RBS Global Restructuring Group and SMEs

Stewart Hosie Excerpts

Thursday 18th January 2018 Commons Chamber

[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)]

This is clearly an important debate, as evidenced by the testimonies that many Members have from their constituencies about RBS GRG. But it goes far wider than that, because RBS was not alone in facing allegations of mis-selling, of treating companies badly at the height of the banking crisis and of poor redress since. I am sure that many Members will have had cases of Clydesdale’s tailored business loan mis-selling, where redress has not yet been made and constituents may have lost their homes, businesses and livelihoods as a result. It is also the case—this adds to our frustrations and those of our constituents—that some products were regulated and others were not and that some customers were deemed to be “sophisticated investors” while others were not. In short, there was an opaque regulatory environment that may have been sufficient in the good times, but most certainly was not when the money ran out and the banks were at their most stressed.

All the banks came under scrutiny, but much of the focus, understandably, was on RBS because it had such a large market share; because, by some measures, it was the largest bank in the world; and, not least, because of the allegations surrounding the treatment of businesses after they entered the bank’s GRG. I will not describe the genesis of the products that people bought, as the hon. Member for Norwich South (Clive Lewis) did that well. I simply say that, when businesses wished to extract themselves, sometimes their only way of escape was to pay substantial sums, larger than any capital ever borrowed, but as they were distressed themselves as the economy downturned, that was not possible, and so, in the case of RBS, they went to GRG. One would have thought, as many have said, that this was to help businesses to recover, but few did. To be fair, some of those businesses are likely to have failed anyway, while others were potentially viable, and referral to GRG may have caused some difficulties. But the key point is that some definitely experienced actions that were likely to have resulted in material financial distress.

One of the many reasons this was able to happen is that in some cases commercial lending was not regulated. To be fair to RBS, it did work with the FCA and it has implemented the complaints review. It also trained the team under Sir William Blackburne, who was honest in saying that outcomes were not being delivered quickly. However, all that remedial work, some of which was very good, is undermined by the swirling belief that refuses to go away that businesses referred to GRG were cash-poor but asset-rich, and artificial default events were engineered. In short, the businesses were asset-stripped.

These allegations are made all the more persuasive by the fact that, as we now know, GRG had a commercial objective and was part of “project dash for cash”; and by what we have seen since the Treasury Committee published the “Just Hit Budget!” memo and the memo from 2008-09.

I fully support the motion. I want to end because time is short. The memo from RBS GRG said that a customer should transfer to GRG if a significant deterioration in any aspect of their activity had happened, where a breach of covenant was likely but had not happened, or where they may miss a contractual payment to anyone. So even businesses that stuck to the terms of the RBS agreement could be referred to GRG. That was completely wrong.