Hinkley Point C

John Bercow Excerpts

Thursday 15th September 2016 Commons Chamber

[Barry Gardiner (Brent North) (Lab)]

I thank the Secretary of State for the 13 minutes’ advance notice of his statement. Let me be clear that this is an important project that must now go forward without any further interruption or delay. The Secretary of State is aware that by intervening on 28 July, after EDF’s final investment decision, the Government put at risk 25,000 well-paid and well-qualified jobs. He knows that delaying not only risked the £18 billion of investment in UK jobs and infrastructure, but rocked confidence in investors who now believe that the Prime Minister does not understand the significance that companies attach to taking a final investment decision. He is aware of the Ernst and Young index that shows that Britain has fallen from fourth to 13th in attractiveness for low-carbon investment. The delay has only unsettled investors further.

I have a number of specific questions for the Secretary of State. First, in her meeting with President Xi, did the Prime Minister attempt in any way to isolate the building of the Hualong One reactor at Bradwell from the deal at Hinkley Point C? Secondly, if she did, what was the Chinese response?

Thirdly, of course every Member of the House agrees that the Government’s primary responsibility is to safeguard our national security, but neither the Secretary of State nor the Prime Minister has ever been clear about what they consider to be the security risks associated with the current deal. Will he now set those out so that the House and the public can decide whether the modifications that he is proposing adequately reflect the risks he believes exist?

Fourthly, can the Secretary of State specifically set out whether the Government were concerned about the security of the intellectual property associated with the EPR reactor? If so, was he aware that two such reactors are already under construction in China, in the form of the Taishan 1 and 2?

Fifthly, were the Government concerned with the potential for a cyber-attack? If so, did the Secretary of State not consider that, given the importance to the Chinese of having Bradwell as a kitemark for marketing their Hualong One reactor technology around the world, such an attack would undermine the very reason the Chinese wanted to be involved in the project in the first place?

Sixthly, if the Secretary of State wishes to dodge these questions by pleading that he does not wish to discuss security matters, I would ask how he can assure the House and the public that the efficacy of the amendments he is proposing are sufficient to meet the risks and challenges that justified a near-fatal delay in the project?

We must address the sole argument that the Government have actually presented as well as those that they have not. They claim that they have introduced significant new safeguards into the package, in particular that they will be able to require notification from owners or operators of nuclear sites of any change of ownership or part-ownership, but the Secretary of State already has such powers. Will he acknowledge that he can currently prevent the sale of any element of the UK’s critical infrastructure? That being the case, can he explain why he believes the proposed new powers add significantly to the public interest regulations in the Enterprise Act 2002, or are they merely window dressing to make it appear that the Government’s intervention has achieved something, no matter how much appearances may indicate to the contrary?

Is the Secretary of State aware of the House of Commons briefing paper entitled “Mergers & takeovers: the public interest test”? It highlights that energy security is already covered by national security, and that the Government already have the powers to prevent such a sale. Is he also aware that in the House of Lords, during the passage of the Energy Act, my noble Friend Lord Puttnam introduced an amendment specifically to introduce energy security as a new public interest term? Government lawyers then advised that:

“In cases where a merger posed a genuine and serious threat to what is described as societal needs, such as energy supply, this would be covered by the existing provision in the 2002 Act regarding national security—so ministers would be empowered to directly intervene.”

The Government created a commercial crisis. They sent shock waves through the industry and unions alike. They risked a diplomatic dispute with one of our key future trading partners, and in the end all they have done is pretend to give themselves powers that they already possessed. This statement is window dressing. It is face-saving by a Government who talked big and eventually backed down with a whimper.

The Secretary of State should explain whether he has reviewed changes to technology that have occurred in the past 10 years, particularly smart grids, battery storage technology and energy efficiency measures to manage our electricity supply in such a way as to reduce our need for the baseload power that Hinkley supplies.

[Mr Speaker]

Order. I think that the hon. Gentleman has concluded his remarks, because his time is up.

[Greg Clark]

The hon. Gentleman raised a large number of points, and I will address them. I hope that we share the view that a confident, long-term energy policy is vital to ensuring that people have access to secure energy that is affordable and clean, and that we should be a world leader in these important energy industries. I hope that he will not think it churlish of me to point out the complete absence of a long-term energy policy during Labour’s 13 years in government, when our nuclear fleet was known to be coming to the end of its life, yet no decision was taken to replace it. It has fallen to this Government to make the long-term decisions for the security of this country. Instead of making like the ostrich and hoping that the problem would go away, this Government are looking to the future, providing the upgrade to our long-term energy security that we need.

With regard to the hon. Gentleman’s position today, I am afraid that I am as confused as ever. His position is no more credible. He seems to be criticising the Prime Minister and the Government for taking the serious decision to review the components of a very important deal—that seems to be the import of his remarks. He said that this had damaged confidence, but when the announcement was made on 29 July, he told the BBC:

“I’m hoping what they will do is take two to three months to seriously review it”.

So much for the suggestion that we should not have had the review in the first place—although I am not sure what the purpose of that two or three months would be, because the very same day he said that he had already made his mind up. He said that he would not scrap the proposal

“because I welcome the jobs and I welcome the 7% of electricity that this will produce for the nation.”

That is from the hon. Gentleman who was urging the Government to take longer to review something, the conclusions of which he had already agreed in the first place. The contrast between that and the seriousness and forensic approach of the Government is marked.

I will address the points that the hon. Gentleman has raised. The powers under the Enterprise Act are subject to takeover thresholds. We are ensuring that any change in ownership or control, of whatever size, will be covered by a national security test. That seems to be sensible.

On Hinkley, until we proposed these changes to the contract, EDF was at liberty to sell its majority stake in that important investment without even needing the permission of the UK Government. Therefore, it seems sensible and prudent to have agreed straightforwardly with EDF that the UK Government’s consent should be required.

I am surprised that the hon. Gentleman, who I would have thought would take a prudent view of matters of national security, should suggest—again, it is not clear—that we should not make these changes. When we debate these matters, he will be able to set out whether he opposes the measures we are taking to safeguard and entrench the same regime for national security in this country that other advanced economies enjoy.

I was clear in my statement that this is the first of what we hope will be a series of new nuclear investments. Just about 20% of power is generated by nuclear. It is important that there is another contribution to a diverse energy mix from nuclear. In so doing, we create new jobs, new opportunities and major advances for the UK economy.