First elected: 22nd July 1999
Left House: 30th March 2015 (Retired)
Speeches made during Parliamentary debates are recorded in Hansard. For ease of browsing we have grouped debates into individual, departmental and legislative categories.
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Onshore wind power has a very small carbon footprint range relative to other energy generation technologies, including coal and gas-fired generation, which, in 2012, emitted, on average, 895 g/kWh and 415 g/kWh respectively (not allowing for emissions incurred during the manufacture, construction and decommissioning phases)1.
The Department does not estimate the gas turbine energy contribution (and therefore related CO2 emissions) associated with the reserve generation needed to manage wind variability specifically, due to complex inter-dependencies of the power system operational parameters. However, the need for reserve generation to manage intermittent supply and demand of electricity does not change the fact that any electricity generated by onshore wind – which in the first quarter of 2014 accounted for around 7% of all electricity generated in the UK – has a carbon footprint of just 8 and 20g CO2eq/kWh. Reserve generation displaces the output of existing generating stations to maintain the balance of supply and demand, so there is no net increase of power on the system at any one time; therefore the only additional emissions from reserve associated with wind power is through the inefficiency of running separate generating stations at part load rather than fewer stations at full-load, which is relatively insignificant compared to the carbon savings made.
[1]Coal and Gas emissions factors from table DUKES 5C, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/electricity-chapter-5-digest-of-united-kingdom-energy-statistics-dukes
In March 2013 DECC published an assessment of the impact of climate change and energy polices on electricity and gas prices and consumer bills[1]. The report estimated that, in 2013, support costs for renewables added around 10% to electricity bills for energy intensive user (8% in relation to the renewables obligation (RO) and 2% in relation to the small-scale feed-in tariffs (FIT)).
Increased deployment of low-carbon generation, including renewables, which typically have low generating (and therefore operating) costs, helps to put downward pressure on wholesale electricity prices. It is not possible to split out the impact of renewable support policies on these wholesale price effects from other drivers such as, for example, the EU emissions trading scheme (ETS). However, the March 2013 report estimated that the overall wholesale price impact of all low-carbon policies was a reduction in the wholesale price faced by industry of around 30p/MWh in 2013.
The Government recognises the particular competitiveness issues faced by some industries in terms of their energy costs and has acted to mitigate the impact of energy policies on those industries. This includes the announcement, as part of the 2014 budget that the Government intends to compensate those energy-intensive industries most at risk of higher electricity prices resulting from the RO and the FIT schemes. We expect that compensation will begin in 2016-17, subject to EU state aid clearance.
The Government intends to move to auctioning of Contracts for Difference (CfDs) for at least those technologies classified as ‘established' (such as onshore wind) from the first allocation round in October 2014.
The Government Response to the consultation on our approach to competitive allocation of CfDs published on 13 May 2014, set out our view that there is some scope for further cost reduction in the onshore wind sector, and that the evidence from UK developers suggests that in the years to 2020, the most significant contributor to reduced costs in the UK is likely to be a constrained and competitive allocation framework under which only the lower-cost projects come forward.
The total cost of the two existing schemes to promote renewable electricity – the renewables obligation (RO) and the feed-in tariffs (FIT) scheme – was £1,300m in 2010/11, £1,609m in 2011/12 and £2,498m in 2012/13 (figures not adjusted for inflation).
DECC's methodology for estimating the impact of energy and climate change policies on energy prices and consumer bills assumes that the costs of supporting renewable energy faced by energy suppliers are passed on in full to consumers (domestic and non-domestic). In the absence of firm evidence on differential cost pass-through, it is assumed that costs are spread over UK electricity sales on an equal per-MWh basis.
Given the respective shares of total UK electricity consumption, this implies that households bear approximately one-third of the total UK costs of supporting renewables and that non-domestic consumers (which includes the commercial and public sectors as well as industry) bear the remaining two-thirds. Theprecise method of cost pass-through will vary between energy suppliers depending on their own tariff structure and approach to cost mark-up.
The cost of supporting onshore and offshore wind through the renewables obligation in 2010/11 and 2011/12 was as follows (figures not adjusted for inflation):
2010/11 | 2011/12 | |
Onshore wind | £398m | £483m |
Offshore wind | £254m | £371m |
Some small-scale onshore wind was also supported by the feed-in tariff scheme (FITs), but FITs costs are not available disaggregated by technology.
Outturn data is not yet available for spend in 2013/14, but we would expect an increase in the total level of support for each technology as there was a higher level of deployment.
The answer of 4 March 2014 on wind power (Official Report, column 764W) explained that there is no further comprehensive banding review planned for the Renewables Obligation (RO) scheme before it closes to new generation on 31 March 2017.
However, as a principle of responsible budget management, we keep under review whether any further targeted actions or banding reviews for specific technologies may be necessary as a result of, for example, technology costs falling faster than expected. This helps to ensure value for public money and protection of consumers from unnecessary costs.
In September 2013, DECC published a study by Professor David MacKay and Dr Tim Stone which gathered the available evidence on the potential greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) from shale gas production and use in the UK and discusses the compatibility of shale gas production and use with UK and global climate change targets. The study concluded that with the right safeguards in place the net effect on GHG emissions from shale gas production in the UK will be relatively small. Indeed emissions from the production and transport of UK shale gas are likely to be lower than imported Liquefied Natural Gas and gas piped from outside Europe, which shale gas is expected to replace.
DECC's Gas Generation Strategy (2012) and Heat Strategy (2013) both set out the important role gas has to play to maintain adequate capacity margins, meet demand and provide supply-side flexibility whilst keeping emissions within the limits set out in the Carbon Budgets to 2030 and beyond. We need further drilling and testing to establish how much shale gas will be recoverable, but it is likely that domestically produced shale gas would contribute to the overall natural gas mix that is used for both heat and electricity generation, replacing some imported and slightly higher carbon liquefied natural gas.
The Government did not withdraw funding from CE&SDL. In 2007, at the request of CE&SDL, the Learning and Skills Council (LSC) transferred the contract for skills provision from CE&SDL to a successor legal entity, Total People. CE&SDL continued to operate when the contract was transferred to Total People but did not directly receive any further funding nor did it acquire funding as a subcontractor. It was dissolved as a company in April 2014. The Skills Funding Agency, as the LSC's successor, continued to fund Total People, and still does so today.
Both the earliest and latest performance data available demonstrate a mixed picture. Prior to 2007 CE&SDL's performance was below the national average. After 2007, and the transfer of contact to Total People, performance was stronger and sometimes higher than national average.
Neither the Government nor the Skills Funding Agency has received any representations about this organisation.
The Written Statement made by my rt. hon. Friend the Secretary of State on 11 March 2014 was based on evidence drawn from the European Commission Staff Working Document ‘Energy prices and costs in Europe' and the International Energy Agency report, ‘World Energy Outlook 2013'.
‘Energy prices and costs in Europe' indicates that increases in network costs, taxes, and levies have contributed to rises in EU energy prices. However, the report also identifies that for 22 of the 27 Member States surveyed, support for renewable electricity generation accounts for less than 10% of the household electricity price. It also finds a relatively small impact of the EU ETS carbon price on electricity retail prices either for industry or households.
The International Energy Agency report, World Energy Outlook 2013, concludes that the recent widening of the gap between EU and US energy prices is mainly as a result of the sharp drop in wholesale gas prices in the United States due to soaring shale gas production, an increase in oil indexed gas prices in other regions, and higher spot prices for liquefied natural gas.
The Green Book and associated supplementary guidance is publicly available on the Treasury web site. It sets out a range of approaches and methods that may be appropriate in a number of different appraisal circumstances.
All new policies, programmes and projects in the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) are subject to comprehensive but proportionate assessment of costs and benefits following Her Majesty's Treasury (HMT) Green Book guidance. The guidance provides advice on valuing costs and benefits including where there is no market value:
In cases where non-market costs or benefits have a significant impact on the outcome, DECC adopt different valuation techniques to elicit values as far as possible. For example, willingness to pay and willingness to accept techniques have been used to elicit the value that users attribute to security of electricity supply (value of lost load):
Quality-adjusted life year (QALY)-based methods have also been used by the Department to illustrate the potential health impacts of improving the energy efficiency of fuel poor homes in the ‘Fuel Poverty – a framework for future action'. Work is planned to understand how estimates of QALYs may be incorporated into cost-benefit analysis in the future:
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/fuel-poverty-a-framework-for-future-action
On other tools to quantify non-market costs and benefits, DECC has produced supplementary guidance to the Green Book which applies the Green Book techniques and principles in the specific context of valuing energy use and greenhouse gas emissions:
These things are not easy to quantify. Approaches to quantifying benefits of a policy intervention are used in accordance with principles outlined in HM Treasury's guidance on conducting appraisal and evaluation in central government (known as the “Green Book”). The Green Book recognises that using these approaches to quantify the benefits of an intervention is challenging, and that the approaches should be used appropriately.
To answer each of these points in turn:
a) DCMS uses Department for Transport cost of fatality estimates where relevant to policy development. For instance, this valuation technique was used recently as part of the assessment of costs associated with allowing motor sport on closed roads.
b) DCMS follows valuation guidance set out in HM Treasury's Green Book, including the use of willingness to pay techniques, to proportionately assess the impact of policy interventions. Willingness to pay has been used as part of the DCMS cost-benefit analysis of Digital Radio Switchover, for example. DCMS also recommends Green Book valuation techniques are used by our ALBs to inform spending decisions.
c) DCMS uses the Quality Adjusted Life Year approach where relevant to policy development. To take an example, the Culture and Sport Evidence programme that DCMS shares with a range of ALB partners has developed a Quality Adjusted Live Year approach for physical health benefits of sport, which Sport England use to assess local impacts.
Other techniques used to assess benefits of interventions include macro-economic modelling to assess the impacts of both the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games and superfast broadband investment funded by the Department.
Department for Education economists employ a range of valuation tools as appropriate to specific policy interventions in order to advise Ministers, following the principles and techniques prescribed in HM Treasury guidance. Such techniques are also used as appropriate in research commissioned by the Department, for instance in policy evaluations.
I refer the Rt. Hon. Member to the reply given on Monday, 07 July 2014: Official Report, Column 73W.
An example of a policy intervention where the reduction of risk of death is valued is in the consultation stage Impact Assessment on whether to issue a Ministerial Direction for the preparation of Reservoir Flood Plans, issued on 17 December 2009. This document has been placed in the House Library.
The focus of the work of the Inter-departmental Group for the Valuation of Life and Health has been methodological rather than upon specific measures of value.
The value of life and health measures submitted by the Department through discussions at the Inter-departmental Group for the Valuation of Life and Health review referred to Defra's guidance on valuing risk to life from Flooding and the “lost life years” estimate associated with reductions in air pollution.
A copy of the published Defra guidance has been placed in the House Library.
The Environment Agency evidence to the Inter-departmental Group for the Valuation of Life and Health review was submitted in March 2008. It did not include any measures of the value of life and health. It did refer to Defra guidance on valuing risk to life, which was under preparation at the time of the review and published in May 2008.
A copy of the Environment Agency submission to the Review has been placed in the House Library.
Documents provided:
Environment Agency, March 2008, response to the Inter-Departmental Group for the Valuation of Life and Health Survey.
Defra, May 2008. Supplementary Note to Operating Authorities, Assessing and Valuing the Risk to Life from Flooding for use in Appraisal of Risk Management Measures.
The focus of the work of the Inter-departmental Group for the Valuation of Life and Health has been methodological rather than upon specific measures of value.
The value of life and health measures submitted by the Department through discussions at the Inter-departmental Group for the Valuation of Life and Health review referred to Defra's guidance on valuing risk to life from Flooding and the “lost life years” estimate associated with reductions in air pollution.
A copy of the published Defra guidance has been placed in the House Library.
The Environment Agency evidence to the Inter-departmental Group for the Valuation of Life and Health review was submitted in March 2008. It did not include any measures of the value of life and health. It did refer to Defra guidance on valuing risk to life, which was under preparation at the time of the review and published in May 2008.
A copy of the Environment Agency submission to the Review has been placed in the House Library.
Documents provided:
Environment Agency, March 2008, response to the Inter-Departmental Group for the Valuation of Life and Health Survey.
Defra, May 2008. Supplementary Note to Operating Authorities, Assessing and Valuing the Risk to Life from Flooding for use in Appraisal of Risk Management Measures.
I refer the Rt. Hon. Member to the reply given on 1 July 2014, Official Report, Column 533-534w.
The focus of the work of the Inter-departmental Group for the Valuation of Life and Health has been methodological rather than upon specific measures of value. It has focused upon the appropriate units for the measurement of impacts on life and health risks in different circumstances, and the methodology to be applied to valuation of those units in different contexts. Nevertheless, as a spur to the methodological investigation, an initial survey of monetary valuations of various units of impact by different departments and agencies including case studies was undertaken. This was conducted by the Institute of Transport Studies at the University of Leeds and compiled into a “Survey of the Value of Life/ Health used in Government Departments”, which has been placed in the Library. In addition, HSE and DfT have already placed in the Library their members' responses to the ITS survey.
The Department uses the methodology most appropriate to the policy question – for example, whether the policy reduces the risk of a sudden loss of life or whether the policy increases life expectancy.
Air quality affects people's health and their life expectancy, this is reflected in policy appraisal with a ‘lost life years' methodology employing a value of £29,000 per year of lost life (in 2004 prices). This figure was informed by a 2004 Defra report entitled Valuation of Health Benefits Associated with Reduction in Air Pollution available here http://archive.defra.gov.uk/environment/quality/air/airquality/publications/healthbenefits/airpollution_reduction.pdf). The 2004 study did not directly give the £29,000 figure but was instrumental in its adoption.
Alternatively, appraisal of policy that prevents sudden loss of life, such as those relating to flood risk, is supported by published Defra guidance on risk to life of flooding which we provide a copy of. This guidance refers to the Green Book which includes a value of preventing fatality of about £1.145million (in 2000 prices). This estimate is not appropriate in all situations but represents a readily available value of changes in risks of fatalities
The methodology used by the Department is likely to evolve over time as new evidence is developed.
Documents provided:
Defra, May 2008. Supplementary Note to Operating Authorities, Assessing and Valuing the Risk to Life from Flooding for use in Appraisal of Risk Management Measures.
The Environment Agency did not provide an explicit monetary value for a quality adjusted life in the context of flood risk management as part of the 2008 review. It did provide a discussion of risk to life valuation in connection to flood risk in Boscastle, as referenced on page 10 of the 2008 Review.
The explicit monetary value per quality-adjusted life from air pollution reduction, as quoted as part of the Department's submission to the Inter-Departmental Group for the Valuation of Life and Health review in 2008 was valued using a “lost life years” methodology at £29,000 (in 2004 prices) for each additional year of life. This figure was informed by a 2004 Defra report entitled Valuation of Health Benefits Associated with Reduction in Air Pollution available here http://archive.defra.gov.uk/environment/quality/air/airquality/publications/healthbenefits/airpollution_reduction.pdf). The 2004 study did not directly give the £29,000 figure but was instrumental in its adoption.
The lead economist working in health and wellbeing in the Department was a member of this group in 2008. His interview responses were formed from his experience within the Department. Records of the interviews conducted by the University of Leeds (other than what is incorporated into the report itself) were not kept by the Department.
The Environment Agency did not provide an explicit monetary value for a quality adjusted life in the context of flood risk management as part of the 2008 review. It did provide a discussion of risk to life valuation in connection to flood risk in Boscastle, as referenced on page 10 of the 2008 Review.
The explicit monetary value per quality-adjusted life from air pollution reduction, as quoted as part of the Department's submission to the Inter-Departmental Group for the Valuation of Life and Health review in 2008 was valued using a “lost life years” methodology at £29,000 (in 2004 prices) for each additional year of life. This figure was informed by a 2004 Defra report entitled Valuation of Health Benefits Associated with Reduction in Air Pollution available here http://archive.defra.gov.uk/environment/quality/air/airquality/publications/healthbenefits/airpollution_reduction.pdf). The 2004 study did not directly give the £29,000 figure but was instrumental in its adoption.
The lead economist working in health and wellbeing in the Department was a member of this group in 2008. His interview responses were formed from his experience within the Department. Records of the interviews conducted by the University of Leeds (other than what is incorporated into the report itself) were not kept by the Department.
The Environment Agency did not provide an explicit monetary value for a quality adjusted life in the context of flood risk management as part of the 2008 review. It did provide a discussion of risk to life valuation in connection to flood risk in Boscastle, as referenced on page 10 of the 2008 Review.
The explicit monetary value per quality-adjusted life from air pollution reduction, as quoted as part of the Department's submission to the Inter-Departmental Group for the Valuation of Life and Health review in 2008 was valued using a “lost life years” methodology at £29,000 (in 2004 prices) for each additional year of life. This figure was informed by a 2004 Defra report entitled Valuation of Health Benefits Associated with Reduction in Air Pollution available here http://archive.defra.gov.uk/environment/quality/air/airquality/publications/healthbenefits/airpollution_reduction.pdf). The 2004 study did not directly give the £29,000 figure but was instrumental in its adoption.
The lead economist working in health and wellbeing in the Department was a member of this group in 2008. His interview responses were formed from his experience within the Department. Records of the interviews conducted by the University of Leeds (other than what is incorporated into the report itself) were not kept by the Department.
The Green Book and associated supplementary guidance is publicly available on the Treasury web site. It sets out a range of approaches and methods that may be appropriate in a number of different appraisal circumstances.
In 2013-14 we estimate that the UK Government spend on malaria control was £536 million. This has been calculated using the methodology detailed in the Malaria Framework of Results. This can be found at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67642/malaria-framework-for-results.pdf.
Malaria death rates have been falling globally since 2010 and the UK investments have significantly contributed to this achievement. According to analysis of current trends by the World Health Organization, by 2015, six high burden countries are on track to halve malaria mortality from a 2009 baseline and another six high burden countries are on track to achieve a 40-50% reduction in malaria attributable deaths. More detail on the UK’s achievements can be found at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/410980/DFID_Mid-Year_Report_Achievements_Annex.pdf.
I refer my Hon. Friend to my answer of 7 July 2014 [Official Report, column 167W].
The value of a prevented fatality is used in the appraisal for every infrastructure investment business case. It is also used in the Impact Assessments for relevant policy interventions. For example, the Impact Assessment on the new drug driving offence takes account of the value of preventing a fatality in assessing the overall impact of the offence. The latest Impact Assessment can be found at:
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukdsi/2014/9780111117422/impacts
In response to my Right Hon. Friend's previous question on this matter, the evidence submitted as part of this review was placed in the Libraries of the House on 25th June 2014.
The value of a prevented fatality used in transport analysis is £1,632,892 (in 2010 prices and at 2010 incomes). The value is given in Table A4.1.1 of the WebTAG (web-based transport analysis guidance) data book:
(https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/webtag-tag-data-book-may-2014)
Guidance on using it, and related values, is given in TAG Unit A4.1 Social Impact Appraisal (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/webtag-tag-unit-a4-1-social-impact-appraisal).
As suggested by the evidence submitted as part of the Department's work with the Inter-Departmental Group for the Valuation of Life and Health review in 2008, the Department for Transport does not use cost per quality adjusted life year in its analysis.
I can inform my Rt Hon Friend that the documents have been placed in the Libraries of the House.
Chapter 4 of Network Rail's West Coast Route Utilisation Strategy describes the evidential basis and modelling approach of the anticipated changes in demand to 2024-25 which are contained in the same document. This is now available at:
http://www.networkrailmediacentre.co.uk/imagelibrary/downloadMedia.ashx?MediaDetailsID=4675
DfT publishes statistics showing the levels of peak crowding in a number of major cities each year, based on the proportion of passengers in excess of capacity (PiXC) and the proportion of passengers standing at trains' busiest points. The latest publication from 2012 is published at the following link: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/rail-passenger-numbers-and-crowding-on-weekdays-in-major-cities-in-england-and-wales-2012.
The PiXC statistics show that the highest levels of crowding are generally seen on peak London commuter services. In autumn 2012 the highest PiXC levels across the morning and afternoon peaks were on First Great Western services at Paddington, Chiltern services at Marylebone and London Midland services at Euston.
The Strategic Case for HS2 (www.gov.uk/government/publications/hs2-strategic-case) sets out how HS2 has the capacity to triple the number of seats leaving Euston on the West Coast Main Line Corridor. By releasing capacity on the classic network, HS2 will ease crowding on crowded commuter routes into Euston, particularly London Midland services and potentially Chiltern services as well.
High Speed 2 is not intended to reduce overcrowding at London Waterloo, as it has been designed as a link between London Euston, Birmingham, Leeds and Manchester.
The 2012 Rail Investment Strategy (HLOS) has asked the industry to provide additional peak capacity for 9,700 extra passengers into Waterloo by 2019 and has provided funding for Network Rail to expand Waterloo and other stations. Network Rail and South West Trains have set out plans to lengthen peak trains and South West Trains is now in discussions with the Department for Transport.
By moving long distance passengers off the existing network, HS2 will release capacity for more regional services, reducing overcrowding and improving reliability, as well as improving connectivity. Nationally, the Economic Case for HS2 found that HS2 will deliver reliability benefits worth £5.5bn, and reduced crowding benefits of £7.5bn, which includes benefits to regional services in the North West.
In response to recommendations made by Sir David Higgins, HS2 Ltd and Network Rail have been commissioned to consider what further improvements can be made to centre to city centre connectivity, east-west links and local connectivity in the Midlands and the North, with a final report on options in 2015.
There are 464 dwellings within the area currently subject to surface-level safeguarding for the London to West Midlands section of HS2, of which 339 are to be demolished. Given recent Census data showing an average 2.3 occupants per property in the UK, we expect around 1,000 people will move from those homes.
We have not estimated numbers of people who may move for reasons of generalised property blight, but there are approximately 220 dwellings within the Voluntary Purchase Area for the London to West Midlands Route announced on 9 April. Our aim is where possible to avoid serious impacts on local residents and enable people to remain in their homes. We expect to consult shortly on further measures that may make that choice more attractive for homeowners.
Pending future decisions on routes and designs, we have made no similar estimates for other proposed sections of HS2.
As per the answer of 31 March 2014, since 2009 we have considered a wide range of alternative options to a high speed railway including the use of alternative modes, a conventional speed line and upgrades to the existing rail network, including double decking.
Specifically, the March 2010 High Speed 2 Strategic Alternatives Study considered the potential for using double deck trains on WCML as one means of enhancing capacity on conventional rail routes between London and the West Midlands/North West. Details of this study, including evidence of expense, disruption and capacity, can be found at:
This work found that while double deck carriages could increase the number of passengers per train there is a practical limit to the expansion of capacity in this manner and it offers limited potential to lead to journey time savings.
This option is also likely to lead to significant disruption and expense. Before such trains could be used on the West Coast Mainline, the route (including diversionary routes) would need to be gauge cleared to allow sufficient space for the trains to operate. This would involve raising all overhead wires, raising bridges, modifying platforms on the route, modifying station canopies, moving or raising all signal gantries and other signage on the route, and lowering track in the tunnels. Work would need to be carried out to modify existing depots or to provide new ones. Additional works would also be required to enable line speeds to be maintained on the route.
For these reasons it was concluded that there was a strong case for not considering this option further. No subsequent work has therefore been done to compare it to the case for HS2.
We will continue to revise and update the economic case for HS2 as new project milestones are reached, such as decisions on the preferred route for Phase 2, to ensure it is based on the best available evidence and latest understanding of the project, including taking account of the decision to remove the existing proposals for the HS1-HS2 link from the scheme.
As per the answer of 31 March 2014, since 2009 we have considered a wide range of alternative options to a high speed railway including the use of alternative modes, a conventional speed line and upgrades to the existing rail network, including double decking.
Specifically, the March 2010 High Speed 2 Strategic Alternatives Study considered the potential for using double deck trains on WCML as one means of enhancing capacity on conventional rail routes between London and the West Midlands/North West. Details of this study, including evidence of expense, disruption and capacity, can be found at:
This work found that while double deck carriages could increase the number of passengers per train there is a practical limit to the expansion of capacity in this manner and it offers limited potential to lead to journey time savings.
This option is also likely to lead to significant disruption and expense. Before such trains could be used on the West Coast Mainline, the route (including diversionary routes) would need to be gauge cleared to allow sufficient space for the trains to operate. This would involve raising all overhead wires, raising bridges, modifying platforms on the route, modifying station canopies, moving or raising all signal gantries and other signage on the route, and lowering track in the tunnels. Work would need to be carried out to modify existing depots or to provide new ones. Additional works would also be required to enable line speeds to be maintained on the route.
For these reasons it was concluded that there was a strong case for not considering this option further. No subsequent work has therefore been done to compare it to the case for HS2.
Evidence set out in the Strategic Case for HS2 (www.gov.uk/government/publications/hs2-strategic-case) demonstrates that parts of the West Coast Main Line are effectively full in terms of the number of trains; many of which are already full to overflowing at certain times of day and demand is expected to grow.
Rail demand has grown by 54% over the last decade, which is the equivalent of annual growth rate of 4.4%. Chapter 3 of the Strategic case sets out that even with more modest growth of 2.5%, all of the additional peak seats provided by enhancing the line will be used up during the 2020s.
The Department has considered a wide range of alternatives including upgrades to the existing West Coast Main Line. The most recent report, commissioned from Atkins can be found here (www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/253456/hs2-strategic-alternatives.pdf). This provides evidence that expanding capacity on the West Coast Main line would not be a robust long term solution to the capacity, connectivity and reliability challenges on the line. Not only would it not provide sufficient additional capacity to meet long term demand, but it would not offer a robust solution to the problem of poor service performance and would significantly disrupt services for many years during construction work.
The HS2 Economic Case published in October 2013 indicates that the average all-day load factor for HS2 services in 2036 for the full network is expected to be 41%. Peak period load factors are expected to be significantly higher.
The Department for Transport asked Network Rail to carry out an assessment of the 51M and RP2 proposals referred to in paragraph 4 of Annex 2 to the Tenth Report of the Transport Committee of Session2010-12, High Speed Rail, HC 1185-i. This assessment is available at:
http://assets.dft.gov.uk/publications/hs2-review-of-strategic-alternatives/hs2-review-of-strategic-alternatives.pdf. Network Rail's assessment suggests that the additional capacity proposed by both 51M and RP2 would not match the demand growth on the route and would not solve the overcrowding on suburban services at the southern end of the route in the peak.
The March 2012 report setting out the options that HS2 Ltd considered for Phase Two, and describing the process of analysing and refining them, can be viewed at
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/options-for-phase-two-of-the-high-speed-rail-network
The information relating to Stoke-on-Trent is in section 4.3 (pages 34 to 69).
Further information can also be found in the ‘HS2 Phase Two Engineering Options Report West Midlands to Manchester (parts 1 and 2)' at
Section 7 in part 2 of the report sets out the history of line of route options studied (pages 279 to 283).
Responses to the Phase Two consultation are being considered currently and no decisions have yet been taken on the route. We will make an announcement in the autumn.
Since 2009 we have considered a wide range of alternative options to a high speed railway including the use of alternative modes, a conventional speed line and upgrades to the existing rail network. The alternatives do not release capacity for commuter and freight services, fail to offer a robust solution to the problem of poor service performance and would significantly disrupt services as upgrade work is carried out.
All of the calculations to demonstrate that alternative schemes would fail to deliver as much capacity as HS2 to address future levels of over-crowding have been published. These are summarised in the Strategic Case for HS2 released in October 2013 (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/hs2-strategic-case).
From the October 2013 economic case, and for the standard case run, the average all-day load factor for HS2 services in 2036 for the full network is 41%, and accordingly higher during peak periods. Equivalent data for the alternatives has been published in the HS2 Strategic Alternatives Final Report (Atkins, 2013)
(http://assets.hs2.org.uk/sites/default/files/inserts/S%26A%201_Economic%20case_0.pdf).
Since 2009 we have considered a wide range of alternative options to a high speed railway including the use of alternative modes, a conventional speed line and upgrades to the existing rail network. The alternatives do not release capacity for commuter and freight services, fail to offer a robust solution to the problem of poor performance and would significantly disrupt services as upgrade work is carried out.
The March 2010 High Speed 2 Strategic Alternatives Study considered the potential for using double deck trains on WCML as one means of enhancing capacity on conventional rail routes between London and the West Midlands/North West. It found that whilst double decking, and the less expensive alternative of train lengthening, would increase the number of passengers per train there is a practical limit to the expansion of capacity on WCML and only limited opportunity to reduce journey times.
All of the calculations to demonstrate that alternative schemes would fail to deliver as much capacity as HS2 to address future levels of over-crowding have been published. These are summarised in the Strategic Case for HS2 released in October 2013 which can be found at:
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/hs2-strategic-case
Before such trains could be used on the West Coast Mainline, the route (including diversionary routes) would need to be gauge cleared to allow sufficient space for the trains to operate. This would involve raising all overhead wires, raising bridges, modifying platforms on the route, modifying station canopies, moving or raising all signal gantries and other signage on the route, and lowering track in the tunnels. Work would need to be carried out to modify existing depots or to provide new ones. Additional works would also be required to enable line speeds to be maintained on the route.
We have received over 10,000 responses to the Phase Two consultation. These are still being analysed and considered, and no decisions on the Phase Two route have been taken. We are considering the recommendation on Crewe as part of our response to the Phase Two consultation which will include analysis and consideration of the proposals to reroute the line through Stoke-on-Trent, as well as all other responses to the consultation. I will respond to the consultation on Phase Two later this year.
We have received over 10,000 responses to the Phase Two consultation. These are still being analysed and considered, and no decisions on the Phase Two route have been taken. We are considering the recommendation on Crewe as part of our response to the Phase Two consultation which will include analysis and consideration of the proposals to reroute the line through Stoke-on-Trent, as well as all other responses to the consultation. I will respond to the consultation on Phase Two later this year.
We will continue to revise and update the economic case for HS2 as new project milestones are reached, such as decisions on the preferred route for Phase 2, to ensure it is based on the best available evidence and latest understanding of the project, including taking account of the decision to remove the existing proposals for the HS1-HS2 link from the scheme.
The strategic case for HS2 assumes that fares are similarly priced between services that operate on and off the HS2 infrastructure. However, the key decisions on fares and services on HS2 once services open in 2026 will be taken by future Governments, as part of determining wider rail policy for the GB rail network as a whole.