Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill

John Bercow Excerpts

Wednesday 11th December 2013 Commons Chamber

Consideration of Lords amendments

[Mr Speaker]

I must draw the House’s attention to the fact that financial privilege is involved in Lords amendments 35, 37, 40, 64, 149, 150, 162, 163, 169, 171, 172, 173 and 175. If the House agrees to any of these amendments, I shall ensure that the appropriate entry is made in the Journal.

After Clause 12

Part 4

[The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Sajid Javid)]

I beg to move, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 41.

[Mr Speaker]

With this we may take Lords amendments 42 to 62, 160 and 174.

[Sajid Javid]

It is a pleasure to introduce these amendments. Much work has been undertaken in this House and in the other place since my predecessor closed the Second Reading debate in March. That work has improved the Bill. The Bill has expanded greatly in length and content since it left this House. In large part, the variety of new issues that it covers reflects the Government’s acceptance of the vast majority of the recommendations that were made by the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, which published its final report after the Committee stage in the Commons.

I pay tribute to the members of the PCBS and especially those who sit in this House: my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie), the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden), the hon. Member for Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross (John Thurso), the hon. Member for Edmonton (Mr Love) and my hon. Friend the Member for Wyre Forest (Mark Garnier). It was their hard work that led to the reports.

I will speak in support of the amendments that resulted from the work of the parliamentary commission, but ask the House to reject the Opposition amendment that was made in the other place, Lords amendment 41. I will begin by explaining how the former amendments will deliver the goal of improving the standards of conduct in banking.

The Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards concluded that the current system for approving those who hold senior positions in banks, the approved persons regime, had failed. The commission’s central recommendation was the creation of a senior persons regime that applies to senior bankers. The Government accepted that recommendation. The amendments will deliver on the recommendation by putting in place a senior managers regime with five key features.

First, the regime will reverse the burden of proof so that senior bankers can be held to account for regulatory breaches in their area of responsibility, without the need to prove that they were personally involved in the wrongdoing. Secondly, there will be mandatory statements of responsibility for senior managers. Thirdly, the regulators will be able to make conduct rules for senior managers in banks. Fourthly, there will be provision for time-limited and conditional approvals of senior bankers. Fifthly, the financial services register, which is kept by the Financial Conduct Authority, will state who is a senior manager in a bank and give details of the regulatory action that has been taken against them. The amendments will provide a clear and effective system for raising standards and increasing accountability among the country’s senior bankers.

Lords amendment 53 introduces a certification regime for bank staff. That will apply to all staff below senior management level who have roles in which they could seriously harm the firm or its customers. The Prudential Regulation Authority and the FCA will therefore be given a far-reaching new power to make enforceable rules of conduct for all employees in a bank. Banks will have to verify that employees who have roles in which they could do significant harm to a bank or its customers are fit and proper for those roles. Banks will have to do that on appointment and annually thereafter. They will have to issue certificates, which may be electronic, to those employees, confirming that they are fit and proper for their role.

The Government have always supported the spirit and substance of the commission’s licensing regime recommendations. However, we do not consider it appropriate to call it a licensing regime. That would imply that the individuals concerned had been given licences by a regulator. That is precisely the opposite of what the commission recommended. We therefore cannot use the words “licence” or “licensing”. It is in order to refer to “certificates” and “certification” because certificates will be issued by the banks. Banks will also have to notify employees of the banking standards rules that apply to them and take steps to ensure that they understand them.

I would like to say something about the firms that are covered by the senior managers regime and the new obligations under the certified persons regime. The parliamentary commission naturally focused on banks. However, the definition was extended to include systemically important investment firms that do not take deposits, but that are regulated by the PRA. We have also included a power to extend the senior managers and certified persons regimes to cover UK branches of foreign banks and investment firms if it is considered appropriate to do so. Some large branches of foreign banks and investment firms operate from London, so it is prudent to equip ourselves to bring them into the new regime.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Tyrie]

The fact that an individual is found responsible should not in any way exculpate the institution from its own responsibilities. On the other hand, a key recommendation of the Banking Commission was to restore individual responsibility. To return to a situation where it is primarily the institution that carries the can for what had been a series of individual pieces of bad behaviour would be a profound mistake. There is a lot behind the exchange we have just had that I am not going to go into now, but which we thought about quite deeply on the commission. I shall now move on as there are a few more remarks I want to make about this group of amendments.

Everyone now seems to be agreed that the APR adds little or nothing, yet over the past few weeks we have discovered that the discredited APR will survive in legislation. In doing that, the regulators are perpetuating a myth that the APR affords any real protection. It will continue to apply to several groups. First, about 20,000 people in the financial services industry outside banking will still be covered, mainly in fund management and insurance.

This is unfinished business. The Banking Commission had the remit to look only at banking. It would be absurd to retain a system for one part of financial services that has so clearly failed in another. The Government and Parliament both need to encourage the regulator to look at this and do what is necessary to extend the coverage of the new regime and to remove the APR from other parts of financial services. To rely on the APR is asking for trouble.

It is also regrettable that the APR will remain in a few isolated pockets within the banking industry. This is because the APR will continue to apply to firms’ LIBOR submitters and to persons with anti-money laundering responsibilities in banks. This amounts, I gather, to only a few dozen people, but I think it would be far better if we removed what amounts to “triple running”. We will have three layers: the senior persons regime, now called the senior managers regime, licensing, now called certification, and the APR in the case of these people. The extra APR layer confers no extra protection, but adds bureaucracy and creates a business cost. There will be plenty of scope for legal wrangling in the event of a regulatory failure, given the great scope for confusion, and for an equal measure of recrimination by regulators who will say they were asked to do too much by Parliament. Banks will have a point when they complain about that. For all those reasons, I hope that the Government will come back to this issue and remove the APR from banking entirely in due course.

The Banking Commission’s proposals do not guarantee better standards. Much will depend on the judgment of regulators and the common sense of the banks, but identifying responsibility for key roles offers a much better prospect of higher standards than does retaining the APR. The commissioners are delighted that our proposals on this are now going to be put on the statute book.

[Mr Speaker]

The hon. Gentleman’s speech is characterised, as always, by a combination of scholarship and erudition. May I just inquire whether we are now nearer to the end of his speech than to the beginning?

[Mr Tyrie]

I can give you a firm assurance, Mr Speaker, that I am coming very close to the end of my remarks. Indeed, I am no closer than I would have been before that intervention, unless I had been told to sit down, because I really am almost at the end.

I just want to say a word about the Opposition amendment before I sit down. It draws on a number of the Banking Commission’s proposals and, by seeking to put it on the face of the Bill, the Opposition have contributed something by forcing the Government to think again about their rejection of our proposals on licensing. The amendment was therefore probably worth while. However, the Government have now thought again and are implementing our proposals.

There are two aspects of Lords amendment 41 that would make me cautious about supporting it. The first is it would require regulators to pre-approve all people covered by licensing—or what is now going to be called certification. I fear that would risk recreating many of the problems we had with the APR—the box-ticking bureaucratic culture that we are trying to get rid of.

My other concern with the amendment is that it appears to mix up licensing with the professionalisation of the banking industry. It would be imprudent to link professionalisation to licensing too closely. Licensing needs to happen now. Professionalisation is not a substitute for it. Even if banking is something that could acquire the characteristics of a profession—which many people are not yet convinced of—it would, as the commission reported, take a generation to build that sense of a professional standard.

For those reasons, although I strongly sympathise with the intent of the Opposition amendment, it is not a Banking Commission proposal and I shall not be supporting it. The House could do better by implementing the commission’s proposals, which are now embodied in Government amendments.

[Several hon. Members]

rose—

[Mr Speaker]

Order. I should explain to the House that I have exercised some latitude so that the hon. Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie) could offer a bit of background on the parliamentary investigation. I did that because I thought that it would be genuinely helpful to the House and because there would be no other opportunity for those observations to be made. That said, I would not want it to be thought that that will be the normal rubric on these occasions. The normal rule of thumb, which must continue to apply, is that Members should attend to and focus their remarks exclusively on the amendments and should not engage in what might be called a wider dilation. I hope that that is helpful to the House.

[Yasmin Qureshi (Bolton South East) (Lab)]

I will bear in mind your observations, Mr Speaker, but I hope you will indulge me if I occasionally say something a bit different. I will of course spend most of my time on the amendment.

I want to set the matter in context. I volunteered to serve on the Bill Committee. I am told that it is traditional for Members to have to be nudged into serving on Committees for Finance Bills, unless of course they are Ministers or shadow Ministers. I wanted to serve on the Committee perhaps because I am a bit geeky or because I am interested in esoteric things; perhaps it is because of my legal background that I am interested in these matters.

I also had a more serious reason for volunteering. We need to bear in mind that this country’s economy relies heavily on the financial services industry, and that a massive banking and financial crisis occurred in 2008, not only in the UK but in similar economies around the world. We know that the crisis started as a result of the collapse of Lehman Brothers and of the sub-prime mortgage market in the United States, which led to the collapse of many banks around the world. Economies like ours—in the USA, Japan, France and Germany, for example—suffered as well.