Leaving the EU: Meaningful Vote

Stephen Kinnock Excerpts

Monday 22nd October 2018 Commons Chamber

[Dominic Raab]

The simple answer is that I am not sure, but I can tell the hon. Lady that we will have a substantive motion and that it will be subject to amendments, which will be for the Speaker to decide on.

[Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)]

The Secretary of State’s memorandum justifies the ordering involving the substantive motion coming first, which is highly unusual, on the basis of Standing Order No. 31, which relates to Opposition day motions. On what planet could this motion be described as an Opposition day motion?

[Dominic Raab]

The hon. Gentleman may well be an expert on the Standing Orders, but I would say to him that on the substance of the issue, this is clear. There will be a clear decision for this House to accept the deal we negotiate with the EU or to leave the EU with no deal. I know which side I will be on in that debate. We are confident that we can get a good deal, and I hope that the hon. Gentleman will row behind it.

EU Exit Negotiations

Stephen Kinnock Excerpts

Tuesday 9th October 2018 Commons Chamber

[Dominic Raab]

I thank my right hon. Friend for his question. He is absolutely right that, as well as on the issue of Northern Ireland, our proposal is designed to guarantee frictionless trade—in particular, for manufacturing businesses that rely on those supply chains. That is a critical element of the White Paper proposals, which is why we are pressing it so hard.

[Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)]

The Secretary of State has said that the backstop has to be time-limited. Can he share with the House which particular date he has in mind and how he came to settle on that date?

[Dominic Raab]

We are not in a position yet to give a date. We will publish that when we publish the proposals in the round. What cannot be allowed to happen is for either Northern Ireland or the UK as a whole to linger in an indefinite limbo of the customs union.

Brexit Negotiations and No Deal Contingency Planning

Stephen Kinnock Excerpts

Tuesday 4th September 2018 Commons Chamber

[Dominic Raab]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. We have talked about that, and we have encouraged it. Of course we want to ensure not just that EU nationals whom we value and whom we want to stay feel secure in their position here, but that British expats are given the same treatment abroad.

[Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)]

The Secretary of State said that the EU had raised some concerns about the Chequers proposals, but the fact of the matter is that they are completely and utterly dead in the water. What is the plan B? Is the Secretary of State now saying that the plan B should be Canada, and has he a full understanding of the impact that a Canada-style deal would have on, for example, our integrated supply chains?

[Dominic Raab]

I know that the hon. Gentleman has a considerable interest in the matter, but this is a negotiation. As was suggested by my hon. Friend the Member for Chelmsford (Vicky Ford), we do not roll over just because we get a bit of a pushback. We explain our arguments so that they are clearly understood, we try to resolve any concerns that the EU has, and we try to pursue the negotiations in a spirit of pragmatism. If that is matched on the other side—and I am confident that it will be—we will get a deal.

EU Withdrawal Agreement: Legislation

Stephen Kinnock Excerpts

Tuesday 24th July 2018 Commons Chamber

[Dominic Raab]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right to get back to the key overarching objectives. I believe that, with this White Paper and the previous one, the full strategy can be seen in the round. Yes, we have had to take a pragmatic as well as a principled approach, but it is faithful to the referendum in the three key areas that he describes.

[Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)]

The Government have promised that the House will have all the information and data that it needs to make an informed choice when we take the critical vote in the autumn. Will they therefore produce an impact assessment on the political declaration on the future relationship between the UK and the EU well in advance of our taking that critical vote?

[Dominic Raab]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his question; he has raised this matter a few times. We will ensure that the appropriate analysis is done on all aspects of all elements on both sides of the deal.

Future Relationship Between the UK and the EU

Stephen Kinnock Excerpts

Wednesday 18th July 2018 Commons Chamber

[Dominic Raab]

I understand precisely the hon. Lady’s concern. This is an important and sensitive issue, and I will be engaging on the EU track in relation to it. I will also, at the right time, make sure that I am properly versed and properly briefed on the matter, and indeed that I visit the border area to take a look for myself.

It is worth emphasising two key principles that we share with our EU friends. The first is that article 50 dictates that a withdrawal agreement must come alongside a framework for the future agreement. The second, flowing from that, is that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. The Government respect and prize both those principles, and we will not sign away our negotiating leverage or spend taxpayers’ money in return for nothing. In December, we agreed that the financial settlement would sit alongside a framework for a deep and mutually beneficial future partnership. We agreed that we would meet our commitments as they fell due, with ever-declining payments over a finite period that will add up to a tiny fraction of what our net contribution would have been as a member. If either side should fail to meet their commitments under this overarching package—we certainly do not expect that to be the case—that would have consequences for the deal as a whole that we are striving to secure.

[Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)]

I thank the Secretary of State for giving way and I should also like to take this opportunity to congratulate him on his appointment. On Tuesday, I hosted an event here in Parliament where the BeLeave whistleblower, Shahmir Sanni, told us that every member of the Vote Leave campaign committee knew precisely about the £680,000 that was donated by Vote Leave to BeLeave. The Secretary of State was of course an active member of the campaign committee for Vote Leave, and presumably therefore knew about that £680,000 donation. Given the importance of his role now in the negotiations with Mr Barnier, will he take this opportunity to set out in precise detail what he knew about that donation to BeLeave? This could be an opportunity to enhance and reinforce his authority and credibility in the negotiations.

[Dominic Raab]

I appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s efforts to try to strengthen my leverage in the negotiations to get Brexit delivered, and I take him at his word. I had nothing to do with any of the financial arrangements; I was on the campaign board. Those details are subject to investigation by the appropriate authorities, and I would just gently say to him that trying in this rather backhanded way to undermine the credibility and the verdict of the British people will only rebound on him—

[Stephen Kinnock]

It is the verdict of the Electoral Commission.

[Dominic Raab]

But the verdict of the British people is the one that we in this House must give effect to.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Baker]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, but I am afraid that I will just refer him to the answer to the relevant urgent question, which I will stand by for a very long time.

The second point—I have received some private communications reinforcing my view—is that, unfortunately, the establishment believes that any deal will be voted through by this House and is working on that basis. I have to say it is with some horror that I face the possibility that that consideration is being borne in mind by negotiators, because I do not believe for a moment that it is true. I believe that Scottish National party Members will always vote in a way that reinforces their hopes of secession from the UK, which is bound to mean voting against any agreement. I believe that the Labour party, for all the good faith of the shadow Secretary of State, will in the end vote against any agreement—any agreement. That therefore means that people—whether or not they like it, and however impartial they may be—must bring forward a deal that can be voted through by the Conservative party.

The number 40 has been bandied around in this House in the past few days. I am sorry to say it—it gives me no pleasure to say it, but I must do so—“and the rest”. People who have said 40 are not out by a fraction: when they come to consider the number of Members on the Conservative Benches who do not like this deal and are willing to vote in line with that dislike, they are out by a factor, not by a fraction. That means people must face up to the difficult truth that a high alignment—a Brexit that requires a high degree of permanent alignment to the European Union—will not go through this House of Commons; it will fail. Those are the two difficulties that officials—officials—must face up to.

[Stephen Kinnock]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Mr Baker]

I will give way briefly, and I then want to try to move to a conclusion.

[Stephen Kinnock]

The hon. Gentleman is being very generous in giving way. Will he confirm that he is in effect saying that Chequers is absolutely dead in the water? The implications of that are enormous for the Secretary of State, who is about to go to Brussels to meet Monsieur Barnier. How is he supposed to do that, and on what basis is he conducting those negotiations? If the hon. Gentleman could also say what his alternative plan is, that would be very useful for the House.

[Mr Baker]

I am about to come on to my alternative, but I will not have words put in my mouth. I said when I appeared on the television last Monday that this was a time for reflection and taking stock, because the choices before this country are grave. Every Member of this House, on whichever Bench they sit, needs to think extremely carefully about how we go forward. I will not have words put in my mouth. What I have said, I have said from my knowledge and I believe it. No one should plan on a high-alignment deal—an EEA-lite style deal—going through this House.

Three key steps should be taken as we go forward. The first is that those in the UK who I would call the establishment, the governing class—those who create the climate of opinion—must accept the referendum result and its consequences. I encourage them to look at President Tusk’s March statement on the guidelines. The red lines that the British public expect us to fulfil imply that the common landing ground of our relationship with the EU, which I spelled out, taking words from his statement, is partnership on security, some participation in research, innovation, culture and education, dealing with the absurd consequences that would otherwise arise, and having a free trade agreement in the style of a normal FTA, not EEA-lite. That must be embraced.

Secondly, I refer the House to the question asked of the Prime Minister by my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) today. The Government should table a legal text that should include a solution for the border in Ireland. We should stand ready, open, to negotiate this common ground set out in March.

Leaving the EU: Parliamentary Scrutiny

Stephen Kinnock Excerpts

Thursday 28th June 2018 Commons Chamber

[Hilary Benn]

Ministers have said to us that work is going on to prepare for the possibility of no deal. The Committee has previously expressed its view that a no deal outcome would be very damaging to the British economy and create a great deal of uncertainty. That is why we say in the report that we do not accept that a rejection of the deal will then automatically lead to us leaving with no deal, because it would be for Parliament, in the end, to decide whether it was prepared to leave the European Union with no deal. That would be a matter for every single one of us as Members.

I think the nearer we get to March 2019, the more there will be concern if the possibility of no deal being agreed becomes greater than it is at present. I still hope and believe that agreement will be reached because, frankly, neither side in this negotiation should contemplate with any equanimity the prospect of leaving with no deal. The consequences would be exceedingly serious, as we learned from the evidence we heard from the Port of Dover when we visited it, in terms of practical things like keeping the lorries flowing, never mind the medicines, never mind aircraft, never mind broadcasting rights, never mind data transfer. There is a very long list of questions on which people know how the system works today and they want to know how it will work once we have left, but they are very worried about what would happen if there were no deal, and my own personal view—I have expressed it in the House before—is that that is not something we should contemplate at all.

[Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)]

I congratulate my right hon. Friend and thank him for his forbearance in what is sometimes a very robust discussion in Committee; he is certainly masterful in seeking consensus.

The question is really around the vote in October and the content of the political declaration on the framework for the future relationship. Does my right hon. Friend agree that there is a real risk of a wishy-washy, vague, motherhood-and-apple-pie political declaration in an attempt to keep the Conservative party together, rather than giving MPs a clear sense of the direction our future relationship would take? What steps does he think the Government should take to assure the House that there will be sufficient detail in that political declaration to make a meaningful vote truly meaningful?

[Hilary Benn]

I thank my hon. Friend for his work on the Committee. I hope he will forgive me if I do not comment on party considerations in making this statement here today, but he raises an important issue about the nature of the political declaration. We heard clearly in evidence that it will not be a treaty or draft treaty, although there was some debate when we heard from Guy Verhofstadt about whether including it as an annexe to the agreement would give it greater force. It will come down to this question: will the House think there is sufficient certainty about the nature of our future relationship on all the things I mentioned a moment ago to the Chair of the Select Committee on Health, the hon. Member for Totnes (Dr Wollaston), in the political declaration or not? If we approve it and there is not that certainty, the House will really be saying, “Well, let’s see what happens.”

There are two parts to this negotiation: the withdrawal agreement, which is the divorce settlement, and which is important, and our future relationship on trade, security, the fight against terrorism, foreign policy and services—80% of the British economy is services—which is the really important bit. Therefore, the more detail and the more certainty the political declaration can offer, and the more the parties to the negotiation can show they are committed to turning that into a treaty, the better it will be for Parliament as it makes its judgment.

Leaving the EU: No-deal Alternatives

Stephen Kinnock Excerpts

Wednesday 21st February 2018 Westminster Hall

[Antoinette Sandbach]

No. The consequences of a WTO Brexit mean that we fall back on rules that require the imposition of tariffs, unless we waive them as a most favoured nation status for all other countries. That would then expose our manufacturing, farming and other industries to competitors with far lower standards than us, some of which have far cheaper labour costs, when we have very high quality products in this country. That is the consequence of WTO terms.

[Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)]

I congratulate the hon. Lady on securing this debate. One of the common misconceptions is that the EEA and the single market are exactly the same thing. That is not the case. There is no common fisheries policy and no common agricultural policy. The writ of the European Court of Justice does not run to the full EEA; there is the EFTA arbitration court. Articles 112 and 113 of the EEA agreement allow for safeguard clauses suspending things such as free movement of labour. So it is important that in this debate we clarify that the European economic area and the single market are not synonymous.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Sharma. I congratulate the hon. Member for Eddisbury (Antoinette Sandbach) on securing this important debate.

As the Government’s own analysis shows, a no-deal outcome would mean that growth would be 8% lower nationwide, 10% lower in Wales and 12% lower in the midlands, Northern Ireland and the north-west—and the north-east would take a huge 16% growth hit. Tariffs would be 10% on every movement along the supply chain of an industry such as the automotive industry, which is so vital to the steel industry in my constituency. It would crush not only that industry but connected industries.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Anybody—any hon. Member—can see those figures in the Treasury report, but the report caveats them by saying that that is without any other Government interventions or reaction of businesses in adjusting to a new world of trade with the European Union. Does the hon. Gentleman accept that?

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

Clearly, the figures are a forecast, which is more of an art than a science, but the fact is that leaving our largest market—where 43% of our exports go—will inevitably have a negative impact on growth. Whatever remedial measures businesses attempt to take, they will always be playing catch-up with the impact of that seismic event. It seems inevitable to me, therefore, that there will be a contraction in the economy.

At the end of last year, the head of HMRC told the Brexit Committee that preparing for Brexit is set to cost £1 billion over the next five years—and that is on the basis of our securing some kind of deal. That tells us that no deal is simply not an option, as the hon. Member for Eddisbury so eloquently set out. It also underscores the importance of the final part of the Brexit negotiations, in which the framework for the future relationship will be set out. If this House wishes to shape that, we must move quickly.

Today’s debate could not be more timely, because we are in a race against time. Later this month, the EU will publish the legal text of December’s joint progress report. In mid-March, the European Parliament plans to publish a resolution to be adopted ahead of the European Council meeting on the future relationship. That will be akin to the 3 October resolution, which made it clear that there would be no regulatory divergence across the Irish border, and that transition could

“only happen on the basis of the existing European Union regulatory, budgetary, supervisory, judiciary and enforcement instruments and structures”.

That must sound familiar to hon. Members, and it means that we cannot dismiss it as just white noise. The October resolution was effectively the blueprint for the deals that have followed. That will also be the case for the resolution that will be passed in March about the negotiating guidelines for the future relationship.

When it comes to the future relationship, Michel Barnier has been clear: our options are a deal based on the Canada model or one based on the European economic area. Once that basic model has been agreed, there will be some scope during the transition period to add or subtract from it, but to all intents and purposes the choice will be made, and it will be binary—and it is coming very soon. That matters because the Canada model offers little on services, which make up 80% of the UK economy and almost 40% of our exports. As Mr Barnier has said, there is no place for services, because

“There is not a single trade agreement that is open to…services. It doesn’t exist.”

The Canada model also leaves us without a customs partnership, which is incompatible with the desire to have a frictionless border in Ireland.

Our conclusion must be clear: our preferred model—the only conceivable model, in fact—for the future relationship is one based on EEA-EFTA membership. EEA-EFTA offers the best possible terms of exit by providing the maximum possible access to the single market from outside the EU while allowing for differences that preserve our desire for greater control and self-determination. The EEA ends the principle of direct effect, so this House would have to pass all rules relating to the EEA internal market into law. It ends the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. Instead, we would move to the governance of the EFTA court, which frequently forges a path different from that of the ECJ, and which would have British judges on its bench if the UK were an EEA-EFTA member.

In EEA-EFTA, we could shape the rules of the single market, of which only 10% are relevant to the EEA. With the right of reservation, we would possess a veto over anything we considered inappropriate. That is not being a vassal state; that is not an empty vessel. The Norwegians have used their veto almost 20 times, most recently in rejecting the third postal directive, for which they suffered absolutely no repercussions.

Articles 112 and 113 of the EEA agreement allow for suspension—

[Mr Virendra Sharma (in the Chair)]

Order. I call Paul Masterton.

--- Later in debate ---

[Suella Fernandes]

We are not working towards a no-deal scenario, if that is what my hon. Friend is implying. As I have set out just now, we want an agreement based on tariff-free access, reducing our non-tariff barriers and with the ability to strike our own free trade agreements, but it is clear that we are a founding member of the WTO and plan to take up our seat at that organisation in due course.

[Stephen Kinnock]

The Minister has set out all the reasons why the Norway option does not work, but has also said that the UK wants collaboration on trade and security; access for services, which are a vital part of the economy; the ability to strike our own free trade agreements; and no ECJ jurisdiction. The Norway option ticks every one of those boxes.

[Suella Fernandes]

I disagree with the hon. Gentleman because Norway, although part of the EEA and EFTA, does not have much say on rules and regulations that come to it through the EEA agreement.

European Free Trade Association

Stephen Kinnock Excerpts

Wednesday 7th February 2018 Westminster Hall

[Dr Rupa Huq (Ealing Central and Acton) (Lab)]

As a fellow London MP, I am sure the hon. Gentleman receives numerous representations from constituents on EU citizens and financial passporting rights. Those people probably think the best course of action would be not to leave at all. Since that is not realistic, will he do all he can to exert pressure on the high command of his party and his namesake the Chancellor—sadly, he is not in the high command anymore—to ensure we have a pragmatic, not a purist Brexit? That way, if the arrangements are ready-made, some of the bumps can be avoided.

[Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)]

rose—

[Stephen Hammond]

I see the hon. Gentleman also wishes to intervene. If he does so at this stage, maybe I could answer both points.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way, and he is making a powerful speech. Is it not the case that the European economic area option ticks many of the leave boxes—no European Court of Justice jurisdiction, the ability to control the inward flow of immigration and the ability to strike trade deals with third countries—but also delivers the certainty that business is so desperately calling out for, because it is a well-established, well-understood agreement that has existed since 1993, but with no ever closer union built into it? Is it not by definition the form of Brexit that ticks the boxes in line with what the vast majority—we might call it the silent majority—of the British people want in this debate?

[Stephen Hammond]

In response to the hon. Member for Ealing Central and Acton (Dr Huq), it is, of course, not my decision who is in the high command, but I understand her sentiments. I absolutely hear her point about financial services. That is why I was very pleased to see the Government taking the initiative and offering unilateral passporting to financial services. Of course, that will work to the greater benefit only if we are able to ensure that the European Union agrees the terms as well, but it was a good start. I wholeheartedly agree with her that the Government’s commitment on EU citizens must be made real and be part of the deal.

The hon. Member for Aberavon (Stephen Kinnock) is absolutely right. In terms of my hon. Friends who are Brexiteers—a few of them are in the Chamber today—I was discussing with one of them last night that the EFTA arrangements are something we can build a consensus around in this country. That is a sensible option, suiting both sides of the argument, and I would welcome any of the pragmatic leavers, including a number who advanced this case during the referendum, joining the cause and arguing for EFTA.

Government’s EU Exit Analysis

Stephen Kinnock Excerpts

Wednesday 31st January 2018 Commons Chamber

[Anna Soubry]

With great respect to my right hon. Friend, that is absolute nonsense, and the good people of this country now require honesty and transparency. Some of us have been over to Brussels. Many people—right hon. and hon. Members, some of whom I can see on the Opposition Benches—have spoken to people at all levels of the 27 nations and to ambassadors from other countries. They have been over to Brussels and spoken to all manner of people, and no, we are not pleased. Don’t patronise; we are not stupid; we know when we are getting a line. We have spoken to disparate people, and every single one of them says, “Wake up, Britain. You’re not going to get a bespoke deal. You’re probably going to get Canada.”

I do not want us to be like Canada. That is not what people in my constituency voted for. They did not vote to be poorer—and they would be poorer, God help us if we got a Canadian deal. People have a right to know what the consequences of the various options are. The problem with the Prime Minister’s position is that she has told us what she does not want—the customs union, the single market and the European Court of Justice—and that has seriously reduced the options available to our country. By drawing those red lines and refusing to move, she puts the EU in a position whereby it is limited in what it can offer us. I say to my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest West (Sir Desmond Swayne) that we are deluding people if we continue to peddle this nonsense.

[Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)]

The right hon. Lady is giving a passionate speech. The one thing that the Prime Minister has said she wants is to keep frictionless trade in Northern Ireland. The problem is that that is utterly irreconcilable with what she said she does not want, which is the single market and customs union. Therein lies the fundamental confusion that is causing so much difficulty in the country right now.

[Anna Soubry]

I agree with the hon. Gentleman—I nearly called him my Friend, although on this he is, because he is absolutely right. The agreement made in December between the European Union and ourselves is such a fudge that it is impossible to put it into a text that could become a treaty. It is a superb fudge, and it has delivered the political outcome, but the reality, which has been accepted by this Government, is that in order to solve the problem in Ireland we are staying in the—not “a”, but “the”—customs union and single market. That is what the Government basically agreed to do in December.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)]

First, may I add to the earlier comments about how good it is to see you back in your place, Mr Deputy Speaker? It is an honour to follow the hon. Member for Redditch (Rachel Maclean).

The debate has been conducted in a cordial and respectful manner. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of previous debates about the impact assessments and many of our Brexit debates, when Members on the Government Benches have repeatedly impugned the motives and questioned the patriotism of Members not only on my side of the House, but on their own Back Benches. This kind of conduct has to stop because debate in this Chamber cannot function on that basis.

When we take our Oath of Allegiance of office, we swear to act in the national interest, in faithful service to those who elected us, and we do so on the understanding that everyone else in this place does the same. Although I may believe that other Members err in what they hold to be in the best interests of our country, I would never for one moment doubt or question the sincerity with which they hold those views, I would never question their patriotism and I would never impugn their motives.

The contest of ideas that illuminates and enlivens this Chamber is one of different solutions, predicated on a common understanding that we all place the interests of our country first, even if we differ over what best serves those interests. Without that common understanding, our democracy breaks down.

That is just one part of a worrying shift in our political culture, however: one where parliamentarians simply trying to do our job are dismissed as traitors or saboteurs; and where the civil service is told, “We’ve had enough of experts,” because they do not give Ministers the answers they want. The job of civil servants is not to tell Ministers what they want to hear. It is to tell them what they need to hear—to speak truth to power.

Parliamentarians requesting information are not betraying our country. We are simply trying to do our job and stand up for our constituents. So when we call for the release of these documents, it is not about undermining the process; it is about improving the process. Parliamentary government requires an informed legislature. That means we must have access to this information. It is not good enough to tell us to wait until October, because by then it will be too late, as we are entering a crunch-point in the negotiations right now.

Earlier this week, we saw the EU agree its transition negotiating guidelines in just two minutes and, as we have seen, once Mr Barnier gets his marching orders he does not deviate from them. In about six weeks the EU will agree the negotiating directives for the final trade deal phase of the withdrawal talks. We should let that sink in for a moment: in six weeks, we will be asked to make the most important choice in our post-war history.

We talk of the fantasy Canada plus plus plus, but these leaked reports give the game away. They do not have anything on a Canada plus plus plus scenario, because such a scenario does not exist. It cannot exist. The “plus plus plus” is presumably supposed to mean the services sector, which accounts for over 80% of the British economy, but just two weeks ago at the Brexit Committee we heard from Christophe Bondy, the lead Canadian negotiator on CETA—the comprehensive economic and trade agreement—who said there is no way for services to be part of a CETA-type deal. The fact is that a Canada-style deal would be about as much use to this country as a chocolate teapot.

It is crystal-clear that the most seamless and secure Brexit—the Brexit that is best for Britain—is an EFTA-a EEA-based Brexit. That is the only Brexit that protects jobs and opportunities, while also delivering control and influence. An EEA-EFTA Brexit ensures maximal access to the single market, being an internal market with the majority of the single market. It therefore protects jobs and investment, strengthens our hand in taking on multinationals such as Google and Amazon when they fail to pay their fair share, and protects vital workplace rights.

[Peter Grant]

Given the hon. Gentleman’s desire to retain access to the single market, can he explain why he does not want to just stay in the single market? Would not that provide the best possible access?

[Stephen Kinnock]

One of the key issues in the referendum was the free movement of labour and, as I shall go on to explain, there is an important provision in the EEA agreement that enables the application of an emergency brake on free movement. That is an important distinction between the EEA and the single market and it is one that we should look at seriously.

An EEA-EFTA-based Brexit would let us take back more control. It would end the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice and direct effect, ensuring that British courts had sovereignty. It would also allow us to shape the rules of the internal market through the EEA joint committees and veto those that did not work, with the right of reservation as enshrined in the EEA agreement. An EEA-EFTA Brexit would allow us to reform free movement by triggering articles 112 and 113, following the protocol 15 precedent, potentially allowing us to introduce a quota-based system to manage the inward flow of labour.

Above all else, an EEA-EFTA Brexit would allow us to reunite our deeply divided country. The Brexit referendum was won on a narrow margin, but the result was clear, and that was why I voted to trigger article 50. The Prime Minister then called an election, hoping to secure a mandate for a hard Brexit, but she had her majority cut substantially. The country said no to a hard Brexit. Any rational Government would accept that decision and commit to a sensible Brexit, rather than ploughing on through this fantasy hard Brexit land of rainbows and unicorns. The country said no to a hard Brexit. It said yes to a Brexit that bridges the divide. Our future relationship with our most important commercial, diplomatic and political partner is on a burning platform, and we have only until the end of March to put out those fires. I therefore urge the Prime Minister and her Cabinet to show some leadership, get off the fence and commit unequivocally to an EEA-EFTA Brexit.

Leaving the EU: Implementation

Stephen Kinnock Excerpts

Monday 29th January 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mr Walker]

My right hon. Friend speaks with great expertise on these matters. It will be in the interests of the UK and the EU to reach agreement on the exact period of this implementation period as soon as possible, but it is important that we enter this negotiation by trying to give ourselves sufficient flexibility to achieve success.

[Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)]

Paragraph 17 of the directives for the negotiating team states clearly that

“any time-limited prolongation of the Union acquis requires existing Union regulatory, budgetary, supervisory, judiciary and enforcement instruments and structures to apply, including the competence of the Court of Justice of the European Union.”

Will the Minister please explain what exactly will be implemented during the implementation period?

[Mr Walker]

Very clearly, as the Prime Minister set out, the aim of the implementation period is to implement the future relationship between the UK and the EU and to allow us to put those structures in place for that future relationship. As the hon. Gentleman so often does, he speaks eloquently in this House on behalf of the EU, but we need to make sure that we are negotiating on behalf of the UK.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Walker]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right on both points. We want to make a success of this process for the UK economy, UK business and every part of the UK. I think that our constituents expect us to work together across the House and not to be calling each other names during this process.

[Stephen Kinnock]

On a point of order, Mr Speaker.

[Mr Speaker]

I will take this point of order now because I understand that it relates to the exchanges that have just taken place. Let’s hear it.

[Stephen Kinnock]

Thank you, Mr Speaker. As you will have heard during this session, I asked the Minister a perfectly reasonable question. Unfortunately, he chose to respond by impugning my motives and questioning my patriotism. I assure him that I speak only in what I see as the national interest and the interests of my constituents. I therefore ask him to retract those comments and apologise, and we will leave it at that.

[Mr Speaker]

I said that I would hear the hon. Gentleman. The Minister is not under any obligation to respond, although he may if he wants to.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Walker]

I did not mean to impugn the hon. Gentleman’s motives. I would only point out that he was reading directly from the EU’s negotiating guidelines and that today we are, of course, discussing the UK’s policy.

[Stephen Kinnock]

That is not an apology.

[Mr Speaker]

No, it is not an apology. It is an explanation. But we will leave it there.