(1 year, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberObviously, management of safety is not something for which I am directly responsible, but I am happy to follow up with my hon. Friend. I always thank him for giving me prior notice, which of course he did not do today.
The Secretary of State is well known for his airbrushing skills, but he cannot airbrush the fact that, of the top 10 economies in the world, the UK is the only one with a declining steel industry. When is he going to sit down with Tata Steel and the other businesses to do a deal on green steel for the future of our workforce?
We are working with the whole steel industry across the UK and regularly hold meetings. I do not think the question was posed in an appropriate way, because we are doing a huge amount of work to support the steel sector, including providing £800 million since 2013. We have provided a package of relief support for non-domestic users throughout this winter worth £18 billion. The report published by the BEIS Committee, which I previously sat on, also mentioned that any earlier bail-out for Liberty Steel, in particular, would not have been good value for taxpayers’ money.
(2 years ago)
Commons ChamberThe hon. Lady has raised an important point about people being treated equally. In these circumstances, people will often have been through the processes that she has described. They will have been on normal payment terms, and there will have been a debt recognition and reconciliation process that may have ended up with people either adopting a prepayment meter voluntarily or, as a last resort, having one forced upon them. There are mechanisms, which I will explain in a minute, whereby people are granted abeyance and forbearance.
In the case of many households, if debt were allowed to spiral out of control—and that is not generally voluntary; it is more often due to matters beyond the control of those households, and it is important that we provide support for them—the suppliers themselves could find themselves in a perilous position. These are commercial suppliers of electricity and gas. In fact, this could force out of the market suppliers who specialise in cases such as this. The last thing we want is a lack of provision for people in these circumstances.
These prepayment meters have moved on from the ones that we used to have. The modern smart meters are far easier to top up remotely, and make it easier to check balances.
I thank the Minister for giving way; he is being very generous.
My constituency office is being contacted by a great many people who have still not received their prepayment vouchers from the energy suppliers, but are receiving letters from the suppliers telling them that if they do not use the vouchers by January they will be cancelled, which would of course push those people further into debt. What are the Government doing to ensure that they receive the vouchers and do not lose the money to which they are entitled?
Other Members have made that important point, and I will come to it, but I had better make some progress, because you asked me to finish in about four minutes, Madam Deputy Speaker, which I shall endeavour to do.
We believe that there is a role for prepayment meters. Ofgem rules already require energy suppliers to offer a prepayment service only when it is safe and reasonably practicable to do so, and that applies whether a meter is smart or traditional. There are clear obligations on energy suppliers regarding customers in payment difficulty, and a prescribed process for occasions on which a warrant is required. That point was raised by the hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun (Alan Brown) and, indeed, by the hon. Member for Glasgow North East.
There are clear expectations for suppliers in respect of the steps to be taken before they instal a prepayment meter owing to debt, or switching a smart meter from credit to prepayment mode. Those steps include conversations to discuss debt repayment, budget management and energy efficiency measures, and referrals to debt advisers and charities. Before a prepayment meter is chosen as the debt repayment pathway, its safety must be assessed, as well as the customer’s ability to pay. Suppliers must give their customers seven days’ notice before installing a prepayment meter or switching a smart meter to prepayment mode. Ofgem recently published a regulatory expectations letter, in which it set out its expectation that suppliers will ensure that prepayment meters are safe and reasonably practicable in every case.
I would like to highlight some of the circumstances in which it is not deemed safe to have a prepayment meter, which include having specific disabilities or illnesses, or having children under five, as has been set out. Indeed, the hon. Member for East Lothian (Kenny MacAskill) raised that point. It is absolutely right that we provide support for those who are most in need.
The hon. Member also raised the issue of social tariffs, which were introduced in 2008 as part of a voluntary agreement between the Government and energy suppliers. They were replaced by the current mandated warm home discount scheme in 2011. This has improved outcomes by providing consistent and transparent benefits, and by utilising data matching to improve targeting. Clearly, it is important that we continue to review our current provisions and see what else might be done to help people in those circumstances.
(2 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesAnyway, I thought it was a speech in favour of the intent of this new clause.
Failure to prevent offences have proved effective elsewhere, as the Minister himself has said. We use them to tackle bribery and tax evasion, and the Minister always raises the best example when he refers to what used to go on in the construction industry. In my youth, people would regularly have terrible accidents on construction sites, some of which were fatal. It was only when a duty was introduced for those who ran construction companies to ensure the health and safety of their workers in the workplace, meaning it would be a criminal offence if they failed to do so, that miraculously, overnight, deaths on building sites came almost to a 100% halt. We have lots of examples of where a failure to prevent does not end up with people being locked up but does change behaviour. That is what we are trying to do.
I have lots of examples of areas where the Bribery Act 2010 has been successful and this is not one. This is the last legislative opportunity we will have in this Parliament to put into effect something that Members across the House think is important. There is so much evidence from so many bodies emphasising the importance of this bit of legislation. I cannot see any argument for delay. Before they reached their great, really important roles on the Front Bench, both Ministers argued passionately, frequently and loudly for this reform. I hope they will accept the new clauses, together with new clause 79, on the identification principle. With the inclusion of those three new clauses, we can hold our heads up high and say that we have done good work in Parliament.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Robertson. I pay tribute to my right hon. Friend the Member for Barking. The passion and eloquence with which she spoke was exemplary in terms of reminding us about what is at the heart of the Bill and one of the top priorities that we want to achieve. I do not want to say much more; how can I follow that?
New clause 73 would introduce a new offence of failing to prevent fraud, false accounting or money laundering, and new clause 74 would extend that offence, so I shall take them together. In effect, the new clauses would extend current failure to prevent offences beyond bribery and tax evasion to other economic crimes, money laundering and fraud. The offences would be applicable both to companies themselves and to senior managers or directors.
The Labour Front Bench team welcomes the new clauses tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Barking as vital to help to drive cultural change and corporate governance standards for the prevention of economic crime in the UK. They would also standardise criminal rules for holding companies to account across different economic crimes.
The call for this change is supported by a number of stakeholders, including Spotlight on Corruption, which made the following argument in written evidence to the Committee:
“Most urgently, a new failure to prevent fraud offence would help address the UK’s serious fraud epidemic. Fraud accounts for 40% of all recorded crime, but fraud prosecutions have fallen from 42,000 in 2011, to 13,500 in 2021 in the last decade, a 67% decrease. According to the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS): ‘an extension of the “failure to prevent” model to fraud, false accounting and money laundering would be unlikely to require companies to do more than what they would already be expected to do under the current law (which relies on the identification doctrine) but it would enable prosecutors to hold them to account more effectively where they fail to do so’. The heads of the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) and the CPS have both recently called for new failure to prevent offences.”
I refer the Minister, in addition to the stakeholders that support the call for change, to his own words on Second Reading. I will not replay his greatest hits—that my right hon. Friend the Member for Barking has already done so—but he has stated clearly that he sees this offence as “the No. 1 measure” that we need. The Opposition fervently hope that both Ministers will agree with their former selves that this is the No. 1 measure we need in the prevention and detection of economic crime. We urge the Conservative Front-Bench team to accept the new clause as a necessary and urgent provision to tackle economic crime that would have support across the board.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I have been promoting accountability for years now. In the work that I did with the Minister as we thought about how we could tackle economic crime and turn round the tanker, we always said there were four ways in which we had to respond. One was through having not more regulation, but smart regulation. The second was through tough enforcement. The third was through broad transparency—the ruling of the European Court of Justice last week is an absolute nightmare that could create real difficulties for us in the economic crime space. The fourth was accountability, and with the new clause we are suggesting a way for us to have that accountability.
There is interest in this subject across the House. The hon. Member for Hitchin and Harpenden (Bim Afolami) has written a paper on these issues. Can we find a mechanism for holding the regulatory bodies properly accountable to Parliament for what they do?
A lot of these questions arose when I chaired the Public Accounts Committee and we first started looking at tax avoidance. The rule is that everybody should be equal before the law in tax, but there was always a suspicion that sweetheart deals were being struck with certain big corporations and high net worth individuals. In fact, early on we came across one involving Goldman Sachs; on the back of a story in Private Eye, we uncovered a sweetheart deal. To this day, though, I do not understand whether Google is paying the correct tax or whether there is a deal there, and I could say the same about a lot of the big multinational companies. Because of the confidentiality of taxpayers’ interests, Parliament has no way to get the information that it needs to assure itself that the tax authorities are treating all taxpayers equally.
I have worked with all the agencies in this area—the NCA, the Serious Fraud Office, the Metropolitan police and so on—so whistleblowers, or just people who come across something that is wrong, often come to me, and I give the case to one of the agencies—and that is the last I ever hear of it. I always pursue the cases, but all too often I get the response, “Oh, there are security reasons for you not being given the information.” There was the Savaro case, which I referred to BEIS at the time. It went through BEIS and I still do not know whether anybody was pursued. Certainly, there were people behind that explosion in Lebanon, which led to so many deaths and loss of property.
I think that Parliament needs a better hold on what is happening and better accountability around how those agencies are operating. In the new clause, we suggest that we mirror the Intelligence and Security Committee, which meets under Privy Council terms. The proposed economic crime committee could be a Committee of both Houses, meeting under Privy Council terms and overseeing all the regulatory bodies in this space—in financial services and economic crime. It could call for papers relating to individual cases, which would remain confidential because the ECC would meet in private. The ECC could then produce reports on systemic changes that are necessary, arising from consideration of those individual cases.
I think that that would massively improve accountability, as well as the performance and effectiveness of the agencies. With that information, members of the ECC would have a better understanding of what, if anything, they needed to do as legislators to improve the situation. I believe that this committee will happen one day, but I am proposing it today as a new clause in this Bill. I know that the hon. Member for Hitchin and Harpenden and those who support him in this mission would be happy to support me today, and I hope that Ministers give it a good hearing.
I am happy to support new clause 75, tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Barking, which would require the Secretary of State by regulation to establish a body to be known as the economic crime committee of Parliament.
The new clause is driven by and based on the fundamental principles of transparency and accountability. Our call for those two principles to be adhered to is important because it recognises that the structures for reviewing progress, and scrutinising and reviewing economic crime, are simply not good enough. There is too much siloed thinking. This aspect of scrutiny does not sit neatly within BEIS, the Treasury, the Home Office, or the Ministries of Defence and of Justice; it really spans the waterfront, yet those Departments are all vital parts of what should be a systemic approach to tackling economic crime.
The proposed committee would consist of nine Members drawn from the House of Commons and the House of Lords, with each member of the ECC appointed by their respective House of Parliament. The ECC would have the power to meet confidentially; it could examine or otherwise oversee any regulatory enforcement or supervision agencies involved in work related to, but not limited to, tax avoidance and evasion by corporations, illicit finance, money laundering, fraud, kleptocracy, corruption, and whistleblower protection.
We welcome the new clause as it would introduce a vital mechanism for transparency and accountability within the Bill. If the Minister does not agree with it, we hope that he will acknowledge that the existing mechanisms are unfit for the kind of joined-up, systemic, expert-driven scrutiny that is needed to keep pace with and keep ahead of economic crime. Throughout this Committee’s proceedings, my colleagues and I have tabled amendments and new clauses designed to increase the scrutiny and transparency of the measures that the Bill will introduce, so as to ensure that when they are implemented, they are as effective as possible. If the Minister is not able to support the new clause, Parliament and the country more broadly would need him to come up with something better.
I wholeheartedly agree with the new clause. When the Treasury Committee looked at this issue, what struck me was that economic crime was nobody’s priority. Our report said:
“Economic crime seems not to be a priority for law enforcement. The number of agencies responsible for fighting economic crime and fraud is bewildering.”
If it is bewildering in that sense, it is bewildering to Parliament, too. This is a BEIS and Home Office Bill, yet it has huge Treasury implications and huge security implications, and that gets to the heart of why this new clause is so important. There needs to be a body in Parliament that holds all these agencies to account in one place. If BEIS does a little bit, and the Home Office does a little bit, and security does a little bit, and the Treasury does a little bit, there will not be the cohesive scrutiny of all those agencies that is needed. Committees could well be palmed off with different responses by different agencies, with nobody consistently holding them to account.
The work of the Treasury Committee is very wide ranging. We have two meetings a week, and that is not enough to cover all the issues we need to cover. Setting up a bespoke Committee that could build up expertise on this issue would allow for that accountability. It could meet in private if it needed to, although it would ideally meet in public. The point is that it would keep an eye on all the things that we have agreed to in the Bill, and we would be holding all these agencies and Ministers to account in a consistent way. The reports of the ECC would also, we hope, be taken seriously, and its recommendations implemented.
It is not really enough that the Treasury Committee or another Committee looks at economic crime every once in a while and sees how things are going. The Treasury Committee has done that previously, looking back at previous reports and asking, “How are things going now?” but there is not that week in, week out consistent scrutiny of what is happening. Without scrutiny and consistency, it is difficult to see how the Government will get this right. We are legislating here, but legislation cannot be put on a shelf and left; it has to be living legislation that is scrutinised on a regular basis. A committee of sort proposed in the new clause really would give Parliament a lot of power to ensure that these measures are implemented correctly and that the agencies responsible for economic crime, which affects all of our constituents, continue to be held to account.
I will be brief because my right hon. Friend the Member for Barking has, again, made the case so eloquently. We support new clause 76. The basic fact is that by their very nature, money laundering and economic crime are very often linked to serious organised crime gangs and hostile states. We are dealing with some pretty frightening people. Without adequate protection, the stakes for an informed insider blowing the whistle are simply too high.
New clause 76 would take those vital first steps to provide more adequate protection for whistleblowers and enable the greater detection of fraud and economic crime by establishing a body specifically set up to both protect whistleblowers and investigate their reports. We feel strongly that the Government must bring forward steps to protect and enable whistleblowers. New clause 76 provides an excellent and strong platform to make that happen.
Yes, because I want it on the record. I am just conscious that Members want to get on, and that the argument is the same.
We fully welcome the new clause, which we think is very important to ensure that all perpetrators of economic crime are caught and dealt with.
I merely point out that, while the new clause addresses many of the points that the right hon. Member for Barking has raised before, it also raises many of the same challenges. For that reason, I will object to it.
I will speak to this very quickly, too. This is an interesting new clause, because its purpose is to tackle the issue of suspicious wealth remaining frozen in bank accounts and serving no useful purpose. We propose a new, more straightforward, pragmatic solution to deal with suspicious wealth, enabling our enforcement agencies to confiscate the moneys in the bank and repurpose them so that much of the wealth can be used to fund and strengthen our anti-money laundering enforcement capacity and perhaps be given back, in some cases, to the nations from which it has been stolen.
When a banker sees a suspicious transaction, he or she is required to ask for consent from the police to allow the transaction to go ahead. If the police officer refuses consent, the moneys can be frozen in the bank account. Under our new clause, the money would then remain frozen for six months, and the director of the Serious Fraud Office could apply to the courts to confiscate or seize the moneys. They will be granted that application unless the respondent proves to the court that the funds do not have a criminal origin. The onus is on the respondent to prove that he or she has obtained the assets legitimately. The SFO does not have to prove that the respondent committed a criminal activity; it is up to the respondent to prove that the funds are legitimately and honestly acquired and are not linked to acts of criminality. The new clause is modelled on unexplained wealth orders.
This would add an important new weapon to our arsenal in the fight against economic crime, as it provides for the non-conviction-based confiscation of frozen assets. Although they are not my favourite people, the people of Jersey have introduced a very similar law and recently managed to secure £1.7 million that was frozen in accounts there. That was money paid to Lieutenant General Jeremiah Useni, who had held office in the Abacha regime in Nigeria, and the allegation was that it was the proceeds of corruption. Although he tried to get his money back, he could not, and a lot of the £1.7 million went back to Nigeria.
The British Bankers’ Association thinks that we have up to £50 million held in frozen accounts, untouched. We need a little touch of boldness from the Minister. He should not just accept the message of “resist” that he gets from his officials. He should give good consideration to this sensible, practical, good idea of seizing money stolen by bad people and giving it back to the citizens who have been robbed, or repurposing it to strengthen the fight against economic crime.
We welcome these new clauses, which would give effect to the Government’s stated intention to unlock the proceeds of crime held in bank accounts to fund law enforcement efforts to tackle economic crime. Their adoption would also optimise the potential of the defence against money laundering regime and streamline the process of UK law enforcement identifying tainted wealth and being able to seek its forfeiture.
I thank the right hon. Member for Barking. While I agree with the intent behind her new clauses, I argue that they narrow slightly the scope in which the state can already recover much of the proceeds of crime. While they attempt to simplify, the reality is that we are already recovering large sums. I am not saying that we could not do more—we certainly could—but I am not convinced that the new clauses would add significantly to existing legislation. Last year, for example, a record £115 million of proceeds of crime were recovered under existing powers.
That is not a brilliant argument, but I will pursue this issue on Report, as we are doing with other issues around seizing and freezing assets. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 84
Compensation for Victims of Economic Crime
‘(1) The Secretary of State must, no later than 90 days from the date on which this Act comes into force, publish and lay before Parliament a strategy for the potential establishment of a fund for the compensation of victims of economic crime.
(2) The strategy may include provisions on the management and disposal of any assets realised by the government, or any body with law enforcement responsibilities in relation to economic crime, under relevant UK legislation.’—(Stephen Kinnock.)
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to prepare and publish a strategy on the potential establishment of a fund to provide compensation to victims of economic crime.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
As this is the last time I will be on my feet, I thank the Committee; it has been an excellent set of debates, and I look forward to further constructive engagement with the Government on these matters.
The context of new clause 84 is the devastation caused by Putin’s barbaric and illegal war for the lives and livelihoods of Ukraine’s population. This demands a concerted cross-party and international effort, of which the UK should be at the forefront, as the staggering costs of reconstruction are sure to remain a key challenge long after the war itself has reached its inevitable end.
The new clause would require the Government to prepare and publish a wide-ranging strategy for efforts to ensure that the necessary financial compensation is made available to victims of economic crime, wherever they may be. This could and should be applied to victims of international crimes, of which the war in Ukraine is without doubt an example, but it could be applied more broadly as a means of providing a measure of justice to the victims of any other kleptocratic regimes around the world. The new clause would provide a mechanism for compensating victims of economic crime in the UK, including the thousands, or perhaps even millions, of British victims of online scams and other kinds of fraud. We therefore commend the new clause to the Committee, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.
If anybody thinks that I was trying to soft-soap the right hon. Lady in order to shut her up in future sittings, they do not know her very well. It would have not worked, and I have not tried it. All I have done is to pay credit to somebody who has definitely earned it. I also thank my fellow Minister and the Whips, who have got us through at lightning speed.
On the new clause, the powers in part 4 already increase the focus on victims. The compensation principles of the Serious Fraud Office, CPS, the National Crime Agency and others have committed law enforcement bodies to ensuring that compensation for economic crime is considered in every relevant case, including where there are overseas victims, so I believe that the Bill already focuses on many of the aspects that we have discussed. That said, we are coming to Report. As always, I will be listening, but I have yet to be convinced about the new clause, because I believe that it has largely been covered.
Has the Minister any thoughts on the international forums that have been set up—for example, the Russian Elites, Proxies, and Oligarchs Taskforce and the European Commission’s Freeze and Seize Taskforce. What contribution are the UK Government planning to make to those processes?
I can speak directly to that, because I have recently had a meeting about it with other Governments and other jurisdictions. So far, many people have come up with ways to freeze assets. That is not a particular challenge; the UK does so very actively. Seizing and forfeiting in totality is a different challenge, because it depends on ownership and on many aspects of common law jurisdiction that we would not want to understate. I assure the hon. Gentleman honestly that I have not given up on this, because compensation for the victims in Ukraine is the very least that we should expect, as he correctly identified. Ukraine’s inevitable victory, which is absolutely assured, leads us to start thinking about how we reconstruct that extraordinary country. It is clear that Russian state assets held abroad—some, sadly, are held in the UK—should go some way to contributing to that.
That said, how do we construct the legal arguments to ensure that that is possible? They need to be in keeping with British common law, for obvious reasons. We do not want a jurisdiction of forfeiture; we want a jurisdiction of law. There is more work to be done, therefore. We are working very closely with other common law jurisdictions, such as Australia, Canada and, indeed, the United States. There is an ongoing discussion, but it is not quite as straightforward as I would have hoped.
I have no further comments, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Schedule 1
Cryptoassets: terrorism
“Part 1
Amendments to the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001
1 Schedule 1 to the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (forfeiture of terrorist property) is amended as follows.
2 After Part 4B insert—
‘Part 4BA
Seizure and detention of terrorist cryptoassets
Interpretation
10Z7A (1) In this Schedule—
“cryptoasset” means a cryptographically secured digital representation of value or contractual rights that uses a form of distributed ledger technology and can be transferred, stored or traded electronically;
“crypto wallet” means—
(a) software,
(b) hardware,
(c) a physical item, or
(d) any combination of the things mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (c),
which is used to store the cryptographic private key that allows cryptoassets to be accessed.
“terrorist cryptoasset” means a cryptoasset which—
(a) is within subsection (1)(a) or (b) of section 1, or
(b) is earmarked as terrorist property.
(2) The Secretary of State may by regulations made by statutory instrument amend the definitions of “cryptoasset” and “crypto wallet” in sub-paragraph (1).
(3) Regulations under sub-paragraph (2)—
(a) may make different provision for different purposes;
(b) may make consequential, supplementary, incidental, transitional, transitory or saving provision.
(4) A statutory instrument containing regulations under sub-paragraph (2) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.
(5) In this Part—
“cryptoasset-related item” means an item of property that is, or that contains or gives access to information that is, likely to assist in the seizure under this Part of terrorist cryptoassets;
“senior officer” means—
(a) a senior police officer;
(b) an officer of Revenue and Customs of a rank designated by the Commissioners for His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs as equivalent to that of a senior police officer;
(c) an immigration officer of a rank designated by the Secretary of State as equivalent to that of a senior police officer;
“senior police officer” means a police officer of at least the rank of superintendent.
Seizure of cryptoasset-related items
10Z7AA (1) An authorised officer may seize any item of property if the authorised officer has reasonable grounds for suspecting that the item is a cryptoasset-related item.
(2) If an authorised officer is lawfully on any premises, the officer may, for the purpose of—
(a) determining whether any property is a cryptoasset-related item, or
(b) enabling or facilitating the seizure under this Part of any terrorist cryptoasset,
require any information which is stored in any electronic form and accessible from the premises to be produced in a form in which it can be taken away and in which it is visible and legible, or from which it can readily be produced in a visible and legible form.
(3) But sub-paragraph (2) does not authorise an authorised officer to require a person to produce privileged information.
(4) In this paragraph “privileged information” means information which a person would be entitled to refuse to provide—
(a) in England and Wales and Northern Ireland, on grounds of legal professional privilege in proceedings in the High Court;
(b) in Scotland, on grounds of confidentiality of communications in proceedings in the Court of Session.
(5) Where an authorised officer has seized a cryptoasset-related item under sub-paragraph (1), the officer may use any information obtained from the item for the purpose of—
(a) identifying or gaining access to a crypto wallet, and
(b) by doing so, enabling or facilitating the seizure under this Part of any cryptoassets.
Initial detention of cryptoasset-related items
10Z7AB (1) Property seized under paragraph 10Z7AA may be detained for an initial period of 48 hours.
(2) Sub-paragraph (1) authorises the detention of property only for so long as an authorised officer continues to have reasonable grounds for suspicion in relation to that property as described in paragraph 10Z7AA(1).
(3) In calculating a period of 48 hours for the purposes of this paragraph, no account is to be taken of—
(a) any Saturday or Sunday,
(b) Christmas Day,
(c) Good Friday,
(d) any day that is a bank holiday under the Banking and Financial Dealings Act 1971 in the part of the United Kingdom within which the property is seized, or
(e) any day prescribed by virtue of section 8(2) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 as a court holiday in a sheriff court in the sheriff court district within which the property is seized.
Further detention of cryptoasset-related items
10Z7AC (1) The period for which property seized under paragraph 10Z7AA may be detained may be extended by an order made—
(a) in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, by a magistrates’ court;
(b) in Scotland, by the sheriff.
(2) An order under sub-paragraph (1) may not authorise the detention of any property—
(a) beyond the end of the period of 6 months beginning with the date of the order, and
(b) in the case of any further order under this paragraph, beyond the end of the period of 2 years beginning with the date of the first order; but this is subject to sub-paragraph (4).
(3) A justice of the peace may also exercise the power of a magistrates’ court to make the first order under sub-paragraph (1).
(4) The court or sheriff may make an order for the period of 2 years in sub-paragraph (2)(b) to be extended to a period of up to 3 years beginning with the date of the first order.
(5) An application to a magistrates’ court, a justice of the peace or the sheriff to make the first order under sub-paragraph (1) extending a particular period of detention—
(a) may be made and heard without notice of the application or hearing having been given to any of the persons affected by the application or to the legal representatives of such a person, and
(b) may be heard and determined in private in the absence of persons so affected and of their legal representatives.
(6) An application for an order under sub-paragraph (1) or (4) may be made—
(a) in relation to England and Wales and Northern Ireland, by the Commissioners for His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs or an authorised officer;
(b) in relation to Scotland, by a procurator fiscal.
(7) The court, sheriff or justice may make an order under sub-paragraph (1) if satisfied, in relation to the item of property to be further detained, that—
(a) there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it is a cryptoasset-related item, and
(b) its continuing detention is justified.
(8) The court or sheriff may make an order under sub-paragraph (4) if satisfied that a request for assistance is outstanding in relation to the item of property to be further detained.
(9) A “request for assistance” in sub-paragraph (8) means a request for assistance in obtaining evidence (including information in any form or article) in connection with the property to be further detained, made —
(a) by a judicial authority in the United Kingdom under section 7 of the Crime (International Co-operation) Act 2003, or
(b) by an authorised officer, to an authority exercising equivalent functions in a foreign country.
(10) An order under sub-paragraph (1) must provide for notice to be given to persons affected by the order.
Seizure of cryptoassets
10Z7AD (1) An authorised officer may seize cryptoassets if the authorised officer has reasonable grounds for suspecting that the cryptoassets are terrorist cryptoassets.
(2) The circumstances in which a cryptoasset is “seized” for the purposes of sub-paragraph (1) include circumstances in which it is transferred into a crypto wallet controlled by the authorised officer.
Prior authorisation for detention of cryptoassets
10Z7AE (1) Where an order is made under paragraph 10Z7AC in respect of a cryptoasset-related item, the court, sheriff or justice making the order may, at the same time, make an order to authorise the detention of any cryptoassets that may be seized as a result of information obtained from that item.
(2) An application for an order under this paragraph may be made, by a person mentioned in paragraph 10Z7AC(6), at the same time as an application for an order under paragraph 10Z7AC is made by that person.
(3) The court, sheriff or justice may make an order under this paragraph if satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the cryptoassets that may be seized are terrorist cryptoassets.
(4) An order under this paragraph authorises detention of the cryptoassets for the same period of time as the order under paragraph 10Z7AC authorises detention in respect of the cryptoasset-related item to which those cryptoassets relate.
Initial detention of cryptoassets
10Z7AF (1) Cryptoassets seized under paragraph 10Z7AD may be detained for an initial period of 48 hours.
(2) Sub-paragraph (1) authorises the detention of cryptoassets only for so long as an authorised officer continues to have reasonable grounds for suspicion in relation to those cryptoassets as described in paragraph 10Z7AD(1).
(3) In calculating a period of 48 hours for the purposes of this paragraph, no account is to be taken of—
(a) any Saturday or Sunday,
(b) Christmas Day,
(c) Good Friday,
(d) any day that is a bank holiday under the Banking and Financial Dealings Act 1971 in the part of the United Kingdom within which the property is seized, or
(e) any day prescribed by virtue of section 8(2) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 as a court holiday in a sheriff court in the sheriff court district within which the property is seized.
(4) This paragraph is subject to paragraph 10Z7AE.
Further detention of cryptoassets
10Z7AG (1) The period for which cryptoassets seized under paragraph 10Z7AD may be detained may be extended by an order made—
(a) in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, by a magistrates’ court;
(b) in Scotland, by the sheriff.
(2) An order under sub-paragraph (1) may not authorise the detention of any cryptoassets—
(a) beyond the end of the period of 6 months beginning with the date of the order, and
(b) in the case of any further order under this paragraph, beyond the end of the period of 2 years beginning with the date of the first order; but this is subject to sub-paragraph (4).
(3) A justice of the peace may also exercise the power of a magistrates’ court to make the first order under sub-paragraph (1).
(4) The court or sheriff may make an order for the period of 2 years in sub-paragraph (2)(b) to be extended to a period of up to 3 years beginning with the date of the first order.
(5) An application to a magistrates’ court, a justice of the peace or the sheriff to make the first order under sub-paragraph (1) extending a particular period of detention—
(a) may be made and heard without notice of the application or hearing having been given to any of the persons affected by the application or to the legal representatives of such a person, and
(b) may be heard and determined in private in the absence of persons so affected and of their legal representatives.
(6) An application for an order under sub-paragraph (1) or (4) may be made—
(a) in relation to England and Wales and Northern Ireland, by the Commissioners for His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs or an authorised officer;
(b) in relation to Scotland, by a procurator fiscal.
(7) The court, sheriff or justice may make an order under sub-paragraph (1) if satisfied, in relation to the cryptoassets to be further detained, that condition 1, condition 2 or condition 3 is met.
(8) Condition 1 is that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the cryptoassets are intended to be used for the purposes of terrorism and that either—
(a) their continued detention is justified while their intended use is further investigated or consideration is given to bringing (in the United Kingdom or elsewhere) proceedings against any person for an offence with which the cryptoassets are connected, or
(b) proceedings against any person for an offence with which the cryptoassets are connected have been started and have not been concluded.
(9) Condition 2 is that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the cryptoassets consist of resources of an organisation which is a proscribed organisation and that either—
(a) their continued detention is justified while investigation is made into whether or not they consist of such resources or consideration is given to bringing (in the United Kingdom or elsewhere) proceedings against any person for an offence with which the cryptoassets are connected, or
(b) proceedings against any person for an offence with which the cryptoassets are connected have been started and have not been concluded.
(10) Condition 3 is that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the cryptoassets are property earmarked as terrorist property and that either—
(a) their continued detention is justified while their derivation is further investigated or consideration is given to bringing (in the United Kingdom or elsewhere) proceedings against any person for an offence with which the cryptoassets are connected, or
(b) proceedings against any person for an offence with which the cryptoassets are connected have been started and have not been concluded.
(11) The court or sheriff may make an order under sub-paragraph (4) if satisfied that a request for assistance is outstanding in relation to the cryptoassets to be further detained.
(12) A “request for assistance” in sub-paragraph (11) means a request for assistance in obtaining evidence (including information in any form or article) in connection with the property to be further detained, made —
(a) by a judicial authority in the United Kingdom under section 7 of the Crime (International Co-operation) Act 2003, or
(b) by an authorised officer, to an authority exercising equivalent functions in a foreign country.
(13) An order under sub-paragraph (1) must provide for notice to be given to persons affected by the order.
Safekeeping of cryptoasset-related items and cryptoassets
10Z7AH (1) An authorised officer must arrange for any item of property seized under paragraph 10Z7AA to be safely stored throughout the period during which it is detained under this Part.
(2) An authorised officer must arrange for any cryptoassets seized under paragraph 10Z7AD to be safely stored throughout the period during which they are detained under this Part.
Release of cryptoasset-related items and cryptoassets
10Z7AI (1) This paragraph applies while any cryptoasset or other item of property is detained under this Part.
(2) A magistrates’ court or (in Scotland) the sheriff may, subject to sub-paragraph (9), direct the release of the whole or any part of the property if the following condition is met.
(3) The condition is that the court or sheriff is satisfied, on an application by the person from whom the property was seized, that the conditions for the detention of the property in this Part are no longer met in relation to the property to be released.
(4) A person within sub-paragraph (5) may, subject to sub-paragraph (9) and after notifying the magistrates’ court, sheriff or justice under whose order property is being detained, release the whole or any part of the property if satisfied that the detention of the property to be released is no longer justified.
(5) The following persons are within this sub-paragraph—
(a) in relation to England and Wales and Northern Ireland, an authorised officer;
(b) in relation to Scotland, a procurator fiscal.
(6) If any cryptoasset-related item which has been released is not claimed within the period of a year beginning with the date on which it was released, an authorised officer may—
(a) retain the item and deal with it as they see fit,
(b) dispose of the item, or
(c) destroy the item.
(7) The powers in sub-paragraph (6) may be exercised only—
(a) where the authorised officer has taken reasonable steps to notify—
(i) the person from whom the item was seized, and
(ii) any other persons who the authorised officer has reasonable grounds to believe have an interest in the item,
that the item has been released, and
(b) with the approval of a senior officer.
(8) Any proceeds of a disposal of the item are to be paid—
(a) into the Consolidated Fund if—
(i) the item was directed to be released by a magistrates’ court, or
(ii) a magistrates’ court or justice was notified under sub-paragraph (4) of the release;
(b) into the Scottish Consolidated Fund if—
(i) the item was directed to be released by the sheriff, or
(ii) the sheriff was notified under sub-paragraph (4) of the release.
(9) If (in the United Kingdom or elsewhere) proceedings are started against any person for an offence with which the property is connected, the property is not to be released under this paragraph (and so is to continue to be detained) until the proceedings are concluded.
Part 4BB
Terrorist cryptoassets: crypto wallet freezing orders
Interpretation
10Z7B (1) In this Part—
(a) “cryptoasset exchange provider” means a firm or sole practitioner who by way of business provides one or more of the following services, including where the firm or sole practitioner does so as creator or issuer of any of the cryptoassets involved—
(i) exchanging, or arranging or making arrangements with a view to the exchange of, cryptoassets for money or money for cryptoassets,
(ii) exchanging, or arranging or making arrangements with a view to the exchange of, one cryptoasset for another, or
(iii) operating a machine which utilises automated processes to exchange cryptoassets for money or money for cryptoassets;
(b) “custodian wallet provider” means a firm or sole practitioner who by way of business provides services to safeguard, or to safeguard and administer—
(i) cryptoassets on behalf of its customers, or
(ii) private cryptographic keys on behalf of its customers in order to hold, store and transfer cryptoassets;
(c) “cryptoasset service provider” includes cryptoasset exchange provider and custodian wallet provider.
(2) In the definition of “cryptoasset exchange provider” in sub-paragraph (1)—
(a) “cryptoasset” includes a right to, or interest in, a cryptoasset;
(b) “money” means—
(i) money in sterling,
(ii) money in any other currency, or
(iii) money in any other medium of exchange,
but does not include a cryptoasset.
(3) The Secretary of State may by regulations made by statutory instrument amend the definitions in sub-paragraphs (1) and (2).
(4) Regulations under sub-paragraph (3)—
(a) may make different provision for different purposes;
(b) may make consequential, supplementary, incidental, transitional, transitory or saving provision.
(5) A statutory instrument containing regulations under sub-paragraph (3) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.
(6) For the purposes of this Part—
(a) a crypto wallet freezing order is an order that, subject to any exclusions (see paragraph 10Z7BD), prohibits each person by or for whom the crypto wallet to which the order applies is administered from—
(i) making withdrawals or payments from the crypto wallet, or
(ii) using the crypto wallet in any other way;
(b) a crypto wallet is administered by or for a person if the person is the person to whom services are being provided by a cryptoasset service provider in relation to that crypto wallet.
(7) In this Part—
“enforcement officer” means—
(a) a constable, or
(b) a counter-terrorism financial investigator;
“relevant court” means—
(a) in England and Wales and Northern Ireland, a magistrates’ court, and
(b) in Scotland, the sheriff;
“senior officer” means a police officer of at least the rank of superintendent;
“UK-connected cryptoasset service provider” means a cryptoasset service provider which—
(a) is acting in the course of business carried on by it in the United Kingdom,
(b) has terms and conditions with the persons to whom it provides services which provide for a legal dispute to be litigated in the courts of a part of the United Kingdom,
(c) holds, in the United Kingdom, any data relating to the persons to whom it provides services, or
(d) meets the condition in sub-paragraph (8).
(8) The condition in this sub-paragraph is that—
(a) the cryptoasset service provider has its registered office, or if it does not have one, its head office in the United Kingdom, and
(b) the day-to-day management of the provider’s business is the responsibility of that office or another establishment maintained by it in the United Kingdom.
Application for crypto wallet freezing order
10Z7BA (1) This paragraph applies if an enforcement officer has reasonable grounds for suspecting that cryptoassets held in a crypto wallet administered by a UK-connected cryptoasset service provider are terrorist cryptoassets.
(2) Where this paragraph applies the enforcement officer may apply to the relevant court for a crypto wallet freezing order in relation to the crypto wallet in which the cryptoassets are held.
(3) But—
(a) an enforcement officer may not apply for a crypto wallet freezing order unless the officer is a senior officer or is authorised to do so by a senior officer, and
(b) the senior officer must consult the Treasury before making the application for the order or (as the case may be) authorising the application to be made, unless in the circumstances it is not reasonably practicable to do so.
(4) An application for a crypto wallet freezing order may be made without notice if the circumstances of the case are such that notice of the application would prejudice the taking of any steps under this Schedule to forfeit cryptoassets that are terrorist cryptoassets.
(5) An application for a crypto wallet freezing order under this paragraph may be combined with an application for an account freezing order under paragraph 10Q where a single entity—
(a) is both a relevant financial institution for the purposes of paragraph 10Q and a cryptoasset service provider for the purposes of this Part, and
(b) operates or administers, for the same person, both an account holding money and a crypto wallet.
Making of crypto wallet freezing order
10Z7BB (1) This paragraph applies where an application for a crypto wallet freezing order is made under paragraph 10Z7BA in relation to a crypto wallet.
(2) The relevant court may make the order if satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that some or all of the cryptoassets held in the crypto wallet are terrorist cryptoassets.
(3) A crypto wallet freezing order ceases to have effect at the end of the period specified in the order (which may be varied under paragraph 10Z7BC) unless it ceases to have effect at an earlier or later time in accordance with this Part or Part 4BC or 4BD.
(4) The period specified by the relevant court for the purposes of sub-paragraph (3) (whether when the order is first made or on a variation under paragraph 10Z7BC) may not exceed the period of 2 years, beginning with the day on which the crypto wallet freezing order is (or was) made; but this is subject to sub-paragraph (5).
(5) The relevant court may make an order for the period of 2 years in sub-paragraph (4) to be extended to a period of up to 3 years beginning with the day on which the crypto wallet freezing order is (or was) made.
(6) The relevant court may make an order under sub-paragraph (5) if satisfied that a request for assistance is outstanding in relation to some or all of the cryptoassets held in the crypto wallet.
(7) A “request for assistance” in sub-paragraph (6) means a request for assistance in obtaining evidence (including information in any form or article) in connection with some or all of the cryptoassets held in the crypto wallet, made—
(a) by a judicial authority in the United Kingdom under section 7 of the Crime (International Co-operation) Act 2003, or
(b) by an enforcement officer, to an authority exercising equivalent functions in a foreign country.
(8) A crypto wallet freezing order must provide for notice to be given to persons affected by the order.
Variation and setting aside of crypto wallet freezing order
10Z7BC (1) The relevant court may at any time vary or set aside a crypto wallet freezing order on an application made by—
(a) an enforcement officer, or
(b) any person affected by the order.
(2) But an enforcement officer may not make an application under sub-paragraph (1) unless the officer is a senior officer or is authorised to do so by a senior officer.
(3) Before varying or setting aside a crypto wallet freezing order the court must (as well as giving the parties to the proceedings an opportunity to be heard) give such an opportunity to any person who may be affected by its decision.
(4) In relation to Scotland, the references in this paragraph to setting aside an order are to be read as references to recalling it.
Exclusions
10Z7BD (1) The power to vary a crypto wallet freezing order includes (amongst other things) power to make exclusions from the prohibition on making withdrawals or payments from the crypto wallet to which the order applies.
(2) Exclusions from the prohibition may also be made when the order is made.
(3) An exclusion may (amongst other things) make provision for the purpose of enabling a person by or for whom the crypto wallet is administered—
(a) to meet the person’s reasonable living expenses, or
(b) to carry on any trade, business, profession or occupation.
(4) An exclusion may be made subject to conditions.
(5) Where a magistrates’ court exercises the power to make an exclusion for the purpose of enabling a person to meet legal expenses that the person has incurred, or may incur, in respect of proceedings under this Schedule, it must ensure that the exclusion—
(a) is limited to reasonable legal expenses that the person has reasonably incurred or that the person reasonably incurs,
(b) specifies the total amount that may be released for legal expenses in pursuance of the exclusion, and
(c) is made subject to the same conditions as would be the required conditions (see section 286A of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002) if the order had been made under section 245A of that Act (in addition to any conditions imposed under sub-paragraph (4)).
(6) A magistrates’ court, in deciding whether to make an exclusion for the purpose of enabling a person to meet legal expenses in respect of proceedings under this Schedule—
(a) must have regard to the desirability of the person being represented in any proceedings under this Schedule in which the person is a participant, and
(b) must disregard the possibility that legal representation of the person in any such proceedings might, were an exclusion not made—
(i) be made available under arrangements made for the purposes of Part 1 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, or
(ii) be funded by the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland.
(7) The sheriff’s power to make exclusions may not be exercised for the purpose of enabling any person to meet any legal expenses in respect of proceedings under this Schedule.
(8) The power to make exclusions must, subject to sub-paragraph (6), be exercised with a view to ensuring, so far as practicable, that there is not undue prejudice to the taking of any steps under this Schedule to forfeit cryptoassets that are terrorist cryptoassets.
Restriction on proceedings and remedies
10Z7BE (1) If a court in which proceedings are pending in respect of a crypto wallet administered by a UK-connected cryptoasset service provider is satisfied that a crypto wallet freezing order has been applied for or made in respect of the crypto wallet, it may either stay the proceedings or allow them to continue on any terms it thinks fit.
(2) Before exercising the power conferred by sub-paragraph (1), the court must (as well as giving the parties to any of the proceedings concerned an opportunity to be heard) give such an opportunity to any person who may be affected by the court’s decision.
(3) In relation to Scotland, the reference in sub-paragraph (1) to staying the proceedings is to be read as a reference to sisting the proceedings.
Part 4BC
Forfeiture of terrorist cryptoassets
Interpretation
10Z7C (1) In this Part—
“cryptoasset service provider” has the same meaning as in Part 4BB (see paragraph 10Z7B(1));
“crypto wallet freezing order” has the same meaning as in Part 4BB (see paragraph 10Z7B(6));
“senior officer” means—
(a) a senior police officer;
(b) an officer of Revenue and Customs of a rank designated by the Commissioners for His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs as equivalent to that of a senior police officer;
(c) an immigration officer of a rank designated by the Secretary of State as equivalent to that of a senior police officer;
“senior police officer” means a police officer of at least the rank of superintendent.
(2) Paragraph 10Z7B(6)(b) (administration of crypto wallets) applies in relation to this Part as it applies in relation to Part 4BB.
Forfeiture
10Z7CA (1) This paragraph applies—
(a) while any cryptoassets are detained in pursuance of an order under paragraph 10Z7AE or 10Z7AG, or
(b) while a crypto wallet freezing order made under paragraph 10Z7BB has effect.
(2) An application for the forfeiture of some or all of the cryptoassets that are detained or held in the crypto wallet that is subject to the crypto wallet freezing order may be made—
(a) to a magistrates’ court by the Commissioners for His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs or an authorised officer, or
(b) to the sheriff by the Scottish Ministers.
(3) The court or sheriff may order the forfeiture of some or all of the cryptoassets if satisfied that the cryptoassets are terrorist cryptoassets.
(4) An order under sub-paragraph (3) made by a magistrates’ court may provide for payment under paragraph 10Z7CJ of reasonable legal expenses that a person has reasonably incurred, or may reasonably incur, in respect of—
(a) the proceedings in which the order is made, or
(b) any related proceedings under this Part.
(5) A sum in respect of a relevant item of expenditure is not payable under paragraph 10Z7CJ in pursuance of provision under sub-paragraph (4) unless—
(a) the person who applied for the order under sub-paragraph (3) agrees to its payment, or
(b) the court has assessed the amount allowed in respect of that item and the sum is paid in respect of the assessed amount.
(6) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (5)—
(a) a “relevant item of expenditure” is an item of expenditure to which regulations under section 286B of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 would apply if the order under sub-paragraph (3) had instead been a recovery order made under section 266 of that Act;
(b) an amount is “allowed” in respect of a relevant item of expenditure if it would have been allowed by those regulations;
(c) if the person who applied for the order under sub-paragraph (3) was an authorised officer, that person may not agree to the payment of a sum unless the person is a senior officer or is authorised to do so by a senior officer.
(7) Sub-paragraph (3) ceases to apply on the transfer of an application made under this paragraph in accordance with paragraph 10Z7CE.
Forfeiture: supplementary
10Z7CB (1) Sub-paragraph (2) applies where an application is made under paragraph 10Z7CA for the forfeiture of any cryptoassets detained in pursuance of an order under paragraph 10Z7AE or 10Z7AG.
(2) The cryptoassets are to continue to be detained in pursuance of the order (and may not be released under any power conferred by this Schedule) until any proceedings in pursuance of the application (including any proceedings on appeal) are concluded.
This is subject to Part 4BD (conversion to money)
(3) Where an application is made under paragraph 10Z7CA in relation to cryptoassets held in a crypto wallet that is subject to a crypto wallet freezing order—
(a) sub-paragraphs (4) and (5) apply, and
(b) the crypto wallet freezing order is to continue to have effect until the time referred to in sub-paragraph (4)(b) or (5).
(4) Where the cryptoassets are ordered to be forfeited under paragraph 10Z7CA(3) or 10Z7CE(3)—
(a) the cryptoasset service provider that administers the crypto wallet must transfer the cryptoassets into a crypto wallet nominated by an authorised officer, and
(b) immediately after the transfer has been made, the freezing order ceases to have effect.
(5) Where the application is determined or otherwise disposed of other than by the making of an order under paragraph 10Z7CA(3) or 10Z7CE(3), the crypto wallet freezing order ceases to have effect immediately after that determination or other disposal.
(6) Sub-paragraphs (4)(b) and (5) are subject to paragraph 10Z7CF and Part 4BD.
(7) The Secretary of State may by regulations made by statutory instrument amend this paragraph to make provision about the forfeiture of cryptoassets held in a crypto wallet that is subject to a crypto wallet freezing order.
(8) Regulations under sub-paragraph (7) may in particular make provision about—
(a) the process for the forfeiture of cryptoassets;
(b) the realisation of forfeited cryptoassets;
(c) the application of the proceeds of such realisation.
(9) Regulations under sub-paragraph (7) may—
(a) make different provision for different purposes;
(b) make consequential, supplementary, incidental, transitional, transitory or saving provision, including provision which makes consequential amendments to this Part.
(10) A statutory instrument containing regulations under sub-paragraph (7) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.
Associated and joint property
10Z7CC (1) Paragraphs 10Z7CD and 10Z7CE apply if—
(a) an application is made under paragraph 10Z7CA in respect of cryptoassets,
(b) the court or sheriff is satisfied that some or all of the cryptoassets are terrorist cryptoassets, and
(c) there exists property that is associated with the cryptoassets in relation to which the court or sheriff is satisfied as mentioned in paragraph (b).
(2) Paragraphs 10Z7CD and 10Z7CE also apply in England and Wales and Northern Ireland if—
(a) an application is made under paragraph 10Z7CA in respect of cryptoassets,
(b) the court is satisfied that some or all of the cryptoassets are earmarked as terrorist property, and
(c) the cryptoassets in relation to which the court is satisfied as mentioned in paragraph (b) belong to joint tenants and one of the tenants is an excepted joint owner.
(3) In this paragraph and paragraphs 10Z7CD and 10Z7CE, “associated property” means property of any of the following descriptions that is not itself the forfeitable property—
(a) any interest in the forfeitable property;
(b) any other interest in the property in which the forfeitable property subsists;
(c) if the forfeitable property is part of a larger property, but not a separate part, the remainder of that property.
References to property being associated with forfeitable property are to be read accordingly.
(4) In this paragraph and paragraphs 10Z7CD and 10Z7CE, the “forfeitable property” means the cryptoassets in relation to which the court or sheriff is satisfied as mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(b) or (2)(b) (as the case may be).
(5) For the purposes of this paragraph and paragraphs 10Z7CD and 10Z7CE—
(a) an excepted joint owner is a joint tenant who obtained the property in circumstances in which it would not (as against them) be earmarked, and
(b) references to the excepted joint owner’s share of property are to so much of the property as would have been theirs if the joint tenancy had been severed.
Agreements about associated and joint property
10Z7CD (1) Where—
(a) this paragraph applies, and
(b) the person who applied for the order under paragraph 10Z7CA (on the one hand) and the person who holds the associated property or who is the excepted joint owner (on the other hand) agree,
the magistrates’ court or sheriff may, instead of making an order under paragraph 10Z7CA(3), make an order requiring the person who holds the associated property or who is the excepted joint owner to make a payment to a person identified in the order.
(2) The amount of the payment is (subject to sub-paragraph (3)) to be the amount which the persons referred to in sub-paragraph (1)(b) agree represents—
(a) in a case where this paragraph applies by virtue of paragraph 10Z7CC(1), the value of the forfeitable property;
(b) in a case where this paragraph applies by virtue of paragraph 10Z7CC(2), the value of the forfeitable property less the value of the excepted joint owner’s share.
(3) The amount of the payment may be reduced if the person who applied for the order under paragraph 10Z7CA agrees that the other party to the agreement has suffered loss as a result of—
(a) the seizure of the forfeitable property under paragraph 10Z7AD and its subsequent detention, or
(b) the making of a crypto wallet freezing order under paragraph 10Z7BB.
(4) The reduction that is permissible by virtue of sub-paragraph (3) is such amount as the parties to the agreement agree is reasonable, having regard to the loss suffered and any other relevant circumstances.
(5) An order under sub-paragraph (1) may, so far as required for giving effect to the agreement, include provision for vesting, creating or extinguishing any interest in property.
(6) An order under sub-paragraph (1) made by a magistrates’ court may provide for payment under sub-paragraph (11) of reasonable legal expenses that a person has reasonably incurred, or may reasonably incur, in respect of—
(a) the proceedings in which the order is made, or
(b) any related proceedings under this Part.
(7) A sum in respect of a relevant item of expenditure is not payable under sub-paragraph (11) in pursuance of provision under sub-paragraph (6) unless—
(a) the person who applied for the order under paragraph 10Z7CA agrees to its payment, or
(b) the court has assessed the amount allowed in respect of that item and the sum is paid in respect of the assessed amount.
(8) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (7)—
(a) a “relevant item of expenditure” is an item of expenditure to which regulations under section 286B of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 would apply if the order under sub-paragraph (1) had instead been a recovery order made under section 266 of that Act;
(b) an amount is “allowed” in respect of a relevant item of expenditure if it would have been allowed by those regulations.
(9) If there is more than one item of associated property or more than one excepted joint owner, the total amount to be paid under sub-paragraph (1), and the part of that amount which is to be provided by each person who holds any such associated property or who is an excepted joint owner, is to be agreed between both (or all) of them and the person who applied for the order under paragraph 10Z7CA.
(10) If the person who applied for the order under paragraph 10Z7CA was an authorised officer, that person may enter into an agreement for the purposes of any provision of this paragraph only if the person is a senior officer or is authorised to do so by a senior officer.
(11) An amount received under an order under sub-paragraph (1) must be applied as follows—
(a) first, it must be applied in making any payment of legal expenses which, after giving effect to sub-paragraph (7), are payable under this sub-paragraph in pursuance of provision under sub-paragraph (6);
(b) second, it must be applied in payment or reimbursement of any reasonable costs incurred in storing or insuring the forfeitable property and any associated property whilst detained under this Schedule;
(c) third, it must be paid—
(i) if the order was made by a magistrates’ court, into the Consolidated Fund;
(ii) if the order was made by the sheriff, into the Scottish Consolidated Fund.
Associated and joint property: default of agreement
10Z7CE (1) Where this paragraph applies and there is no agreement under paragraph 10Z7CD, the magistrates’ court or sheriff may transfer the application made under paragraph 10Z7CA to the appropriate court.
(2) The “appropriate court” is—
(a) the High Court, where the application under paragraph 10Z7CA was made to a magistrates’ court;
(b) the Court of Session, where the application under paragraph 10Z7CA was made to the sheriff.
(3) Where (under sub-paragraph (1)) an application made under paragraph 10Z7CA is transferred to the appropriate court, the appropriate court may order the forfeiture of the property to which the application relates, or any part of that property, if satisfied that what is to be forfeited—
(a) is within subsection (1)(a) or (b) of section 1, or
(b) is property earmarked as terrorist property.
(4) An order under sub-paragraph (3) made by the High Court may include provision of the type that may be included in an order under paragraph 10Z7CA(3) made by a magistrates’ court by virtue of paragraph 10Z7CA(4).
(5) If provision is included in an order of the High Court by virtue of sub-paragraph (4) of this paragraph, paragraph 10Z7CA(5) and (6) apply with the necessary modifications.
(6) The appropriate court may, as well as making an order under sub-paragraph (3), make an order—
(a) providing for the forfeiture of the associated property or (as the case may be) for the excepted joint owner‘s interest to be extinguished, or
(b) providing for the excepted joint owner‘s interest to be severed.
(7) Where (under sub-paragraph (1)) the magistrates’ court or sheriff decides not to transfer an application made under paragraph 10Z7CA to the appropriate court, the magistrates’ court or sheriff may, as well as making an order under paragraph 10Z7CA(3), make an order—
(a) providing for the forfeiture of the associated property or (as the case may be) for the excepted joint owner‘s interest to be extinguished, or
(b) providing for the excepted joint owner‘s interest to be severed.
(8) An order under sub-paragraph (6) or (7) may be made only if the appropriate court, the magistrates’ court or the sheriff (as the case may be) thinks it just and equitable to do so.
(9) An order under sub-paragraph (6) or (7) must provide for the payment of an amount to the person who holds the associated property or who is an excepted joint owner.
(10) In making an order under sub-paragraph (6) or (7), and including provision in it by virtue of sub-paragraph (9), the appropriate court, the magistrates’ court or the sheriff (as the case may be) must have regard to—
(a) the rights of any person who holds the associated property or who is an excepted joint owner and the value to that person of that property or (as the case may be) of that person’s share (including any value that cannot be assessed in terms of money), and
(b) the interest of the person who applied for the order under paragraph 10Z7CA in realising the value of the forfeitable property.
(11) If the appropriate court, the magistrates’ court or the sheriff (as the case may be) is satisfied that—
(a) the person who holds the associated property or who is an excepted joint owner has suffered loss as a result of—
(i) the seizure of the forfeitable property under paragraph 10Z7AD and its subsequent detention, or
(ii) the making of the crypto wallet freezing order under paragraph 10Z7BB, and
(b) the circumstances are exceptional,
an order under sub-paragraph (6) or (7) may require the payment of compensation to that person.
(12) The amount of compensation to be paid by virtue of sub-paragraph (11) is the amount the appropriate court, the magistrates’ court or the sheriff (as the case may be) thinks reasonable, having regard to the loss suffered and any other relevant circumstances.
(13) Compensation to be paid by virtue of sub-paragraph (11) is to be paid in the same way that compensation is to be paid under paragraph 10Z7CM.
Continuation of crypto wallet freezing order pending appeal
10Z7CF (1) This paragraph applies where, on an application under paragraph 10Z7CA in relation to a crypto wallet to which a crypto wallet freezing order applies—
(a) the magistrates’ court or sheriff decides—
(i) to make an order under paragraph 10Z7CA(3) in relation to some but not all of the cryptoassets to which the application related, or
(ii) not to make an order under paragraph 10Z7CA(3), or
(b) if the application is transferred in accordance with paragraph 10Z7CE(1), the High Court or Court of Session decides—
(i) to make an order under paragraph 10Z7CE(3) in relation to some but not all of the cryptoassets to which the application related, or
(ii) not to make an order under paragraph 10Z7CE(3).
(2) The person who made the application under paragraph 10Z7CA may apply without notice to the court or sheriff that made the decision referred to in sub-paragraph (1) for an order that the crypto wallet freezing order is to continue to have effect.
(3) Where the court or sheriff makes an order under sub-paragraph (2) the crypto wallet freezing order is to continue to have effect until—
(a) the end of the period of 48 hours starting with the making of the order under sub-paragraph (2), or
(b) if within that period of 48 hours an appeal is brought (whether under paragraph 10Z7CG or otherwise) against the decision referred to in sub-paragraph (1), the time when the appeal is determined or otherwise disposed of.
(4) Sub-paragraph (3) of paragraph 10Z7AF applies for the purposes of sub-paragraph (3) as it applies for the purposes of that paragraph.
Paragraphs 10Z7CA to 10Z7CE: appeals
10Z7CG (1) Any party to proceedings for an order for the forfeiture of cryptoassets under paragraph 10Z7CA may appeal against—
(a) the making of an order under paragraph 10Z7CA;
(b) the making of an order under paragraph 10Z7CE(7);
(c) a decision not to make an order under paragraph 10Z7CA unless the reason that no order was made is that an order was instead made under paragraph 10Z7CD;
(d) a decision not to make an order under paragraph 10Z7CE(7).
Paragraphs (c) and (d) do not apply if the application for the order under paragraph 10Z7CA was transferred in accordance with paragraph 10Z7CE(1).
(2) Where an order under paragraph 10Z7CD is made by a magistrates’ court, any party to the proceedings for the order (including any party to the proceedings under paragraph 10Z7CA that preceded the making of the order) may appeal against a decision to include, or not to include, provision in the order under paragraph 10Z7CD(6).
(3) An appeal under this paragraph lies—
(a) in relation to England and Wales, to the Crown Court;
(b) in relation to Scotland, to the Sheriff Appeal Court;
(c) in relation to Northern Ireland, to a county court.
(4) An appeal under this paragraph must be made before the end of the period of 30 days starting with the day on which the court or sheriff makes the order or decision.
(5) Sub-paragraph (4) is subject to paragraph 10Z7CH.
(6) The court hearing the appeal may make any order it thinks appropriate.
(7) If the court upholds an appeal against an order forfeiting any cryptoasset or other item of property, it may, subject to sub-paragraph (8), order the release of the whole or any part of the property.
(8) If (in the United Kingdom or elsewhere) proceedings are started against any person for an offence with which the property is connected, the property is not to be released under this paragraph (and so is to continue to be detained) until the proceedings are concluded.
Extended time for appealing in certain cases where deproscription order made
10Z7CH (1) This paragraph applies where—
(a) a successful application for an order under paragraph 10Z7CA relies (wholly or partly) on the fact that an organisation is proscribed,
(b) an application under section 4 of the Terrorism Act 2000 for a deproscription order in respect of the organisation is refused by the Secretary of State,
(c) the property forfeited by the order under paragraph 10Z7CA was seized under this Schedule on or after the date of the refusal of that application,
(d) an appeal against that refusal is allowed under section 5 of the Terrorism Act 2000,
(e) a deproscription order is made accordingly, and
(f) if the order is made in reliance on section 123(5) of the Terrorism Act 2000, a resolution is passed by each House of Parliament under section 123(5)(b) of that Act.
(2) Where this paragraph applies, an appeal under paragraph 10Z7CG against the making of an order under paragraph 10Z7CA, and against the making (in addition) of any order under paragraph 10Z7CE(7), may be brought at any time before the end of the period of 30 days beginning with the date on which the deproscription order comes into force.
(3) In this paragraph a “deproscription order” means an order under section 3(3)(b) or (8) of the Terrorism Act 2000.
Realisation or destruction of forfeited cryptoassets etc
10Z7CI (1) This paragraph applies where any cryptoasset or other item of property is forfeited under this Part.
(2) An authorised officer must—
(a) realise the property, or
(b) make arrangements for its realisation.
This is subject to sub-paragraphs (3) to (5).
(3) The property is not to be realised—
(a) before the end of the period within which an appeal may be made (whether under paragraph 10Z7CG or otherwise), or
(b) if an appeal is made within that period, before the appeal is determined or otherwise disposed of.
(4) The realisation of property under sub-paragraph (2) must be carried out, so far as practicable, in the manner best calculated to maximise the amount obtained for the property.
(5) Where an authorised officer is satisfied that—
(a) it is not reasonably practicable to realise any cryptoasset, or
(b) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the realisation of any cryptoasset would be contrary to the public interest,
the authorised officer may destroy the cryptoasset.
(6) But—
(a) the authorised officer may destroy the cryptoasset only if the officer is a senior officer or is authorised to do so by a senior officer, and
(b) the cryptoasset is not to be destroyed—
(i) before the end of the period within which an appeal may be made (whether under paragraph 10Z7CG or otherwise), or
(ii) if an appeal is made within that period, before the appeal is determined or otherwise disposed of.
(7) The question of whether the realisation of the cryptoasset would be contrary to the public interest is to be determined with particular reference to how likely it is that the entry of the cryptoasset into general circulation would facilitate criminal conduct by any person.
Proceeds of realisation
10Z7CJ (1) This paragraph applies where any cryptoasset or other item of property is realised under paragraph 10Z7CI.
(2) The proceeds of the realisation must be applied as follows—
(a) first, they must be applied in making any payment required to be made by virtue of paragraph 10Z7CE(9);
(b) second, they must be applied in making any payment of legal expenses which, after giving effect to paragraph 10Z7CA(5) (including as applied by paragraph 10Z7CE(5)), are payable under this sub-paragraph in pursuance of provision under paragraph 10Z7CA(4) or, as the case may be, 10Z7CE(4);
(c) third, they must be applied in payment or reimbursement of any reasonable costs incurred in storing or insuring the property whilst detained under this Schedule and in realising the property;
(d) fourth, they must be paid—
(i) if the property was forfeited by a magistrates’ court or the High Court, into the Consolidated Fund;
(ii) if the property was forfeited by the sheriff or the Court of Session, into the Scottish Consolidated Fund.
(3) If what is realised under paragraph 10Z7CI represents part only of an item of property, the reference in sub-paragraph (2)(c) to costs incurred in storing or insuring the property is to be read as a reference to costs incurred in storing or insuring the whole of the property.
Victims etc: detained cryptoassets
10Z7CK (1) A person who claims that any cryptoassets detained under this Schedule belong to the person may apply for some or all of the cryptoassets to be released.
(2) An application under sub-paragraph (1) is to be made—
(a) in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, to a magistrates’ court;
(b) in Scotland, to the sheriff.
(3) The application may be made in the course of proceedings under paragraph 10Z7AG or 10Z7CA or at any other time.
(4) The court or sheriff may, subject to sub-paragraph (8), order the cryptoassets to which the application relates to be released to the applicant if it appears to the court or sheriff that—
(a) the applicant was deprived of the cryptoassets to which the application relates, or of property which they represent, by criminal conduct,
(b) the cryptoassets the applicant was deprived of were not, immediately before the applicant was deprived of them, property obtained by or in return for criminal conduct and nor did they then represent such property, and
(c) the cryptoassets belong to the applicant.
(5) If sub-paragraph (6) applies, the court or sheriff may, subject to sub-paragraph (8), order the cryptoassets to which the application relates to be released to the applicant or to the person from whom they were seized.
(6) This sub-paragraph applies where—
(a) the applicant is not the person from whom the cryptoassets to which the application relates were seized,
(b) it appears to the court or sheriff that those cryptoassets belong to the applicant,
(c) the court or sheriff is satisfied that the release condition is met in relation to those cryptoassets, and
(d) no objection to the making of an order under sub-paragraph (5) has been made by the person from whom those cryptoassets were seized.
(7) The release condition is met—
(a) if the conditions in Part 4BA for the detention of the cryptoassets are no longer met, or
(b) in relation to cryptoassets which are subject to an application for forfeiture under paragraph 10Z7CA, if the court or sheriff decides not to make an order under that paragraph in relation to the cryptoassets.
(8) If (in the United Kingdom or elsewhere) proceedings are started against any person for an offence with which the cryptoassets are connected, the cryptoassets are not to be released under this paragraph (and so are to continue to be detained) until the proceedings are concluded.
Victims etc: crypto wallet freezing orders
10Z7CL (1) A person who claims that any cryptoassets held in a crypto wallet in respect of which a crypto wallet freezing order has been made belong to the person may apply for some or all of the cryptoassets to be released.
(2) An application under sub-paragraph (1) is to be made—
(a) in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, to a magistrates’ court;
(b) in Scotland, to the sheriff.
(3) The application may be made in the course of proceedings under paragraph 10Z7BB or 10Z7CA or at any other time.
(4) The court or sheriff may, subject to sub-paragraph (8), order the cryptoassets to which the application relates to be released to the applicant if it appears to the court or sheriff that—
(a) the applicant was deprived of the cryptoassets to which the application relates, or of property which they represent, by criminal conduct,
(b) the cryptoassets the applicant was deprived of were not, immediately before the applicant was deprived of them, property obtained by or in return for criminal conduct and nor did they then represent such property, and
(c) the cryptoassets belong to the applicant.
(5) If sub-paragraph (6) applies, the court or sheriff may, subject to sub-paragraph (8), order the cryptoassets to which the application relates to be released to the applicant.
(6) This sub-paragraph applies where—
(a) the applicant is not the person from whom the cryptoassets to which the application relates were seized,
(b) it appears to the court or sheriff that those cryptoassets belong to the applicant,
(c) the court or sheriff is satisfied that the release condition is met in relation to those cryptoassets, and
(d) no objection to the making of an order under sub-paragraph (5) has been made by the person from whom those cryptoassets were seized.
(7) The release condition is met—
(a) if the conditions for the making of the crypto wallet freezing order are no longer met in relation to the cryptoassets to which the application relates, or
(b) in relation to cryptoassets held in a crypto wallet subject to a crypto wallet freezing order which are subject to an application for forfeiture under paragraph 10Z7CA, if the court or sheriff decides not to make an order under that paragraph in relation to the cryptoassets.
(8) Cryptoassets are not to be released under this paragraph—
(a) if an application for their forfeiture under paragraph 10Z7CA is made, until any proceedings in pursuance of the application (including any proceedings on appeal) are concluded;
(b) if (in the United Kingdom or elsewhere) proceedings are started against any person for an offence with which the cryptoassets are connected, until the proceedings are concluded.
(9) In relation to cryptoassets held in a crypto wallet that is subject to a crypto wallet freezing order, references in this paragraph to a person from whom cryptoassets were seized include a reference to a person by or for whom the crypto wallet was administered immediately before the crypto wallet freezing order was made.
Compensation
10Z7CM (1) This paragraph applies if no order is made under paragraph 10Z7CA, 10Z7CD or 10Z7CE in respect of cryptoassets detained under this Schedule or held in a crypto wallet that is subject to a crypto wallet freezing order under paragraph 10Z7BB.
(2) Where this paragraph applies, the following may make an application to the relevant court for compensation—
(a) a person to whom the cryptoassets belong or from whom they were seized;
(b) a person by or for whom a crypto wallet to which the crypto wallet freezing order applies is administered.
(3) If the relevant court is satisfied that the applicant has suffered loss as a result of the detention of the cryptoassets or the making of the crypto wallet freezing order and that the circumstances are exceptional, the relevant court may order compensation to be paid to the applicant.
(4) The amount of compensation to be paid is the amount the relevant court thinks reasonable, having regard to the loss suffered and any other relevant circumstances.
(5) If the cryptoassets were seized, or the crypto wallet freezing order was applied for, by an officer of Revenue and Customs, the compensation is to be paid by the Commissioners for His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs.
(6) If the cryptoassets were seized, or the crypto wallet freezing order was applied for, by a constable, the compensation is to be paid as follows—
(a) in the case of a constable of a police force in England and Wales, it is to be paid out of the police fund from which the expenses of the police force are met;
(b) in the case of a constable of the Police Service of Scotland, it is to be paid by the Scottish Police Authority;
(c) in the case of a police officer within the meaning of the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000, it is to be paid out of money provided by the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland.
(7) If the cryptoassets were seized, or the crypto wallet freezing order was applied for, by a counter-terrorism financial investigator, the compensation is to be paid as follows—
(a) in the case of a counter-terrorism financial investigator who was—
(i) a member of the civilian staff of a police force (including the metropolitan police force), within the meaning of Part 1 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, or
(ii) a member of staff of the City of London police force,
it is to be paid out of the police fund from which the expenses of the police force are met;
(b) in the case of a counter-terrorism financial investigator who was a member of staff of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, it is to be paid out of money provided by the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland.
(8) If the cryptoassets were seized, or the crypto wallet freezing order was applied for, by an immigration officer, the compensation is to be paid by the Secretary of State.
(9) If an order under paragraph 10Z7BB, 10Z7CA, 10Z7CD or 10Z7CE is made in respect of some of the cryptoassets detained or held, this paragraph has effect in relation to the remainder.
(10) This paragraph does not apply if the relevant court makes an order under paragraph 10Z7CK or 10Z7CL.
(11) In this paragraph “relevant court” means—
(a) in England and Wales and Northern Ireland, a magistrates’ court;
(b) in Scotland, the sheriff.
Part 4BD
Conversion of cryptoassets
Interpretation
10Z7D (1) In this Part—
“converted cryptoassets” is to be read in accordance with paragraphs 10Z7DC and 10Z7DD;
“crypto wallet freezing order” has the same meaning as in Part 4BB (see paragraph 10Z7B(6));
“relevant court” means—
(a) in England and Wales and Northern Ireland, a magistrates’ court;
(b) in Scotland, the sheriff;
“relevant financial institution” has the same meaning as in Part 4B (see paragraph 10Q);
“UK-connected cryptoasset service provider” has the same meaning as in Part 4BB (see paragraph 10Z7B(7)).
(2) Paragraph 10Z7B(6)(b) (administration of crypto wallets) applies in relation to this Part as it applies in relation to Part 4BB.
(3) In this Part references to the conversion of cryptoassets into money are references to the conversion of cryptoassets into—
(a) cash, or
(b) money held in an account maintained with a relevant financial institution.
(4) For the purposes of Parts 2 to 4, converted cryptoassets detained under this Part are not to be treated as cash detained under this Schedule.
Detained cryptoassets: conversion
10Z7DA (1) Sub-paragraph (2) applies while any cryptoassets are detained in pursuance of an order under paragraph 10Z7AE or 10Z7AG (including where cryptoassets are subject to forfeiture proceedings).
(2) A person within sub-paragraph (3) may apply to the relevant court for an order requiring all of the cryptoassets detained pursuant to the order to be converted into money.
(3) The following persons are within this sub-paragraph—
(a) an authorised officer;
(b) a person from whom the cryptoassets were seized.
(4) In deciding whether to make an order under this paragraph, the court must have regard to whether the cryptoassets (as a whole) are likely to suffer a significant loss in value during the period before they are released or forfeited (including the period during which an appeal against an order for forfeiture may be made).
(5) Before making an order under this paragraph the court must give an opportunity to be heard to—
(a) the parties to the proceedings, and
(b) any other person who may be affected by its decision.
(6) As soon as practicable after an order is made under this paragraph, an authorised officer must convert the cryptoassets, or arrange for the cryptoassets to be converted, into money.
(7) The conversion of cryptoassets under sub-paragraph (6) must be carried out, so far as practicable, in the manner best calculated to maximise the amount of money obtained for the cryptoassets.
(8) At the first opportunity after the cryptoassets are converted, the authorised officer must arrange for the amount of money obtained for the cryptoassets to be paid into an interest-bearing account and held there.
(9) Interest accruing on the amount is to be added to it on its forfeiture or release.
(10) Where cryptoassets are converted into money in accordance with an order made under this paragraph—
(a) the cryptoassets are no longer to be treated as being detained in pursuance of an order under paragraph 10Z7AE or 10Z7AG, and
(b) any application made under paragraph 10Z7CA(2) in relation to the cryptoassets which has not yet been determined or otherwise disposed of (including under paragraph 10Z7CD or 10Z7CE) is to be treated as if it were an application made under paragraph 10Z7DG(2) in relation to the converted cryptoassets.
(11) An order made under this paragraph must provide for notice to be given to persons affected by the order.
(12) No appeal may be made against an order made under this paragraph.
Frozen crypto wallet: conversion
10Z7DB (1) This paragraph applies while a crypto wallet freezing order under paragraph 10Z7BB has effect (including where cryptoassets held in a crypto wallet that is subject to a crypto wallet freezing order are subject to forfeiture proceedings).
(2) A person within sub-paragraph (3) may apply to the relevant court for an order requiring all of the cryptoassets held in the crypto wallet to be converted into money.
(3) The following persons are within this sub-paragraph—
(a) an authorised officer;
(b) a person by or for whom the crypto wallet is administered.
(4) In deciding whether to make an order under this paragraph, the court must have regard to whether the cryptoassets (as a whole) are likely to suffer a significant loss in value during the period before—
(a) the crypto wallet freezing order ceases to have effect, or
(b) the cryptoassets are forfeited (including the period during which an appeal against an order for forfeiture may be made).
(5) Before making an order under this paragraph the court must give an opportunity to be heard to—
(a) the parties to the proceedings, and
(b) any other person who may be affected by its decision.
(6) As soon as practicable after an order is made under this paragraph, the UK-connected cryptoasset service provider that administers the crypto wallet must convert the cryptoassets, or arrange for the cryptoassets to be converted, into money.
(7) The conversion of cryptoassets under sub-paragraph (6) must be carried out, so far as practicable, in the manner best calculated to maximise the amount of money obtained for the cryptoassets.
(8) At the first opportunity after the cryptoassets are converted, the UK-connected cryptoasset service provider must arrange for the amount of money obtained for the cryptoassets to be paid into an interest-bearing account nominated by an authorised officer and held there.
(9) But—
(a) the UK-connected cryptoasset service provider may deduct any reasonable expenses incurred by the provider in connection with the conversion of the cryptoassets, and
(b) the amount to be treated as the proceeds of the conversion of the cryptoassets is to be reduced accordingly.
(10) Interest accruing on the amount obtained for the cryptoassets is to be added to it on its forfeiture or release.
(11) Where cryptoassets are converted in accordance with an order made under this paragraph—
(a) the crypto wallet freezing order ceases to have effect,
(b) any application made under paragraph 10Z7CA(2) in relation to the cryptoassets which has not yet been determined or otherwise disposed of (including under paragraph 10Z7CD or 10Z7CE) is to be treated as if it were an application made under paragraph 10Z7DG(2) in relation to the converted cryptoassets, and
(c) any application made under paragraph 10Z7CF(2) in relation to the crypto wallet which has not yet been determined or otherwise disposed of may not be proceeded with.
(12) An order made under this paragraph must provide for notice to be given to persons affected by the order.
(13) No appeal may be made against an order made under this paragraph.
Conversion: existing forfeiture proceedings
10Z7DC (1) Where—
(a) cryptoassets are forfeited under paragraph 10Z7CA or 10Z7CE, and
(b) before the cryptoassets are realised or destroyed in accordance with paragraph 10Z7CI, an order is made under paragraph 10Z7DA requiring the cryptoassets to be converted into money,
paragraph 10Z7DJ(1) applies in relation to the converted cryptoassets as if they had been detained under paragraph 10Z7DD and forfeited under paragraph 10Z7DG (and accordingly paragraph 10Z7CI ceases to apply).
(2) Where—
(a) cryptoassets are forfeited under paragraph 10Z7CA or 10Z7CE, and
(b) before the cryptoassets are realised or destroyed in accordance with paragraph 10Z7CI, an order is made under paragraph 10Z7DB requiring the cryptoassets to be converted into money,
paragraph 10Z7DJ(2) applies in relation to the converted cryptoassets as if they had been detained under paragraph 10Z7DE and forfeited under paragraph 10Z7DG (and accordingly paragraph 10Z7CI ceases to apply).
(3) Where—
(a) an appeal may be made under paragraph 10Z7CG(1) or (2) in relation to the determination of an application under paragraph 10Z7CA(2) for the forfeiture of cryptoassets (including where paragraph 10Z7CD or 10Z7CE applies), and
(b) an order is made under paragraph 10Z7DA or 10Z7DB requiring the cryptoassets to be converted into money,
the appeal may instead be made under paragraph 10Z7DH (within the time allowed by paragraph 10Z7CG(4)) as if it were an appeal against the determination of an application under paragraph 10Z7DG.
(4) Where—
(a) an appeal is made under paragraph 10Z7CG(1) or (2) in relation to the determination of an application under paragraph 10Z7CA(2) for the forfeiture of cryptoassets (including where paragraph 10Z7CD or 10Z7CE applies), and
(b) before the appeal is determined or otherwise disposed of, an order is made under paragraph 10Z7DA or 10Z7DB requiring the cryptoassets to be converted into money,
the appeal is to be treated as if it had been made under paragraph 10Z7DH(1) in relation to the determination of an application under paragraph 10Z7DG for the forfeiture of the converted cryptoassets.
Detained cryptoassets: detention of proceeds of conversion
10Z7DD (1) This paragraph applies where cryptoassets are converted into money in accordance with an order under paragraph 10Z7DA.
(2) The proceeds of the conversion (the “converted cryptoassets”) may be detained initially until the end of the period that the cryptoassets could, immediately before the conversion, have been detained under Part 4BA (ignoring the possibility of any extension of that period).
(3) The period for which the converted cryptoassets may be detained may be extended by an order made by the relevant court.
(4) An order under sub-paragraph (3) may not authorise the detention of the converted cryptoassets beyond the end of the period of 2 years beginning with the relevant date; but this is subject to sub-paragraph (5).
(5) The relevant court may make an order for the period of 2 years in sub-paragraph (4) to be extended to a period of up to 3 years beginning with the relevant date.
(6) In sub-paragraphs (4) and (5) “the relevant date” means the date on which the first order under paragraph 10Z7AE or 10Z7AG (as the case may be) was made in relation to the cryptoassets.
(7) An application for an order under sub-paragraph (3) or (5) may be made—
(a) in relation to England and Wales and Northern Ireland, by the Commissioners for His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs or an authorised officer;
(b) in relation to Scotland, by a procurator fiscal.
(8) The relevant court may make an order under sub-paragraph (3) only if satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the converted cryptoassets to be further detained—
(a) are within subsection (1)(a) or (b) of section 1, or
(b) are property earmarked as terrorist property.
(9) The relevant court may make an order under sub-paragraph (5) only if satisfied that a request for assistance is outstanding in relation to the cryptoassets mentioned in sub-paragraph (1).
(10) A “request for assistance” in sub-paragraph (9) means a request for assistance in obtaining evidence (including information in any form or article) in connection with the cryptoassets, made—
(a) by a judicial authority in the United Kingdom under section 7 of the Crime (International Co-operation) Act 2003, or
(b) by an authorised officer, to an authority exercising equivalent functions in a foreign country.
Frozen crypto wallets: detention of proceeds of conversion
10Z7DE (1) This paragraph applies where cryptoassets held in a crypto wallet subject to a crypto wallet freezing order are converted into money in accordance with an order under paragraph 10Z7DB.
(2) The proceeds of the conversion (the “converted cryptoassets”) may be detained initially until the end of the period that the crypto wallet freezing order was, immediately before the conversion, due to have effect under Part 4BB (ignoring the possibility of any extension of that period).
(3) The period for which the converted cryptoassets may be detained may be extended by an order made by the relevant court.
(4) An order under sub-paragraph (3) may not authorise the detention of the converted cryptoassets beyond the end of the period of 2 years beginning with the day on which the crypto wallet freezing order was made; but this is subject to sub-paragraph (5).
(5) The relevant court may make an order for the period of 2 years in sub-paragraph (4) to be extended to a period of up to 3 years beginning with the day on which the crypto wallet freezing order was made.
(6) An application for an order under sub-paragraph (3) or (5) may be made—
(a) in relation to England and Wales and Northern Ireland, by the Commissioners for His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs or an authorised officer;
(b) in relation to Scotland, by a procurator fiscal.
(7) The relevant court may make an order under sub-paragraph (3) only if satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the converted cryptoassets to be further detained—
(a) are within subsection (1)(a) or (b) of section 1, or
(b) are property earmarked as terrorist property.
(8) The relevant court may make an order under sub-paragraph (5) only if satisfied that a request for assistance is outstanding in relation to the cryptoassets mentioned in sub-paragraph (1).
(9) A “request for assistance” in sub-paragraph (8) means a request for assistance in obtaining evidence (including information in any form or article) in connection with the cryptoassets, made—
(a) by a judicial authority in the United Kingdom under section 7 of the Crime (International Co-operation) Act 2003, or
(b) by an authorised officer, to an authority exercising equivalent functions in a foreign country.
Release of detained converted cryptoassets
10Z7DF (1) This paragraph applies while any converted cryptoassets are detained under paragraph 10Z7DD or 10Z7DE.
(2) The relevant court may, subject to sub-paragraph (7), direct the release of the whole or any part of the converted cryptoassets if the following condition is met.
(3) The condition is that, on an application by the relevant person, the court is not satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the converted cryptoassets to be released—
(a) are within subsection (1)(a) or (b) of section 1, or
(b) are property earmarked as terrorist property.
(4) In sub-paragraph (3) “the relevant person” means—
(a) in the case of converted cryptoassets detained under paragraph 10Z7DD, the person from whom the cryptoassets mentioned in sub-paragraph (1) of that paragraph were seized, and
(b) in the case of converted cryptoassets detained under paragraph 10Z7DE, any person affected by the crypto wallet freezing order mentioned in sub-paragraph (1) of that paragraph.
(5) A person within sub-paragraph (6) may, subject to sub-paragraph (7) and after notifying the magistrates’ court or sheriff under whose order converted cryptoassets are being detained, release the whole or any part of the converted cryptoassets if satisfied that the detention is no longer justified.
(6) The following persons are within this sub-paragraph—
(a) in relation to England and Wales or Northern Ireland, an authorised officer;
(b) in relation to Scotland, a procurator fiscal.
(7) Converted cryptoassets are not to be released under this paragraph (and so are to continue to be detained)—
(a) if an application for their forfeiture under paragraph 10Z7DG is made, until any proceedings in pursuance of the application (including any proceedings on appeal) are concluded;
(b) if (in the United Kingdom or elsewhere) proceedings are started against any person for an offence with which the converted cryptoassets are connected, until the proceedings are concluded.
Forfeiture
10Z7DG (1) This paragraph applies while any converted cryptoassets are detained under paragraph 10Z7DD or 10Z7DE.
(2) An application for the forfeiture of some or all of the converted cryptoassets may be made—
(a) to a magistrates’ court by, the Commissioners for His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs or an authorised officer;
(b) to the sheriff, by the Scottish Ministers.
(3) The court or sheriff may order the forfeiture of some or all of the converted cryptoassets if satisfied that the converted cryptoassets to be forfeited—
(a) are within subsection (1)(a) or (b) of section 1, or
(b) are property earmarked as terrorist property.
(4) But in the case of property which belongs to joint tenants, one of whom is an excepted joint owner, the order may not apply to so much of it as the court thinks is attributable to the excepted joint owner’s share.
(5) Where an application for forfeiture is made under this paragraph, the converted cryptoassets are to continue to be detained under paragraph 10Z7DD or 10Z7DE (and may not be released under any power conferred by this Part) until any proceedings in pursuance of the application (including any proceedings on appeal) are concluded.
(6) For the purposes of this paragraph—
(a) an excepted joint owner is a joint tenant who obtained the property in circumstances in which it would not (as against them) be earmarked, and
(b) references to the excepted joint owner’s share of property are to so much of the property as would have been theirs if the joint tenancy had been severed.
Forfeiture: appeals
10Z7DH (1) Any party to proceedings for an order for the forfeiture of converted cryptoassets under paragraph 10Z7DG who is aggrieved by an order under that paragraph or by the decision of the court not to make such an order may appeal—
(a) from an order or decision of a magistrates’ court in England and Wales, to the Crown Court;
(b) from an order or decision of the sheriff, to the Sheriff Appeal Court;
(c) from an order or decision of a magistrates’ court in Northern Ireland, to a county court.
(2) An appeal under sub-paragraph (1) must be made before the end of the period of 30 days starting with the day on which the court makes the order or decision.
(3) The court hearing the appeal may make any order it thinks appropriate.
(4) If the court upholds an appeal against an order forfeiting the converted cryptoassets, it may, subject to sub-paragraph (5), order the release of some or all of the converted cryptoassets.
(5) If (in the United Kingdom or elsewhere) proceedings are started against any person for an offence with which the converted cryptoassets are connected, the converted cryptoassets are not to be released under this paragraph (and so are to continue to be detained) until the proceedings are concluded.
Extended time for appealing in certain cases where deproscription order made
10Z7DI (1) This paragraph applies where—
(a) a successful application for an order under paragraph 10Z7DG relies (wholly or partly) on the fact that an organisation is proscribed,
(b) an application under section 4 of the Terrorism Act 2000 for a deproscription order in respect of the organisation is refused by the Secretary of State,
(c) the converted cryptoassets forfeited by the order under paragraph 10Z7DG were converted from cryptoassets which were seized under this Schedule on or after the date of the refusal of that application,
(d) an appeal against that refusal is allowed under section 5 of the Terrorism Act 2000,
(e) a deproscription order is made accordingly, and
(f) if the order is made in reliance on section 123(5) of the Terrorism Act 2000, a resolution is passed by each House of Parliament under section 123(5)(b) of that Act.
(2) Where this paragraph applies, an appeal under paragraph 10Z7DH against the making of an order under paragraph 10Z7DG may be brought at any time before the end of the period of 30 days beginning with the date on which the deproscription order comes into force.
(3) In this paragraph a “deproscription order” means an order under section 3(3)(b) or (8) of the Terrorism Act 2000.
Application of forfeited converted cryptoassets
10Z7DJ (1) Converted cryptoassets detained under paragraph 10Z7DD and forfeited under paragraph 10Z7DG, and any accrued interest on them, must be applied as follows—
(a) first, they must be applied in making any payment of reasonable expenses incurred by an authorised officer in connection with the safe storage of the cryptoassets mentioned in paragraph 10Z7DD(1) during the period the cryptoassets were detained under Part 4BA;
(b) second, they must be applied in making any payment of reasonable expenses incurred by an authorised officer in connection with the conversion of those cryptoassets under paragraph 10Z7DA(6);
(c) third, they must be applied in making any payment of reasonable expenses incurred by an authorised officer in connection with the detention of the converted cryptoassets under this Part;
(d) fourth, they must be paid—
(i) if forfeited by a magistrates’ court in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, into the Consolidated Fund, and
(ii) if forfeited by the sheriff, into the Scottish Consolidated Fund.
(2) Converted cryptoassets detained under paragraph 10Z7DE and forfeited under paragraph 10Z7DG, and any accrued interest on them, must be applied as follows—
(a) first, they must be applied in making any payment of reasonable expenses incurred by an authorised officer in connection with the detention of the converted cryptoassets under this Part;
(b) second, they must be paid—
(i) if forfeited by a magistrates’ court in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, into the Consolidated Fund, and
(ii) if forfeited by the sheriff, into the Scottish Consolidated Fund.
(3) But converted cryptoassets are not to be applied or paid under sub-paragraph (1) or (2)—
(a) before the end of the period within which an appeal under paragraph 10Z7DH may be made, or
(b) if a person appeals under that paragraph, before the appeal is determined or otherwise disposed of.
Victims etc
10Z7DK (1) This paragraph applies where converted cryptoassets are detained under this Part.
(2) Where this paragraph applies, a person (“P”) who claims that the relevant cryptoassets belonged to P immediately before—
(a) the relevant cryptoassets were seized, or
(b) the crypto wallet freezing order was made in relation to the crypto wallet in which the relevant cryptoassets were held,
may apply to the relevant court for some or all of the converted cryptoassets to be released to P.
(3) The application may be made in the course of proceedings under paragraph 10Z7DD, 10Z7DE or 10Z7DG or at any other time.
(4) The relevant court may, subject to sub-paragraph (9), order the converted cryptoassets to which the application relates to be released to the applicant if it appears to the relevant court that the condition in sub-paragraph (5) is met.
(5) The condition in this sub-paragraph is that—
(a) the applicant was deprived of the relevant cryptoassets, or of property which they represent, by criminal conduct,
(b) the relevant cryptoassets the applicant was deprived of were not, immediately before the applicant was deprived of them, property obtained by or in return for criminal conduct and nor did they then represent such property, and
(c) the relevant cryptoassets belonged to the applicant immediately before—
(i) the relevant cryptoassets were seized, or
(ii) the crypto wallet freezing order was made in relation to the crypto wallet in which the relevant cryptoassets were held.
(6) If sub-paragraph (7) applies, the relevant court may, subject to sub-paragraph (9), order the converted cryptoassets to which the application relates to be released to the applicant or to the person from whom the relevant cryptoassets were seized.
(7) This sub-paragraph applies where—
(a) the applicant is not the person from whom the relevant cryptoassets were seized,
(b) it appears to the relevant court that the relevant cryptoassets belonged to the applicant immediately before—
(i) the relevant cryptoassets were seized, or
(ii) the crypto wallet freezing order was made in relation to the crypto wallet in which the relevant cryptoassets were held,
(c) the relevant court is satisfied that the release condition is met in relation to the converted cryptoassets, and
(d) no objection to the making of an order under sub-paragraph (6) has been made by the person from whom the relevant cryptoassets were seized.
(8) The release condition is met—
(a) if the conditions in this Part for the detention of the converted cryptoassets are no longer met, or
(b) in relation to converted cryptoassets which are subject to an application for forfeiture under paragraph 10Z7DG, if the court or sheriff decides not to make an order under that paragraph in relation to the converted cryptoassets.
(9) If (in the United Kingdom or elsewhere) proceedings are started against any person for an offence with which the converted cryptoassets are connected, the converted cryptoassets are not to be released under this paragraph (and so are to continue to be detained) until the proceedings are concluded.
(10) Where sub-paragraph (2)(b) applies, references in this paragraph to a person from whom relevant cryptoassets were seized include a reference to a person by or for whom the crypto wallet mentioned in that provision was administered immediately before the crypto wallet freezing order was made in relation to the crypto wallet.
(11) In this paragraph “the relevant cryptoassets” means—
(a) in relation to converted cryptoassets detained under paragraph 10Z7DD, some or all of the cryptoassets mentioned in sub-paragraph (1) of that paragraph, and
(b) in relation to converted cryptoassets detained under paragraph 10Z7DE, some or all of the cryptoassets mentioned in sub-paragraph (1) of that paragraph.
Compensation
10Z7DL (1) This paragraph applies if no order is made under paragraph 10Z7DG in respect of converted cryptoassets detained under this Part.
(2) Where this paragraph applies, the following may make an application to the relevant court for compensation—
(a) a person to whom the relevant cryptoassets belonged immediately before they were seized;
(b) a person from whom the relevant cryptoassets were seized;
(c) a person by or for whom the crypto wallet mentioned in paragraph 10Z7DE(1) was administered immediately before the crypto wallet freezing order was made in relation to the crypto wallet.
(3) If the relevant court is satisfied that—
(a) the applicant has suffered loss as a result of—
(i) the conversion of the relevant cryptoassets into money, or
(ii) the detention of the converted cryptoassets, and
(b) the circumstances are exceptional,
the relevant court may order compensation to be paid to the applicant.
(4) The amount of compensation to be paid is the amount the relevant court thinks reasonable, having regard to the loss suffered and any other relevant circumstances.
(5) If the relevant cryptoassets were seized, or the relevant crypto wallet freezing order was applied for, by an officer of Revenue and Customs, the compensation is to be paid by the Commissioners for His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs.
(6) If the relevant cryptoassets were seized, or the relevant crypto wallet freezing order was applied for, by a constable, the compensation is to be paid as follows—
(a) in the case of a constable of a police force in England and Wales, it is to be paid out of the police fund from which the expenses of the police force are met;
(b) in the case of a constable of the Police Service of Scotland, it is to be paid by the Scottish Police Authority;
(c) in the case of a police officer within the meaning of the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000, it is to be paid out of money provided by the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland.
(7) If the relevant cryptoassets were seized, or the relevant crypto wallet freezing order was applied for, by a counter-terrorism financial investigator, the compensation is to be paid as follows—
(a) in the case of a counter-terrorism financial investigator who was—
(i) a member of the civilian staff of a police force (including the metropolitan police force), within the meaning of Part 1 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, or
(ii) a member of staff of the City of London police force,
it is to be paid out of the police fund from which the expenses of the police force are met;
(b) in the case of a counter-terrorism financial investigator who was a member of staff of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, it is to be paid out of money provided by the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland.
(8) If the relevant cryptoassets were seized, or the relevant crypto wallet freezing order was applied for, by an immigration officer, the compensation is to be paid by the Secretary of State.
(9) This paragraph does not apply if the relevant court makes an order under paragraph 10Z7DK.
(10) In this paragraph—
“the relevant cryptoassets” means—
(a) in relation to converted cryptoassets detained under paragraph 10Z7DD, the cryptoassets mentioned in sub-paragraph (1) of that paragraph;
(b) in relation to converted cryptoassets detained under paragraph 10Z7DE, the cryptoassets mentioned in sub-paragraph (1) of that paragraph;
“the relevant crypto wallet freezing order”, in relation to converted cryptoassets detained under paragraph 10Z7DE, means the crypto wallet freezing order mentioned in sub-paragraph (1) of that paragraph.”
3 In Part 1, in paragraph 1(1) (terrorist cash), for “and 4B” substitute “to 4BD”.
4 In Part 4B (forfeiture of terrorist money held in bank and building society accounts), after paragraph 10Z6 insert—
“Victims etc
10Z6A (1) A person who claims that money in respect of which an account freezing order has been made belongs to them may apply to the relevant court for the money to be released.
(2) The application may be made in the course of proceedings under paragraph 10S or 10Z2 or at any other time.
(3) The court may, subject to sub-paragraph (7), order the money to which the application relates to be released to the applicant if it appears to the court that—
(a) the applicant was deprived of the money to which the application relates, or of property which it represents, by criminal conduct,
(b) the money the applicant was deprived of was not, immediately before the applicant was deprived of it, property obtained by or in return for criminal conduct and nor did it then represent such property, and
(c) the money belongs to the applicant.
(4) If sub-paragraph (5) applies, the court may, subject to sub-paragraph (7), order the money to which the application relates to be released to the applicant.
(5) This sub-paragraph applies where—
(a) the applicant is not the person from whom the money to which the application relates was seized,
(b) it appears to the court that the money belongs to the applicant,
(c) the court is satisfied that the release condition is met in relation to the money, and
(d) no objection to the making of an order under sub-paragraph (4) has been made by the person from whom the money was seized.
(6) The release condition is met—
(a) in relation to money held in a frozen account, if the conditions for making an order under paragraph 10S in relation to the money are no longer met, or
(b) in relation to money held in a frozen account which is subject to an application for forfeiture under paragraph 10Z2, if the court or sheriff decides not to make an order under that paragraph in relation to the money.
(7) Money is not to be released under this paragraph—
(a) if an account forfeiture notice under paragraph 10W is given in respect of the money, until any proceedings in pursuance of the notice (including any proceedings on appeal) are concluded;
(b) if an application for its forfeiture under paragraph 10Z2, is made, until any proceedings in pursuance of the application (including any proceedings on appeal) are concluded;
(c) if (in the United Kingdom or elsewhere) proceedings are started against any person for an offence with which the cash is connected, until the proceedings are concluded.
(8) In relation to money held in an account that is subject to an account freezing order, references in this paragraph to a person from whom money was seized include a reference to a person by or for whom the account was operated immediately before the account freezing order was made.”
5 In Part 6, in paragraph 19(1), at the appropriate places insert—
““cryptoasset” has the meaning given by paragraph 10Z7A(1);”;
““crypto wallet” has the meaning given by paragraph 10Z7A(1);”;
““justice of the peace”, in relation to Northern Ireland, means lay magistrate;”;
““terrorist cryptoasset” has the meaning given by paragraph 10Z7A(1);”.
Part 2
Amendments to the Terrorism Act 2000
6 The Terrorism Act 2000 is amended as follows.
7 In Schedule 6 (financial information)—
(a) in paragraph 6(1) (meaning of financial institution)—
(i) omit the “and” after paragraph (ha), and
(ii) after paragraph (i) insert—
(b) after sub-paragraph (1AA) insert—
“(1AB) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1)(j), “cryptoasset exchange provider” means a firm or sole practitioner who by way of business provides one or more of the following services, including where the firm or sole practitioner does so as creator or issuer of any of the cryptoassets involved—
(a) exchanging or arranging or making arrangements with a view to the exchange of, cryptoassets for money or money for cryptoassets,
(b) exchanging, or arranging or making arrangements with a view to the exchange of, one cryptoasset for another, or
(c) operating a machine which utilises automated processes to exchange cryptoassets for money or money for cryptoassets.
(1AC) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1)(k), “custodian wallet provider” means a firm or sole practitioner who by way of business provides services to safeguard, or to safeguard and administer—
(a) cryptoassets on behalf of its customers, or
(b) private cryptographic keys on behalf of its customers in order to hold, store and transfer cryptoassets.
(1AD) For the purposes of sub-paragraphs (1AB) and (1AC), “cryptoasset” means a cryptographically secured digital representation of value or contractual rights that uses a form of distributed ledger technology and can be transferred, stored or traded electronically.
(1AE) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1AB)—
(a) “cryptoasset” includes a right to, or interest in, the cryptoasset;
(b) “money” means—
(i) money in sterling,
(ii) money in any other currency, or
(iii) money in any other medium of exchange,
but does not include a cryptoasset.
(1AF) The Secretary of State may by regulations amend the definitions in sub-paragraphs (1AB) to (1AE).”
8 In section 123 (orders and regulations), after subsection (6ZE) insert—
“(6ZF) Regulations under paragraph 6(1AF) of Schedule 6 may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”’—(Tom Tugendhat.)
Part 1 of this Schedule amends the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 to make provision for a civil recovery regime in relation to terrorist cryptoassets. Part 2 of this Schedule amends the Terrorism Act 2000 to make provision about financial institutions and cryptoassets.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
Bill, as amended, to be reported.
(2 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause is designed to ensure disclosure of information relating to bank accounts held by subscribers to a memorandum of association. Like many of the amendments that the Opposition have proposed, it is aimed at tightening up loopholes, making things just that wee bit more transparent, and flagging up any issues to Companies House. The issue of bank accounts and people carrying on business at a particular address in the UK has been discussed previously. Adding a bank account to that, so that one can go, “This is a bank account. This bank account is held in the UK,” and one can find that account quite easily as a result, seems to be a sensible way to close down yet another loophole in the Bill. It will continue the jurisdiction of the issuing bank of each account, which goes to some of the other points made about Companies House registration being used and abused as a means of setting up bank accounts in other jurisdictions. People were abusing the veneer of respectability afforded to them by a company registration in the UK to then set up bank accounts in other countries, which affects those other countries through the perpetration of fraud or dubious activities in those countries by those using that Companies House veneer of respectability.
The new clause would provide a bit more transparency by giving the company registrar more information, which would be useful in terms of those red flags and making it clear where companies are actually based and carrying on their business. If, for example, a company’s bank account is held in Mauritius and it claims to carry out its business in the UK, Companies House could query that and ask, “If you are really carrying on your business in the UK, why is your bank account held in Mauritius?” That would be a red flag for the registrar and would be an extra small but significant hoop that a company would have to jump through to make the situation clearer and to give Companies House a bit more reassurance that the business that is registering is indeed legitimate. It adds a helpful grip within the system, and helps Companies House to identify any red flags. I urge the Minister to consider whether this is a measure that would help Companies House in its work.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Christopher. New clause 24, tabled by SNP Members, would add to the transparency of the companies register and enhance the ability of law enforcement to identify suspect registrations. It would do so by requiring the subscribers or initial shareholders of a company to provide information on the location of any bank account held either by the individual shareholders or in the name of the company itself.
The new clause reflects an acknowledgement of the realities that have been exposed by many of the recent leaks and investigative reporting by the media of the widespread criminal use of bank accounts registered in jurisdictions known for exercising minimal oversight over financial activity and for lax controls on money laundering offences. Given that the entire point of the Bill is to clamp down on the ability of criminals to exploit gaps in laws and regulatory approaches to economic crime across different countries, the Opposition sincerely hope that the Government welcome proposals that are intended to provide law enforcement with as much information as possible to facilitate the detection of economic crime. Requiring Companies House to record information on the location of relevant individuals’ bank accounts seems like an eminently reasonable measure that could make a valuable contribution to the fight against economic crime.
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Sir Christopher. I thank the hon. Member for Glasgow Central for the new clause, which raises an interesting point. I have concerns about the privacy issues involved in putting this information in the public domain, and I wonder whether she has considered that. We are potentially talking about personal bank accounts rather than company bank accounts.
A similar proposal to require the disclosure of bank account information relating to companies was included in the 2019 corporate transparency and register reform consultation, as the hon. Member mentioned. Respondents did not on balance support the proposal and the Government subsequently agreed that the proposal did not offer sufficient benefits to justify the additional burden being imposed on companies. There is also concern that there would be practical difficulties with implementation, such as the inability to confirm information provided, or to identify where it is missing, which would reduce the effectiveness of the proposal.
There are some other measures we can use. The European Union’s fifth anti-money laundering directive required the UK to build a centralised automated mechanism, a bank account portal, designed to help law enforcement and AML supervisors to access information on the identity of holders and beneficial owners of bank accounts and safe deposit boxes. Following the UK’s exit from the EU and the agreement of the trade and co-operation agreement in January 2021, the Government reviewed the case for building the portal. At that point, law enforcement did not believe there was a strong rationale for an alternative, centralised mechanism in order to support its work and the Government concluded that we should not build a bank account portal. UK money laundering regulations have been amended to remove redundant obligations.
I would be grateful if the hon. Member withdrew her amendment, but I would like to explore the issue further, certainly as it relates to company bank accounts, so we will perhaps return to it at a later stage.
Thank you very much, Sir Christopher. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 50
Requirement for UK-resident director
‘(1) The Companies Act is amended as follows.
(2) In section 156B of the Companies Act 2006, inserted by section 87 of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, after subsection (4) insert—
“(4A) The regulations must also include provision to require all companies to have at least one director who is ordinarily resident in the UK.”’—(Stephen Kinnock.)
This new clause would amend the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 to require all companies to have at least one person who ordinarily resides in the UK as a director.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 49 sought to ensure that the provisions of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, which require company directors to be natural persons, would be brought into force. The Opposition welcomed the Minister’s commitment to introducing the necessary regulations to enact that measure in the near future, and we are very pleased to have that on the record. At the same time, however, the Opposition remain convinced that there is much more that the Government could and should be doing to reduce the risks of money laundering and economic crime within the company registration requirements. The new clauses we are about to discuss provide a number of different means by which the law could be further strengthened against the risk of such abuses.
New clause 50 would make it a requirement that every company registering in the UK has at least one director who is ordinarily resident here. I have already spoken in Committee about the risks that often come with a system that allows companies to register in places to which they have a tenuous connection in terms of actually doing business there. Although there may be certain limited circumstances in which it might be legitimate for a company with no UK-based directors to register with Companies House, I am struggling to see what they might be. On the other hand, I can think of plenty of reasons why the fact that a company has no UK-based directors might be considered a red flag for money laundering risks, calling for additional scrutiny from the registrar.
I thank the Minister for his remarks. We are talking about how to make it as easy as possible for those red flags to be clear. If we were to do exception reporting, there may, of course, be a clear explanation in certain circumstances for why there is not a single UK-based company director and perfectly legitimate reasons for that. We think that it would be better to do the exception reporting on that basis, so that we are casting the net and identifying red flag areas because of the nature of the company directors and where the risk would appear to be.
I take it from the Minister’s remarks that there is not a great deal of room for negotiation on that point. However, we are trying to put forward a sensible and pragmatic solution. Can the Minister say any more about how to look through the telescope in terms of exception reporting? We argue that exception reporting could be conducted on the basis of explaining why there is not a single UK-based company director while maintaining the blanket provision that there should always be such an individual in order to minimise risk.
That is exactly how we expect the process to operate. If there are red flags of concern—an exception report, as the hon. Gentleman calls it—the registrar can ask further questions and may deny that company the right to establish itself in the UK. I think those checks and balances are in place, and of course, as hon. Members have said, it is very important that those opportunities are used by the registrar. I am very keen to ensure that we have the opportunity to scrutinise the use of those powers.
I thank the Minister for those points. I see that we will agree to disagree on this. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 51
Registration requirements: UK-based assets held by overseas entity
‘(1) The Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022 is amended as follows.
(2) In Schedule 2—
(a) in sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 2, for “and” substitute “or”;
(b) after sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 2 insert—
(aa) is a beneficial owner of any UK-based assets held by overseas entity, and”.’—(Stephen Kinnock.)
The intention of this new clause is to broaden the scope of registration requirements for overseas entities, as set out in the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022, to include the beneficial owners of any UK-based assets owned by an overseas company, as well as the beneficial owners of the company itself.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The purpose of the new clause is to close what appears to be a loophole in the current requirements on the registration of overseas entities that own property in the UK. The case for the new clause is simple. Under the current rules, as set out primarily in the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022, a foreign company that owns property or land in the UK is required to declare the beneficial ownership of the company itself. It is, however, unclear whether it would also be required to disclose the ultimate beneficial owner of any property owned by that company.
In recent years, we have seen ample evidence of how easy it can be—
I am trying to understand the new clause. How could someone be the beneficial owner of a company and someone else own the assets? If the beneficial owners own the company, how can a different beneficial owner own the assets?
According to our interpretation, schedule 2 of the 2022 Act is unclear about whether a company would be required to disclose the ultimate beneficial owner of any property owned by that company. Our worry is that there is a loophole in the law that talks about the beneficial owner but does not give us the tools to obtain disclosure of who is the ultimate beneficial owner of the property.
In recent years, we have seen ample evidence of how easy it can be for money launderers and the enablers of economic crime to exploit any grey area, perceived or actual, in the laws that apply to them. Therefore it is essential that the law is absolutely crystal clear on that point. It is about tightening up the law as it stands.
We already know that the beneficial ownership of property and other assets is often shrouded in layer on layer of corporate secrecy. In its official guidance and examples of best practice on beneficial ownership, the Financial Action Task Force draws a distinction between the ownership of a company on the one hand and the ultimate beneficial ownership of any assets held by that company on the other. The guidance makes it clear that they are not necessarily the same thing. One of the most salient differences is that although a company can be the legal owner of a property, the ultimate beneficial owner of that property will always be a natural person, or, in layman’s terms, a human being. It is not clear whether the current legal framework for the register of overseas entities is sufficiently clear on that point.
To make a significant difference in terms of transparency, the register must require all companies to disclose the ultimate beneficial owner of any UK property under their control. It must publish that information. I would be grateful to hear the Minister’s thoughts on whether the legislation currently provides an adequate degree of clarity. If he agrees that the requirements could be made clearer, I hope that we can trust that the necessary changes will be incorporated in the Bill, or set out in regulation.
Again, I thank the hon. Gentleman for tabling the new clause. I understand what he is seeking to do, and I support him in that endeavour. I believe that the intent behind the new clause is the concern that assets other than land can be used for illicit purposes, but I am not sure that the new clause, as drafted, serves to address that.
As the hon. Gentleman knows, overseas entities are required to register beneficial owners with Companies House. Those registered as the beneficial owners of the overseas entity are the same persons as the beneficial owners that the new clause seeks to make registerable. Any assets held by the overseas entity are ultimately owned by those already required to register with Companies House.
Say an overseas entity owns a case of whisky, so we know who is the beneficial owner of that case. Who then owns the bottles of whisky in the case? It is the same owner as the one who owns the case. There is no separate owner—they either own the case of whisky, or they do not. I honestly do not think that the new clause would achieve what the hon. Gentleman wants it to achieve. If we think about yachts and other property, if we know the beneficial owner of the company, we also know the owner of the assets inside it. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw the motion.
I thank the Minister for that clarification. What rang alarm bells with us were the comments of the Financial Action Task Force, which drew the distinction between the ownership of a company and the ultimate beneficial ownership of any assets held by that company. The Minister has made his position clear, and, again, we just agree to disagree. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)
(2 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIt is a pleasure to speak with you in the Chair, Sir Christopher.
The clause amends section 15 of the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022 to align it with amendments made to section 32 during the passage of that Act and with amendments introduced by this Bill. The clause substitutes section 15 and adds proposed new sections 15A and 15B.
Proposed new section 15 restates and slightly amends the general false statement offence in section 32 of the ECTE Act to reflect changes made by the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022. Existing section 15 restricts the false statement offence to being committed when a person knowingly or recklessly makes a false statement in response to a notice. Proposed new sections 15A and 15B amend that offence to change the threshold to be met, by splitting it into two separate offences. That aligns with section 32 of the ECTE Act and amendments to that section introduced by the Bill.
Clause 137 amends section 32 of the ECTE Act on the general false statement offence. The effect of the amendment is that both the basic offence and the aggravated offence are expanded so that a false statement offence can be committed by a legal entity, and, where this is the case, by every officer of the entity in default. That maintains consistency with other legislation amended by the Bill. The penalty for committing the aggravated offence on summary conviction in England and Wales is also amended in line with the Judicial Review and Courts Act.
Clause 157 amends the Reports on Payments to Governments Regulations 2014. Those regulations require certain large businesses in the extractive industries to report annually their payments to overseas Governments associated with the extraction activities. The regulations were brought in to support accountability and to reduce space for corruption.
The Government are conducting a post-implementation review of the regulations to evaluate their impacts and effectiveness. However, in advance of that, the Government propose that the false statements offences and penalties in the regulations be updated to provide consistency with other offences, as previously outlined.
Clause 157 does not alter the requirement for any prosecutions for non-compliance with the 2014 regulations to be mounted or approved by the Attorney General or the Director of Public Prosecutions—or, in Northern Ireland, by the Secretary of State or the Northern Ireland Director of Public Prosecutions—to ensure that they are in the public interest.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Christopher. Compared with clause 135, clauses 136, 137 and 157 are more substantial. In drafting them, the Government appear to have accepted that the existing law in relation to false statement offences is too narrow to serve either as an effective deterrent or as a useful tool for law enforcement.
Clause 136 removes the requirement to prove that false information had been submitted knowingly and recklessly. That is a very high bar for prosecutors to clear, and the introduction of a broader set of criteria for these offences is therefore welcome. The changes will replace the existing false statement offence with a two-tier approach that will provide a range of options for dealing with overseas entities that either fail to provide information about beneficial ownership upon request or respond with false or misleading information.
The basic offence, which will not require evidence that a false statement had been made knowingly or recklessly, should provide a strong incentive for companies to be as rigorous as possible in ensuring that any information they provide is completely accurate. Of course, the financial penalties for such an offence will need to be set at a level sufficient to impose a significant cost on non-compliant companies. Will the Minister therefore comment on how he will ensure that penalties are set at a rate commensurate with achieving that objective?
Particularly welcome is the additional provision in clause 137 for an aggravated offence in cases where an intent to mislead can be proven, as is the extension of the changes to the reporting requirements in relation to payments to foreign Governments under clause 147. The threat of criminal convictions, with custodial sentences of up to two years, sends a strong message that fraudulent activities must not and cannot be tolerated.
Of course, in these clauses, as elsewhere in the Bill, the jury will be out on whether the changes will have any meaningful impact on economic crime until we can be sure that compliance with the law is robustly monitored and that non-compliance will be punished to the fullest extent of the law. The Committee will be grateful for any reassurances that the Minister can provide, especially on what preparations are being made to ensure that offences are identified and prosecuted as swiftly as possible, because he has repeatedly said that legislation without robust implementation is not worth the paper it is written on.
As for the level of fines, in England and Wales they can be unlimited—level 5 on the scale.
I thank the Minister for that clarification. Does he have any broader assurances around enforcement and implementation? It would be useful to get a sense of what institutional or organisational capability he envisages, and of whether that is in line with what the Bill is trying to achieve.
As the hon. Gentleman knows, as we have discussed on many occasions and as I am on the record as saying, legislation without implementation is worthless. We need to ensure that offences are discovered and then prosecuted. Of course, we must ensure that the registrar, and the law enforcement agencies they work with, have sufficient capacity and resources to do the job. The Bill does not cover that directly, but I am certainly keen to ensure that happens.
I thank the Minister for those assurances. I have no further comments.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 136 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 137 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 138
Meaning of “service address”
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 138 will improve the effectiveness of the register of overseas entities by defining “service address” so that it has the same meaning as in the Companies Act 2006. That will help those registering as overseas entities to ensure that they understand what a service address is, and that they must provide an address that meets the definition.
Clause 138 is another relatively minor change to the definition of a company’s service address, and it brings the definition used for the purposes of the overseas entities register into line with the language in the Companies Act. That language, the Committee will recall, defines a service address as a place where documents may be served to someone. We have already debated the potential problems of relying on such a definition in the context of amendments in which the Opposition sought to restrict and clarify what counts as an appropriate address for a company to register.
While we will not go back on all that and re-litigate those lengthy arguments, and while we will not oppose the clause, I put on the record that the Opposition do not believe that the Bill goes as far as it could and should have to prevent the fraudulent or unauthorised use of addresses. I am sure that we will come back to that on Report.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 138 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 139
Meaning of “registered overseas entity” in land registration legislation
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The clause amends the Land Registration Act 2002, Land Registration etc. (Scotland) Act 2012 and the Land Registration Act (Northern Ireland) 1970. It will improve the effectiveness of the register of overseas entities by punishing a registered overseas entity for failing to comply with the registrar’s new power—as inserted into the Companies Act by the Bill—to require information from the entity.
Currently, an overseas entity will lose its status as a registered overseas entity if it fails to provide an annual update to the registrar. The clause adds that an overseas entity will also lose its status as a registered overseas entity if it fails to respond to a notice from the registrar requesting information. Once it is no longer considered to be a registered overseas entity, the entity will be treated as non-compliant. A non-compliant entity will find it difficult to sell, lease or raise charges over its land and cannot therefore deal freely with it.
Upon submitting the requested information to the registrar, the overseas entity will once more be compliant. However, the compliance status is not retrospective. Any person dealing with the overseas entity in the non-compliance period will be unable to register any completed transaction with the land registries. I know that all Members will join me in wanting to ensure the robustness of the register and ensure that overseas entities comply with their duties, or face tough restrictions. The clause will help Companies House to do so.
The clause makes some relatively minor changes to the language on the requirement to provide information requested by the registrar. The effect is to extend the existing restrictions on the ability of an overseas entity to deal with property it owns, such as by selling it, in order to apply the restrictions to companies that fail to comply with the registrar’s requests for information. The change is sensible and pragmatic, and the Opposition support it.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 139 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 140
Power to apply Part 1 amendments to register of overseas entities
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government new clause 19—Resolving inconsistencies in the register.
Government new clause 20—Administrative removal of material from register.
The clause provides for certain changes to be made to the Companies Act via regulations using Henry VIII powers, where necessary, to bring the Act into line with the provisions in part 1 of the Bill. The Government’s use of Henry VIII powers to change primary legislation has generated some criticism in other contexts, but the provision that the Government have made in this clause for the relevant regulations to be subject to the affirmative procedure represents a welcome commitment to parliamentary scrutiny on their part.
Finally, the Government’s new clauses 19 and 20 have been tabled to ensure that the provisions on resolving inconsistencies in the register and on removing material from it are applied to overseas entities on the same basis as to other registered companies. Those are also sensible and pragmatic changes, which the Opposition are happy to support.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 140 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)
(2 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIt is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Elliott. I want to make a few general points about registers of beneficial ownership and have a number of questions for the Minister, as a preamble to commenting on clause 135 specifically. Registers of beneficial ownership are not, of course, a new concept. We have had one for UK companies, namely the people of significant control register, since 2016. In that year, David Cameron made what would turn out to be the first of many promises to introduce a register of overseas owners of UK property, meaning that for the first time
“foreign companies that already hold or want to buy property in the UK will be forced to reveal who really owns them”.
Yet here we are, six and a half years and four Prime Ministers later, still discussing how to implement the register. After years of kicking the can down the road, it took the Russian invasion of Ukraine to jolt the Government into action. The first of this year’s economic crime Bills, now the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act, provided the legislative basis for the register of overseas entities, which at long last went live on 1 August.
As much as I welcome the fact that the register is now up and running, it remains very much a work in progress. The legislation passed earlier this year was rushed through on an expedited timetable, with just two weeks of debate. The need to amend what was clearly a hastily drafted law is reflected in the changes set out in clauses 135 to 140. Before addressing the substance of the clauses, it is worth taking stock of what progress has been made in setting up the register and, more importantly, what more needs to be done. According to Government figures, some 32,000 overseas companies are required to register with Companies House by 31 January. Between them, those companies own almost 100,000 properties in the UK. It was the Minister himself, in his previous incarnation as a Back Bencher, who argued forcefully back in March for the transition period during which those 32,000 companies would be required to register to be limited to six months.
Now that we have reached the halfway point in the process, I asked the Minister in written questions how many companies have now registered. Members might have reasonably expected the number to be somewhere in the region of 16,000, or half of the 32,000 total required. Imagine my surprise and disappointment when the Minister replied to my written question saying that, in fact, only 3,214 entities had registered as of last week; in other words, just 10% of those required. If progress were to continue at such a sluggish rate, the register would not be completed until 2025. I therefore ask the Minister whether he has a magic wand, and whether he intends to use it to ensure that the remaining 90% of companies comply with the registration requirement in the next three months.
I will also ask the Minister what he thinks is the reason for the astonishingly low number of registrations to date. But the answer to that question is in fact clear: the failure of the Government to enact the new law until the situation became urgent due to the war in Ukraine meant that the regulations and statutory guidance were sloppily drafted without consultation, leaving the entire framework riddled with holes and shrouded in uncertainty.
I hope the Minister will take the opportunity we have today to clarify some of the issues. Companies House has written to entities to inform them that they need to register, but the data used to contact them came from the Land Registry. That data is, in many cases, out of date. What assessment have the Government made of the accuracy of the contact information provided by the Land Registry? What steps is the Minister taking to ensure that everyone who is expected to register is at least made aware of the requirement in time for them to apply ahead of the 31 January deadline?
Will the Minister also confirm what additional resources, if any, have been made available to Companies House to support the introduction of the register? How many staff are now working to support its implementation? What preparations are the Government making to deal with companies that fail to comply before the deadline? Specifically, how will Companies House identify such companies and work quickly to impose the financial and criminal penalties that the Government have provided for? Will the Minister explain how the Government plan to deal with companies whose beneficial ownership cannot be verified? His Department’s guidance says that entities that claim to have no beneficial owner should provide information without a “managing officer”, but that term is not defined in the guidance. Can the Minister shed some light on this?
Clause 135 makes what appear to be minor technical changes to the wording of documentation to be held as part of the register. To the extent that those changes help ensure that the information on the register is giving as complete and as accurate a picture of companies beneficial ownership as possible, the changes are welcomed by the Opposition.
I very much value the hon. Gentleman’s comments and reflections. There is no doubt at all that the measures are a work in progress; that is one of the reasons behind the Bill, of course. I enjoyed answering his questions in writing and we will no doubt correspond further on such matters. He is right to scrutinise the activities of Companies House, which I have sought to do as well.
Let me give a few facts that may help the hon. Gentleman. As of today, there are 3,893 registrations; that is a more up-to-date figure than the one I gave him on 11 November, which was about 3,500. That equates to about 400 in the past six or seven days, which illustrates that the number of registrations is increasing significantly. We always thought that there would be a last-minute rush to file because, as the hon. Gentleman knows, there are significant penalties for not doing so: up to £2,500 per day and a prison sentence of up to five years. That is the risk that those who do not comply are taking, which is pretty significant, so we always thought that there would be a last-minute rush.
To answer one or two of his other questions, eight people are working full time on the register of overseas entities and 20 are trained to handle registrations. They are deployed relevant to workload. There is no current backlog at His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs in this regard. A managing officer is defined in the Act as being akin to a director, secretary or manager.
On that point about staffing, I think the Minister’s point is that there will be a last-minute rush. Is he confident that the current staffing levels are sufficient to cope with that last-minute rush—that surge?
I am not intimately involved in the management of the register. It would be interesting to see and that is a fair point. I will write to the hon. Gentleman. I have asked Companies House to provide us with that information, which it has done, about the activities it is undertaking to pursue people who have not yet completed their registration. We will continue to do that. In the meantime, I am happy to write to the hon. Gentleman on the points he has raised and, indeed, on his further point about making sure that we have enough staff to deal with the last-minute rush that we anticipate.
I thank the Minister for that. Does he have any thoughts on the interface between the Land Registry and the register of beneficial owners? It appears that a lot of the information on the Land Registry is seriously outdated. What steps are being taken to address that challenge, and does he see a risk in the communication between them?
I do not see there being a risk of a lack of communication; they seem to be working together adequately. There is no doubt that some information is out of date. Many overseas entities have not kept their address details up to date, and many letters have been returned as undeliverable. Companies House is undertaking open-source research to try to identify up-to-date addresses, and we are working with stakeholders to raise awareness of the requirements and the deadline.
Companies House is used to dealing with large number of registrations, and we believe it can handle much larger volumes than it is receiving. The hon. Gentleman has asked some detailed questions and made some salient points that I want to follow up with Companies House in order to make sure that we can maintain the register properly, and I suggest we correspond on that basis.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 135 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)
(2 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesClause 107 requires a limited partnership to confirm on application for registration that none of its general partners are disqualified under directors disqualification legislation. It also introduces a duty on all general partners of a limited partnership to take any steps necessary to remove a disqualified general partner on pain of criminal sanction for failure to take those steps.
General partners are responsible for the management of limited partnerships, including the movement of funds. There is currently nothing in place to remove a general partner from a limited partnership once they become disqualified. The clause is needed to ensure that disqualified individuals are prevented from being general partners of a new limited partnership set up after the Bill and to ensure that existing general partners of extant firms who become disqualified, or already are when the Bill comes into force, cease to be a general partner.
New clause 49 would require the Secretary of State to make regulations under section 87 of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, which amended the Companies Act 2006 to require all company directors to be natural persons, with the power to make exceptions in regulation. I have every sympathy with the intention of the amendment, which challenges the Government to act on something they have long promised. I am happy to commit to the Committee that such regulations will be made soon.
Very similar. It is sooner than shortly. The ban on the appointment of corporate directors will not and should not be absolute. That is why the Companies Act provides for a delegated power to create exemptions by regulations. Those regulations will address the limited circumstances under which a company will be permitted to have a corporate director. It is important that those regulations are in force before we ban the appointment of any corporate directors and are aligned with the new reforms proposed in the Bill.
(2 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberPerhaps the hon. Gentleman should be asking the Minister that question rather than me. [Interruption.] He has told me he is going to ask the Minister in a minute, and I look forward to the answer. Our view is that we have to respond to the fact that the EU is already doing this and we are clearly going to have to take action to safeguard the steel industry in this country. So I would be very interested in what the Minister says and whether it is consistent with what I have said.
My hon. Friend is making an excellent speech. Does he agree that what Conservative Members seem to be failing to recognise is that they have had 12 years to deal with the massive disparity in electricity costs between ourselves and our nearest competitors? There has been a total failure to have a procurement strategy that works for the UK steel industry and a complete absence of any action to support the transition to net zero. So rather than us take any lectures from Conservative Members, it is time they showed some humility and actually started to take some decisions about this vital foundation industry.
I am extremely grateful to my hon. Friend, who has led the steel MPs on this side of the Chamber, and has often led cross-party as well, in fighting the cause of steel communities. As he says, a core foundation industry is crucial to jobs and prosperity; to our national defence and security, with its role in procurement in defence; and to decarbonisation for climate security. It is right that we should be supporting our steel industry and our other core industries.
I will come to steel, shipbuilding and automotive shortly. I had not mentioned the hon. Gentleman’s rail point because I was highlighting the industries of tomorrow.
Does the Minister know how many tonnes of British steel there are in a single wind turbine, onshore or offshore, in our country?
I do not have that figure at my fingertips, but I have a funny feeling that the hon. Gentleman does. The Under-Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, my hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake) will respond on that later.
Britain has suffered from 12 years of low-growth, low-wage, high-incompetence conservatism. A key feature of the Conservatives’ disastrous record on the economy is their catastrophic performance on productivity. Output per hour worked in the UK grew at 1.9% between 1997 and 2007 but at a mere 0.7% between 2009 and 2019. It is that lower productivity that has caused the economy as a whole to fall further behind the US, Germany and others over the past decade.
This collapse in our productivity is not an act of God but the result of fundamental political choices. Do we starve businesses of the policy framework and investment they need to get our economy growing while cutting public services to the bone? Or do we pursue smart investment in Britain’s infrastructure, education, skills, research and development, and new technologies such as green energy? The Conservatives have consistently made the former choice over the past 12 years, but what we need for the decade ahead is the latter investment-driven growth model and, more specifically, Labour’s new industrial strategy.
There is a direct link between Britain’s low growth and poor productivity and the decline of our manufacturing sector, which has collapsed from around 30% of GDP in the 1970s to just 9% today. Manufacturing provides good jobs in less prosperous areas—meaningful, well-paid jobs on which people can raise a family—as well as the industries we need to get us to net zero and, perhaps most crucially of all, the foundations of our national security and economic resilience.
It is deeply troubling that the Chinese state holds a 33% stake in Hinkley Point, a 10% stake in Heathrow airport and a 9% stake in Thames Water. The public are opposed to the road this Government are taking. They know we need a Britain that can stand more firmly on its own two feet, and they recognise the need for foundational industries to thrive if Britain is to prosper. Indeed, in one recent poll, 80% of those surveyed declared steel as a strategically important industry that we must maintain in the UK, but the Conservative Government have failed to invest in our manufacturing base.
This September, manufacturing output fell by 2.3% to record the worst performance in manufacturing over three months since the 1980s. That is why the Labour party’s green prosperity plan will marry the quest for sustainable growth and jobs on which people can raise a family with the need for resilience. We see net zero not as a hindrance but as an opportunity for growth and prosperity.
I can assure the House that nobody will have to drag my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) kicking and screaming to COP. He will be leading, not leaving. He will be boldly setting out his Labour Government’s plan to double onshore wind, treble solar power and quadruple offshore wind by 2030 and, in so doing, create as many as 1 million green jobs—from technicians to plumbers and steelworkers.
This is the level of ambition we need for our country: a plan to make sure British industry leads the world again, making us a clean-power superpower. We will also champion sectors of the British economy that are the envy of the world, from the fintech hubs growing in places such as Leeds to the booming video game production in Dundee and chemicals industry in Middlesbrough.
Our green steel renewal fund will secure the future of the steel industry in my Aberavon constituency in south Wales. By greening our steel processing, Labour will ensure our steelmakers can compete in a world in which global steel demand is on the rise. Make no mistake—Britain needs its steel as a foundation of the modern manufacturing renaissance that Labour will deliver.
Labour will, of course, put resilience front and centre of our industrial strategy by launching publicly owned GB Energy to ensure that Britain becomes energy independent. Not only Labour MPs but businesspeople are backing this. Paul Lindley, a successful entrepreneur, recently wrote in The Times about Labour’s investment-based approach, and the CEO of Tesco said that, when it comes to who has a convincing plan for growth, Labour is the
“only team on the pitch”.
Businesspeople across the length and breadth of the country know that Labour will partner with the private sector to drive a new kind of growth that will rebalance the economy, decarbonise our industries and reignite Britain’s potential. Twelve years of the Conservatives have hammered our manufacturing sector and crashed our economy. We need change and we need it now.
(2 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIt is a pleasure to speak with you in the Chair, Mr Robertson. The Bill seeks to ensure that companies and other entities benefiting from incorporated status directly contribute to maintaining the integrity of the company register. We will do that by including investigation and enforcement costs in Companies House fees. We will debate those issues shortly, but first, I hope that Members will agree that it is right that the costs incurred through pursuing enforcement activity in Northern Ireland should also be included in the Secretary of State’s decision making when setting Companies House fees, which is the effect of these amendments.
Amendment 14 agreed to.
Amendments made: 15, in clause 89, page 68, line 36, at end insert—
“(ba) any function of a Northern Ireland department under or in connection with the Insolvency (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 (S.I. 1989/2405 (N.I. 19)), so far as relating to bodies corporate or other firms;”.
The amount of fees set under the Companies Act 2006 is determined in accordance with regulations. This amendment allows the regulations to reflect costs or likely costs of a Northern Ireland department under the insolvency legislation.
Amendment 16, in clause 89, page 68, line 40, at end insert—
“(d) any function carried out by the Insolvency Service in Northern Ireland on behalf of a Northern Ireland department in connection with the detection, investigation or prosecution of offences, or the recovery of the proceeds of crime, so far as relating to bodies corporate or other firms.”.—(Kevin Hollinrake.)
The amount of fees set under the Companies Act 2006 is determined in accordance with regulations. This amendment allows the regulations to reflect costs or likely costs of the Insolvency Service in Northern Ireland in connection with enforcement.
I beg to move amendment 115, in clause 89, page 68, line 40, at end insert—
“(3B) Prior to making any changes to the level of fees payable to the registrar, the Secretary of State must—
(a) consult with the registrar on the proposed changes; and
(b) set out in writing what the basis is for the proposed changes, with reference to subsection (2) above.”.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 25—Fee for registering a company—
“(1) The Companies Act 2006 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 1063, after subsection (3), insert—
‘(3A) Regulations under this section must set a fee of at least £50 for the incorporation of a company.’”.
New clause 33—Fees—
“(1) Section 1063 (Fees payable to registrar) of the Companies Act 2006 is amended as follows.
(2) Before subsection (1) insert—
‘(A1) The registrar must charge a fee of £100 for the incorporation of a company.
(B1) The Secretary of State must once a year amend the fee in subsection (A1) to reflect inflation.
(3) In subsection (1)—
(a) after “fees” insert “other than the fee in subsection (A1)”
(b) in paragraph (a) after “functions” insert “other than the incorporation of a company’.
(4) In subsection (5), in paragraphs (a) and (b) after ‘regulations’ insert ‘or subsection (A1)’.”.
This new clause requires Companies House to charge a fee of £100 for the incorporation of a company. It gives the Secretary of State the power to amend this fee once a year to reflect inflation.
New clause 40—Retention of fees by Companies House—
“(1) The Secretary of State must report to Parliament on the case for incorporation fees for companies being retained by the registrar.
(2) The report must be laid before Parliament within three months of this Act being passed.”.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Robertson. I rise to introduce amendment 115. When considering any piece of legislation that creates new criminal offences, one of the most important questions we have to ask is how confident we can be that the offences will be adequately policed and enforced. The question is particularly relevant in our deliberations on this Bill, because there is such a wealth of evidence that the laws we already have on economic crime are not being enforced as rigorously as we would hope. The reason is clear: the chronic under-resourcing of the various law enforcement bodies in recent years—or, to put it another way, under this Government.
I am sure that the Minister needs no convincing on this point. In fact, some of the most compelling arguments for greater resourcing for economic crime enforcement have been made by the Minister himself. Just over four months ago, he joined my right hon. Friend the Member for Barking in leading a debate on this issue. The motion for that debate pointed out that
“law enforcement agencies are significantly under-resourced to deal with the scale of the problem”.
In speaking to the motion, the Minister pointed out:
“We know that roughly 40% of our crime is economic crime, yet only 0.8% of our resources in man hours are dedicated to tackling economic crime, so there is a huge disparity.”—[Official Report, 7 July 2022; Vol. 717, c. 1042.]
Those figures are striking, and it should alarm Committee members that the Bill is likely to widen that disparity even further. The reforms to Companies House set out in part 1 of the Bill represent
“its biggest upgrade in 170 years”.
Again, I am quoting the Government’s own words. It is still the case today that if someone goes to the official Companies House website to search the register, they find a disclaimer stating:
“Companies House does not verify the accuracy of the information filed”.
Of course, one of the most important goals of the Bill is to change that, through new requirements on Companies House to verify the accuracy of new filings, and to continuously monitor and update records; but despite that fundamental shift in the scale and scope of its responsibilities, there is nothing in the most recent corporate plan for Companies House, published in July this year, on increasing either its budget or workforce in the light of those changes.
Not only is there unlikely to be additional Treasury funding for Companies House, but it appears there may even be cuts. Given the repeated warnings from the Chancellor to expect “eye-watering” decisions on public spending in this week’s fiscal statement, it seems unlikely, to say the least, that Companies House can expect a financial settlement that is even remotely commensurate with its obligations under the Bill. If the Minister could provide any reassurance to the contrary, it would certainly be welcomed by the Opposition—but we are not holding our breath.
In the absence of more resources from the Treasury, we are left with just one option, which is for Companies House to generate more income from registration fees. The case for higher fees is compelling. Not only is there the increased workload that the Bill will create for Companies House, but it has been abundantly clear for some time that the fees charged for registration are ludicrously low. The Minister is aware that it is undeniably too cheap, quick and easy to form a new company in the UK; there is minimal to non-existent verification or oversight.
For evidence of what appears to be emerging cross-party consensus on the necessity for higher fees, we need look no further than the exceptionally thoughtful and balanced report on economic crime published by the Treasury Committee in February this year, which stated:
“The low costs of company formation, and of other Companies House fees (such as filing fees), present little barrier to those who wish to set up large numbers of companies for dubious purposes…The Government should…review…Companies House fees to bring them closer to international standards.”
As a member of the Treasury Committee at the time of the report’s publication, the Minister presumably agreed with that statement back in February. I see no good reason why the position would have changed since then.
It is striking that the Bill does not address the question of fees payable to Companies House until clause 89. Even then, the clause sets out what costs may be taken into account in setting future fees, but avoids the next logical question of what an appropriate fee might be. Like so many fundamental details of how the legislation will work when in force, that has been left up to regulations that will be made at some indeterminate point in the future. It does not seem unreasonable to expect, or at least hope for, more detailed provisions on the subject in the Bill.
Clause 89 refers to the need for future regulations setting new fee levels to reflect the expanded responsibilities of Companies House under the Bill and other recent legislation. That is welcome as far as it goes, but unfortunately it does not go far enough. Through amendment 115, the Opposition seek to fill some of the gaps left open by the Bill by introducing an explicit requirement for the Secretary of State to consult with the registrar before changing fees. It would also require the Secretary of State to set out explicitly in writing the justification for any changes to the functions and workload of Companies House.
The amendment would provide a stronger statement of the necessity of setting fees at a level commensurate with the actual day-to-day needs of Companies House in carrying out its responsibilities under this and other relevant legislation. It should go without saying that fees should not be set at such low rates that we become a magnet for dodgy business dealings by criminals in search of the weakest possible regulatory environment; but it is not by any means clear that we can trust the Government’s wisdom in determining appropriate fees. A clearer, stronger set of criteria for such decisions should be incorporated into the Bill. Amendment 115 provides what we hope is a useful way forward.
Turning to new clauses 25, 33 and 40, there are strong arguments in favour of setting a specific level of fee as a baseline for any future changes. We should all be in agreement by now that the current fee—it is just £12 to register a company—is far lower than it should be. Certainly, that was the message from the many expert witnesses who gave evidence to the Committee last month. I recall in particular the testimony of Nick Van Benschoten of UK Finance, who pointed out that the UK’s £12 fee puts it in closer alignment with countries such as Benin and Turkmenistan than with comparably well-developed economies in Europe and North America, where fees roughly in the range of £50 to £100 are the general rule.
New clause 25, tabled by Scottish National party Members, suggests a minimum fee of £50. That would certainly be a good start, but the Bill could and should go further. New clause 33, tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Barking, would require a fee of at least £100 to be charged for company formation, with annual increases based on inflation. On behalf of the official Opposition, my hon. Friend the Member for Feltham and Heston and I are pleased to add our names to the proposed new clause, which we believe is a necessary and proportionate solution to the problem at hand.
It should be pointed out that the figure of £100 has not been plucked out of thin air. It is useful to return to the report that I mentioned by the Treasury Committee, of which the Minister was a member at the time. It concluded that a £100 fee for company formation would not deter genuine entrepreneurs, and would raise significant additional funding for Companies House and the fight against economic crime. It would be helpful if the Minister could confirm whether that remains his view. If he has changed his mind, he may wish to say a little about the basis on which he has done so.
New clause 40, also tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Barking, would add a further requirement on the Government to review and report on the case for measures to ensure that any future revenue from fees can be retained by Companies House for reinvestment in its work to police and enforce our laws against economic crime, under its remit as set out in the Bill and elsewhere. Again, this is a common-sense proposal that we should all welcome. It should not continue to be the default position that either all or a large part of any fees payable to Companies House go straight to the Treasury, with no guarantee that there will be any reinvestment into efforts to tackle economic crime. New clause 40 would make an important contribution by addressing that problem. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
New clause 25 is a probing amendment. I am minded to have a higher fee than £50, but what does the Minister think the baseline ought to be? Is it £100 or £50, or is he not prepared to put a number on the minimum price for registering a company? By way of contrast, a provisional driving licence fee application is £34, a passport is £75.50, and citizenship is £1,330 pounds. The Government are prepared to levy a whole range of fees for a whole range of privileges to do with living in this country; £12 to register a company seems miraculously low in comparison to all the other fees that the Government are willing to charge. In all those cases, I am sure that the Government would say that they are trying to recover costs, but they are not prepared to say how much it would cost to run Companies House in such a way that it can prevent economic crime, although that is pretty crucial to the whole endeavour.
I agree with everything the hon. Member for Aberavon has said, and I support the amendments from the right hon. Member for Barking, who is, I am sure, absolutely correct in everything she is about to say; I often agree with everything she says. I draw the Government’s attention again to the written evidence from UK Finance, which says:
“Clause 89 should be amended to ensure an initial increase in registration fees within six months of commencement, and to ensure annual reporting on planned investment, fee increases and scheduled implementation of new powers.”
If we set a minimum in legislation and do not update it, the problem is that often prices increase—mostly artificially, but also through factors such as the runaway inflation that we see in the UK at the moment. It is important to commit to an annual increase and annual reporting to ensure that fees keep pace with changes in a way that is considered reasonable.
Twelve pounds to register a company is really nothing in the grand scheme of things. I ask the Minister to consider how we can better ensure that the Companies House registration scheme forms part of the deterrent. Rather than allowing the bulk creation of lots of small companies at £12 a pop, we can ensure that people say, “This is a real company. There is a real financial commitment to it.” I do not think that any company will be deterred by a fee of £100 rather than £12.
No. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment made: 17, in clause 89, page 69, line 5, at end insert—
“(b) the reference in subsection (3A)(d) to functions carried out by the Insolvency Service in Northern Ireland on behalf of a Northern Ireland department, so long as the functions referred to are functions of a Northern Ireland department that are of a similar nature.”—(Kevin Hollinrake.)
The amendment allows the reference to functions carried out by the Insolvency Service in Northern Ireland on behalf of a Northern Ireland department to be amended in the event that, in future, the functions are exercised otherwise than by the Insolvency Service in Northern Ireland.
Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
As I have just set out to the Committee, clause 89, as amended, will enable Companies House fees to be used to fund enforcement and prosecution action against companies and other entities. As we increase the powers of the registrar and expand the role that Companies House and the Insolvency Service play in tackling economic crime, we need to make sure that they are appropriately resourced to carry out that activity. The clause is therefore vital in ensuring that Companies House can do that.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 89, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 90
Disclosure of information
It is a pleasure to speak in this stand part debate. I will defer to my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon to speak to new clause 36.
I have referenced some points on clause 90 and its importance. I will make a couple of other remarks on that more generally. It widens disclosure provisions, and the registrar will proactively disclose information held where that disclosure enables the exercise of her functions. I have a question for the Minister on subsections (5) and (6), where offences and defences are set out. That is obviously important, but I have a concern about the disclosure or data sharing provisions.
The fear of being on the wrong side of the law can sometimes deter the use of those powers. It is a question about whether there has been any discussion with the registrar, for example, about the interpretation of the wording; being as clear as possible about what is permissible within the law and where the offences might be, and the possible defence for a person who could be charged with an offence under subsection (5). So often we say, “There are powers to do X” or “The police have a power”, but there are concerns about the use of that power and how someone could be accused of not using that power within the law, so we might end up having a challenge. Someone could go through a process to clear their name or to say that their actions were within the scope of the law. We just need to be clear to reduce the challenges that can come later.
Perhaps the Minister will respond today or clarify in discussions with the registrar on this very important clause that it is as clearly worded as it could be, with less room to be challenged where that power is used as intended by Parliament.
Schedule 3 makes consequential amendments to clause 90 and amends the Companies Act to enable the registrar to disclose usual residential addresses. It states that where additional trust information is protected from disclosure to the public, regulations made under section 25 may not require the registrar to refrain from disclosing that information under proposed new section 1110E. Will the Minister explain that aspect a little further? Broadly, we welcome the schedule as a necessary provision in expanding the information sharing aspect.
Clause 91 highlights an offence that can be committed by a company and every officer who is in default. Clause 92 confers a power on the Secretary of State, on application, to make regulations requiring the registrar to make an order requiring a company not to use or disclose relevant information regarding persons of significant control. The Minister has spoken to this point briefly, but could he expand a little more on the introduction of this clause, and can he provide any examples of instances in which—as per clause 92—the Secretary of State might require a company not to disclose PSC information? We would welcome that clarity.
I have no further comments on clause 93, which restricts the registrar from using directors’ residential addresses for anything other than communicating with the director. I would welcome the Minister’s clarification of the points I have raised.
I rise to speak in support of new clause 36. In considering the Bill’s provisions on information sharing, we should ask ourselves two main questions. First, do the clauses strike the right balance between protecting individuals’ privacy on the one hand, and making as much information as possible available to members of the public on the other? Secondly, does the Bill make adequate provision for information to be shared between organisations in order to facilitate the robust enforcement of these laws? It is the second of those questions that new clause 36 seeks to address.
On a number of issues, the Committee has been able to find an encouraging degree of cross-party consensus on the actions we need to take against economic crime. I think we can all agree that the existing frameworks for law enforcement are not currently up to the task. It has been widely acknowledged for some time now that the diffuse nature of enforcement responsibilities across so many different government agencies, police forces and private sector institutions often acts as a hindrance to efforts to achieve a comprehensive, strategic approach across all sectors involved. Alongside the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022, which came into force earlier this year, the Bill seeks to reduce barriers to information sharing in order to facilitate more timely and effective enforcement action where it is needed. However, the information-sharing provisions that we are currently discussing leave some important issues unresolved.
With new clause 36 we have sought to address one of the most troubling gaps in the Bill as currently drafted: the absence of any specific measures to facilitate information sharing with local authorities. That is a serious weakness that, if left unaddressed, could pose a serious challenge to efforts to ensure a strong, unified, cross-government approach to law enforcement, in terms not only of Whitehall but the vertical relationship between national Government and local government. Many local authorities, particularly in London, are at the coalface when it comes to dealing with some of the most pernicious effects of money laundering and other forms of economic crime. It is disappointing that the Committee was not able to hear from any local government representatives during our evidence sessions. I would be grateful if the Minister could set out what steps, if any, the Government took to consult local authorities during the process of drafting the Bill.
In the meantime, I would like to share some of the points raised with me recently by members and officers from Westminster City Council. It should come as no surprise to Committee members that the effects of money laundering and other criminal activity, particularly in relation to property ownership, can be seen more acutely in Westminster than probably anywhere else in the country. As we should have the opportunity to discuss issues related to property ownership when we debate part 3 of the Bill, at this point I want to provide an example that illustrates the need for measures that specifically address the need for more information sharing with local authorities.
In Westminster, the council is trying to deal with a range of problems caused by the huge and growing presence of so-called American-style candy stores and souvenir shops across central London, with 21 such stores in the Oxford Street area alone. Extensive investigations by council officers, together with raids that have led to the seizure of more than £650,000-worth of counterfeit goods, provide an important evidence base that indicates the scale of the problem. Among the goods seized in those raids were thousands of disposable vapes that are in breach of UK standards on nicotine levels. That suggests that these stores may pose risks to public health, in addition to their apparent role in illicit financial activity. In Westminster alone, unpaid business rates from the stores amount to some £8 million.
I shall respond briefly to the queries raised. All the information must be handled in accordance with the Data Protection Act 2018. The way the Bill operates is consistent with similar legislation that deals with data sharing.
The hon. Member for Feltham and Heston raised the issue of the protection of information. The provision applies in a situation of risk of harm or serious risk of violence or intimidation—for example, in respect of domestic abuse victims.
Data sharing was raised by both shadow Ministers—the hon. Members for Feltham and Heston and for Aberavon. It is permitted to assist public authorities when they exercise public functions, such as confirming the accuracy of data or providing intelligence to law enforcement agencies.
Does the Minister have any comments on the points about local authorities?
Data sharing is permitted to assist public authorities when they exercise their public functions. For example, they could ask the registrar to confirm the accuracy of data that is held, which may lead to information being shared for intelligence purposes with enforcement agencies.
Local authorities are a subset of public authorities.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 90 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 3
Disclosure of information: consequential amendments
Amendment made: 49, in schedule 3, page 162, line 5, leave out paragraphs 5 to 7.—(Kevin Hollinrake.)
This amendment is consequential on NC17 and NC18.
Schedule 3, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 91 to 93 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 94
General false statement Offences
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 94 amends the general false statement offence in section 1112 of the Companies Act 2006 to create two separate offences: a basic offence and an aggravated offence. The Bill also amends section 32 of the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022 to make a mirror-image, two-tier approach. The existing false statement offence under the Companies Act requires a document or a false, misleading or deceptive statement to have been delivered or caused to be delivered knowingly or recklessly to the registrar. Clause 94 substitutes that existing offence for two new offences with commensurate penalties.
The basic offence is committed when the false statement is made without reasonable excuse. The aggravated offence is committed when the false statement is knowingly made. It is worth noting that that refines the amendments made by the Government during the passage of the 2022 Act in response to parliamentary scrutiny. When either offence is committed by a firm, every officer of the firm that is in default also commits the offence. The structure of the new sections maintains consistency with amendments to the 2022 Act, the Limited Partnerships Act 1907 and the Reports on Payments to Governments Regulations 2014, as amended by the Bill.
On clause 95, we have already discussed many of the new powers that we are providing to the registrar and how they are intended to work. In exceptional circumstances, it may be necessary for the Secretary of State to allow material that would otherwise be treated as false, misleading or deceptive to be deliberately provided to the registrar to protect our nation’s interests or to assist in the prevention or detection of serious crime. The clause ensures that when such action is taken, the Secretary of State can issue a certificate that ensures that the person to whom it is issued is not liable for the commission of acts that might otherwise amount to a false filing offence.
Clearly, the work of our law enforcement and intelligence agencies must be able to be carried out without fear of prosecution when they are acting in our interests. The certificate that may be issued provides an exemption for those purposes. The Secretary of State must be satisfied about the reason why a certificate has been sought and may issue one only if to do so is in the interest of national security or for the prevention or detection of serious crime. The certificate can be revoked at any time.
To further limit the circumstances in which a certificate can be issued, serious crime is defined in the clause, providing further assurance about the need for such a certificate. The definition of serious crime aligns with that used in section 18 of the 2022 Act, which allows the Secretary of State to exempt a person from the requirements of the register of overseas entities for the same reasons. The Government listened to the concerns expressed about such exceptions and exemptions during the expedited passage of the 2022 Act; the clause is therefore carefully constructed so as to be as narrow as possible.
One of the key problems the Bill seeks to address is the difficulty that arises when enforcing laws for which the burden of proof is exceptionally high. In that regard, the Opposition welcome the changes set out in clause 94. The current requirement to prove that somebody who has delivered false or misleading information or documents to Companies House did so knowingly and recklessly seems to set the bar so high as to act, in effect, as a hindrance to successful prosecution. It is a sensible change to replace the current requirement with language that enables a defence on grounds of a reasonable excuse, especially in the context of the related provision in the clause to prosecute those who can be shown deliberately to have provided false information for an aggravated offence that is subject to imprisonment for up to two years.
Clause 95, however, raises some questions that I hope the Minister will clarify. It will amend the Companies Act to allow the Secretary of State to issue any individual with a certificate that, it would seem, could provide blanket immunity from prosecution for any offence related to the delivery to the registrar or the making of a statement that is misleading, false or deceptive. This power is potentially very broad and, beyond a couple of lines stating that a certificate could be issued for reasons of national security or to assist in the prevention or detection of serious crime, there is little clarity as to how it might be used. I am sure the Committee would be grateful if the Minister could provide any further detail on how frequently and in what kinds of circumstances the power might be used. Perhaps the Minister could also set out in a bit more detail what safeguards, if any, might be put into place to ensure that the power is used only in cases in which there is a compelling need to do so.
The Minister knows that that is not necessarily to fight economic crime, but to fight other crimes. I was talking about the economic crime levy and those are the figures that I have.
It is irritating but understandable that the enforcement agencies prioritise other crimes in their day-to-day work; they do not prioritise economic crime. Despite the lack of funding, a lot of money is brought in by the enforcement agencies. Between 2018 and 2021, £3.9 billion was brought in in fines, confiscation and forfeiture. If all of that had been reinvested, all of the agencies would have had an extra £748 million to fight economic crime over that period. That would have had a fantastic impact on our ability to fight, detect and prevent economic crime.
It has been said in previous debates that money from fines cannot be hypothecated in that way, but I draw the Minister’s attention to three precedents that negate that claim. In June 2022, the Information Commissioner announced a new arrangement allowing the office to keep some of the proceeds of its civil penalties to fund its work with the big tech companies. In 2019, Ofwat kept the proceeds of penalties it had raised on Southern Water to pay out to and reimburse customers. The Gambling Commission can also require payments rather than penalties to compensate victims or make payments to charities. Those are three precedents on which the Minister could build the argument that it would be perfectly appropriate for the proceeds of fines to be kept in order to resource the fight against economic crime.
I also draw the Minister’s attention to a report on fraud published by the House of Lords last week, which states:
“To support the forthcoming fraud strategy”,
which is only a part of addressing economic crime,
“with adequate resources, the Government must commit to a long-term funding strategy with an increased offer for law enforcement agencies”—
and this is the important bit—
“focussed primarily on recycling revenue collected by law enforcement agencies back into law enforcement activity.”
The House of Lords has, therefore, come to the same conclusion as we have in tabling this amendment.
The UK’s asset recovery incentivisation scheme ensures that some assets are recycled. Most of them go to the Treasury. Of the £354 million recovered in 2021-22 from confiscation orders, forfeiture orders and civil recovery orders, only 40% went back into fighting crime. If we compare ourselves with the Americans, we will see that all of their forfeiture proceeds go back into enforcement.
Under our proposal, money would be ring-fenced and it would be a cross-Government fund to finance enforcement against fraud and dirty money. The Minister knows that if the UK is to tackle economic crime effectively, far greater ambition is needed on the scale of public investment, and establishing an economic crime fund is the radical response that we need.
I would like to add some comments to the eloquent remarks of my right hon. Friend the Member for Barking.
In clause 96, the Government provide a framework for the registrar, within parameters to be set out by the Secretary of State in regulations, to impose direct financial penalties for many offences without the need for lengthy and often costly court proceedings. That is surely a welcome development, at least in so far as it should enable the registrar to take swifter action to deal with any offences involving false representations made to Companies House.
Of course, we will need to look closely at the details of how that will work in practice. In that respect, it is right that the Bill provides for parliamentary scrutiny of the relevant regulations via the affirmative resolution procedure. If the Minister could give a rough indication of when we can expect those regulations to be published, I am sure that the Committee would be grateful.
One thing that clause 96 makes clear is that any civil penalties imposed by the registrar will not exceed £10,000. I would be grateful for an explanation from the Minister about how that figure was arrived at, and whether he is confident that the power to impose a fine at that level will act as a deterrent to would-be offenders. Given the profit margins involved in some of the most serious crimes, we must ensure that the threat of civil penalties is both real and sufficient in terms of its potential to take a meaningful chunk out of criminals’ assets. I am not entirely convinced that the threat of a £10,000 fine will be taken all that seriously by some of the intended targets, but if the Minister is aware of any convincing evidence to the contrary, I would be glad to hear it.
Even if we assume that the Government make rapid progress with the regulations enabling the registrar to impose civil penalties, we must then address—not for the first time in Committee—what happens to any funds raised from civil penalties. In amendments 84 and 80 and new clause 29, my right hon. Friend the Member for Barking has once again provided the Committee with an eminently reasonable and sensible answer to that question. Taken together, these amendments would require any fines paid to the registrar to be specifically designated and ring-fenced for the purposes of tackling economic crime.
The asset recovery incentivisation scheme, introduced by the previous Labour Government, provides a template of sorts, but given the scale of the threat that we now face from economic crime, we need to go further. It is surely a no-brainer that any fees paid to the registrar, together with penalties for those who break the rules, should be reinvested in broader cross-Government efforts to tackle economic crime. That would provide a stronger incentive for tougher enforcement and a more sustainable long-term funding model for Companies House and other enforcement bodies at no additional cost to the taxpayer. Opposition Front Benchers therefore fully support these amendments. We hope that Members on the Government Benches will do the same.
I am very sympathetic to the points raised by contributors to this debate, and I am fully signed up to making sure that our law enforcement agencies have a long-term funding solution. As the right hon. Member for Barking knows, I am very sympathetic to the need to properly resource enforcement agencies, and, indeed, to the need for clarity on what funding is in place, right across the piece. We could have various different debates about what level that should be and on whether it should be £30 million a year. It is an awful lot more than that, but I accept that there should be more clarity. Wherever we can, we should seek to raise the moneys that the enforcement agencies need to do their job properly.
We are developing a new funding model for Companies House, which demonstrates our commitment to tackling economic crime. The combination of last year’s spending review settlement and private sector contributions through the new economic crime levy will provide funding of £400 million over the spending review period. That applies to the AML regulated sector and will fund new or uplifted activity to tackle money laundering, starting from 2023-24. There will be a wide-ranging review three years later to provide transparency on how the levy is performing against its original purpose, including how the money is being spent.
In addition, as the right hon. Member for Barking set out, a proportion of assets recovered under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 are already reinvested in economic crime capability under the asset recovery incentivisation scheme. The figures that she quotes are interesting, because according to my note here, the receipts paid should be split 50:50 between the Home Office and the Treasury and operational partners, which should be the enforcement agencies. It should be an equal split. I do not know about the numbers that she gives regarding the situation in the US, but I am happy to look at that in further detail. I am very keen to make sure that resources are made available.
There is probably a difference here in relation to fines. The right hon. Lady acknowledges that POCA offences have been subject to the oversight of our courts. In terms of fines and civil penalties, however, there are strict guidelines on how that money can be spent. It is interesting to look at the examples she quotes, but I think that two of them concern reimbursement of victims rather than further resourcing of the relevant agencies. I also slightly worry about the unintended consequences of allowing the regulator to simply issue fines and keep them. Many of those fines may be issued not because of transgressions related to economic crime; they may be related to other offences and other things.
The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Aberavon, raised the issue of whether the level of £10,000 was appropriate. It is quite a lot of money, of course. The vast majority of businesses registered with Companies House are smaller companies. For a smaller company, £10,000 is an awful lot of money. It is, of course, an option. It is not that the registrar cannot refer this to law enforcement agencies. She can determine whether to impose a civil penalty or refer the matter to a law enforcement agency if it is serious enough. We felt that £10,000 was a reasonable compromise. On that basis, I hope that the right hon. Member for Barking will withdraw the amendment.
I think that is a very sensible suggestion and I am happy to take that away. I would like to see a number of things in that report that are currently not there. If we look at the most recent report, we see a number of references to this particular legislation. It welcomes this legislation, and I think it is important that the body reports publicly and to Parliament, as would be the case with the measures that the right hon. Lady mentions.
Similarly, there may be reason to review the appropriate financial penalty amount, and interest or late payment amount, to deter misconduct against the register as effectively as possible. The regulations will be subject to the affirmative procedure, which will provide the appropriate amount of parliamentary scrutiny of any proposed further changes.
Clause 97 will strengthen the link between civil sanctions and director disqualification by amending section 3 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, which states that the court may make
“a disqualification order against a person where it appears to it that he has been persistently in default in relation to provisions of the companies legislation”,
and that
“the fact that a person has been persistently in default…may…be conclusively proved by showing that”,
in the previous five years,
“he has been adjudged guilty…of three or more defaults”.
Under proposed new section 1132A of the Companies Act 2006, the registrar will be able to impose a financial penalty on a person, if she is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the person has engaged in conduct amounting to an offence.
Section 3 of the CDDA will be amended so that the imposition of a financial penalty can count as a default. That will provide a greater deterrent to those who seek to circumvent legislative requirements. Not only will individuals face the risk of a financial penalty but the risk of being disqualified will become more likely when a financial penalty has been imposed. Clause 98 mirrors the provisions in clause 97 so that they apply in Northern Ireland, amending the current provision in article 6 of the Company Directors Disqualification (Northern Ireland) Order 2002.
We are disappointed that clause 96 will go forward unamended, because we feel that there are real risks in not directly linking the moneys raised with reinvestment specifically into economic crime. It is important to put that disappointment on the record.
Of course, there is a link in the average scheme. I think £1.3 billion has been raised from asset recovery for law enforcement agencies since 2007, so there is a link. The point that we disagree on is fines.
I thank the Minister for that intervention. The amendments were trying to require any fines paid to the registrar to be specifically designated and ringfenced for the purposes of tackling economic crime. It is the lack of a specific designation and ringfencing that is disappointing, but we are where we are, and we move forward.
I will comment briefly on the final two clauses in the group. They are largely supplementary to the provisions that we have already discussed, but are nevertheless important. I particularly welcome the clarification in clause 97 that individuals subject to civil penalties under the preceding clauses will be treated in a similar way to those with a criminal conviction for the purposes of determining whether they meet the criteria for disqualification from serving as company directors. Making it clear that the same standards of conduct apply to those with a record of civil or criminal penalties should buttress the new system for civil enforcement fines, and will hopefully increase compliance.
The provisions of clause 97 that apply within Britain would be extended to Northern Ireland under clause 98. As I have said before, ensuring that a common set of rules and regulations is applied across the UK as a whole can only be a good thing.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 96 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 97 and 98 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 99
Meaning of “limited partnership”
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
This is a very simple measure. The Government are seeking to tackle the misuse of limited partnerships while modernising the law governing them. The clause clarifies the meaning of the term “limited partnership”. The revised wording removes ambiguity and sets out that it is possible to be a limited partnership only by virtue of being registered as a limited partnership under the Limited Partnerships Act 1907. Furthermore, the Companies Act 2006 provision relating to the index of company names is amended to refer to limited partnerships registered under the Limited Partnerships Act. That allows the registrar to remove firms from the index of company names if they are dissolved, cease to be registered under the Limited Partnerships Act, or both.
(2 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesClause 68 amends section 1025 of the Companies Act 2006 to require that outstanding fines or financial penalties must have been paid for a company that has been previously struck off to be restored to the register. I thank the hon. Members for Feltham and Heston and for Aberavon for new clauses 45 and 46.
First, new clause 45 seeks to ensure that before striking off a company, the registrar must check whether the named directors have had their identities verified or do not need to do so because are they are exempt. Secondly, there are two routes by which a dissolved company can be restored to the register: one is an administrative process involving application to the registrar; the other involves applying to the court to order restoration. New clause 46 would expand the categories of persons who can use the administrative route by allowing former creditors and former liquidators to apply to the registrar for a dissolved company to be restored to the register. At present, only former directors or members of the company can apply to the registrar. Creditors of the company at the time of its striking off or dissolution and former liquidators currently have access to the court application route under section 1029 of the Companies Act 2006.
While I appreciate that in comparison to the administrative route, the court route is more cumbersome and potentially costly, it exists for a reason. Where a creditor seeks restoration in an effort to prove a debt outstanding from a company, the court is best placed to determine the validity of the case. Opening the administrative restoration route to creditors would place the registrar in the position of having to judge the legitimacy of a creditor’s interest in a company. That is not and should not be the role of a registrar.
However, liquidators are a matter of public record and in many cases might be the official receiver. I appreciate that there may be instances where their interests in restoring a company might be in the wider interest of others, including potential creditors, and that there may be a case for giving them access to the less cumbersome administrative process. On the basis of our undertaking to consider the matter further, I shall be grateful if hon. Members do not press the new clause.
Although driven by good intentions, we believe that new clause 45 is unnecessary. As the Committee has heard, ID verification requirements will apply to all new and existing registered company directors, as well as to people with significant control and those delivering documents to the registrar. That means that directors and beneficial owners already on the register prior to the reforms coming into force will be covered by the ID verification requirements, although they will have a transition period within which to become compliant.
Directors of companies applying for strike-off under section 1003 of the Companies Act 2006 will therefore not evade verifying their identity before their company is struck off without exposing themselves to criminal liability. Crucially, anyone delivering an application to strike off a company to the registrar will also have to verify their identity. I hope that that explanation is appropriate, and provides such reassurance that hon. Members will consider not pressing the new clauses.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Bardell.
Clause 68 makes welcome changes to the Companies Act and should make it easier to enforce penalties imposed in response to criminal breaches under it. The circumstances under which an application can be made for a company struck off the register to be restored to it are set out in section 1025 of the Companies Act. Clause 68 amends section 1025 to make it clear that, as a prerequisite for any such application, any outstanding fines imposed on the applicant and relevant company directors in relation to a criminal offence under the Companies Act must be paid in full. That is a positive step toward increasing levels of compliance with companies legislation in the UK.
The Minister may wish to clarify one point in relation to company directors convicted of criminal offences. In previous sittings, the Committee discussed the grounds on which someone can be disqualified from serving as a company director under the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 and subsequent amendments. They include the disqualification of individuals guilty of persistent breaches of companies legislation. That appears to leave the door open for someone to serve as a director, even if they have committed a criminal breach of the legislation, provided they have not done so on multiple separate occasions.
Will the Minister tell us whether the Government considered extending the criteria so that anyone with even a single criminal conviction related to companies legislation would be prohibited from serving as a director again? Does he believe that it might send a stronger message were the Government to adopt a zero-tolerance approach to these kinds of crimes? I hope that he will come back on that point. It has some relation to new clauses 45 and 46, and I look forward to the remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for Feltham and Heston on them.
Clause 69 establishes—
Order. We are not there yet. The hon. Member is getting a little ahead of himself.
I am getting a bit excited. Sorry, Ms Bardell. I will leave it at that.
I am grateful for the opportunity to speak to new clauses 45 and 46, following the remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon. He and the Minister highlighted how clause 68 amends the Companies Act and provides that outstanding penalties will need to be paid by applicants or directors for a full strike-off. If I am correct, section 1025, which the clause amends, is about applications for administrative restoration by a former director or member—a shareholder—whereas a creditor would use a separate process under section 1029 to restore a company to the register. That is not being amended by the Bill and does not require payment of outstanding fines.
The clause introduces identity verification requirements for individuals delivering documents to the registrar. It also requires that when an individual acts on behalf of another, they must confirm that they have the authority to do so. That will enable the registrar to reject documents unless they are accompanied by a true statement that the identity of the individual filing the document is verified and that the person filing the document is authorised to file.
An individual who delivers a document to the registrar on their own behalf must have their identity verified, and the document must be accompanied by a statement confirming their verified status. If an individual is exempt from identity verification requirements under the clause, they must provide a statement to that effect when delivering a document. Documents delivered on behalf of another person must be accompanied by a statement that the filer is authorised to do so. A document delivered by an employee of an authorised corporate service provider must additionally confirm that they are acting in the course of their employment.
Ensuring that individuals are identity verified before they can deliver documents to the registrar and that they are permitted to do so provides greater accountability because the documents will be traceable back to a verified identity.
Clause 70 creates a prohibition on delivery of documents to the registrar by disqualified persons. Clause 71 enables the registrar to reject documents that have been delivered by people who are not within the categories permitted to file documents under clauses 69 and 70.
Clause 69 establishes a requirement for anyone delivering documents to the registrar to have their identity verified, subject to certain exemptions, which may be set out in secondary legislation. However, it is not clear in what circumstances the Government might consider an exemption appropriate. The requirement for any exemption to be set out in secondary legislation subject to the affirmative procedure is welcome, because it enables the relevant changes to be scrutinised by Parliament. Nevertheless, it would be helpful if the Minister could provide an indication of what sort of exemptions might be expected.
Clauses 70 and 71 relate to the delivery of documents to the registrar. Clause 70 stipulates that disqualified individuals may not deliver documents on either their own or someone else’s behalf. As set out in the clauses, individuals delivering documents to the registrar will be required to make a series of statements confirming that they are not subject to any disqualification under companies legislation.
The hon. Gentleman asked me for examples of exemptions. We expect exemptions to be used rarely, but examples might include Government Departments, local authorities and international organisations where the identity and accountability of the organisation delivering the information carries little risk.
I thank the Minister for that clarification. Assessing the meaning of “carrying little risk” is a subjective thought process, but he is right that not everything can be micromanaged in this process. We will probably never get absolute clarity on these issues, but it will be important that Parliament scrutinises the way in which exemptions are implemented so that we get to know what “little risk” means through their implementation. It will also be important for Ministers to keep a close eye on the risk management processes that need to be implemented. As the Minister rightly said, legislation without good implementation is not worth the paper it is written on.
In previous debates, this Committee has discussed issues involving the verification of information provided to Companies House and the enforcement of criminal penalties for those who fail to comply with requirements to provide truthful information. These clauses raise similar questions. For instance, could the Minister explain what actions the registrar will be able to take to verify that, if somebody delivering documents states that they are not acting on behalf of a disqualified individual, that is a true and accurate statement?
The clauses also relate to issues discussed by the Committee on authorised corporate service providers. We all want this Bill to make it much more difficult for the people who own or control companies to hide their identities behind layers of secrecy, which often take the form of corporate service providers or other individuals acting on behalf of those in control. It would be helpful if the Minister could provide more detail about how the Government plan to protect the system against abuse, particularly by third parties acting on behalf of criminal clients. Could he tell us, for instance, whether the Government have considered introducing a more proactive licensing system for corporate service providers—as is used by some other jurisdictions, including Jersey—and what assessment the Government have made of whether the Bill provides adequate safeguards against the submission of false statements to the registrar?
I think the hon. Gentleman asked me to address two points. First, he asked how we will ensure that the documents filed are accurate. That goes back to the risk-based approach that the registrar should take on potential red flags and other such matters. Obviously, that role fits into the registrar’s wider objectives of ensuring that the information is accurate and minimising unlawful activity. It is a red-flag approach in terms of systemised and human intervention.
The hon. Gentleman’s second, wider point was on the penalties for false filing, which are up to two years in jail. I think most people will consider that to be a decent deterrent against abuse of the system.
I thank the Minister for that clarification. Does he have a view on the question of a more proactive licensing system for corporate service providers, along the lines of what is done in Jersey? Have the Government made any assessment of whether the Bill provides adequate safeguards against the submission of false statements to the registrar, particularly by corporate service providers?
I fully recognise the concerns expressed across the Committee about our oversight of corporate service providers. As I say, we should not mix up the many bone fide companies and household name accountants and lawyers, but clearly there are concerns, for example about some company formation agents. We need to ensure that the system that supervises money laundering is much more effective—we know there are deficiencies. The Treasury is looking at that right now. It will report and say exactly what it will do to beef up the system and make sure it is more fit for purpose. I am taking a keen interest in that. I am just as keen as the hon. Gentleman and other Members that the system properly identifies people with shortcomings and identifies wrongdoing, and that we build a much better system of money laundering supervision.
The hon. Gentleman mentioned licensing. Let us see what the Treasury review says and then we can make judgment. In terms of oversight of the money laundering supervision system, I am as concerned as he is and as keen to make sure that that system is fit for purpose.
I thank the Minister for that clarification. Will he assure us that he will encourage his colleagues at the Treasury to consider the option of a licensing system within the terms of reference of the review?
I am keen to make sure that the system works, whether by licensing or by some other means. There are lots of different options for what might be described as a system that is fit for purpose. Of course, in common with all Members of this House, we are keen to avoid unnecessary bureaucracy, but nevertheless we want a system that works and that we have faith in, so, in my view, all options should be on the table.
I hope that the clauses are pretty uncontroversial, but let us see. Companies House systems are already enabled to receive digital account submissions. The clauses will help Companies House to become a fully digital organisation by 2025.
Clause 72 transfers the power to require delivery by electronic means from the Secretary of State to the registrar. Filing information digitally is easier, quicker and more secure for filers. The information can be more easily checked for accuracy and compliance, and is less likely to be rejected for basic errors or omissions. That increases transparency. Suspicious activity can be better identified, contributing to our efforts to detect and prevent economic crime.
Clause 73 will require companies to deliver to the registrar a copy of a court order confirming their share capital reduction, rather than the original document itself. Clause 74 does the same in respect of a declaration of solvency. Clause 75 gives the registrar an administrative power to specify, in registrar’s rules, where documents must be delivered together.
Requiring companies to file component parts together will make it easier for Companies House to check that companies are meeting their filing obligations. It will also reduce unnecessary errors. Where filings are made that do not meet the requirements, they can be rejected, helping to improve the integrity of information on the register.
The main purpose of clause 72 is to make it easier for future changes to registrar’s rules to be made by the registrar directly, rather than through the Secretary of State. The Government’s intention is to facilitate the electronic delivery of documents. Using quicker, more efficient electronic systems for delivery should play an important role in wider plans for the transformation of Companies House and the service it provides.
With that in mind, could the Minister say a bit more about how the provisions fit into the ongoing Companies House transformation programme, particularly in relation to the planned new IT system? When might the fully electronic system for the submission and processing of documents submitted to the registrar be in place? We would be grateful for the Minister’s comments, particularly about timing.