Courts and Tribunals Bill (First sitting)

Siân Berry Excerpts

Wednesday 25th March 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

We are going to move on, because there are a lot of questions to get in.

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

Q I have a question of clarification for any member of the panel who wants to answer. In the letter received from the wider VAWG sector, the offences they are concerned that victims of coercive control or abuse might be charged with after striking back are triable either-way offences and therefore affected by this Bill, but rape and sexual assault, as far as I understand it, are indictable-only and will remain so. The impact on those more serious cases that have been discussed will therefore be due to the impact on the time to trial and on the efficiency of the courts, which we know will be uncertain and somewhat delayed. Is that your understanding? In some of the evidence we have heard, it sounded like the assumption is that rape trials will become judge-only, but that is not what this Bill is about.

Dame Vera Baird: No, it is not. It has been, I am afraid, ramped up outside these rooms, with all these Churchillian speeches suggesting that jury trial is being taken away, full stop. That is completely untrue, as you rightly say.

[Siân Berry]

Q But the victims’ groups who have written in because they are concerned about the criminalisation of women are talking about triable either-way offences, which are directly affected by this Bill. Are their concerns there valid?

Professor Hohl: One thing to remember here is that over 90% of domestic abuse cases are already heard in the magistrates court. VAWG comprises not just sexual violence; it includes domestic abuse, sexual violence and sexual offences. There are some that will be in the either-way category.

We have had a really emotive conversation this morning. One of the issues is judge-alone versus jury trials, and there is a lot of emotion on either side. When we look back at the actual research, there is mention that judges may have biases, and a judge-alone trial may disadvantage people. If that is the genuine concern, why are we happy to accept that for sentencing and admissibility? Why is it that in all the law we are making to guide admissibility of evidence, we trust a judge to separate between myth and stereotypes and facts, but not a jury? If we are genuine about it, we have to go a lot further around oversight and accountability in the judiciary. It would be odd to just worry about it on that specific issue.

I would also like the Committee to consider the evidence around juries. This is not to cast shade on juries but to pause and look at the research, which shows that juries, too, have biases, and there are worries about myths and misconceptions. The research on juries shows that these problems exist there, too. These issues exist with judges and juries. The remedy is not going to be either holding on to the status quo or not. The remedy will be something utterly outside of the discussion we are having that is about accountability and oversight.

Some of the measures in the Bill go that way—for example, recording creates transparency, and judges having to spell out the reasons for their verdict also goes towards that. The debate has moved a really long way away from what the research actually tells us, to quite an emotive batting to and fro. If there is space for the Committee to consider that wider evidence, I would recommend it is looked at.

[John Slinger (Rugby) (Lab)]

Q Professor Hohl, do you think the Bill will lead to a fairer system, particularly for women?

Professor Hohl: This is an unanswerable question. What is fairness? [Interruption.] Well, it is an answerable question, but not a black and white one. We have heard this morning about a separation between the speediness of justice and the fairness of justice, as if they were two different things, when all the research shows that, for both defendants and victims, the time taken is part of justice. To artificially separate them does not work.

The way we measure the fairness of the system is about due process, not about outcomes. We cannot measure fairness through conviction and acquittal rates. The way our system is set up is about due process. Due process is not taking place when the system is on its knees, so getting the system to function better, so that due process can take place, should lead to a fairer system—provided that the Bill functions as intended.