Royal Bank of Scotland

Steve Baker Excerpts

Thursday 5th November 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Steve Baker (Wycombe) (Con)]

I agree with the hon. Gentleman that this is a live issue on the right, and I, too, would like to see a much more diverse banking sector. Let me bring him back to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Horsham (Jeremy Quin). Is it not a problem for the hon. Gentleman and me, and for all those who want a more diverse, more co-operative and mutual banking sector, that the entire atmosphere of co-operative banking in the UK has been established by the circumstances of our own Co-operative bank?

[Jon Cruddas]

The hon. Gentleman seems to be hiding behind one example when all the evidence across western market economies suggests that more co-operative banking does indeed have a part play in creating a more resilient modern capitalism.

What does all this mean for RBS? The Government have presented an artificial choice between business as usual with taxpayer ownership and business as usual with private ownership. This could be deemed outdated thinking. We need so much more imagination and so much more ambition if we are really going to build a better banking system. We urgently need to nurture new kinds of bank that exist in almost every other developed economy—banks that are rooted in local communities, accountable to more than quarterly profit figures, focused on supporting real economic activity, and run with an ethic of public service attached to them. The reason this debate is so obviously important is that with economists the world over warning that the next financial crisis could be just round the corner, the stakes literally could not be higher.

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[Jeremy Quin]

Of course, we must maximise the returns, but we must do so in the context of the broader picture for the UK. I acknowledge that the banking system is incredibly important to our economy, including what it can provide to the real economy.

[Mr Baker]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Jeremy Quin]

I will give way briefly to my hon. Friend, but I know that other Members want to speak.

[Mr Baker]

I am most grateful to my hon. Friend. Having listened to the debate, one of my advisers has texted me to say that according to the International Monetary Fund, as retrospectively analysed by Ewald Engelen et al, the taxpayer cost of saving the banking system was £500 billion, which is way more than the equity injected into it. Has my hon. Friend taken into account the IMF’s calculations, and does he think we will get that £500 billion?

[Jeremy Quin]

I am grateful for the wisdom and insight that has flashed on to my hon. Friend’s machine. His staff are very attentive and I look forward to them providing me with the IMF report so that I can go through it in great detail. I look forward to discussing it with him later. I am being intervened on from all sides. My hon. Friend makes me take on board the £500 billion mentioned by the IMF, while the hon. Member for East Lothian (George Kerevan) simply wants us to hit the five pounds tuppence per share. I am being pulled in different directions, but we all agree that RBS needs to be productive for the real economy.

That takes me to the heart of the motion tabled by the hon. Member for Edmonton. The long-delayed and long-drawn-out splitting off of Williams & Glyn from RBS has cost billions and taken a huge amount of management time. With the best will in the world, splitting up such organisations takes time, effort and money. I am really concerned that it could be an unnecessary distraction to try to pull a bank in as many as 130 different directions, as the hon. Lady proposes. I fear that the creation of multiple banks will lead to multiple dis-synergies and create entities that will find it much harder to access capital markets. It could be a very costly distraction and I am very nervous that it would not act in the interests of the broader economy. There are advantages that flow from a large, well-capitalised and well-regulated bank being able to spread its assets across the UK.

Although I wish the initial public offering of the Clydesdale and Yorkshire Bank well, if it goes ahead in the new year, I fear that investors prefer the spread of banks across asset classes and across the whole of the UK, rather than regional entities. One only needs to remember the passion in this place regarding the steel industry to recognise how a major problem can have a ripple effect on small and medium-sized enterprises locally and cause huge problems for a regional economy. I fear that capital markets would reflect those risks in a higher cost of capital and scarce resources, particularly in those very areas of the country where we all wish to see the maximum amount of lending.

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[Mr Bailey]

I take my hon. Friend’s point.

[Mr Baker]

I share the hon. Gentleman’s sense of irony, but is it not the case that communist China has such assets only in so far as it has adopted the market economy principles of private property rights and the freedom to make contracts?

[Mr Bailey]

I broadly agree with the hon. Gentleman’s thesis, but I do not think that he would agree with mine: that if we had the sort of financial services industry that was focused in the right direction, it would not really matter anyway what progress they were making.

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[Mr Steve Baker (Wycombe) (Con)]

Some lessons of history are so well established as to virtually be axioms: the Government ought not to own banks and private enterprises ought not to be bailed out by the taxpayer. Unfortunately, the Government do own banks and those banks were bailed out by the taxpayer. I think that the taxpayer bail-outs, which involved the privatisation of profit combined with the socialisation of risk, together with all the conduct issues that we all know so well, have done a great deal to undermine faith in the market economy, which we know is the only way to sustain billions of people on the face of the earth.

Some of the issues that have come up today go to the heart of how we should structure a market economy. In my view, in a market economy there should be a plurality of ownership models for banks. One of the great mistakes of the 1980s was the demutualisation of building societies. [Interruption.] I see my hon. Friend the Member for Horsham (Jeremy Quin) nodding furiously in agreement, for which I am grateful. As a teenager, I knew instinctively that the mutual model aligned interests in a way that the shareholder model did not. I was opposed to the demutualisation, or carpet-bagging as it was called, that went on then. These days, I have more theoretical grounding for my views and I certainly believe that we should have a more diverse banking sector, with more mutuals and co-operatives.

I should say briefly that the systemic problems that have affected the entire banking system around the world, irrespective of ownership models, are symptomatic of far deeper problems in the institutional arrangement of money and banking, which I have talked about at great length on other occasions.

[Kelvin Hopkins]

The problems around the world derive from the fact that we have a globalised financial system with no boundaries between countries, so money can flow freely around the world. Had we been insulated from what happened in America, we might have survived rather better.

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[Mr Baker]

The hon. Gentleman knows that I often agree with him, but on this point I do not. I am an old English liberal free trader and I think that the fundamental problem is the chronically inflationary system of fiat money. I hope that he will forgive me if I talk instead about the Royal Bank of Scotland, because I have put the other issues on the record since my maiden speech.

I have two long-standing misgivings that come to a head in RBS. The first is about the effect that the international financial reporting standards have on our ability to see the true and fair position of banks. The other is about the stress tests. I am grateful to Professor Kevin Dowd, Gordon Kerr and John Butler of Cobden Partners for their advice, but any errors or omissions are my own. I should say that I have no financial interest whatever in Cobden Partners, although it was a spin-out from the Cobden Centre, which I co-founded to advance the ideas on which they are now working.

I have said many times that the IFRS allow, enable and encourage banks to overstate their asset values, and therefore their profits, and to understate their losses. In May, we conducted an exercise in which we compared the accounts of RBS with the statement of its accounts in the asset protection scheme. We believed that its capital was overstated by £20 billion. We had a meeting with RBS at which that was admitted.

If it is the case that the IFRS encourage banks to overstate their capital positions to such an extreme degree, I am not in the least convinced that we are selling something that we truly understand. Indeed, as the hon. Member for Edmonton (Kate Osamor) was opening the debate, on which I congratulate her, Gordon Kerr texted me to say that if we broke up the bank into 130 pieces, it would reveal its insolvency. I am not asserting the insolvency of RBS; what I am saying is that with the IFRS the way they are, we simply cannot know whether RBS is in the position it appears to be in.

In such circumstances, the paying of dividends, which has been proposed, would be extremely unwise. It would risk exposing taxpayers to future claims from stakeholders ranking superior to those common stakeholders. The claim will be that their entitlements have been improperly paid out as dividends, when those funds should lawfully have been held back and attributed to creditors and depositors. Tim Bush of Pensions & Investment Research Consultants, Gordon Kerr and others argue that we should have strong reservations about the integrity of the numbers and the ability of the firm to distribute profits under the law.

[Ian Blackford]

The hon. Gentleman is painting an interesting picture of the deficiencies of the IFRS. If we believe it for a second, does it not behove the Government to do a proper analysis of the true value of Royal Bank of Scotland, given that we own over 70% of it?

[Mr Baker]

I banged on in the last Parliament about the IFRS and their shortcomings. Indeed, I introduced a Bill to require parallel accounts to use the UK generally accepted accounting principles, precisely because I think there is a serious problem. I refer the House to Gordon Kerr’s book “The Law of Opposites”, published by the Adam Smith Institute, which not only covers this problem in detail, but explains how it feeds into the problem of derivatives being used specifically to manufacture capital out of thin air to circumvent regulatory capital rules. That is an extremely serious problem that might mean that the entire banking system is in a far worse place than we might otherwise think.

[Jeremy Quin]

I am genuinely curious about what my hon. Friend is saying. A lot of work was done on the balance sheet of RBS at the time of the asset protection scheme. Does he not think that any accounting issues would have been picked up at that stage?

[Mr Baker]

As I said earlier, we compared the asset protection scheme’s accounts with those of RBS and found a £20 billion difference in capital. When I write to my hon. Friend with the details from the IMF, I will introduce him to the people who did that work. I would be glad to sit down with him and my advisers and see what he thinks, because I recognise and respect his vast experience. I am, of course, only a humble engineer who sat in banks asking people how the system worked and found that they often could not tell me.

These concerns are not ones that I have made up. I have in my hand a letter from the Local Authority Pension Fund Forum that explains to our commissioner at the European Union in considerable detail over eight pages what is wrong with the IFRS. I would be pleased to share that with Members who are interested.

I am extremely uncomfortable with the idea that we understand the true and fair position of RBS, or indeed any other banks, because of the imposition of the IFRS. Particularly in relation to RBS, that has meaningful consequences when it comes to thinking about selling the shares. There are also consequences that we should consider when any consideration is given to paying out dividends.

Secondly, I want to raise Professor Kevin Dowd’s extended criticisms of the stress tests. He has made the point to me that under the 2014 stress tests, RBS had a projected post-stress, post-management action ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets of 5.2%. That was sufficiently poor that the bank was required to take further action on its capital position. Of course, it now wants to hand out dividends. That seems to both of us to make no sense. He continued:

“This 5.2% ratio compares to the 4.5% hurdle the Bank used, which is actually less than the 7% imposed on UK banks last year, and much less than the 8.5% to 11% minimum that will be imposed when Basel III is fully implemented in 2019.”

The range arises because of the counter-cyclical capital buffer. That is rather bizarre because it appears that RBS did not meet the Bank of England’s minimum requirements in the stress tests.

I am afraid that it gets worse. Because market events do not follow a normal distribution, there are severe problems with the risk-weighted assets measure that perhaps even render it useless. Therefore, the only measure that really makes sense is the leverage ratio, which is the ratio of capital to total assets, with none of the risk weighting. Under Basel last year, the absolute minimum leverage ratio was 3% and the Bank of England expected UK banks to meet that minimum. That 3% minimum was low. Some of my advisers suggest that a minimum of 15% is necessary, and possibly even double that for the bigger banks. That would be a radical departure. What did RBS achieve under the stress tests? It achieved 2.3%.

I am grateful for the work of Kevin Dowd, Gordon Kerr and John Butler at Cobden Partners on the IFRS and the stress tests. The problems that they have put in front of us are potentially extremely severe. I encourage the Government to meet my colleagues, to look at this matter again in great detail and to understand what has happened with this accounting, so that they can see what it means for our ability to see the true position of banks and how it incentivises structures that we subsequently find, as was pointed out earlier, are of no social value—structures that often serve to deceive and to create an impression of capital where there is none.

It is highly unlikely that RBS is in the state it appears to be in, and I agree with those who have called for diversity in ownership models. The challenges of providing those diverse banks out of RBS in its current condition are probably insurmountable, and I would welcome Government policy action to encourage mutuals and co-operatives. Above all, I encourage the Government to take all possible steps to establish the true position of RBS and the entire banking system, by comprehensively investigating the flaws in IFRS that have been well set out.