Deprivation of Citizenship Orders (Effect during Appeal) Bill

Simon Hoare Excerpts

Committee of the whole House
Monday 14th July 2025 Commons Chamber

[Kit Malthouse]

The Minister is a fair man and a fair-minded man. He is quite right, and I am willing to countenance his appeal and give him the benefit of the doubt, and that is exactly what I am asking for the individuals subject to this legislation. He will know that we have certain inalienable constitutional rights as British citizens, which this legislation contravenes. The first is that we have a right to a fair hearing and that any action the Government take must be exercised fairly. That right has been established in the common law again and again, and most recently in 1994, in the case of ex parte Doody, when the court decided that Ministers must exercise their powers fairly.

The second inalienable right, which has been decided in the Supreme Court, is that we all have a right to access to the courts, and that cannot be unfairly restricted. As that has been decided by the Supreme Court, the Government cannot put up artificial barriers to our access, such as raising fees or making sure that we cannot physically get to the court. Indeed, as the Minister will know, I have an absolute right to defend myself in person at every stage of legal action, whether that is at first hearing or at subsequent appeal. All those powers or rights that I have as a citizen are affected by the legislation he is attempting to put through.

My amendment essentially says three things. If the Government failed to win an appeal, but wished to continue to deprive me of my citizenship pending a further appeal, they must, when seeking leave to appeal from the judge, also ask the judge for leave to continue the deprivation of citizenship. The judge basically could say no in three circumstances. First, the judge could say no if there is a real and substantial threat of serious harm to that individual if they were denied access to the United Kingdom. Some of these people will be living or operating from extremely dangerous places. If that person is likely to be killed pending further appeal on the denial of their citizenship, it would seem grossly unfair, their having already won an appeal, to deny them access to the country.

The second ground would be if their exclusion from the UK and the continuing of denial of citizenship would be deeply prejudicial to the conduct of their defence in an appeal that the Government subsequently decided to bring. In such a case, it would be impossible for me to defend myself at appeal in person, which should be my inalienable right as a British citizen. It would be impossible for me to do that remotely in some God-forsaken part of the world where I cannot Zoom in or I do not have the ability to communicate. It would be the same if I am unable to communicate with my legal team. I am sure the Minister can see that it would be unfair to interfere with someone’s ability to mount a proper defence—we should not forget that that person has already won an appeal—through the continuing denial of citizenship.

The third ground, which we covered on Second Reading, is the Government’s taking their time, achieving their objective merely by dragging their heels and playing for time, hoping that something, perhaps something untoward, will turn up. A judge should then make a judgment—the clue is in the name—on whether they are being efficient in their use of the legal system, rather than, as I am afraid happens from time to time, gaming it to their own advantage.

[Simon Hoare (North Dorset) (Con)]

As my right hon. Friend knows, I have a huge amount of respect and affection for him, and he is right to refer to the inalienable rights that a British citizen has in terms of access to justice and so forth, but surely he must accept that individuals facing deprivation of citizenship will have crossed a threshold of behaviour, or allegiance, so alien to our traditions, so alien to all the rights and responsibilities accrued over the decades of British citizenship, that in essence, in the court of public opinion, they will put themselves way beyond the pale when it comes to those issues. It would be an extreme hypocrisy for those who most seek to undermine our way of life to demand all the rights and privileges that they have sought to undermine, and possibly destroy, through their actions or foreign allegiances.

[Kit Malthouse]

I understand my hon. Friend’s point, but I would have more faith, or confidence, in his view if it applied to me as well, which it does not. What we are saying is that we can have two British citizens who commit the same heinous acts but receive two different kinds of treatment. One can have his or her citizenship removed and be expelled from the country, but another—say I were to do that—cannot. My view is that this is highly discriminatory, and tramples over some of the inalienable rights that my hon. Friend has mentioned. We currently have plenty of British citizens in high-security prisons who have committed acts as heinous as those committed by people whom we have deprived of British citizenship, but we have decided to deprive them of British citizenship purely because of their heritage and background—purely because they may be second-generation immigrants.

As I pointed out on Second Reading, this legislation applies to every single Jewish member of the United Kingdom citizenry. They all have an inalienable right to Israeli citizenship, and as a result, in my view, they all have second-class citizenship. I do not think that that is right. I do not think that it is fair. I think that it drives a wedge into our society, and sows a seed of doubt at the back of everyone’s mind.

This is the point that I was trying to make at the start. Those who perpetrate such heinous acts overseas absolutely should be punished. As my hon. Friend will know, over the past 10 years I have been at the forefront of trying to ensure that as many criminals as possible end up behind bars, whatever the criminality might be, but the fact is that there is a principle in British law—we are all supposed to be equal—and the Bill breaches that principle very significantly. Moreover, what the Government are attempting to do not only reinforces that breach, but aims to twist and skew fundamental tenets of British justice that have been our right for centuries.

[Simon Hoare]

Surely the fact that a remedy is not available to all does not mean that it is not a remedy. If we wish to argue for the two-tier approach, we can think of instances in which mental capacity has come into play, particularly in respect of capital offences, when those existed here. In abstract theory, that was a two-tier approach to justice, determined on the grounds of mental capacity or lack thereof. Surely remedies do not have be applicable universally to be applied fairly and within the law.

[Kit Malthouse]

I am not sure that I accept the hon. Gentleman’s logic. The test of mental capacity in the judicial system applies to everyone equally. If I were being prosecuted for an offence, I would be assessed for mental capacity, just as my hon. Friend would. The court would accept that there might be mitigations for his actions, or a requirement for a different disposal if he lacks mental capacity, but that is an external influence on him. It may come about owing to mental illness or some other kind of disability—who knows?

The point is that this comes about through no reason other than birth. My citizenship, or my lack of citizenship, is conferred on me by reason of my birth—my parentage, or my heritage. I cannot do anything about it. I cannot be treated for it, as I can be for mental illness. This is purely because my parents may have come from another country, my skin may be of a different colour, or the country of the origin of my DNA may offer particular rights of citizenship. It is something arbitrary, about which I can do nothing. We might as well have a piece of legislation that says that people with red hair receive different treatment under the law, because there is nothing they can do about that.