European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill

Stephen Farry Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading: House of Commons & Money resolution: House of Commons & Programme motion: House of Commons & Ways and Means resolution: House of Commons & Money resolution & Programme motion & Ways and Means resolution
Friday 20th December 2019 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Farry (North Down) (Alliance)]

Go raibh maith agat, a Leas-Cheann Comhairle. Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker. I wanted my first formal comments in this Chamber to be in Irish to reflect the shared heritage of the language across all the traditions in Northern Ireland.

I am very pleased to be here as a representative of the Alliance party of Northern Ireland. I am the second member of my party to be elected, following in the footsteps of my party leader, Naomi Long, who was elected back in 2010, and of Stratton Mills, who sat here for about a year as an Alliance Member back in the early ’70s as the Member for Belfast North.

Before commenting on the Bill, I want to pay tribute to my predecessor, Lady Hermon, who was a diligent Member over 18 years and conducted herself with tremendous integrity. In recent years in particular, she was very dogged in standing up for Northern Ireland and particularly in protecting the Good Friday agreement in the context of Brexit.

I come to this House with a very strong mandate for remain—indeed, the remain vote in Northern Ireland grew in the election—and that strong remain vote continues to reflect the dominant majority of the people in that region. I will therefore be voting against Second Reading of the Bill in order to honour the wishes of the people who sent me here and the people of Northern Ireland.

There is no such thing as a good or sensible Brexit, whether we are talking about the UK or Northern Ireland in particular. Following on from previous comments, it is worth stressing that the House is potentially poised today to consciously vote to make the UK worse off economically. We are aware that that is what we are doing. It is an incredible situation the House finds itself in. The European Union represents perhaps the single greatest example of economic integration anywhere in the world, and we are walking away from that.

We are being presented with a false choice between working in the context of the European Union and pursuing a global Britain. We can best expand our trade and economy by working through the EU, where we have the strength in numbers to stand up and get better deals with the likes of the United States, Australia and China. That is in our self-interest. It is also important to bear in mind that the EU is more than an economic body. It is more than the sum of its parts and it allows effective and collective responses to global challenges, including migration, global poverty and, most critically in terms of the current agenda, tackling climate change.

Society in Northern Ireland only works when based on sharing and inter-dependence. Sadly, we remain a divided society. We are a complex society with lots of ambiguities. The Good Friday agreement balanced all those different challenges through a unique set of relationships. It is about the principle of consent, but it is more than that; it is about the internal dynamics, the north-south relationship and the east-west relationship. In terms of our economy, both supply chains and trade, we depend both on north-south and east-west linkages.

The challenge of Brexit is that if we do not go for a soft Brexit, as defined by the UK staying inside a customs union and the single market, Northern Ireland will be confronted with some form of border boundary interface and a degree of friction, which is very regrettable. Any perception of a border creates the feeling of winners and losers, and in the context of a place like Northern Ireland, where we are inching slowly towards a better and more reconciled and integrated society, that has the potential to be very damaging and destructive.

The deal negotiated by the right hon. Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May) was a better attempt at a soft landing than the deal negotiated by the current Prime Minister. Indeed, the previous deal had the pragmatic support of the Northern Ireland business community and an unprecedented level of commitment from them, given that this is a rather contentious political issue. They understood that it was a genuine attempt to address the issues. The current proposal from the Prime Minister presents Northern Ireland with a much more challenging situation. While it certainly maintains an open border on the island itself, it creates a much more problematic situation down the Irish sea than people had a right to expect and was originally anticipated.

To be clear, some degree of checks down the Irish sea can be managed—indeed, there are already precedents in that regard—and Northern Ireland has always done things differently since the early 1920s. Nor do I see the notion of any special deal for Northern Ireland or an interface as being a constitutional question, but what has been proposed so far will be very challenging for our economy, in terms of both the east-west interface and the west-east exchange. Some estimates put the compliance costs as high as £300 million per year for our businesses. That simply cannot be sustained. So rather than Northern Ireland having a foot in both camps, Northern Ireland risks becoming peripheral. The Prime Minister, throughout the election campaign, has been very clear that there will be no checks down the Irish sea, but that is clearly at odds with the view of most experts and most people who have analysed the deal so far.

There is some common ground across all the parties from Northern Ireland. Clearly, I am coming from a remain perspective, as are my colleagues from the Social Democratic and Labour party, whereas my counterparts from the Democratic Unionist party are coming from a leave perspective. But together we have a reasonable argument, and we speak with a moral authority, about trying to mitigate the impact of that boundary down the Irish sea. At the very least, we would ask that the Prime Minister and Government meet us halfway in that regard.

Much has been made of the Prime Minister’s comment about being a one nation Conservative. Unlike my counterparts in the DUP, I do not interpret that as meaning one nation of the UK; the UK is about four different nations. My appeal to the Prime Minister is: don’t be a one nation Prime Minister for England, but be a Prime Minister for all four nations of the UK, and, as we proceed to the more detailed scrutiny of this Bill, pay particular attention to the needs of Northern Ireland and the damaging implications of what is now set to emerge in terms of that interface down the Irish sea.

European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill

Stephen Farry Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting: House of Commons & Committee: 2nd sitting
Wednesday 8th January 2020 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Farry (North Down) (Alliance)]

I am happy to withdraw my amendments in the light of the Minister’s comments, but I ask him to respond further on the need for both the Human Rights Commission and the Equality Commission to receive the same notification as the Attorney General on human rights or equality issues that come before the courts or tribunals.

[Mr Walker]

I hear the hon. Gentleman’s point, which I am happy to look into, but my understanding is that under the Bill those bodies have the powers they need to acquire the necessary information. I am grateful to him for his gracious withdrawal.

New clauses 11 and 12 were tabled by the right hon. Member for Lagan Valley. I want to make it clear from the outset that the Government’s commitment to the Northern Ireland Act 1998 and the Belfast agreement, which it implements, is unfaltering. The consent mechanism contained in the protocol, for which the Government will legislate before the first vote is required in 2024, operates on the basis of a majority of democratically elected representatives in Northern Ireland being able to continue or end alignment with EU law. I am certain that this is the right mechanism. The right position in principle is not to hand a veto to any one party—not to Brussels, not to Dublin and not to any one party or community in Northern Ireland. That is what our consent mechanism does. I therefore urge the right hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendments and back this arrangement.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir William Cash]

In conclusion, I will simply say that I entirely endorse what my right hon. Friend has said, as indeed I endorse what my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) said. The bottom line is that our passing of the withdrawal Act, in conjunction with the general election that we have just won, gives us back the opportunity to make laws on behalf of the people of this country in a democratic, constitutional arrangement of such importance that I believe it will go down as a historic moment when the Bill’s Third Reading is passed tomorrow.

[Stephen Farry]

I rise primarily to address amendment 35 in my name and its intersection with clause 38. I do not intend to press it to a Division, but I want to highlight some of the issues that arise from it.

More generally, on the point of parliamentary sovereignty, I want to make a couple of comments, as other Members have, about the irony with respect to the level of delegated powers that the Bill will create, as well as the lack of scrutiny of the future relationship, which is of particular importance to us in Northern Ireland but also, of course, for all colleagues across the United Kingdom. The Northern Ireland/Ireland protocol, which is of such importance to us in Northern Ireland and has almost bedevilled the process of Brexit for many years, was only in effect programmed for two hours today. Many of the Northern Ireland voices were not properly articulated on that.

The concern of my amendment is the rights protections under the Good Friday agreement. The Good Friday agreement is, of course, an international agreement, but its implementation in domestic law falls to the UK Government. The agreement sets out a comprehensive set of rights, including the political participation of women, the right to freely choose one’s residence, freedom from sectarian harassment, a statutory equality duty and, perhaps most significantly, the requirement for the incorporation of the European convention on human rights into UK domestic law.

Most of the debate in Northern Ireland and beyond around Brexit, as it pertains to our situation, has focused on issues around borders, including the business community, the economy, trade and what the future holds in that regard. But people are also deeply concerned about rights issues, for a whole range of reasons. Article 2(1) of the protocol on Northern Ireland/Ireland provides a commitment that there will be

“no diminution of rights, safeguards or equality of opportunity”.

That is very much welcome, but we have seen a gradual weakening of the level of commitment to rights protections since the original draft of the joint report in December 2017. The European Union is very clear that it falls to the United Kingdom Government to ensure that the rights under the Good Friday agreement are protected as part of the future relationship.

The specific concern that I am trying to raise through amendment 35 is that there seems to be an inconsistency between section 7A of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 and clause 38 of the Bill, which is the focus of this section of our debate. Clause 38 stresses parliamentary sovereignty notwithstanding section 7A, which is used to give some degree of reassurance that there will not be any threat to rights, but there is the potential that section 7A could be overridden in some shape or form. There are several reasons why we have some concern in this respect. First, not all Good Friday agreement rights relate to the European convention itself; some are broader than what the convention contains. Some of the proposed legislative commitments apply only to Northern Ireland Departments and public bodies, and do not extend as far as the UK Government themselves, and in that there may well be some potential danger.

There are also concerns about whether the UK Government have, to date, fully respected some of the rights under the Good Friday agreement. As Members will appreciate, identity is a very complex issue across these islands, but it has been managed to date through a number of different forms—for example, the common travel area; more recently, the Good Friday agreement; and hitherto, of course, the joint membership of the European Union by the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. Up until now, both jurisdictions have moved in tandem on issues involving the European Union, including on matters such as the Schengen agreement, which the Republic of Ireland has also opted out of. We are now faced with the fact that, for the first time ever, we are going to see the UK and Ireland move in different directions in terms of the European Union. That may well throw up a whole range of issues, challenges and anomalies that will need to be managed successfully.

Brexit strips away a lot of those protections, and perhaps does create a certain degree of risk. If I may, I will take one example in that regard. Members may well be aware of the Emma DeSouza case regarding immigration. It drew attention to the fact that the UK Government have not reflected in UK domestic law, particularly in relation to revision of the British Nationality Act 1981, the right of someone born and resident in Northern Ireland to identify solely as Irish, and to have Irish citizenship. What the law currently says is that anyone born in Northern Ireland is, by birth, automatically British, and to many that goes against both the letter and the spirit of the Good Friday agreement.

As long as that case, and indeed other situations, go unresolved there is a latent fear of these anomalies persisting and, indeed, potentially growing, particularly if there is greater divergence between the UK and the rest of the European Union, including the Republic of Ireland in particular. That has implications for what is a very complex situation, which has been managed by the Good Friday agreement—on a faltering basis over the past 20 years, but none the less managed—and we may well be in very difficult and rocky territory. It is important that the Government reflect on some of the fears that are being expressed in Northern Ireland. Although I am not going to press the amendment today, I think it is important that the Government reflect on the matter.

[Ian Paisley (North Antrim) (DUP)]

The hon. Member must of course reflect that the fact of the matter is that the Republic of Ireland is an independent country in its own right. By being independent it is entitled to go its own way, and if it wants to go a different way with Europe it is entitled to do that. We would not want to restrict it and say it has to come with Britain. I would be delighted, whenever we leave the EU and Europe increases its bill of membership to the Republic of Ireland—when the Republic sees how costly it is to be a member—if those in the Republic of Ireland had a national conversation about their role as Irish citizens in the EU. Ultimately, however, that is a choice the Republic of Ireland has made—that it wishes to remain within the EU—and we should not try to restrict its hands, either.

[Stephen Farry]

I am always grateful to hear comments from my counterpart in Northern Ireland, but I think it is worth stressing for the record that there is no significant movement or debate whatsoever in the Republic of Ireland about any form of “Irexit”, as it might be framed. There is deep commitment to membership of the European Union in the south of Ireland, as indeed there is, on a majority basis, in Northern Ireland and in Scotland and other parts of the UK as well.

While Ireland will make its decision to remain part of the European Union, it is of course the UK that is diverging. That debate has been had, and I recognise the outcome in that respect. None the less, it is important to recognise that Northern Ireland is a complex society, and it only works on the basis of sharing and interdependence. A very careful set of balanced relationships has been built up over the past number of years, with the support of those on both Front Benches in this House over that period. Brexit does potentially strip away some of the sticking-plaster over some of the cracks and we do not know exactly how things will work out. It is important that the Government pay regard to, and are sensitive to, the very particular implications in rights terms for Northern Ireland as the Brexit process unfolds.

European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill

Stephen Farry Excerpts

3rd reading & 3rd reading: House of Commons
Thursday 9th January 2020 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Farry (North Down) (Alliance)]

Thank you very much, Madam Deputy Speaker, but I should say that I have already had that privilege, before the Christmas break. None the less, thank you for the entreaty.

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

I sincerely apologise to the hon. Gentleman. It will be obvious that I have been absent from the Chair for a few weeks. Given that the hon. Gentleman is not making his maiden speech, he can take lots of interventions and everyone can shout at him.

[Stephen Farry]

Thank you very much, Madam Deputy Speaker, for setting me up in that regard. May I pass on formally our congratulations on your election as Deputy Speaker?

I wish to introduce Northern Ireland into the debate, given the fact that it has been so central to the Brexit process so far. There are still so many unresolved issues and questions and it is important that we reflect on them as the Bill passes Third Reading, because there is still a long journey ahead.

Before I do that, I wish to make some general comments and to share in the concerns expressed by many Opposition Members about where we are with the Bill. There is uncertainty as to whether a trade deal can be done in the next 11 and a half months; there is the risk of no deal; there is the nature of the future relationship to consider; and there are issues of the parliamentary scrutiny, or lack thereof, of where we go from here. Of course, there is also more general regret about the Brexit process, which is going to leave the UK in a worse position overall in terms of the economy, society, security and the environment. That is particularly true of my own region of Northern Ireland.

I wish to focus on the unresolved issues. Brexit throws up a unique set of challenges for Northern Ireland, because, perhaps more than any other part of the UK, we are part of that wider network—that integrated framework across these islands. We are interdependent in terms of our trade and our society, both north-south on the island and in the wider whole-UK context as well. The problem of Brexit is that, whatever way it falls, it entails some degree of new barriers, borders or friction. In the context of Northern Ireland, that creates a sense of win and loss, in terms not only of the economy but of wider society and the emotional and psychological impacts. We also need to be acutely aware of the potential political ramifications in the medium to long term.

That said, we saw this week the almost remarkable situation in which, across the political divide in Northern Ireland, we had all the parties coming together behind a common set of amendments, which were also backed by—and, indeed, in many respects driven by—the local business community in Northern Ireland, which has itself come together in an almost unprecedented way because of the huge importance of the issues before us. I remain very much convinced, as do my colleagues in the Social Democratic and Labour party, that Northern Ireland’s place is as part of the European Union. The Democratic Unionist party comes from a leave, pro-Brexit perspective. Regardless of how we reached this point, we all share the desire to ensure that we have the seamless, unfettered trade between Northern Ireland and Great Britain that was the theme of the amendments, to protect the wider UK internal market and to ensure that the GB-to-Northern Ireland interface can be managed successfully.

Several wider points need to be made about the context. First, we should not see emerging—or indeed being forced on us—a choice or a trade-off between some sort of border or interface on the island of Ireland and a border or interface down the Irish sea. We want to avoid both those possibilities, but there will be a huge challenge in the way things have fallen in that respect. Indeed, the Assembly has almost been set up with this choice to make in four or eight years’ time: whether to maintain ongoing regulatory alignment for goods on an all-island and European basis, or align with the rest of the UK. It is not a choice that anyone particularly relishes and it builds a degree of instability into our political structures. Members will be aware that talks are ongoing back in Belfast as we speak to try to restore the Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly—I pay tribute to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland for his work in that regard over the past months—but Brexit adds a new layer of complexity to that wider context.

The focus of the debate and the amendments has largely been the interface between Northern Ireland and Great Britain, mainly because that is much more under the control of the UK Government. However, the process from Great Britain into Northern Ireland—and, indeed, beyond into the European Union—is just as important, if not more so. I think that those plans were not tested so much through amendments because that work depends on the outworkings of the future free trade arrangement. In that regard, it is worth stressing that a free trade agreement—even one that is very far reaching and inclusive—is not the same as the arrangements we currently have as part of the European Union; it is not the same as a customs union and a single market. A free trade agreement is a qualitatively different concept. We currently have a free trade arrangement through which we can access trade agreements with the rest of the world, and that is what we are giving up for an untested future.

There is ambiguity about where Northern Ireland will sit with respect to these future trade relations—whether we are part of a wider European Union framework when it comes to goods, or whether we are part of the wider UK trade policy. There was a time, particularly under the proposals of the former Prime Minister, when Northern Ireland could have had a foot in both camps, and the business community was embracing that. The danger now is that Northern Ireland could be marginalised and peripheral in both UK and EU trade terms, with local businesses facing considerable ongoing economic costs. In particular, there may well be barriers to accessing certain markets or attracting investment, because people will just see Northern Ireland as a complicated place and think that it is too difficult to engage with us. Our economy, which is already struggling from a low starting point, will continue to be marginalised.

As we look to a future relationship, it is important that we bear in mind the importance of integrating goods with access to labour; I am particularly thinking about ongoing freedom of movement and the service economy. It is very difficult to uncouple the four freedoms of the European single market. We need some degree of new deal for Northern Ireland because local businesses are going to face considerable economic costs. There will be a need for financial support as mitigation, or to support the transition as local companies adjust to the new arrangements and the new market frameworks.

Let me return to what happens as we look ahead to the next phase. There is a gap between: the rhetoric, declarations and promises of the UK Government and Ministers, particularly the Prime Minister; what we have been told by a range of different experts; and the reality of international and European law on customs and regulatory matters. That is an ongoing challenge which needs to be addressed, but Northern Ireland businesses want to see the commitments to unfettered access being honoured. We want to ensure that there is no discrimination against Northern Ireland goods, and it is important that we assess on an ongoing basis the economic impact of the Northern Ireland protocol.

My final point is that there has been a lot of focus on the joint report as being the almost magic solution to every unresolved question at this stage, as well as on the free trade agreement and negotiations. Given the very particular circumstances faced by Northern Ireland, my appeal would be for Northern Ireland representatives to be integral to those discussions and for there to be a proper feedback loop to the Northern Ireland Assembly, Executive and whatever democratic structures we can put in place back in Northern Ireland.