(12 years ago)
Commons ChamberOrder. The hon. Gentleman’s time has run out.
Thank you very much, Mr Deputy Speaker, for presiding over our last debate before Christmas. I have one specific subject that I want to raise, and a couple of very little things that I shall mention at the end.
A lot of my constituency casework—about 40%—relates to the Home Office and to the UK Border Agency, and many of the cases involve people who are here legitimately and who want to renew their visas. The process is simply not working, and we need to sort that out. All sorts of people are affected, including people who are working here and need to renew their visa in order to carry on doing their job, and people who came here as spouses and need to renew their status to be able to continue to live with their wife, husband or partner.
People can choose how to apply to renew their visas. They can apply by post, or in person after booking an appointment online. The applications are not free. The minimum cost is about £300 and the maximum is about £2,000, so people are making a significant contribution. Both application systems have problems, and they are causing my constituents, and those of many other colleagues, severe inconvenience. It is possible to use the premium same-day service, and it costs between £300 and £400 more to apply in person than to apply by post.
My constituents tell me that the system often releases new appointments at midnight, which is inconvenient, and because everyone logs on to the website at midnight, the system regularly crashes. The website also has basic technical errors. One constituent, a friend of mine named Selcuk Akinci, found that it was offering appointments only for 2020, which was not particularly useful. There are rarely any appointments available within two months, although that fact is not advertised anywhere. Most people, quite reasonably, think about applying to extend their stay only one or two months before their current visa is due to expire. Many therefore find that they cannot get an appointment before their leave expires. They then have to apply by post, which often means a six-month wait without being able to travel. People will not have expected that, and it can cause real problems for them, especially if they need to visit family regularly or if their work involves frequent travel. This problem can often prevent people from doing their job, if they need to travel for work.
Appointments can be made at any of the seven public inquiry offices in the UK. The system tells people where the next available appointment is, and they might find that they have to go from south London to Glasgow or Birmingham. Many people have to travel a long way for their appointment. When they arrive, even if they have booked the premium same-day service, there is no guarantee that the application will be processed on the same day. If the UKBA decides that further checks are necessary, the application is taken out of the premium service queue and put into the postal applications queue, which means that it could take up to six months to process. There is no refund of the premium fee in those circumstances.
People have no way of knowing whether their case will require further checks, which can be triggered by many different factors. There can be genuinely good reasons for carrying out such checks. For example, the person’s name might generate a hit on the police national computer, they might have used a different identity in the past, or they might have no leave to remain at the time of their application. However, further checks are sometimes triggered for bad reasons. Whatever the reason, the person concerned is not allowed to talk to anyone. They are taken out of the premium application process and told that their case has gone into the postal system and that they have to go home and wait, perhaps for more than three months. The case is placed in a kind of “cannot process it today” queue and sent away to a casework centre.
Cases are sometimes referred for further checks for illegitimate reasons. My senior caseworker, James Harper, deals with such cases every day in our Bermondsey office, and I deal with them often. For example, a person’s records might not have been properly updated on the UKBA database. In a recent case, a Ghanaian couple travelled all the way to Birmingham so that the husband could apply to extend his marriage visa in the normal way. However, Mr Kusi’s records had not been properly updated on the Home Office system to show his existing leave to remain. It therefore appeared to the officers at the inquiry office that he had no right to apply, even though he did, and the couple were turned away and left with only three days to apply by post before his existing visa expired. The couple pleaded with the officers to ring the visa office that had dealt with the original application, but were told that that was not possible and that they would have to leave. This is really unacceptable.
In a further case, an Iranian woman in my constituency was applying to extend her stay as the wife of a British citizen. Her case was referred for further checks because it was believed that she did not have high enough English language test scores: level 4.0 on the IELTS—International English Language Testing System—scale in reading and writing. In fact, this was a misinterpretation of the rules, as level 4.0 is required only in speaking and listening. My constituent qualified and her case was sent on, but it was subject to a long delay; only after we intervened did the UKBA admit that an error had been made and then refund the additional premium fee.
(12 years, 3 months ago)
Commons ChamberWith this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 9, page 2, line 40, in clause 4, leave out from ‘statement’ to end of line 41 and insert—
‘the court must have regard to all the circumstances of the case and those circumstances may include (among other things)—’.
Amendment 1, page 3, line 5, after ‘it’, insert—
‘or within or a reasonable amount of time following initial publication’.
Amendment 10, page 3, line 7, leave out paragraph (g).
Amendment 2, page 3, line 8, at end insert—
‘within a reasonable amount of time, allowing for the public and commercial interest in publication.’.
Amendment 11, page 3, line 9, leave out from ‘the’ to end of line and insert—
‘urgency of the matter; or’.
Amendment 3, page 3, line 10, at end insert—
(j) whether the defendant had made reasonable efforts to abide by the National Union of Journalists’ Code of Conduct.’.
Amendment 12, page 3, line 10, at end insert—
‘() the extent of the defendant’s compliance with any relevant code of conduct or other relevant guidelines’.
Amendment 4, page 3, line 21, at end insert—
‘(7) In determining public interest, the court shall have regard to whether the claimant is a person in public life, which should be taken to include (amongst others) politicians, public officials, celebrities and others whose influence, earnings or social status is dependent on a public image.’.
This debate is about how we deal with what is or is not a matter of public interest—which, in itself, is increasingly becoming a matter of public interest.
I had a few days off in August. I tried to escape the British media by going to Spain—in particular, to watch Barcelona play Real Madrid in the first half of the super cup, in that most fantastic of stadiums in Barcelona. I did not succeed entirely in having five days free from the British media, because even the Spanish media were reporting that The Sun was publishing photographs of Prince Harry, defending its actions on the basis that they were in the public interest. In that way, the debate starts to take over everything that people want to justify. However, in the light of the Prime Minister’s statement earlier and the comments across the House, I hope that The Sun understands today what is in the public interest and that that appears on the front page of tomorrow morning’s paper by way of an apology to the supporters of Liverpool who were killed or injured at Hillsborough 23 years ago.
I want to introduce the debate by tracing where we have got to in terms of legislation. My new clause 4 suggests an additional way of dealing with public interest matters, which I hope will commend itself to the House. I have had the benefit of a brief word with the new Secretary of State and the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, the hon. Member for Maidstone and The Weald (Mrs Grant), who will be responding to this debate, both of whom we welcome to their posts. It is not my intention to divide the House on my new clause today; we just need to flag up where the issues are. Also, given that the time we have been given since the Bill was in Committee has been foreshortened, I accept that the issue will need more consideration.
Until recently, the question of what was in the public interest was dealt with by the common law, as opposed to by statute. I can do no better than to quote a short excerpt from the excellent Library note on the Defamation Bill—research paper 12/30, published on 28 May—to explain what the position was then. The case of Reynolds v. Times Newspapers in 2007 established what has become known as the “Reynolds privilege”, which is a common-law defence that a publication is acceptable and therefore cannot be the subject of a successful libel action because it is in the public interest. That defence is of particular importance to the press and broadcasters, although it is available to anybody, publishing in any medium, who wishes to use it. There was then a further case in the House of Lords, called Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe Sprl. The commentary on those two cases, which followed one another pretty speedily, by the authoritative book on the subject, “Carter-Ruck on Libel and Privacy”, said that, in the case of Jameel,
“the House of Lords sent a strong signal that the direction of travel, post-Reynolds had not been sufficiently in favour of press freedom,”
and, as the Library paper sets out, highlighted:
“Lord Hoffman’s comment that the non-exhaustive list of ten factors that had been set out in Reynolds to consider whether the journalism employed had been responsible had been taken by some judges as a set of hurdles to be overcome by a defendant.”
Before the Reynolds case, it seems that
“it was clear that, although no generic privilege existed for fair publication in the press on a matter of public interest, there were some situations in which a qualified privilege would attach to publications to the general public,”
yet it was unclear quite how that would work.
The Bill we are considering today was preceded by a draft Bill, which was considered by a Joint Committee of both Houses. It concluded on the subject:
“The Reynolds defence of responsible journalism in the public interest should be replaced with a new statutory defence that makes the law clearer, more accessible and better able to protect the free speech of publishers. The Bill must make it clear that the existing common law defence will be repealed.”
Therefore, clause 4, which is entitled “Responsible publication on matter of public interest”, contains a proposal to replace the common law defence with a statutory defence. Subsection (6) states:
“The common law defence known as the Reynolds defence is abolished.”