased reliance on social security benefits. All of that is largely hypothetical anyway, since as we all know the non-EU spouse is prohibited from accessing social security benefits in any event for five years.

Ultimately, we should not engage in a balance-sheet debate that excludes from consideration family life and the best interests of children. We are talking about people—husbands, wives, mothers, fathers, sons and daughters—whose lives are being absolutely ruined. I have no doubt that colleagues will raise many constituency cases today, and each of them is absolutely deserving of our attention.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Goodwill]

People have to get an English qualification at level A1 in their country before they come here. I represented Yorkshire in the European Parliament, and having represented many of the communities there, I know the disadvantage that many children face when they start school—perhaps second or third-generation English-born children—if they do not speak English as their first language. Having that ability in English is absolutely vital not only for the integration of spouses, but for enabling children to progress in life. That is why we set these levels and why, from 1 May 2017, we are introducing a new English language requirement for partners applying for further leave after two and a half years in the UK on a five-year route to settlement. That will require them to progress to A2 level from the A1 level required on entry.

Thirdly, the rules seek to prevent burdens on the taxpayer. That is achieved through the minimum income threshold of £18,600 a year to be met by those wishing to sponsor a partner to come or remain here, with higher thresholds for also sponsoring dependent, non-EEA national children. It is right that those wishing to establish their family life here must be able to stand on their own feet financially. That is the basis for sustainable family immigration and for good integration outcomes.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The Minister argues that migrants coming here should stand on their own two feet, so why will he not take into account their potential earnings when they go out of their way to show that that is exactly what they intend to do?

[Mr Goodwill]

That point was raised in the debate, including by the hon. Gentleman’s Front-Bench colleague, the hon. Member for Glasgow North East (Anne McLaughlin). Employment income from the migrant partner will not count towards a minimum income threshold. We will not take into account the previous, current or prospective earnings, or any job offer of the migrant partner, when they apply for entry clearance to come to the UK. Employment overseas is no guarantee of finding work in the UK. Partners coming to the UK with an appropriate job offer can apply under tier 2 of the points-based system. Those using the family route to come to the UK must be capable of being independently supported by their sponsor or by their joint savings or non-employment income. When a migrant partner is in the UK with permission to work, we will take their earnings from employment here into account.

As I was saying about the rules relating to the £18,600 threshold, it is right that those wishing to establish their life here can stand on their own feet financially. The previous requirement for “adequate” maintenance meant that any sponsor earning, after tax and housing costs had been deducted, more than the equivalent of income support for a couple—around £5,700 a year—was deemed to have sufficient funds to sponsor a partner. That was not an adequate basis for sustainable family integration and provided little assurance that couples could support themselves over the long term. That is why the minimum income threshold for sponsoring family migrants was introduced as part of the reforms of the family immigration rules implemented in July 2012.

Post-study Work Schemes

Debate between Stuart C McDonald and Robert Goodwill

Thursday 8th December 2016 Westminster Hall

[The Minister for Immigration (Mr Robert Goodwill)]

It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Rosindell. If I may, I will leave a couple of minutes at the end for the hon. Member for Perth and North Perthshire (Pete Wishart), who moved the motion, to respond. I congratulate him on securing the debate and I congratulate all hon. Members who have participated on their valuable contributions to a spirited debate. Indeed, such has been the turnout for the Scottish National party, it has almost been like a scene from “Braveheart”. I welcome the shadow Secretary of State for Scotland. During my short time as Immigration Minister, I have faced seven Members of the Labour party across the Dispatch Box, and I have had seven slightly different takes on what Labour’s immigration policy might be. I hope we can get some clarity at some point.

It would be careless of me not to begin with the fact that the Scottish people knew, when they voted in the Scottish independence referendum, that issues such as immigration and defence were not devolved matters. Therefore, the majority agreed that that should continue to be the situation. Incidentally, despite what the shadow Secretary of State said about my party’s attitude to Scotland, I want to put on the record that Scotland, like Yorkshire, is an important part of our country and that use of the word “colony” is really not appropriate. Perhaps the people in Scotland are slightly more generous than people from Yorkshire, but both are vital parts of our country. More Scots chose to vote Conservative than Labour in the last Scottish election. Indeed, many would say that Labour has become irrelevant in Scotland and that only the Conservatives are seen as offering a real choice for our people north of the border.

I am pleased to say that, on some key issues, there are no differences between any of us, whichever side of the border we are on. International students make an important contribution to UK educational institutions not just because of the income they bring, but because of the wider perspective they contribute and the lasting links they forge with this country. Let me be clear: there is no limit on the number of genuine international students who can come to study in the United Kingdom, and we have no intention of imposing any limit or cap. I hope that all hon. Members will acknowledge and welcome that fact. Let me also be clear about what that means in practice. The Government have taken seriously our duty to clear up the mess we inherited from the previous Government, including stopping more than 900 bogus institutions bringing in international students, and the number of genuine international higher education students has risen. Indeed, since 2010, the number of international students at Scottish universities has increased by 14%. I wish that those who seem to trade in doom and gloom would celebrate that fact and help the excellent universities in Scotland to flourish.

The hon. Member for Edinburgh North and Leith (Deidre Brock) raised a point about numbers falling. I point out that non-EU enrolments at Scotland’s Russell Group universities have increased. Between 2011-12 and 2014-15, the University of Edinburgh’s numbers were up by 9%, and the University of Glasgow’s were up by 32%. That is a great achievement by some of our great institutions.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The point here is not a comparison between where we are now and where we were a few years back. It is about where we are now and where we could have been if we still had the post-study work visa. Universities Scotland has highlighted the fact that it has lost out on hundreds of millions of pounds of income, so we would have had more international students. That is an appropriate comparison and that is what the Minister has to address.

[Mr Goodwill]

The hon. Gentleman continually makes such points, but we must always bear in mind that many of those numbers are people who did not come here to study at all in some cases. They enrolled in bogus colleges intending not to study, but merely to take low-skilled jobs as a way of getting into the country and, in some cases, achieving residency in due course.

Let me turn to the issue of post-study work in Scotland, dealing first with the Fresh Talent—Working in Scotland scheme, which closed in 2008 because of its manifest limitations. An evidence review of the Fresh Talent scheme published by Scottish Government Social Research in 2008 refers to analysis of in-country applications conducted by the Border and Immigration Agency between June and August 2007, showing that a significant proportion of respondents were not in the types of job they would have liked to be in, with about four in 10 stating that their employment was not linked to their career choice, and more than half saying that it was not even appropriate to their level of education.

The Government closed the tier 1 post-study work route in April 2012. The route granted free access to the UK labour market for two years to international students who graduated in the UK. Too many individuals in the route were unemployed or in low-skilled work, and too many were using the student route as a means to work in the United Kingdom without any intention to study. We also saw a large number of fraudulent applications, which undermined our work routes and damaged the reputation of our education system. However, the closure of the two schemes does not mean that the United Kingdom fails to provide an attractive offer for international graduates of our universities. We have a generous offer for international students graduating from UK universities, which contains important safeguards to protect against abuse, the undermining of our work migration routes, and students being exploited by being used in low-skilled work or remaining in the United Kingdom unemployed.

With our current post-study provisions, the number of international students switching from tier 4 into tier 2 in the UK has been increasing. In 2015, the number was more than 6,000—up from around 5,500 grants in 2014, and around 4,000 grants in 2013. The hon. Member for Perth and North Perthshire made the allegation that we will “boot them out”. That is not the case. He talked about people having to find a job in four months, which is also not the case. They can start looking for a job before they finish their course, and many participate in the famous milk round, in which employers go around universities before exams and graduation have been completed. The important point is that there is no limit, and never has been, on the number of international graduates of UK universities who can move into skilled jobs in the UK workforce. There is no limit on the number of tier 4 students who can move into tier 2 jobs. Students moving into skilled jobs do not count against the annual tier 2 general limit.

Another point was on students being able to stay for up to two or four months before switching. Four visa categories are available to non-European economic area graduates of UK universities who wish to remain in the UK to work. First, those with an offer of a graduate-level job that pays an appropriate salary may take sponsored employment through tier 2. Secondly, those who have been identified by their higher education institution or by UK Trade & Investment can stay on for up to two years to develop their businesses in the UK under the tier 1 graduate entrepreneur category. Thirdly, graduates wishing to undertake a period of professional training or a corporate internship related to their qualifications can do so under tier 5. Lastly, PhD students can stay in the UK for an extra year under the tier 4 doctorate extension scheme to look for work or to start their own business.

We need to be clear that this debate is not about skilled work or ensuring that graduate-level skills are available to Scotland. That is already provided for. The Scottish National party is arguing for the right for international graduates to stay in this country to work in low-skilled and unskilled jobs. I fail to see how that benefits the economy of any part of the United Kingdom.

Although I recognise and welcome the work in Scotland to reduce unemployment rates—I note that there are still 129,000 unemployed people in Scotland—as in other parts of our country, the unemployment rate has fallen in recent years. Many of those people may already have the skills, or could acquire the skills, to take up jobs that do not require graduate training.

The other argument advanced by the SNP is that not having post-study work schemes makes the UK education sector less competitive than all our key international competitors. Perhaps we should look at the facts. An international student graduating from a UK university can stay in this country for at least two months after graduating, during which they can do whatever they like, including both working and looking for tier 2 employment that would allow them to stay on. If they have undertaken a course lasting more than a year, which covers the majority of international students in the UK, they can remain for four months.

The only country with a greater number of international students than the UK is the United States of America. In the United States international graduates, other than those undertaking work directly relevant to their degree, must leave the country within 60 days of completing their programme. In passing, I note that Canadian study permits become invalid 90 days after the conclusion of a study programme, which again is less generous than the position that applies to most international students in the UK. I hope we will not hear any more rhetoric about the UK’s uncompetitiveness on international students.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The Minister is talking about the student visa itself. The US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand all have post-study work offerings that allow people to switch without, say, salary thresholds for 12 months or, in one case, 24 months. The Minister is not making a fair comparison.

[Mr Goodwill]

I have mentioned the four routes that graduates can take, but I make it clear that coming to the UK to study and obtain a degree is not a way into low-skilled work or unemployment. The vast majority of students come to the UK to study and then go back to contribute to their country’s economy. Indeed, on the statistics, those students do not contribute to net migration. If a person comes here to study and leaves at the end of their course, they do not contribute to net migration.

The hon. Members for Dundee West (Chris Law) and for Rutherglen and Hamilton West (Margaret Ferrier) spoke of the tier 4 visa pilot. In recent months, some Scottish National party Members seem to have fixated on the claim that Scottish universities have somehow been deliberately and consciously excluded from the tier 4 visa pilot. The four universities chosen were selected objectively, with no prejudice—indeed, if there were prejudice, I suspect we would have had one in Yorkshire—and, as a result, the pilot includes the top four institutions based on their consistently low levels of visa refusals. There was no agenda to limit those involved to universities in any region of the UK.

The hon. Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath (Roger Mullin) is keen on putting words in my mouth, and I am not saying that all institutions not currently involved in the pilot have a poor record of immigration compliance. There are plenty of excellent institutions throughout the UK, including in Scotland. However, the four institutions participating in the pilot have the best record, which is why they have been chosen. We have deliberately kept it small scale, and I assure hon. Members that it will be properly evaluated. Should the pilot prove a success, it will be rolled out more widely—including, I hope, to universities in Scotland.

Finally, the Government continue to engage widely with the further and higher education sectors. Only yesterday, as has been mentioned, I met Dr Alasdair Allan, the Scottish Government’s Minister for International Development and Europe, to discuss these points.

I have time to touch on one or two other points. It was claimed that the number of Indian students coming to the UK has fallen by half, which should be viewed in the context of the clampdown on abuse. We issue more tier 4 visas to students from India than to students from any other country except China and the United States. The proportion of Indian students in the UK who are studying at a university has increased from some 50% in 2010 to some 90% in 2015. The trend of smaller volumes of students with greater concentrations in higher education is likely to reflect the recent policy changes to clamp down on immigration abuse by non-genuine students and bogus colleges. In 2015, some 90% of Indian students who applied for a tier 4 visa were issued one, which is up from 86% in 2014 and 83% in 2013. The Indian student grant rate is higher than in our competitor countries, and in quarter 3 of 2016 there was a 6% increase in the number of tier 4 visas issued to Indian students compared with 2015.

As anticipated, this has been a lively debate. I thank all hon. Members for their contributions. I reiterate that genuine students are welcome, and will continue to be welcome, in the United Kingdom. The UK has an enviable reputation as the home of world-class educational institutions, and the Government will continue to help them to ensure that they can continue bringing in the best and brightest students from across the globe to all parts of the UK, particularly Scotland.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Stuart C McDonald and Robert Goodwill

Monday 5th December 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Goodwill]

We do have a specific Scotland shortage occupation list, which recognises the need to attract certain types of occupation to Scotland and which takes account of Scotland’s needs.

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

One group of families that a distinct immigration system for Scotland would help are the “skype” families. There are 15,000 kids across the United Kingdom who are separated from a parent abroad because this Government have the least family-friendly immigration rules in the whole of the developed world. Almost half of Scotland’s people do not earn enough to meet the crazy financial threshold to bring the partner whom they love from abroad to live here. Will the Minister for Immigration allow the Scottish Government to set their own threshold, or how will he explain to those children why they have to live apart from one parent?

[Mr Goodwill]

At least the Scottish National party is honest about the fact that it wants to increase immigration, unlike the Labour party, which repeatedly refuses to say that that is its policy.

[Mr Speaker]

I am sure there is no suggestion that anybody would be anything other than honest in this Chamber.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

What is so difficult about some state variations in immigration rules? Many visas tie people to a specific job and employer. We have Tech City visas, which have special rules for certain UK cities, and we do operate a common travel area and an open border with Ireland, which is a completely distinct immigration system. Does the Secretary of State accept that there is no practical reason why we cannot see significantly different rules applying in Scotland for those significantly different needs?

[Mr Goodwill]

If the hon. Gentleman were to examine the evidence of the Fresh Talent scheme, which the Scottish Government reviewed in 2008, he would see that only 44% of those applicants remained in Scotland, and more than half of those jobs were not appropriate for the level of education of those who took them.

Refugee Family Reunion (Immigration Rules)

Debate between Stuart C McDonald and Robert Goodwill

Tuesday 29th November 2016 Westminster Hall

[Mr Goodwill]

I understand the hon. Lady’s point, but I will justify exactly where we are and why we believe we have got the right policies.

As I was saying, the rules reflect our obligations under article 8 of the European convention on human rights. Where an application does not meet the rules, our policy requires consideration of any exceptional or compassionate reasons for granting a visa outside the rules. That caters for extended family members of refugees and family members of British citizens who cannot meet the financial requirements of the rules.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Goodwill]

I will make a little progress, otherwise I will not be able to answer the points made during the debate, given the time constraints.

In July, the Home Office published revised guidance on the types of cases that may benefit from a grant of leave outside the rules in exceptional circumstances, including adult dependent sons or daughters over the age of 18 who are not leading an independent life and are living in a conflict zone. The new guidance also provides more clarity for applicants and their sponsors, so that they can better understand the process and what is expected of them. I do not believe that widening the definition of family is practical or indeed necessary, especially as the numbers of people granted a family reunion visa are likely to increase in line with the numbers of recognised refugees in the UK.

A balance has to be struck between reuniting families quickly and not creating a situation where the UK becomes the destination of choice, with family members and children in particular being encouraged or even forced to leave their country and risk hazardous journeys to the UK. They should instead claim asylum in the first safe country they reach.

Immigration Rules (International Students)

Debate between Stuart C McDonald and Robert Goodwill

Wednesday 16th November 2016 Westminster Hall

[The Minister for Immigration (Mr Robert Goodwill)]

I congratulate the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East (Stuart C. McDonald) on securing the debate and I thank all hon. Members who participated in it for their worthwhile, considered and thoughtful contributions on such a wide-reaching and important topic. I think that we can all agree that it is in the best interests of the UK as a whole to ensure that the United Kingdom continues to attract the best and brightest international students to study here. High-quality international students make an important contribution to the UK. Our universities are strengthened by the presence of some of the finest minds from around the world, and the international students themselves benefit from the chance to receive an education at some of the world’s best educational institutions.

Much emphasis has been placed today on the desire for Scotland to re-establish a post-study work visa. Hon. Members may remember the Fresh Talent scheme that operated in Scotland between 2004 and 2008. That scheme placed few restrictions on those who wanted to stay in the UK to work post-study, and granted free access to the whole of the UK labour market. An evidence review published by Scottish Government Social Research in 2008 found that only 44% of applicants remained in Scotland at the end of their two years’ leave on the scheme, and a significant proportion were not in skilled work appropriate to the level of education.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

That is exactly the point I made during my speech and I suggested that it is made a condition of a post-study work visa that that person has to live and work in Scotland. That would absolutely solve the Minister’s concerns.

[Mr Goodwill]

It is very difficult to ensure that a person who gets a visa to work, potentially, in Scotland is stopped from travelling elsewhere in the UK. Certainly, the pull of the south-east and London is one we are all too well aware of.

In 2008, the tier 1 post-study work visa replaced the Fresh Talent scheme and was introduced country-wide. This route saw high levels of abuse, with evidence of large numbers of fraudulent applications and individuals deliberately using the student route solely as an avenue to work in the UK, with no intention to study and many in unskilled work. I am sure that hon. Members are not seriously suggesting that a return to a completely open post-study work route that does not lead to skilled work would be advantageous for any part of the United Kingdom.

The UK already has an attractive offer for international graduates of UK universities. Those who can find a skilled job are free to do so. There is no limit to the number of tier 4 students who can move to a tier 2 general skilled worker route, nor do they count against the annual tier 2 cap. Around 6,000 tier 4 international students move to tier 2 annually, and that number has been rising year on year. However, that does not mean that the Government do not remain open to keeping our offer for international students under constant review, to ensure that we help our renowned institutions to attract talent from around the world. One such recent development was the launch of the tier 4 visa pilot with the universities of Bath, Cambridge, Oxford and Imperial College in July.

Calais Children and Immigration Act

Debate between Stuart C McDonald and Robert Goodwill

Wednesday 16th November 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Goodwill]

First, let me pay tribute to the non-governmental organisations that have been working in France. I am talking about not only the French NGOs such as France terre d’asile, but British charities that have been working in the camp, giving the children much-needed help, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which is one of our partner organisations working in France and the wider region. Anyone who is in contact with a child in France should tell them to apply for asylum in France. That child’s claim will be considered and they will be looked after in France. One problem that we faced during the Calais camp situation was that the people traffickers and the organised criminals were advising people not to apply for asylum. That is the wrong advice to give. It is important that they do apply for asylum in France, which is a safe country for them to be in.

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

The debates that we had in this House on the Dubs amendment were among the most passionate that I have seen since my election 18 months ago. How section 67 of the Immigration Act 2016 is now implemented is important to this House and deserves the greatest scrutiny. Surely the Government will agree to a proper debate in this Chamber on the content of the guidance that they have issued, because restrictions appearing in the guidance were certainly never contemplated during the Dubs debates.

My party shares the uneasiness about the exclusion of any children aged 16 and 17. Of course 16 and 17-year-olds can be, and are often, vulnerable. I ask the Minister is this a hard and fast rule, or will discretion be applied?

Similarly, we are very troubled with the restrictions on nationality. For example, the exclusion of Eritreans is utterly inappropriate given that Home Office decision making in this area has been torn to pieces in the tribunals. Surely, the grant rate will soon be back through the 75% threshold mentioned. Again, will some discretion be applied in this area? We share UNICEF’s concerns that eligibility is restricted to those

“at risk of sexual exploitation.”

I have not yet heard an explanation of why those at risk of trafficking, forced labour and modern slavery are not to be included as well. As the hon. Member for Swansea East (Carolyn Harris) said, this guidance relates to children in France. What input did the French Government have in setting these criteria, and when will we see guidance for other countries, especially Greece and Italy?

Finally, in relation to children and the Immigration Act, may I ask when the Secretary of State intends to extend the scope of the scheme for transferring responsibility for relevant children in order to include Scotland, under section 73 of the Immigration Act?

[Mr Goodwill]

May I suggest that the hon. Gentleman closely reads section 67, the Dubs amendment, as it makes it quite clear that it applies to refugee children? The reason why we are choosing these particular nationalities is that they are more likely to qualify for refugee status. He also talks about vulnerability. That is why we are addressing the issue of younger children. Indeed, we go further to make it clear that we must work with local authorities and, I am pleased to say, the devolved Governments around the country, to ensure that the capacity is there. This is all in the Dubs amendment, which is why we are discharging that amendment within not only the letter of the law, but the spirit as well.

European Union Agency for Asylum

Debate between Stuart C McDonald and Robert Goodwill

Tuesday 15th November 2016 General Committees

[Mr Goodwill]

I thank my hon. Friend for his questions. The first—on whether the UK will continue to participate in EASO when we exit the EU—is one I can provide an answer to. How the UK supports the EU on asylum and wider migration matters will be considered in due course. However, we remain committed to supporting member states as necessary. Member states participating in EASO who do not participate in the EU agency for asylum would remain bound by the current EASO regulations, unless ejected in line with article 4 of protocol 21 of the treaty. EASO will continue to exist when the agency is set up, so as long as we are a member of the EU, we will be able to participate in the two in parallel.

My hon. Friend also asked about the continuation of the Dublin III regulations and Eurodac when we leave. The operation of a system whereby people can be identified through their biometrics will be important post-Brexit. No doubt that will be part of those negotiations, about which I will not speculate. Countries that are not currently members of the European Union can participate in Dublin III, so a precedent may well be set there. It would not be helpful to speculate on any of our negotiating positions or on what may be the concluding position of negotiations. Be in no doubt, though, that we see these as very important issues that should be addressed during our negotiations once article 50 has been triggered, which I am told will be before the end of March.

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

The Minister has outlined again the Government’s opposition to any form of relocation mechanism. That takes us to the crux of the matter. As the European Scrutiny Committee has asked in some of the supporting papers, if the Government do not have this model in mind, what alternative model do they have to share responsibility more equitably at times of intense migratory pressures? Is it the Government’s position that, instead of solidarity, we are just to leave matters to the frontline states?

[Mr Goodwill]

We certainly stand by our record of stepping up to the mark in helping with the unprecedented wave of migration across the European Union. Home Office officials, as well as other officials, are operating in Italy and Greece. As the hon. Gentleman will know, the situation in Greece has not yet been normalised. Of course, operating through the Dublin mechanism, not only have we been able to bring children across from countries such as Italy, Greece and, in particular, France in recent days and weeks, but children whose needs are best served by being in another EU member state have been moved to join family elsewhere. The system is voluntary: we have been offering technical and practical support, including funding for particular needs, as well as the support we have been giving in the Mediterranean, using vessels commissioned to help to rescue life and deter migration there.

[Mr Goodwill]

Of course that is a commendable concept; it is how it is practically delivered. That is why we have regulation such as Dublin III, which enables a mechanism to be put in place to help where we can. As we have seen following the dismantlement of the camp in Calais, through the Dublin III regulation and, indeed, section 67 of the Immigration Act 2016—the so-called Dubs amendment —we have been able to play our part in giving care and help to unaccompanied asylum-seeking children whom we saw in such dreadful conditions in Calais.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Just one supplementary question, if I may. I welcome some of what the Minister said about work that has been undertaken in frontline states. To press that a little further, I remember reading a situational briefing about Home Office staff who had been sent to Greece. If I recall correctly, at that stage 75 staff were involved in implementing the deal to return people to Turkey, but only two people were involved in implementing the Dublin process. Does that suggest that we have not got our priorities right and should be increasing support for reuniting families across Europe?

[Mr Goodwill]

It is certainly a priority to make sure that the Dublin regulation operates. We offered 75 staff to help in Greece and have dedicated teams working on the Dublin system as well. However, I must underline the importance of the Turkey deal, because one of the most harrowing images that we all saw, following that dreadful number of shipwrecks and drownings, was the poor child washed up on the beach. The Turkey deal was there to deter and prevent people from making that hazardous journey, to stop us playing into the hands of the people smugglers. That deal is saving lives every single day. If only we could have a similar deal for people making the hazardous trip from north Africa, where in some cases we are still seeing dozens of drownings at a time. It is important that we support our EU partners in Greece and Italy through the practical mechanisms and the practical support we put in place, but we also need to ensure that the Dublin regulation operates. Returns to Greece are not possible currently because of some problems that I hope the Commission and the Greek Government will be able to work through.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I have one final set of questions on Eurodac. I broadly share the Minister’s views—the proposals are welcome—but these questions come from the Committee papers. Are the Government satisfied with the safeguards that will be put in place and the rationale for the significant reduction in the age when migrants will be documented? What did the Information Commissioner say when consulted about the Eurodac proposals, if they were consulted at all?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Goodwill]

There can be no doubt that migration and immigration are very contentious issues, not only in this country but worldwide. It is important that we have a grown-up debate on the issue, one in which xenophobia or racism should play no part whatsoever. The Government’s position is well known, which is that we should control net immigration to sustainable levels—that is, the tens of thousands rather than the hundreds of thousands. At the same time I must make it clear that the UK has a proud history of providing help for those in genuine need. The objectives of reducing net migration should not be confused with our international obligations towards those claiming asylum and the mechanisms within the Dublin regulation for family reunification, which are supported by Eurodac. Indeed, in 2015, 130 children came to the UK under the Dublin regulation.

We have also unilaterally implemented measures such as the Syrian vulnerable persons relocation mechanism, through which we are on track to bring 20,000 vulnerable people to the UK before the end of this Parliament. The latest figures on that will be published on 1 December. I am optimistic that they will show that we are on track to deliver it. In addition, we have the scheme to bring 3,000 vulnerable children and their families from the wider region to the UK. This process is just starting to get into gear.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

All these schemes are very welcome—for the children, the relocation of Syrians and so on—but what strikes me as the Minister is speaking is whether these people coming into the UK will be counted towards the net migration target. Is that not a perfect example of why refugees and asylum seekers should be removed from any net migration target?

[Mr Goodwill]

They will be part of the figures. That is how the net migration figures are gleaned. They are based on a survey. As I said, we should not hear any suggestion that we are not stepping up to the mark as regards our international obligations on asylum. That should not be affected by the target to reduce net migration. Indeed, we have unilaterally put the schemes I have just described into place to bring people across from the region and reduce one of those big pull factors. One of the big problems with people drowning on that perilous journey across to Greece or Italy is that the people smugglers see their customers—if you can call them that—being able to get to Europe and be looked after there. We need to make sure we help people in the region, removing that pull factor.

This is over and above our long-standing obligations through the gateway and mandate systems. In terms of our wider help, from the financial point of view, the UK remains one of the largest member state contributors to Greece’s efforts to implement the EU-Turkey agreement, offering 75 personnel, of whom 58 are on station. The UK has deployed a Border Force search and rescue cutter in the Aegean, as well as contributing assets to the NATO mission. HMS Mersey, our offshore patrol vessel, is on station too.

Funding of £2 million was made available for the assisted voluntary returns project through the International Organisation for Migration in Greece from January 2014 to May 2016. The UK has also allocated up to £34 million to the humanitarian response in Greece, including £8 million to the UNHCR.