Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Debate between Stephen Farry and Tony Lloyd

Committee stage
Tuesday 19th July 2022 Commons Chamber

[Tony Lloyd (Rochdale) (Lab)]

The hon. Member is making a very good speech. It is not the EU that wants to change the rules; rather, we hear from some contenders for the Conservative leadership that they want to change the rules. They want to strip away regulation, as indeed do some members of the DUP. Is that not a concern for the agricultural sector?

[Stephen Farry]

Absolutely; I concur very much with what the hon. Member says. Regulation sometimes has a negative connotation, but it is there to protect everyone’s interests and it is there for often very good and valid reasons. It is noticeable that we do not have the Foreign Secretary with us today—or indeed for any stage of the Bill, apart from the first hour—even though she has been very keen to promote it, for whatever agenda she has.

Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Debate between Stephen Farry and Tony Lloyd

Committee stage
Wednesday 13th July 2022 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Farry]

Amendment 24 would remove from clause 4 the measures that strip out the heart of the protocol, namely article 5, which relates to the management of the customs union and single market as they pertain to Northern Ireland, making it an excluded provision under domestic law. That, of course, would be a unilateral breach of the protocol, rather than working through negotiations to find durable solutions. The effect of that unilateral action would be to undermine Northern Ireland’s current unfettered access to both the single market and customs union for goods.

Fundamentally, there is no escaping the Brexit trilemma. When the Government decided to leave both the single market and the customs union, that required some form of interface to be put in place somewhere between the UK and the European Union’s economic zones, and that interface must be managed and mitigated as far as possible. The protocol offers relative opportunities for Northern Ireland compared with Great Britain, and they should be preserved and maximised. However, the protocol also poses challenges that need to be minimised.

The solutions must be mutually agreed, sustainable and legal. Northern Ireland businesses need certainty, and the only way through the process is negotiation. As someone who is at least a pragmatist or a realist on the protocol and who was a strong opponent of Brexit, I firmly believe that the European Union needs to be as flexible as possible, and that much more can be done in that regard—it is important that I put that on the record. At the same time, we must be brutally honest that the Government have been disingenuous in their approach to the negotiations over the past 12 months. Engagement has been extremely limited and, at times, counterproductive.

The Bill itself makes the prospect for negotiations even harder. Indeed, the passage of the Bill will probably make negotiations almost impossible. The European Union has been clear that it is tantamount to asking for negotiations with a metaphorical gun sitting on the table. By contrast, the key ingredients for progress are trust and partnership, but unilateral action undermines trust. Trust is central in two respects—first, to securing solutions in the first place; and, secondly, to ensuring their ongoing operation.

I want to highlight two particular solutions that are out there. A lot of Members have talked about them and, indeed, there has been a lot of commentary outside this Chamber as well. The first relates to red and green channels. On the surface, I think there is a lot of common ground between me and others from Northern Ireland, the Government and the European Union on something generally speaking along those lines. There is of course a major difference in the approach by which we get from A to B and reach such a conclusion, and I think that is the fundamental difference of opinion in relation to the Bill.

While Ministers keep saying that there is broad-based support for at least some aspects of the Bill, I am firmly opposed to achieving those through unilateral action, because that is not actually a genuine solution. We have to recognise that there may be some differences over the details of what this may look like in practice, and we need to be open, frank and honest about those. A green lane may not necessarily mean a fully open door; there may still need to be some degree of a risk-based approach to how that is managed. However, I think the essential concept remains that processed or final goods destined to remain in Northern Ireland should not be treated as something posing a risk to the EU single market or customs union.

The second aspect I want to focus on is a UK-EU veterinary agreement. It may be that we do end up with something that is very bespoke for the Irish sea interface, but I think we should focus on what should be the first preference, which is a UK-wide solution. The UK retains very high standards for agrifood, and they are de facto aligned with those of the European Union, but because the legal regimes do not align, we end up with barriers—frankly, needless barriers. That makes it much more difficult than it need be to manage movements across the Irish sea, but it also poses huge issues for the entire UK economy. In particular, the agrifood sector exports to the European Union—indeed, the European Union is by far the main export market for UK agrifood producers —and we are seeing a major shortfall in agrifood exports as a consequence of Brexit and the absence of a veterinary agreement.

People talk about what I suppose are the two polar opposite approaches to a veterinary agreement: first, there is the Swiss model, which is based on dynamic alignment; and, secondly, we have the New Zealand model, which is based on mutual recognition. The nature of New Zealand’s trade with the European Union, given the geography and a more limited range of products, will be different from that of the UK, which has its own requirements. Frankly, however, it is absurd that New Zealand has easier access to Northern Ireland for agrifood than the UK.

The Government face a choice between continuing to pursue the hardest of hard Brexits, especially on agrifood, when it makes no sense to diverge whatsoever, and being pragmatic and considering some form of veterinary agreement. That veterinary agreement may well end up being unique. It will be a UK-EU solution: it will not be the Swiss model or the New Zealand model, but something else. A veterinary agreement has the potential to reduce agrifood checks across the Irish sea by as much as 80%, and that would go a massive way to addressing the heart of the issue. Parallel movements could also address the pets issue, which has been a source of contention for many pet owners across these islands.

[Tony Lloyd]

On the veterinary agreement, an EU that has negotiated—in good faith, one assumes—with New Zealand and Switzerland, would negotiate in good faith with the United Kingdom. The point that the hon. Gentleman makes is a real one, but for many years, both the agrifood business and farmers have worked to the same common standards in the UK and the EU. We have not diverged so far, so could that not be part of rebuilding the trust that he spoke about?

Bosnia and Herzegovina: Stability and Peace

Debate between Stephen Farry and Tony Lloyd

Thursday 2nd December 2021 Commons Chamber

[Tony Lloyd]

I do not disagree, but look at the progress we have and have not made in Northern Ireland. This takes time, but it is a real issue. That is why we cannot let Bosnia and Herzegovina disappear off the radar again as other crises move in and out. Belarus matters—as the Minister knows, I am deeply involved in Belarus—and I can name conflicts all around the world, but this issue in the western Balkans also matters.

[Stephen Farry (North Down) (Alliance)]

I pay tribute to the hon. Gentleman for the role he played as shadow Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. In the light of the comparison that he is making, it is worth stressing that there are similarities with the Good Friday agreement, which did lock in identity back in 1998, and to some extent, has not evolved, as Dayton also has not. However, the key issue is how we build up the civil society and try to create the overall sense of a Bosnian identity and work on shared and integrated education and other areas that he supported Northern Ireland in during his time in post.

[Tony Lloyd]

I am grateful for that intervention because my hon. Friend leads me on to my next point, which is a simple one. The hon. Member for Rutland and Melton said, importantly, that Dodik is not the voice of every Bosnian Serb. We have to make sure that we speak to the majority of Bosnian Serbs and say, “There is a different future. It is not Russia—it is not with Moscow. It is not even with the mad voices coming from across the border in Serbia. It is something very different.” But we have to give the incentives that we promised but never delivered on, and we have to think seriously about what that means. We cannot offer European Union membership—it is not in our gift—but we can think about NATO, which is certainly a possibility, although NATO cannot interfere in internal conflicts in any easy way. However, there has to be conversation with the decent people among the Bosnian Serbs to make sure that they can see a better future that eschews the kind of nationalist rhetoric that will damage them and permanently lock Bosnia and Herzegovina into a past that is unthinkable and deny it a future that is possible.

There are big things to play for. This debate is an important part of that. Let us give the very clear message that we do care. We will not go away. We want the Bosnian Serbs to work with the Croats and the Bosniaks to guarantee that future. Yes, let us rethink the structure around Dayton in as short a time as we can. Let us make sure, if necessary, that we sanction the individuals, such as Dodik, who would do harm. And let us make sure that we simply do not let this disappear once again from the agenda.