Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill

Debate between Stewart Hosie and Pat McFadden

Monday 11th March 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr McFadden]

If the hon. Gentleman believes that the tools were in place, I must refer him to the Chancellor, who is constantly saying that his predecessor, my right hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West (Mr Darling), had no alternative when the crisis hit in 2008.

Let me turn to the Bill and some of the issues before us today. There is broad agreement on the need for some kind of structural separation between retail and investment banking. It is important to understand that the point of ring-fencing, as recommended by the Vickers commission, is not to ensure that no retail bank can ever fail—that is impossible—but to make failure, if it does occur, more manageable by insulating the risks and focusing the resolution effort on the essential services that the Government judge it in the public interest to protect: people’s savings, the payments service and simple consumer and SME lending. It would be going too far, and it would be far too rash, to say that that solves the “too big to fail” problem. However, ring-fencing ought to reduce the risks of future failure to taxpayers and the wider economy.

As the hon. Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie) has said, the parliamentary commission, on which I serve, made two proposals in relation to structural separation. The first was the reserve power to separate individual banks should they try to burrow under, climb over, erode or get through—or any other metaphor that has been used—the fence, and the Government have accepted that recommendation. The second was to have a wider power to enforce separation on the sector as a whole. That second power would be needed precisely because problems in the sector do not come in the neatly wrapped form of one institution. As we saw in 2007-08, contagion is a fact of life in banking; the weakness of one can quickly affect others. Cultural problems in one part of the sector also spread quickly. It is precisely because problems in the industry are often widespread that there is a strong case for taking a reserve power to enforce separation on the sector as a whole, in the event that the sector tries to get around the intention of the Bill.

[Stewart Hosie]

I am not yet convinced about the reserve power and have many questions. The three banks that actually collapsed were Northern Rock, Bradford & Bingley and Dunfermline, all narrow mortgage banks. How would the ability to separate investment from retail banking have helped in those circumstances?

[Mr McFadden]

The hon. Gentleman neglects to mention RBS, a universal bank, which needed major intervention to bail it out.

The Minister has said that he does not want wider separation because the Bank of England does not want it. It is true that the Bank of England has expressed some reservations about the power if it were to be wielded by the regulator. I took the opportunity to ask the Governor about it last week when he appeared before the commission. He replied that

“a provision so important that it affects the entire sector is one that both de facto and de jure will and should be taken by Parliament.”

When I explained to him that it had never been the commission’s recommendation that this be a policy decision taken purely by the regulator, and that all along we had been clear that it was a decision for Government, he said:

“As long as the decision is taken by Government, we would have no objection to that.”

I hope that we will no longer hear Ministers saying that they are rejecting this power because the Bank of England is opposed to it. This should of course be a decision taken by Government. As for the Chancellor’s point that it would be “undemocratic”, what is undemocratic about holding a proper review into legislation passed by this House as the Banking Commission suggests, or about taking a reserve power the exercise of which would involve the parliamentary process of debate and approval? The truth is that it would not be undemocratic at all.