Read Bill Ministerial Extracts
Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateSeema Malhotra
Main Page: Seema Malhotra (Labour (Co-op) - Feltham and Heston)Department Debates - View all Seema Malhotra's debates with the Department for Business and Trade
(1 year, 3 months ago)
Commons ChamberIt is a pleasure to speak on the Second Reading of this important Bill on behalf of His Majesty’s Opposition. The world has changed enormously, as has technology. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol North West (Darren Jones), the hon. Member for Weston-super-Mare (John Penrose) and other colleagues for their important and influential work in the development of this Bill, which Labour welcomes, having led the way in calling for large tech companies to be properly regulated to ensure competition in digital markets. We have long called for measures to protect consumers, enhance innovation and promote competition in digital markets, to unlock growth and level the playing field for innovative smaller businesses.
In the midst of a cost of living crisis, the Bill could not be more important. As the Minister alluded to, fairer markets will save billions of pounds for consumers. This important Bill updates the UK’s competition and consumer rules, in line with a changing economy and changing consumer behaviours, through three main areas of reform.
First, it creates a new pro-competition regime for digital markets by putting the Digital Markets Unit on a statutory footing and establishing a process for designating the “strategic market status” of firms that meet specific criteria in relation to certain specific digital activities. These firms will be subject to regulated behaviour regarding such digital activities, in the form of conduct requirements to help ensure fair competition.
Secondly, the Competition and Markets Authority will have new powers on market investigations, enforcement of existing competition rules and enhanced mergers and anti-trust activity. Thirdly, there are updates to consumer law, reforming consumer policy to increase consumer protection.
As long ago as 1950, the Labour manifesto written by Michael Young promised:
“An independent Consumer Advice Centre will be set up to test and report on the various consumer goods on the market. Good manufacturers will be protected and unscrupulous advertising exposed.”
Since then, Labour has certainly been the champion of consumers. Consumer rights are a proud part of the Labour and Co-operative tradition and values.
The Government needlessly delayed this Bill as a result of infighting and the changing of Ministers and Secretaries of State. Since the Bill was announced a year ago we have had three Prime Ministers, four Business Secretaries and four small business Ministers. I congratulate the Under-Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam (Paul Scully), who has done a full circle. He was the first Minister I shadowed in my role, and he will be winding up this debate.
It has been a year since this Bill was promised and five years since the Government established their digital competition expert panel. With these delays, we have fallen behind our European neighbours in this vital policy area, so this is an important Bill and we will support its Second Reading.
I thank the Under-Secretary of State for Business and Trade, the hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake), and his officials for their meetings with me and my hon. Friend the Member for Pontypridd (Alex Davies-Jones). I hope this is the spirit in which the Bill will be considered in Committee and in which we constructively debate the gaps we believe there to be in the Bill, which I will highlight today. I also thank those who have been involved in the development of this important policy and legislation, from the CMA, Which?, UKHospitality, the Chartered Trading Standards Institute, Citizens Advice, techUK and smaller enterprises.
In digital markets, a small number of large technology companies have an ever-increasing dominance. The subsequent lack of competition and regulation has acted as a barrier to entry and expansion in digital markets, preventing new entrants from bringing innovation and choice to the market. The seriousness of this for our economy and consumers has become apparent in the billions of pounds in penalties levied for anti-trust violations.
Legislators around the world are catching up with the challenges we face in relation to this abuse of dominance in digital markets. Indeed, the OECD’s global forum on competition highlighted this five years ago, outlining how many digital markets
“exhibit certain characteristics, such as low variable costs, high fixed costs and strong network effects, that result in high market shares for a small number of firms… Firms in these concentrated markets may possess market power, the ability to unilaterally and profitably raise prices or reduce quality beyond the level that would prevail under competition.”
In the UK, the Furman report concluded in 2019 that competition in digital markets needed a “new approach,” and in December 2020 the CMA convened a taskforce that recommended the creation of the Digital Markets Unit with a new regime for regulating digital firms with strategic market status.
The Office for National Statistics reports that, between 2008 and 2020, the percentage of adults reporting having shopped online in the previous 12 months increased from 53% to 87%. This ongoing trend has increased consumer exposure to the harms associated with the digital economy, including the use of consumer data, harmful online choice architecture and misleading information.
Those are reasons why the Bill needs to deliver on being a pro-competition, pro-consumer and pro-growth Bill. We welcome steps to address consumer harm resulting from monopolisation of our increasingly digital economy, while making sure that innovation is not stifled and that we are realising the benefits of new technology for social and economic progress. The interests and rights of consumers, and the enforcement of those rights through effective competition in this new, complex and evolving digital marketplace, need to be at the core of this legislation, which is vital for all of our constituents.
The challenge now is to get the legislation right. It is important that the new powers given to the CMA to ensure competition in digital markets are not watered down as the Bill progresses. Powers are needed to crack down on unfair practices. That means there must be clarity on how the new powers will be used, along with the right scrutiny, transparency and accountability, both of the CMA and of the Government to Parliament. In addition, there must be clarity on thresholds and the process of appeals. I am sure we will discuss the checks and balances in detail in Committee, not least because 35 new Henry VIII powers are in the Bill, as listed in the delegated powers memorandum. The November 2021 House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee report noted:
“Henry VIII powers are controversial and for good reason. Every such power; and its scope, must always be fully justified.”
Let me say a few further words about what we welcome in this Bill. We support the approach taken to the legislation, which seeks to be targeted to specific anti-competitive digital activities and is arguably more flexible than the reforms brought about in the EU. If that allows a more proportionate and targeted set of interventions, that is welcome. Legislators across the world are all learning, and we all want to see this be an effective regulatory framework that helps innovation, rather than hinders it, and protects consumers.
An example of how this is beginning to work is how the CMA has worked with Google on its digital Sandbox. An issue relating to third-party cookies emerged during the CMA’s digital advertising market study and a Competition Act 1998 case was then opened. Google’s proposed changes could have had privacy benefits, but they could also have given Google an anti-competitive advantage, strengthening even further its position in digital advertising markets. The CMA reached legally binding commitments with Google to address these concerns. It is important to say that both sides continue to work together and with the Information Commissioner’s Office. This is about working in partnership with business, and in the public interest, and this Bill represents a pragmatic step towards achieving that. We also welcome the inclusion of proposals such as monetary penalties for failures to comply and making undertakings directly enforceable, which were raised at the consultation. We welcome the strengthening of the alternative dispute resolution provisions, although we believe they could be strengthened further.
However, there are notable gaps that we are concerned about—areas where we are surprised and concerned the Bill does not go further. Such areas include subscription traps, tackling fake reviews and other consumer harms. First, on subscription traps, it is always to be welcomed when the Government decide to adopt a Labour party policy, which seems to be happening increasingly often. In April, we announced Labour’s plans to crack down on rip-off subscription traps, which trap people into subscriptions they no longer want. We want to legislate to ensure that customers must opt in to, rather than opt out of, subscriptions that automatically renew. That will end automatic renewal as the default option, ensuring that consumers are offered an alternative. Instead, businesses would have to offer customers a default option without automatic renewal, with the option for customers to seek automatic renewal if they prefer. At present, consumers only need to be informed about their continued subscription, not given a genuine choice. That means they can end up trapped into contracts they no longer want or use. Citizens Advice estimates that £306 million per year is spent in the UK on unwanted subscriptions.
This Bill goes part of the way to addressing that by introducing new requirements to remind customers at the end of a trial and the beginning of an auto-renewed subscription charge. But it does not go far enough in tackling these traps and adopting Labour’s full proposals, which stakeholders also support. We will be seeking to strengthen the legislation in this area to make subscription auto-renewals opt-in, rather than opt-out.
Secondly, the Government, with much fanfare, announced that this Bill would introduce provisions outlawing fake reviews. News headlines last month trumpeted the Government’s briefing, saying:
“Buying, selling or hosting fake reviews will become illegal as part of changes planned in new laws.”
Fake reviews cause huge damage, both by encouraging consumers to buy unsafe or poor-quality products, and by ruining the reputation of hospitality venues in the UK. Such reviews are utterly unfair for honest businesses, which have no means of redress, but banning fake reviews is not mentioned in this legislation once. What has been lauded as a huge step in banning fake reviews appears to be a clause allowing the Secretary of State to add to the list of unfair trading practices in schedule 18. This is quite vague and so it could be very weak. I would therefore welcome clarification from the Minister on why this has been left out, and whether he is able to expand on what banning fake reviews will look like in practice?
On broader consumer harms, the Bill represents an opportunity to take action on a number of issues affecting consumers in the digital economy. That includes taking action against drip-pricing and misleading green claims, and requiring online marketplaces and social media platforms to make buyers aware of the status of a seller, none of which are dealt with in this Bill. Do we need stronger statutory consumer advocates? I ask the Minister: why does the legislation stop where it does? Should it not go further in addressing further consumer harms in the digital economy?
Finally, on delay, it has been a year since this legislation was promised in Parliament. The Government’s own impact assessment acknowledges:
“The Bill’s impacts are expected to begin in 2025 once the package of Bill measures has been implemented”.
That is the earliest it could be, but action is needed now. We are prepared to work with the Government not only to ensure effective scrutiny of the Bill, but to get it on to the statute book as soon as possible. That includes ensuring speed on guidance and codes of practice, and sufficiency of resources. There should be no more delays.
This legislation is welcomed by the Opposition but it is well overdue. It is a welcome step in creating a new competition and digital markets regime that will enable the competition authorities to work closely and fairly with business to ensure fair competition, and promote growth and innovation. Labour welcomes competition, consumer choice and protection as signs of a healthy, functioning market economy. We are committed to making the UK the best place in the world to start and grow a business. We believe there is a pro-business, pro-worker, pro-society agenda to be built for Britain, and that consumer and competition law play an essential part in that. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill (First sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateSeema Malhotra
Main Page: Seema Malhotra (Labour (Co-op) - Feltham and Heston)Department Debates - View all Seema Malhotra's debates with the Department for Business and Trade
(1 year, 2 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesBefore we start hearing from the witnesses, do any Members wish to make declarations of interest in connection with the Bill? No.
We will move straight on then to hear oral evidence from the Competition and Markets Authority. This morning, we are privileged to have a trio of stellar CMA executives: Sarah Cardell, the chief executive; George Lusty, the senior director for consumer protection; and Will Hayter from the digital markets unit.
Before calling the first Member to ask a question, I remind all Members that questions should be limited to matters within the scope of the Bill, and that we must stick to the timings in the programme motion that the Committee has agreed. For this session, we have until 9.55 am. Could I ask our three witnesses, starting with the chief executive, to introduce themselves for the record?
Sarah Cardell: I am Sarah Cardell, chief executive of the CMA.
George Lusty: I am George Lusty, senior director for consumer protection at the CMA.
Will Hayter: I am Will Hayter, senior director for the digital markets unit at the CMA.
Q
Sarah Cardell: I will start off, and Will might come in with a specific example. We are talking here specifically about the provisions around digital markets in the Bill. What we have got with the design of the provisions here is exactly as you say—something that is really quite bespoke, quite targeted and flexible. I think that is really important. When we look at the issues that we are seeking to tackle in digital markets, there are many benefits that come from them, but there are real competition concerns. We see a concentration of market power. We see the characteristics of these markets, where there are substantial economies of scope and of scale, and the aggregation of data, and that results in potential harm, both for consumers, in terms of their ability to access a broad range of products and services, and for competing businesses that want to be able to compete and grow and innovate on a level playing field.
What does the Bill do? The Bill enables us to tackle those concerns in a very targeted way. That is critical. You asked about the comparison with the European Union’s Digital Markets Act. In terms of the underlying concern, what we have in the EU is designed similarly—there is no fundamental difference there—but it is a more blanket approach, with a blanket list of prohibited conduct, whereas what we have here is a Bill that enables the CMA to designate particular companies in relation to particular activities, and then to design conduct requirements to manage their market power in relation to those specific activities. That is a much more bespoke system from the outset—it is targeted at the individual company and the individual conduct that is a cause of concern.
I think this Bill also has a greater degree of future-proofing. That is obviously critical in these markets, because they evolve so rapidly. The system in the EU is a slightly more static approach. You have a set of provisions that prohibit certain conduct as things stand at the moment. What we will have is the ability to bring in new conduct requirements if we see new concerns emerging, and to vary those or remove them when they no longer apply. That means that the system over time will be much more responsive and much more future-proofed. Will might want to come in with a couple of specific examples.
Q
Sarah Cardell: My view is that it is entirely the opposite. Competition and open competitive markets are the foundation of an economy that encourages investment, innovation and growth. We see that from a vast range of economic literature and economic research. The work that the CMA already does is very much tied to driving innovation, investment and growth.
So the starting point is that open competitive markets are good for innovation, good for investor confidence and good for growth. We then need to make sure that the design of the regime delivers that, and that the implementation of the regime, by the CMA, delivers that. I think the design does, for the reasons that I broadly outlined, and obviously the scrutiny is then, rightly, on the CMA to make sure that in practice we deliver the regime in a way that inspires that confidence.
I think we will do that in a number of ways. The first is to look at the outcomes that we deliver, which will ensure that businesses, large and small, are able to grow, invest and thrive in these markets. The second way is to make sure that we have really strong stakeholder engagement. This is not a regime where we want to operate behind closed doors. The whole design of the regime is a participative approach where we will engage with a broad range of stakeholders, businesses and consumers as we consult on designation, design the conduct requirements, and then enforce against them.
Q
Sarah Cardell: If I quickly take accountability, George might come in on secondary tickets. Accountability is key. The Bill gives us greater responsibility and power, and with that must come greater accountability. That comes in a number of forms. Parliamentary accountability is critical. We are accountable to Parliament. We do that already through a number of appearances and engagement with Committees, but I am sure that there is more that we could do in the design of that, and we are very keen to work with colleagues in Government and across Parliament to ensure that that happens. Accountability for our decisions through the courts is another important element, and accountability to stakeholders, going back to the previous point, is key as well.
George Lusty: On secondary tickets, the CMA has taken a lot of action in this area. It has taken Viagogo to court. We found ourselves up against some of the inherent weaknesses in the existing consumer protection toolkit when we did that. We effectively had to initiate an attempt to start contempt of court proceedings to get Viagogo to comply with the court order that we had secured. We think that many of the changes in the Bill will address those weaknesses directly by giving us civil fining powers for the first time. We set out specific recommendations back in August 2021 about other things that we think could be done, but ultimately it is a matter for the Government to decide what they want to include in the legislation.
Q
Sarah Cardell: On digital markets, the design works very well, because you have an engaged approach where we will work with businesses to secure compliance with the conduct requirements. We hope that that will be a constructive engagement, and that much of that compliance will be achieved without any enforcement activity. That is the aspiration and the goal. Of course it is important to have enforcement as an effective backstop and that that enforcement happens rapidly for the reasons that you stated. The Bill envisages a six-month time limit for enforcement, which is important so that everybody knows that that timing is ringfenced.
On appeals, let me take a minute to talk through the JR standard and why I think that it is effective, because there has been a lot of debate about that. It is critical that the CMA faces effective judicial scrutiny for our work. That should go on the record. We think that the JR standard achieves that. The JR standard applies to much of our work already, including our merger control and market investigations. It applies to a number of regulators for their regulatory work already, so there is an established approach for JR.
What JR is not, certainly in our experience, is a very light-touch procedural review. It looks at process questions, but it also looks fundamentally at whether we have applied the right analytical approach, the kind of evidence that we have reviewed, how we have weighed that evidence, and the rationality—the reasonableness—of our decision making. Take the example of the Competition Appeal Tribunal review of our merger decision, which was a review of the acquisition by Meta of Giphy. We had 100-plus pages in that judgment, with 50-plus pages looking at our analytic framework, how we looked at the effect on competition, the kind of evidence that we took into account and whether we weighed it effectively. It was a very detailed critique of our assessment.
What JR does not do is start a full merits from first instance court process. It does not say, “Back to the drawing board—we are going to set the CMA’s decision to one side and then conduct the process all over again.” That is much more similar to the full merits review that we have at the moment on Competition Act 1998 cases. Our experience there is that it results in very protracted litigation—we often have cases that are in court for five or six weeks. But, fundamentally, it also changes the incentives to the parties that we are engaging with, because all eyes are on that litigation process. That means that, in our process and our own investigations, it is a lot harder to reach constructive, collaborative outcomes, because every point that we are investigating is thrown into an adversarial contest. It means that we have to turn every stone, check every piece of evidence and make sure that every point is covered, which means that our investigations themselves are more protracted and the litigation is much longer.
The benefit of judicial review in this process is that it provides absolutely robust and effective scrutiny, but it also supports an environment that is aligned with the aspirations of the Bill more broadly—to encourage engagement early on and to encourage constructive, collaborative outcomes. Then, of course, parties absolutely have the right to challenge and appeal our decisions and, where they do so, that is resolved effectively through a JR process.
I welcome Rocio Concha, director of policy and advocacy and chief economist at Which?, and Matthew Upton, acting executive director of policy and advocacy at Citizens Advice. Thank you for coming this morning. Would you be kind enough to introduce yourselves to the Committee for the record?
Rocio Concha: I am Rocio Concha, the director of policy and advocacy, and the chief economist at Which?.
Matthew Upton: I am Matthew Upton. I am the acting executive director of policy and advocacy at Citizens Advice.
Q
Rocio Concha: Let me start by saying that we are fully supportive of the Bill. We think that it will modernise competition policy and consumer policy in the UK, and that it will deliver clear benefit for consumers, businesses and the economy.
We are very supportive of part 1 of the Bill, which you discussed with the previous panel and which is about the additional powers to introduce a pro-competition regime. That is very important and we think that the regime will be proportionate and flexible, and will deliver benefit to consumers by providing more choice and lower prices.
One thing to say is that it important to look at the regime in its totality. The CMA explained that the regime is very proportionate and consultative. For it to work, it is important that the appeal process is on a judicial review basis, which is what is proposed in the Bill. That should be maintained as the Bill goes through Parliament. Obviously, we are very supportive of the new powers for the CMA to fine directly companies that breach consumer law. Why? Because that is a stronger deterrent to those businesses that may decide to ignore the law.
We are also very supportive of the Secretary of State having the power to act on the practices set out in schedule 18 that are clearly unfair. Why? Because we need a flexible system, particularly in the digital space where things move very quickly. We need that flexibility in the system as we identify additional areas.
You mentioned fake reviews. We welcome the commitment to include fake reviews in the Bill, but basically the commitment is that that will be introduced by the Secretary of State. We do not think that we should wait. Clearly, fake reviews are harmful, so the buying, selling and hosting of fake reviews should be included in schedule 18. We think that drip pricing is another practice that is very harmful. There is a lot of evidence that that is the case, and it should be included on the face of the Bill.
How will we measure this? When we look at our work and at the areas we want to focus on, we do quite a lot on consumer detriment; we also work with the Government and the CMA to see what the big areas of detriment are. We expect to see changes in the behaviours of some companies that decide not to follow the law. With the previous panel, you talked about, for example, the measures that the CMA took in the past on secondary ticketing companies, such as Viagogo. That took six years—six years of harm for consumers. We expect that, after the Bill becomes an Act, we will see action and that all those crimes that do harm will be resolved more quickly.
Q
Matthew Upton: We have been asking for action on subscription traps for a long time. Any action is positive, but we are seeing this in the context of a cost of living crisis, where anything that takes cash out of people’s pockets stops them getting by from day to day. To be honest, we think that the intent is right, but this is potentially a huge missed opportunity for action on subscription traps. We have to understand how high the incentive is for firms to trap people in subscriptions. There is a huge amount of money to be made, to the extent that it changes the whole incentive structure so that for many firms, rather than thinking about how to provide a quality subscription, the rational thing to do is think about how to design the worst possible customer journey and to trap someone, whether through an online process that makes it difficult to cancel something—you will all have experience of this—or, to give a slightly facetious example, a process whereby you can cancel only when you ring between 2 and 2.30 on a Tuesday and you have wait for 45 minutes in the queue.
Obviously, we want to change that incentive structure so that we have a flourishing subscription economy, which should be encouraged, where consumers want to stay in subscriptions and firms focus on providing quality subscriptions. We do not think that the Bill as it stands will do that. For example, it says that exit has to be timely and straightforward. We do not think that that will work. We have been here before, if we think back to utility bills four or five years ago, when there was a big push to stop people rolling on to expensive contracts and to get them to switch. Regulators were focused on trying to dictate what went into letters to consumers about their renewals. Firms could make so much money by obeying the letter but not the spirit of the regulation that they would find ways round it, and switching rates did not go up. We think that the same will happen here.
The specific change that would make a huge difference and is legislatively straightforward is to provide that, at the end of an annual trial subscription, the default is that the consumer opts out. That is not about things like car insurance, where there is a detriment to people opting out, but for basic subscriptions, opt-out should be the default. That would allow firms to use all their ingenuity, power and influence to persuade consumers to stay in. They could go for it—send as many reminders as they wanted; that is absolutely fine. If the subscription is good, a consumer will stay in. That change will make the difference. We have done some polling on this and about 80% of people agree that that should happen. We think that it will put millions of pounds back in people’s pockets, that it is proportionate and that it will encourage a flourishing subscription economy.
Q
Rocio Concha: A provision on fake reviews in the Bill should apply to both products and services. There is evidence to show that fake reviews also harm services. I do not think that there is a major risk. We and the CMA have produced a lot of evidence about how fake reviews are endemic on some sites. We have demonstrated the harm that they cause. It is clear what is needed. We know that we need to look at selling, buying and hosting. I do not see a risk to including such a provision on the face of the Bill. Then, in secondary legislation—
Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill (Second sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateSeema Malhotra
Main Page: Seema Malhotra (Labour (Co-op) - Feltham and Heston)Department Debates - View all Seema Malhotra's debates with the Department for Business and Trade
(1 year, 2 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesQ
Some conversations that we have had have been more explicit about the increased costs of innovation, and the difficulties when there is no interoperability or access, and increased costs being passed on to customers. Is that consistent with your experience, and what are the likely economic benefits to businesses and consumers of this legislation? I will take Professor Fletcher first, and then we will come back to Professor Furman and Professor Marsden.
Professor Fletcher: That was exactly our experience. We heard about the importance of interoperability with systems, and access to data and consumers, and how all those things were not always effective. Some innovation was fostered by big tech and some was less fostered by it, but the point is that they were in control of what happened in a way that we felt was not right for a proper, innovative environment, and certainly not right if you want to see real, disruptive innovation coming through—and I think that is what we do want to see.
We also thought that interoperability, data portability and data access were all pretty intrusive interventions. Therefore—unlike what has been done in the EU, where they have particular rules that require interoperability and require data portability on a fairly widespread basis—we instead thought that that should not be part of the core code of conduct, and that the aim could be achieved via pro-competitive interventions that were evidenced, bespoke and really well targeted. Again, that has been taken through into the Bill’s design, and shows that it is targeted at the barriers to innovation that we identified.
Q
Professor Furman: The short answer is yes, I think it gets it right. It strikes what my colleagues have described—and I agree—as a delicate balance. It depends on who is the head of the DMU and who is the head of the CMA.
In general, my experience with the regulators in the UK is that they are very thoughtful in understanding the importance of markets, competition and taking evidence seriously. The legislation gives them a certain amount of discretion. As my colleagues have testified, that is unavoidable; in a market and an environment where things are changing very rapidly, it would be very difficult to try to write into the legislation every single detail. This sets the standard for what the world should do. Frankly, part of the reason I agreed to do this project is that I would love to see the United States following legislation like this. I hope the UK serves as a model for the world in this regard, and I think it is doing so.
On innovation, I agree with Amelia that what we heard from businesses and reviewed in the academic research is that it is not just a question of how much innovation, but what type of innovation. Are you trying to innovate so you can be acquired by Google or are you trying to become the next Google? There is one thing that motivated us. It is very hard to see the future of this space, but four years ago we thought the next big thing would involve artificial intelligence and machine learning. Unlike the past waves of innovation—where IBM was dominant, and then it became about PCs so it was Microsoft, and then it was about the internet so it became Google, and we saw one wave after the next displacing the previous—we were very worried that because artificial intelligence required large amounts of data, it would not necessarily lend itself to a new upstart competitor, but would instead entrench the power of the existing ones. So far, what we are seeing with OpenAI and the role that Microsoft plays in it, and with what Google is doing in this space, is that it is largely playing out along the lines that we were concerned about. That is partly motivating us looking forward.
Q
Professor Marsden: Let me take your first point with respect to evidence related to economic benefits. We had a natural experiment before this, called open banking. You will have heard things about this before. No matter what hopes or disappointments people had about open banking, we seemingly had the power at the time to investigate a market that had competitive problems but no anti-trust violations, so there was nothing we could address with anti-trust law. We identified certain competitive structure problems, and there was an expectation on us perhaps to break up the banks, and we hear that with respect to some platforms.
That power is there in the Bill, but with the Furman review and this Bill, which has been kindly carried forward by the excellent civil servants, our emphasis is on the idea of opening up these markets with the same kinds of ex ante obligations on the larger platforms that we imposed on the big banks. Did we break up the banks? No. Did we see massive amounts of switching from one bank to another? No, but we have evidence that British people switch their spouse more frequently than they switch their bank.
What we want is more engagement. We want customers, users and small businesses to be engaged with their platform—with their bank—and that is what we will be seeing. We saw new offers coming in without the extensive capital requirements to bring in a full new entry, but there were new services offers in real intermediation and disintermediation of various products. If anything, open banking allowed consumers and users to—I hate this term—have affairs. It allowed them to check out where they could get the best mortgage, the best loan and those kind of things. That disciplines the incumbents, especially HSBC and Barclays, to provide competitive offers themselves. That is an example, to me at least, about how a pro-competitive, ex ante set of rules on very large platforms with a lot of data can help diversify the economy without harming the platforms. If anything, it puts a little bit of heat under them. I think that was a good achievement, whatever people think politically about it. It was supposed to be a balanced, gradual attempt to try to fix a market that had competitive structure problems, and I believe that is what the Bill does here.
In terms of global leadership, the UK is definitely still leading, despite a bit of a delay. It is the most bespoke, nuanced and balanced bit of legislation that has been proposed so far that I have seen, as we have already discussed this afternoon. At the same time—I completely understand your jurisdictional point—there is a real zeitgeist politically around the world to introduce measures like these of some sort. Of course, they depend on the economic, political and legal backgrounds of the society, but I cannot imagine like-minded authorities and Governments not trying to work hard or co-operate in this space.
We are seeing some examples of that already in the digital space. It is not really an area where there is a competition of competition laws; it is more that this is a regulated solution that we are putting forward in various jurisdictions through a democratic process. It does not depend too much on the discretion of the authority. It depends on the process that the authority undergoes to understand the markets and to then work with the tech platforms to find out which remedies would be available. That participative nature is a very important part of this, rather than an adversarial nature where we just chase after the companies after they have done something that is alleged to be wrong.
Professor Fletcher and Professor Furman, do you want to add anything?
Professor Fletcher: A lot of jurisdictions around the world are looking at this space. We talked earlier about how some of what we will achieve through this is stuff that can be achieved through competition law, and almost all jurisdictions have competition law. In a way, the more jurisdictions that have regulation, the easier it becomes for other jurisdictions to achieve some of the same things through competition law, because it changes the costs and benefits for the firms to change their business model.
The firms have quite an interesting decision to make on a global basis anyway about how much they do the same thing globally as they are required to do locally. I think it will vary depending on what thing it is. If it is terms and conditions, they can easily change that on a local basis. If it is interoperability, it is quite hard or rather more hard to design a system so that it has different interoperability standards in different places. We may well see an extraterritorial effect—not a deliberate one—because of the cost considerations and reputational considerations of the firms themselves. That will have a positive benefit in terms of providing a more consistent framework globally for the third parties that we are hoping to innovate. The more consistent global framework they have to compete upon, the better it is for innovation.
Professor Furman: The ideal thing would be if the whole world sat down and agreed how it was going to approach this problem and there was a single global system, or lots of countries co-ordinated and did the same thing. In practice, that is impossible, so what one should aspire towards is having essentially correlated actions in different countries, where different countries have similar rules and are looking at each other and learning from each other.
This puts the UK in a position to be a leader in that global process, and that, frankly, is the way mergers work already. It is not like there is a single global merger authority; there are merger authorities in economies around the world, but they use similar rules, are looking at similar evidence, come up with similar decisions and all, to some degree, talk to each other. That is what this is—an emerging correlation of approach.
We have seen in the United States in both the House of Representatives and the Senate legislation being put forward and in some cases being passed out of Committee that would accomplish some of the different pieces of what this legislation would do, frankly, more comprehensively than anything I have seen in the United States.
Q
Professor Fletcher: I know this is something that Philip cares a great deal about. I will come in first and then let him have a go. We have talked about it being a delicate balance. I discussed the EU regulation, where they have gone very far towards ensuring administrability and enforceability by having the rules set out in the legislation with quantitative thresholds. That is how they have dealt with the need for administrability and enforceability.
We have tried to be more bespoke, as I have said, and more evidence based, but there is a real risk in terms of administrability and enforceability that we end up in the same place as we have been with competition law, whereby the cases get hugely burdensome and hard to bring to a conclusion within a sensible timescale, and there are insufficient agency resources really to do everything that is needed.
I think there is a real risk that if you play around with what might seem like tiny changes to the legislation, that could really threaten the administrability and enforceability of it, and we could lose the benefits of it over competition law and put us in a bad place relative to the EU—whereas at the moment I think we could show ourselves to be better in terms of getting the right balance by being more bespoke and evidence based. The appeals standard goes to that point. I strongly support the JR appeals standard because if we went for a full merit standard, it would be too far and would become inadministrable. I am sure the CMA would find a way to try to administer it, but I do not think it would be the right balance. I feel the same way about the customer benefits exception.
Q
Noyona Chundur: Thank you for the great question. Perhaps I can start with a little bit of context. We believe that confident consumers will drive competitive markets. There is a lot that the Bill does really well. It is great progress, and I commend the work of colleagues in the Department, as well as partners in the CMA and Tracey from Consumer Scotland for their input in getting us to this point. There are eight areas that could be strengthened or clarified. There is building consumer confidence. There is the potential risk of only the CMA having direct enforcement powers. It is around the supervision of enforceable standards, practice and conduct of businesses. It is the ability to add and remove—
Slow down!
Noyona Chundur: Sorry, would you like me to step through each one? Would that be easier?
You are going through them quite well, but could you go you through them slightly more slowly, because colleagues will want to write them down?
Noyona Chundur: The first thing for us is building consumer confidence as a priority, because prioritising consumer protection to build the foundations that create confidence in competitive markets will benefit both the consumer and the economy. We are looking at this through the prism of the cost of living crisis and through the heightened prism of vulnerability. In the packs that we provided, you can see that vulnerability has certainly increased in the last 12 months. The Consumer Council has dealt with over 33,000 consumers, and they are showing increasingly more complex and multifaceted needs. Income in Northern Ireland has—
Q
Noyona Chundur: Understood. Did I get to adding to or removing from the list of banned practices in the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008?
Could you start the list again?
Noyona Chundur: Okay. Building consumer confidence is a key priority for us. The second thing is the potential risk of only the CMA having direct enforcement powers. The third is perhaps expanding the Bill in some way to include the supervision of enforceable, standards, practice and conduct. The fourth is adding to or removing from the CPR list of banned practices.
Next is establishing enforceable minimum standards to alternative dispute resolution schemes. We welcome the mandatory accreditation as part of the Bill, but we would like to take it a step further. Then there is a question around better regulation of firms that exploit behavioural bias or nudge techniques for negative effect. Finally, we recommend going further on subscription traps with opt-in clauses after the trial or end-of-contract period.
Q
Noyona Chundur: The key thing for us comes from research that the Government have published. I think the Department for Business and Trade estimated that 81% of UK households signed up to at least one subscription last year, and consumers are spending £1.6 billion per year on subscriptions that they do not want. That is a huge amount of money that a lot of consumers do not have in the current cost of living crisis. Our own research highlights the lived experience. In the online detriment research that we carried out, one consumer told us that they signed up for a 30-day trial but it took them six months to get the subscription cancelled. In the light of that, I think that it is appropriate for us to recommend that legislating for opt-in clauses after the initial trial or end-of-contract period is reasonable. I also believe that that may deliver the most immediate and material benefit to consumers in the short term, given the vast quantities involved.
Q
Peter Eisenegger: Our overall approach here, at the more strategic level, is that the Bill contains lots of good stuff. It is a significant step forward. What we do not want is, as has happened with the Online Safety Bill, for it to hang around forever and not enter law. Our view is that we can talk about improvements in some areas. You mentioned one—the way that fake reviews are handled. To delve into that detail, however, would just prolong the process of getting it into law. We recommend that the Bill gets enacted as soon as possible, that we recognise it as a step forward, and that the CMA and this Committee look at areas of improvement beyond it. There is something that would relate to online reviews in terms of whether the information being provided is accurate, but it is good enough. Let us press on and get it done.
That said, I have not heard a discussion about the role of standards and supporting regulation. We are in the digital world, and an awful lot of regulation is supported by standards. You will find that General Data Protection Regulation is leaning very heavily on work in Europe to adapt and put some final European tweaks on the work that has gone on at the ISO level, and similarly with AI. If you want to be a leading player in this area, particularly an innovative one, from our perspective—we play in international, European and UK standards—you have to be very well aware of, and participating in, all those arenas.
To make an innovation comment—having spent two thirds of my career in product management and innovation, I am now doffing the consumer cap and putting the real-life innovation one on—good innovation practice is to look at what other people are doing and pinch as many legitimate ideas as you can from them. Quite honestly, the fact that the EU has the same sort of intent but a slightly different approach is great. Just keep an eye on its members to see whether there is good stuff. To be fair, I will say the same to them, because I am participating in the AI standardisation at the moment.
Q
Tracey Reilly: Broadly speaking, we welcome the Bill. As your previous panellists said, it has lots of good stuff in it. It should provide the CMA with more flexible powers, which can be used in a more responsive and timely way to prevent detriment. On how the Bill will affect individual consumers, we hope that it will lead to consumers experiencing lower levels of detriment and being less subject to unfair, misleading or aggressive trade practices so that if and when such practices occur, they can be stamped out more quickly and easily, and it is easier for consumers to seek redress through ADR systems that are appropriately regulated and standardised.
In terms of how the Bill will affect Scottish interests, in many ways the level of detriment experienced by consumers across the UK is similar. The consumer protection survey is UK-wide and the patterns of detriment for Scottish consumers are generally not hugely different from those experienced in the rest of the UK. That said, there are obviously differences between the two nations in the regulatory enforcement and judicial landscapes, and it is important that we understand and pay attention to them. Equally, I understand that the Department has been engaging with Scottish stakeholders. We welcome that and would obviously like that to continue through the implementation process.
Some markets operate differently in Scotland, either because they are entirely devolved because there are fewer providers and therefore lower levels of competition, or because consumers access services differently, for example, due to geography. It is important that, within the overall UK framework, the system can respond to those regional differences or local issues. We hope that the additional levels of flexibility granted to the CMA under the Bill will allow for a more flexible and targeted response, particularly if any local practices cause detriment. We look forward to liaising with the CMA on that. Noyona may wish to make additional comments, given that she is in Northern Ireland.
Q
Noyona Chundur: There is a heightened risk, Minister, if the new direct enforcement powers sit only with the CMA. Ultimately, the purpose of those powers is to be much more agile, flexible and responsive to consumer detriment in the market. Is there a heightened risk that enforcement will default to the CMA because perhaps it may deliver a solution that is much more agile and responsive and much more in keeping with the pace of detriment in the marketplace compared with a courts-based system? The sector regulators and trading standards could therefore have the same or similar powers. The question is about agility and responsiveness to detriment, which is exploding in the marketplace. We see it increasingly, particularly in digital markets, which evolve so quickly. That is our perspective.
Q
Peter Eisenegger: Yes, I can. It was a consumer-initiated standard on complaints handling. If you want the number, I can blind you with it: it was ISO 10002. It was initiated by the consumer side of ISO. It is clearly written for the big company: it has lots of good practice where you divide all the responsibilities, the analysis of the complaints and things like that. There is an annex for SMEs. I have been through the main part of the document and counted the number of requirements: there are more than 250. For the SMEs, there are eight.
Where you look at the consumer and it is your small local trader, you go, “That’s fine,” because they know you personally—you know where they live, basically, and that changes the whole local relationship. But you do not really see that many standards where the practicalities for the smaller company are reflected. I am quite pleased that the consumer world did a decent job for the SMEs there, because they are very important to us in terms of local service and providing competition to the big guys.
Q
Peter Eisenegger: Do as much as you feel you can make time for, while getting the Bill implemented as quickly as possible. I come back to the key clauses that relate to the appropriateness of the information provided. Is it complete? Is it misleading? As a charity, we have looked at how heat pumps are being advertised at the moment. About 80% of the online information did not provide the right contextual information for your heat pump decision; some did not even mention it at all, and a few hid it away behind several layers of interaction with the website before you found it out. That would fall under the incompleteness clause, but again, you are going to come back. The CMA would be able to apply an interpretation, which would probably go through some sort of intense dialogue with the industry people concerned, but if you do not have time to cover all those other aspects as explicitly as you would wish in the Bill, I think there is a clause that gives the CMA some capability for addressing it.
Noyona Chundur: Maybe I can add to that. This talks to the point in the earlier session on how quickly or whether fake reviews should be automatically added to the list of bad practices, or should we go through full consultation. In all these things, we need to have appropriate consultation and the appropriate due diligence carried out. It needs to be done as quickly and thoroughly as possible so there is no doubt. I am completely supportive of what was said earlier today that there is a lot of detriment as a result of fake reviews, and the sooner that is resolved, the better. None the less, we need to be careful about setting the right precedents. We need to have consistency in procedural application. For all those things—I believe we are all in agreement that drip pricing is of huge concern, as are misleading green claims—we need to follow the right process and get through it as quickly as possible.
I think Ms Reilly wants to come in as well.
Tracey Reilly: I simply want to endorse much of what Noyona said. There are issues around fake reviews, drip pricing and greenwashing that we all want to see addressed, and for that to happen as soon as possible. However, there is also a need to ensure that the definitions are right and the provisions are effective. We would hugely support the Secretary of State having the power, which is in the Bill, to amend the schedule by regulation. I realise that is a Henry VIII clause, which is not always popular, but in this case I think it is an acceptable use of that power, and it comes with appropriate safeguards in terms of the affirmative statutory instrument procedure and the requirement to consult first.
Touching briefly on greenwashing in particular, we acknowledge that existing regulators have powers to tackle that and that there are existing programmes of both education and enforcement. However, greenwashing claims are hugely prevalent and there is a lot of work to be done. It is an issue that, for us, has real risks associated with the net zero transition, because we are going to get consumers to make quite different choices around what they eat, what clothes they buy, how they heat their houses and what vehicles they drive. Some of those are quite big-ticket items in terms of cost, so there is a real risk for consumers and a real need for them to be able to trust the information they are given, which links back to the points my colleague Noyona was making about consumer confidence.
Q
Tracey Reilly: Just a couple of quick points. There is a need to produce very clear guidance on the new plans and have very clear referral processes to the CMA for the use of those plans, so that advocacy and advice bodies have almost a direct line, if you like, into the points of contact. Essentially, it is about pathways and signposting, and ensuring that the routes from an individual consumer experiencing detriment to those who are able to take action on it are as quick and flexible as possible.
Noyona Chundur: From my perspective, I would ask for two things. The first is greater connectivity across the ecosystem. We all have a lot of data; we all have a lot of intelligence; we all have a lot of on-the-ground insights that should be shared and published in a more connected and co-ordinated way. Ultimately, that is more holistic, but it gives the level of granularity we need on a four nations basis. The other is greater focus on the broader issues of online behavioural bias and the exploitation of behavioural bias—you know, nudge techniques—to negative effect. To my mind, the Bill does not adequately cover that, so I believe this is an area of potential development.
As has been touched on already, vulnerability is not just about personal characteristics or social circumstances; the behaviour of organisations can cause harm and put you in a vulnerable position. That is a key area that we would love to see explored in more detail as the Bill passes through scrutiny.
Peter Eisenegger: In terms of support, having mentioned standards, there is a Government mechanism for providing the consumer arm of BSI with money to support its experts. Keep a careful eye on that, and work with BSI and its consumer arm to ensure that that is suitable for the level of really important issues we need to address.
There is another area of the consumer world, which is about the smaller, really voluntary charities, such as ourselves and the Child Accident Prevention Trust, which have no regular income and live hand to mouth. We have been on the brink of extinction every now and then, and although we have managed to haul ourselves back, it is a very precarious position. When we and others in a similar position contribute to this sort of arena or talk to regulators, our voice is valued and has something to offer, but we are very precarious. If Parliament looks at the people who really represent the grassroots and different perspectives and are without a regular income, and if something can be done, that would be extremely useful. Some of these voices drop out.
Q
Tracey Reilly: I think that is a very difficult question. Without remotely passing the buck, I think that ultimately it is a judgment for your Committee to take as to whether it considers there is sufficient clarity in the definitions proposed during the amending stages to allow for those decisions to be made now. If the Committee is confident that there is sufficient clarity, and the soundings you are receiving from stakeholders indicate that they are content, it is a matter for the Committee to decide. Ultimately, our position is that we want to see it as soon as possible, but we also want to see it done correctly, because as we all know it is very difficult to amend primary legislation once that is in place.
Q
Professor Myers: Again, I think the Bill strikes quite a good balance with the judicial review approach. To bring in some practical experience from my days at Ofcom, I have had a role as an expert witness in quite a number of appeals of Ofcom decisions, in front of both the Competition Appeal Tribunal and the High Court. At the Competition Appeal Tribunal, those have been under different standards: there used to be a full-merits review, but recently that was changed to a judicial review.
I think what matters, as well as the legal standard of review as laid out in this legislation, is the nature of the appeal body. In this case, it is the Competition Appeal Tribunal. Compared with the High Court, these are specialists—both judges and lay members—with specialist knowledge and experience of dealing with both competition and regulatory cases. They have a greater appetite to get into the detail and merit issues, to the extent that that is compatible with the judicial review standard, than the High Court would. Having appeared in front of the Competition Appeal Tribunal under a judicial review standard, I can say, as I think Professor Fletcher did, that that is not a walk in the park for the regulator. You get a thorough testing, and what the Competition Appeal Tribunal is looking to identify is clear errors of either law or reasoning. I think that that is an appropriate way to strike a balance here.
Q
Professor Myers: You heard some evidence earlier this afternoon about the relationship between jurisdictions in different countries. Clearly, the Digital Markets Act in the European Union is being implemented at the moment and the effects of that will come in. The longer the UK legislation takes, the more that will condition the context within which the CMA will have to operate in implementing this regime. That is probably the most likely thing. There are obviously some other countries that are looking into that, but that is probably the main issue I would point to.
Q
Professor Myers: I do not think that that kind of timeline of 2025 means it is all a waste of time and we should not bother; I think it will still be important. It is not a complete all or nothing. There are some digital services where the platforms will want to standardise globally, but there are others where they will be interested in making national variations. I think the CMA can influence things using its competition powers. An example of that at the moment is the competition case it has had about Google’s Privacy Sandbox and the use of third-party cookies on Chrome. That is a Competition Act case where the commitments that Google has agreed with the CMA are actually influencing how it is operating Chrome globally, so there is still some scope for the UK to have a role even before this Bill comes in. Then when it does, obviously that will increase.
Q
Professor Myers: Perhaps one of the few things I did not entirely agree with in the evidence room was when Professor Marsden talked about the participative approach which, again, is obviously not in the legislation, but is envisaged in how the CMA will operate. I do not think what you want out of that is a cosy relationship between the regulator and the SMS firms. You need to have a constructive relationship, but that is going to be adversarial. To expect it not to be adversarial to some extent is probably over-optimistic and, indeed, probably undesirable, but it is also very important for the CMA to build a wider set of relationships with the industry, consumers and smaller stakeholders, who are not so used to dealing with a regulator. It is important for the CMA as a regulator to have a good overview of a cross-section of all the views in the industry and not just be captured by the SMS firms, which they are inevitably talking to an awful lot.
That brings us to the end of this session. On behalf of the Committee, I thank you, Professor, for taking the time to give evidence.
Professor Myers: Thank you very much.
Examination of Witness
Graham Wynn gave evidence.
We will now hear oral evidence via Zoom from Graham Wynn, assistant director for consumer competition and regulatory affairs at the British Retail Consortium. Graham, will you introduce yourself for the record?
Graham Wynn: I am Graham Wynn. I am assistant director at the British Retail Consortium, dealing with consumer affairs mainly and a number of other issues for some years now—about 20, I think. Today, I am representing the views of members.
Q
Graham Wynn: As far as the Bill is concerned, it is about 50:50. We would like the Committee to examine about 50% of the issues particularly carefully. Generally, we support the Bill—we think it does some useful things—but there are one or two matters of detail. On the other hand, we think that some omissions need to be looked at, whether in the Bill or elsewhere; they are necessary for the Bill to succeed.
We have some concerns about the enforcement landscape as a whole, the resources available to trading standards, and whether the Bill and its focus on the CMA will mean that trading standards go even more into the background. Members tell me they find that enforcement activity by trading standards has declined quite dramatically over the years. The other day, someone said to me, “Online, it is the wild west out there.” Although people try to comply with all the regulations, they find that many businesses—many of their rivals—do not do so, and that no one enforces anything. One of the issues retailers hope will be looked at is whether the whole regime, with the CMA’s new powers, will lead to better enforcement to create a level playing field for consumers and for businesses.
We are concerned about fake reviews. We support the banning of them. We wish that what the Government propose for them was on the face of the Bill. It is also important that people understand exactly what a review or a website should and should not include. They should include both negative and positive reviews, but it is very difficult to define what a fake review is and to ensure that whatever we come up with is enforced. The key theme is enforcement. It is no good giving people protections if they are not enforced.
The other thing is the CMA’s new approach to consumer issues and admin powers. We have a good relationship with the CMA. Members are more—let us say—acquiescent with the proposal to move towards an administrative-based regime. They accept that it has been debated over many years now, and that the Government are determined, so the key thing is to make it work. The real thing is to make sure that there is a good appeals system, independent of the CMA at the end of the day.
Another concern about what is missing from the Bill is the requirement for the CMA to accept primary authority advice. The CMA refuses to do that. When a business has been given primary authority advice—assured advice—that governs what other local authorities and trading standards do in the area, but that is not the CMA approach. We think that with its new powers, it is important for the CMA to accept primary authority advice, or indeed, to devise its own system by which it gives advice to businesses that is assured advice. It will do that in the competition area—on sustainability—but we think it would be very important in the consumer area as well.
There are other issues, of course. The review of the blacklist is another that I would pick out as one we are slightly concerned about. One of the dangers in all politics is a knee-jerk reaction to a political issue, and we think that one such danger is in adding to and subtracting from the blacklist in schedule 18 by statutory instrument, rather than right up front in primary legislation. We argued this in the EU when it first came out with the unfair commercial practices directive. We argued that successfully in relation to much retail and commerce across Europe. The point is that we want to make sure that anything that goes into or comes out of the blacklist is properly debated and analysed and so on, rather than going through virtually on the nod, which is likely even with affirmative resolution. Those are some of the things you might want to bring out, such as unit pricing, and you might want to ask about those.
Q
Graham Wynn: Yes.
Q
Graham Wynn: I think it is important that they co-operate and that there is a clear line of responsibility for each and a clear demarcation. The real problem with trading standards is not so much their powers but their lack of resources. One business with over 2,000 stores —not a supermarket—said the other day that the number of inspections and the number of times they see a trading standards officer has come down dramatically in the last few years. It makes it very difficult for those who are responsible for compliance in the business to persuade those who are responsible for, say, marketing and promotions to keep in line. The lack of trading standards activity makes that more difficult and also leads to a playing field that is not totally level. The problem is resources.
Q
Graham Wynn: The view is, as I said, that we do not want to see what I call knee-jerk reactions to Daily Mail items that are politically sensitive or are political problems. The obvious answer is to say, “Let’s add it to schedule 18 as a banned practice.” It really is important that the schedule and what is in it is clear, clearly understood and that we do not add or subtract from it just on the basis of needing to get over a political problem, for example.
You can make sure that you do proper consultation and all that sort of thing, but we can understand why the Government would want to be able to add to it more quickly—obviously, primary legislation takes a while. In Europe, we certainly argued against Governments or the Commission being able to add to it willy-nilly. We were keen to keep it as something that had to be put in the directive originally. On balance, we would rather it was debated fully and that it amended legislation. Alternatively, you could decide to make changes once a year, say, rather than as you go along. That might be an alternative answer to the danger of a knee-jerk reaction.
Q
Graham Wynn: Yes. I think it needs to be done, but without committing us, we would expect it to be done in the context of a product safety review and how you are going to deal with product safety issues in the future. It needs a thorough examination, including the role of marketplaces, their general obligations and what is practical and proportionate. I would not add that to this Bill now, because it requires more of an assessment and consideration than would be possible.
Q
Graham Wynn: ADR is not something that our members are exercised about in the same way as some other people are. Those who are responsible for selling high-value items tend to be members of ADR schemes. Their criticism of the current arrangement has been that they are not convinced that there is a full assessment of the ADR providers, so everything that is necessary to give them the confidence to use the systems. They believe that that perhaps has held back ADR schemes from really taking off in some places.
Those who sell high-value items—kitchens, some white goods and furniture items—generally are members of ADR schemes. Those who sell groceries, as they are generally called these days, including food and non-food, tend to feel that it is not really appropriate for them because of the cost. When dealing with something worth only a few pounds, it is much cheaper and much more sensible to just deal with the consumer and, ideally, give them their money back if there is a problem, rather than take everyone through ADR. It is not necessarily the best approach. However, the accreditation system and making sure that companies abide by what they are supposed to do in ADR is vital to have confidence in general.
I am afraid that brings us to the end of this witness session. Thank you very much for your evidence.
Examination of Witness
Max von Thun gave evidence.
Thank you all very much. We will move on to our next session to hear from John Herriman, chief executive, and David MacKenzie, lead officer, from the Chartered Trading Standards Institute. Could you introduce yourselves for the record?
John Herriman: I am John Herriman, chief executive of the Chartered Trading Standards Institute.
David MacKenzie: I am David MacKenzie. My day job is with the Highland Council on trading standards, in the sunny north of Scotland. I also have a role with the CTSI across the UK for free commerce and related issues.
Q
John Herriman: Obviously, as you have heard, we have been very publicly supportive of the Bill. The key point, which I know others have made, is that in the online marketplace and the landscape, it feels like a bit of a wild west out there—I know that term was used this morning—and there has been a lack of protection for consumers and clarity for businesses. We have also seen that dramatic change in business and consumer behaviours, particularly during the pandemic, which is good for consumers, businesses and the economy. Trading standards absolutely sees that first hand. Trading standards plays a very unique role in this discussion; we are at that interface between the business and the consumer, so the lens through which we look at this is consumer confidence. Essentially, that is what we are really taking a perspective on.
We very much welcome the Bill and the new powers, particularly for the scope of the CMA, which we work with closely. We think it provides clearer legislation and changes to CPRs. We think it will enable quicker and stronger action, and we think it is very supportive of competition and innovation but, as you have alluded to, we do think there are some opportunities in the Bill where it could go further and where it would not impact on competition and innovation, and also where it would be more supportive of consumer confidence. We are happy to talk in more detail about those.
It is probably best to explain that we are both here because I can take that very strategic view and answer questions about that. David is our lead officer for the online marketplaces, so when we get into more of the technical detail he will be able to answer some of those questions. Essentially, in those areas around drip pricing, fake reviews, subscription traps and greenwashing, we think there are opportunities to go further or for some further discussion.
We also think the Bill addresses the national issues around the CMA’s powers, but we do not think it is sufficiently robust in some areas to enable trading standards which, in the context of this conversation, does the place-based and local regulatory enforcement and support for local businesses and enterprise. That national system does not work effectively if you do not have the local system working effectively alongside it, because they are mutually supportive of each other as part of that same system.
Q
John Herriman: It is a combination of both. David will be best placed to comment on the powers. Essentially, there are some issues there that we would like to consider, but it is also a factor of capacity. If I just focus on that, David can answer the second part of the question. From a capacity point of view, trading standards over the last 10 years or so—I think the National Audit Office reported back in 2021; it has also just done a very recent report—has been hit by about 50%. Relative to other regulatory services and local governments, regulatory services—according to the latest National Audit Office report—have been hit by about 25% cuts.
Trading standards has been hit exponentially harder than some of those other services. If we do not have enough capacity, we cannot do the enforcement activity. If we cannot do the enforcement activity, we cannot ensure that there is a level playing field for businesses. There is a definite capacity issue there. This Bill will make the legislation more robust, but we also need the capacity alongside that to make that system work effectively, because regulatory systems do not work effectively unless you have the right levels of enforcement capacity. David, do you want to answer the other part of that question?
David MacKenzie: We really welcome the strengthening of civil enforcement in the Bill. It introduces a range of potential punitive sanctions that can be imposed on businesses. That potentially strengthens our position, and we really welcome that.
At the same time, as John says, that is really dependent on our guys up and down the country being able to utilise that through civil enforcement, which is still a relatively newish thing for us. Our officers are very well versed, over many decades, in criminal law investigations and going for prosecutions. The civil law is relatively newer. Along with these new powers, there needs to be a bit of a campaign across the whole UK to ensure that local authorities have the skills and necessary legal backing to take these cases. I have certainly discussed that with the Department and will continue to do so.
Those are the good things in the Bill—giving us more powers and more sanctions. Our disappointment is what is not included: officers’ powers. The way that I like to characterise it is that the existing powers are very good, but are they very good for a world that is changing all the time? They are essentially based on one of our officers being on physical premises, doing the work.
The powers are all really good: powers of entry, of inspection, to test, to get documents, and all that kind of stuff. But we increasingly find that, when it comes to the documents side of things, if somebody still has a filing cabinet with bits of paper in it, that is fine—we can get that and use it as part of our investigation—but, as we would all expect nowadays, even small business do not operate in that way anymore. The information will be in the cloud; it will be somewhere else that is not necessarily accessible from those premises.
Q
David MacKenzie: The current powers do not give us direct access to that—they just don’t. The Bill addresses that to a degree in that, in terms of entry under a warrant, as long as the files are accessible—again, from that physical premises—there is an extra power there. We welcome that. That is good progress. But it is important to realise that the vast majority of our investigations are done not under warrant, but using normal powers of entry, so the vast majority of situations are not covered by the change.
Even when the power is exercised through warrant, and we are able to use the new provision, that is only when the files are accessible from that premises, but we are increasingly finding that the local branch manager just does not have access to that information. I suppose that we are calling for a general power to access that information, in the same way as if it happened to physically be on those premises, and to be able to use it in all cases, including criminal prosecutions.
The other point that goes along with that is about online enforcement and takedown powers. I think it would really surprise the public if we told them that we do not have any formal powers of takedown at all for any online content. The only way we can do that is through ways and means—trying to get platforms to do the right thing and all that kind of stuff. It is long past time that we got a formal takedown power.
Q
David MacKenzie: Absolutely, yes. It could be a whole website, an account on a website or just a narrow bit of content. The Bill contains the concept of online interface orders that the CMA can apply to the court for, and we think that that should be applied to other regulators—particularly trading standards, from my point of view, but to other regulators as well. I think that if we are to be taken seriously in—
Q
David MacKenzie: Absolutely. A lot of the stuff in the Bill that replaces the consumer protection regulations is really good, and we really welcome it. There is still some stuff around the definition of “trader” that we think is a little bit of a missed opportunity.
There are two angles. When does a consumer become a trader? How many things do you have to sell in an online marketplace before you become a trader? That is a difficult judgment for us to make and we feel that some work should be done on that. The point you have made is equally important: the status of the seller in an online marketplace. We think there should be a requirement for the online marketplace to declare whether the seller is a consumer or a business because that makes a massive difference to the consumer rights of the buyer and it also makes a difference to what we do.
If someone is a business seller, they have to comply with all consumer law; if they are a private seller, they do not really have to comply with anything, so this is for both consumers and for us. To be fair to other businesses that operate on the site, we think this is a necessary change that is not in the Bill.
Q
John Herriman: That was another point that we wanted to make. This is not the only legislation that impacts on the landscape: the product safety review is fundamentally important in this space. The key point there is being clear on where those boundaries are.
We will be contributing to the product safety review. It is fundamentally important that it should come out quickly, so that we can address it and respond to the consultation. We can then look at that in the context of this Bill and others that it might impact on as well. We think that some things would be best placed in the product safety review—anything to do with legislation there—and would not appear here. But it is important that those provisions work hand in hand over a similar period, so that we can make sure that there are not any gaps. Consumers will then be better protected and businesses will have the clarity that they need, which is really important for them.
David MacKenzie: I agree with everything John said, but if we leave all these issues to the product safety review, presumably that would apply only to unsafe products. There is a wider range of situations for which we need these take-down powers when it comes to fair trading—scams and so on.
Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill (Third sitting) Debate
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(1 year, 2 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesQ
Tom Fish: Exactly.
Richard Stables: I could give a bit of colour to that. When we started being hit by Google, we thought that it was just us. Eventually we realised that the whole market was suffering. We started talking to the commission. We were absolutely paranoid. We said, “Don’t tell Google because we think we might get the traffic back. If they know that we’re talking to you, that’s going to hurt us.” Eventually, they hurt us so much that it did not matter. I have spoken to so many firms—big firms as well as small firms—that have turned around and said, “We’re really glad about what you’re doing. I can’t come out and say this.” The power that these companies have is phenomenal. Companies can literally be put out of business overnight if one of these companies decides that that is what is going to happen.
Mark Buse: They believe in retribution. When we tried to offer Korean citizens in Korea a discounted price, Apple, instead of rejecting our app build, put every app build on hold. If you are not familiar with the concept of a build, it is where you update and change your app. You always get messages on your phone saying, “You need to update.” For 35 days, Apple froze every app build for every brand that we have that operates anywhere around the globe. We were unable to bring new products out, but more importantly we had bug fixes in all those builds. We have white-hat hackers: people we pay to show us what is wrong. We learned bug fixes internally. There were people who could not use the product right.
All those bug fixes sat on hold, so for UK citizens using our products, with no connection to Korea, those fixes did not take place for 35 days because Apple refused to let us move any builds. When we withdrew the build that would have given us the right to use alternative payment authorities, Apple then approved everything within 72 hours.
Tom Fish: On that point, it is important not always to get drawn into a polarised debate on these issues. It is not necessarily black and white—that big tech is good or evil. You can be a supporter of the Bill and the new regime without wanting to break up big tech. All that I am really asking for is a bit more scrutiny, oversight and transparency where obvious conflicts of interest exist.
Q
Mark Buse: We believe that the relationship should be between us and the customer—that Apple should not intermediate between us and the customer. Then we will, rightly, have the responsibility to ensure that there are not subscription traps or any other issues around subscription. At this point, generally what happens is that we are still blamed but the subscription is actually with Apple. We do not think that in an ideal world it should necessarily be just us. If some of our users want to subscribe via Apple, we are more than happy to let them use our service and continue to subscribe through Apple. If they believe that that is a safer, more private way to do it, great. We want to bring as many people as possible into our business. It is not about excluding; it is about different ways to include.
Q
Mark Buse: It is a historical anomaly. When the store was created, in a brilliant move by Steve Jobs, he needed to get companies to build apps. Apps did not exist. People my age were bombarded with commercials. The slogan for Apple was, “There’s an app for that.” Apps have become the way we use our phones because they make it easier. He had to go to all these physical companies and say, “Build me an app. I’ll put it on the phone.” The Walmarts and Tescos of the world said, “We want people coming into our stores. Why on earth would we want them not to, and to use the app?”
What Jobs did, again because he was a brilliant man, is say, “Look—it won’t cost you anything. In essence, it will just increase sales. It’s you-branded. It’s yours. You operate it.” That is why apps are distinct. Uber had just come on to the scene and was the hottest thing going. It went into New York and into London—some would argue illegally, not abiding by the rules. What happened is that Jobs—you can see this from various biographies and public court documents—said to Uber, “Come into the store, but because you’re a digital product, and the whole idea of the walled garden is that they hold on to your digital data, you’re going to have to pay 30%.” Uber said, “No. We won’t do it.” Because the store was nascent and Uber was popular, Jobs said, “You know what? Go into the store anyway. It’s fine. I won’t make you pay.”
Match at the time was a fledgling, super-small company, and our business was not big and growing because there was a lot of stigma around online dating at the time. People thought that if you cannot meet a date in real life, in person, you go to the online dating world. Now online dating is the No. 1 way that people meet in the UK. More relationships start online than in any other way. In the LGBTQ community, over 70% of all relationships start online. The market has changed. If the store was being created today, our market power might enable us to say, “Don’t include us in that.”
Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill (Fourth sitting) Debate
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(1 year, 2 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesQ
Kelli Fairbrother: I am Kelli Fairbrother. I am the co-founder and CEO of xigxag.
Christian Owens: And I am Christian Owens. I am the founder and executive chairman of Paddle.
Q
I know that both of your businesses are players in the digital market sector. It would be useful to understand, with some illustrative examples, how the current market dominance of a few large tech companies affects how you do your business, and how it has perhaps affected how you have been able to innovate and the costs of innovation. Perhaps we can hear from Ms Fairbrother first?
Kelli Fairbrother: I lead an independent business based in Cornwall that is challenging the incumbents’ dominance of digital books, which we believe have not been innovated on in decades. Our aim is to create an exceptional digital book experience that keeps young people engaged in books, makes books more accessible to the one in five people who struggle with traditional reading, and saves the 320 million or so books that end up in landfill every year.
The challenge that we face as a fast-growing, innovative business is that Apple and Google use their dominant positions in the mobile device and mobile app ecosystem as a means of forcing themselves into transactions between us and our customers. They do that to us in two ways: they force us to distribute our apps through the app stores, then, because we are distributed through the app stores, they force us to use their in-app payment services when we want to enable our customers to buy in-app, which is clearly the most obvious way in which customers would expect to transact with us, as we are an app-led business. They also prevent us from using alternative providers such as Paddle, which is a great UK business that we would love to use.
The challenge that that creates is that, by forcing us to use their in-app payment systems, they charge us about five to 10 times more than we would pay in the free and fair online payments ecosystem—we would be paying about 3%, versus the 15% to 30% they charge—and they pay us our own revenue at least a month late. That is our own revenue—
Q
Kelli Fairbrother: For example, the revenue that I earned on 1 January this year I did not earn back from Apple until 9 March. By comparison, on average, online payments are paid to us in about seven days on a regular basis. The fees are effectively allocating all of the costs and generating excess profits from a minority of people who use the system to deliver digital content and services, which happen to compete with Apple and Google’s content services businesses. The behaviour you see in the market is the result of this behaviour. Companies either need to charge more for in-app purchase or they force customers on to a web experience to redeem their content in the app.
You heard earlier from Match explaining the difference between Uber and Match. It is the same. If I were selling physical books, I would not be subject to a 30% tax, even if I were selling them through the app, so that is interesting. As a very early-stage business, this hit to our margin and our cash flow is especially precarious. As you can imagine, it makes it difficult to access investment, especially in what is a very difficult fundraising environment at the moment.
The other thing we observe is that, as a non-subscription-based business, the app stores are not really fit for purpose for our needs. Up until about a month ago, we were allowed to choose—we have a catalogue of 50,000 titles—from approximately 90 price points, from 99p up to about 1,000. Our customers receive invoices that say, “Audiobook: £7.99”. They do not give them any more detail, which makes it difficult to know which books they have bought and which books they are trying to return. We do not control returns.
Q
Kelli Fairbrother: In the receipts, yes, that is correct. I cannot merchandise—what we would call merchandise—or allocate the receipt to a particular title that the person bought to allow for the ability to reconcile transactions. It is not possible on Apple. Again, it is not fit for purpose. The way that the system works is that it is delivering you a receipt that says, “Audiobook: £7.99”. Those are the limitations of the system. Any discussion of it being a competitive product is quite misleading.
They offer us no control over our returns. Although there is some ability to control returns through the Apple system, it is difficult to understand exactly the process by which we are allowed to challenge returns. My co-founder is among the best in the world of digital media tech, a former director of production technology at ITV, and he is constantly frustrated by the limitations of the app store APIs. We get very little visibility into the transactions from Apple and Google. Our model for in-app payment where we sell these multiple thousands of different products is terribly supported by Apple and Google. We believe that it is either unintentionally—through neglect—unsupported, or intentionally, trying to force our customers to be on a subscription model.
I will have to move on.
Christian Owens: I started Paddle about 11 years ago to help small software companies and developers to sell their products internationally. Today, we do that for around 5,000 businesses, a number of which are based in the UK. We provide payment services. We help those businesses to take payments all around the world and to pay local taxes and be compliant with the various regulations of wherever it is they sell.
For the last 10 years we have had constant inbound from our customers—who we support by processing payments and paying their taxes for them online for the web or desktop-based version of their products—saying, “Why can’t I use Paddle for my iOS or Android app?” We have tried on numerous occasions to figure out a solution to that, but we are simply prevented, on the basis of the terms and conditions of the app stores, from allowing those developers to process transactions via any mechanism that is not controlled by Apple and Google. For us, we are explicitly prevented from competing. I have no problem if Apple or Google build a better solution than us—that should win. Today, we are not even allowed to try.
Q
Kelli Fairbrother: We are monitoring, on our own side, the transactions to be able to control entitlements, because we actually have to control the rights of the books for individuals who have purchased them. The risk for us is that a lack of ability to reconcile at the level of an individual transaction actually puts us at a degree of risk, in terms of our ability to manage the 100% accuracy of what we have delivered. The other interesting thing that happens, on the returns side, is that a customer could read the entire book and go to Google and get a return. I am only getting informed of that after the fact; I cannot really challenge the fact that the return was probably invalid. That is another example.
Q
Christian Owens: No, not any specific details on this.
Q
Kelli Fairbrother: It is absolutely critical that judicial review is the standard that is used, because I think we have seen time and time again, in markets all around the world, that when Governments act, Apple and Google do their best to try to get around the work that is being done. They lawyer up—they have millions to spend on appeals slowing things down—and there really is a sense of urgency. This is existential for a lot of small app developers, so we would really urge that the Bill passes, it is not watered down and it passes without delay and without dilution, I think we would say.
Christian Owens: I agree.
Q
Thank you very much for coming, and welcome. We will now hear oral evidence from Tom Morrison-Bell, Government affairs and public policy manager at Google. We have until 2.45 pm. Could the witness please introduce himself for the record?
Tom Morrison-Bell: I am Tom Morrison-Bell. I am a public policy manager at Google, and I work on a range of competition and media policy issues.
Q
Tom Morrison-Bell: Thank you for the question. Let me just take a step back and look at how search and this question fit in with the current regime. A huge amount of consumer benefit comes from products such as Google Search. By and large, Google’s products are free, and there are also paid services that support around 700,000 small businesses in the UK. If you look at the financial aspects of search—so, advertising—the revenues generated are in a very small subsection of that. The market might be e-commerce or retail, for example, rather than general search. If you look at retail—people will place an ad next to a keyword such as “buy trainers”—you will see in the market that most retail searches do not start on Google Search. Also, advertising revenues on other e-commerce platforms are growing much faster than Google. So it is important to understand it specifically: yes, there is a general search engine, but in the case of markets, that can often be a different story.
Q
Tom Morrison-Bell: With respect, I do believe that Google is one of the most innovative companies and largest investors in innovation. Between 2018 and 2022, Google spent $145 billion on research and development. That includes amazing stuff that happens here in the UK. For example, Google DeepMind, which is probably the world’s foremost artificial intelligence research institute, is based here and is solving incredible problems such as protein folding.
Q
Tom Morrison-Bell: Yes, I can. I am happy to touch on some of those issues with regard to the Bill. As you will have heard by now, the Bill gives very extensive powers to the DMU that will be highly discretionary and very open-ended. That is how the Bill has been drafted. In Google’s case, those will be powers to direct how complex products are designed, and critically the regime will be forward-looking rather than backward-looking, which is how traditional competition policy works. As I have said, Google’s products and services drive a huge amount of consumer benefit in the UK, and these markets are fast-moving and complex.
With the Bill specifically, our key point is that in relation to products that provide a substantial amount of consumer benefit, that are innovative and that are complex, it is important that these very open-ended powers for the regulator have appropriate checks and balances. I wanted to bring to the Committee three specific areas in which we think the Bill can be strengthened. I am sure that you will have heard about these in other sessions.
First, I think there are strong grounds for making sure that the appeals standard is aligned with that in the Competition Act 1998, which is appeal on the merits as opposed to judicial review. Secondly, the Bill should ensure that consumer benefits can appropriately be considered by the regulator in the regime by adding a bit more coherence to the way the countervailing benefits exemption is constructed. Thirdly, one of the really innovative things that is designed to drive the Government’s ambition of ensuring that it is a speedy regime with innovation at its heart is this idea of a participative approach, whereby all parties involved in the market are encouraged into dialogue with the regulator.
One thing that the Bill provides for is for private cases to be brought before the digital markets unit has found any breach of a requirement on a firm. If that is the case, we think it is important that the digital markets unit is given the opportunity to make the decision first. Otherwise, there is a risk of the courts deciding something and the digital markets unit deciding something else, so that we end up with potentially conflicting compliance requirements on regulated firms.
Q
I want to come back to a specific point. You have talked about consumer benefit, and I think we all see the consumer benefit that can and does come from the innovation of Google. However, given your dominance and market power, do you accept that the way in which Google works with other companies is actually contributing to consumer harm as well?
Tom Morrison-Bell: As a general statement, no: I would not agree with that, straight up. We deliver huge amounts of consumer benefit. There are numerous areas where we are and have been in dialogue with the CMA. We really want to continue to be able to deliver that.
Q
Tom Morrison-Bell: Well, I think there are some things to unpack. For example, payment systems have been mentioned. We have agreed commitments with the CMA—I believe they are out to market testing at the moment—on offering a range of payment systems. When it comes to app stores, 99% of app users pay 15% or less on fees. There are important details here.
Q
Tom Morrison-Bell: Generally speaking, Google is estimated to provide around £55 billion of economic activity a year in the UK, as a starting figure. We have multiple products. It depends where you look. Workspace is our productivity suite, with word processing and similar, and is estimated to have saved 600 million hours for workers around the UK through more effective communication and speedier software. As I have said, tools like search and maps are free, and they also support businesses across the country to be more effective. That drives £55 billion in economic activity.
There is also our Play store. Android is open source and a free operating system that is available free to mobile device manufacturers, and they can make their own versions. That has substantially driven down the cost of handsets around the world and has been a huge contributor to making sure that people can have access to the internet at lower rates. The Play store itself is estimated to support about 240,000 developer jobs in the UK alone. That drives revenues for them of about £2.8 billion. Across the board, there is substantial benefit.
Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill (Fifth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateSeema Malhotra
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(1 year, 2 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThe Minister may have explained this elsewhere, but I am wondering about the thresholds of £1 billion and £25 billion. Will those thresholds be assessed over time, because firms’ turnover and so on can change from year to year? When is the point at which assessment is made, and will the threshold change subsequently if turnover drops?
The hon. Lady makes a good point, which relates to what my hon. Friend the Member for Broadland said about fluctuation of turnover and what companies may do with their turnover. It might be a good time to tackle that.
First, the turnover of the whole corporate group needs to be considered. That approach will help to avoid complications in revenue allocation, which could result in firms avoiding investigation and designation by virtue of their corporate structure or accounting practices. The DMU will be able to consider the past two periods of 12 months, not just the more recent one when calculating turnover—that should cover fluctuations, which the hon. Member for Feltham and Heston asked about. Markets can fluctuate, and turnover is not the same as market power; it is just part of the definition. The flexibility will also reduce the likelihood of the figures being manipulated and circumvented for the purposes of the turnover threshold.
Importantly, the use of the turnover thresholds will provide certainty to the vast majority of firms that they cannot be in scope of the regime, as they will easily be able to determine that their turnover is below the thresholds. However, if a firm meets the turnover threshold that does not necessarily mean that it will be subject to an investigation. The DMU will also need to have reasonable grounds to consider that the firm meets the two SMS conditions in respect of a digital activity that is linked to the UK—that is, that it has substantial and entrenched market power, and a position of strategic significance in respect of that activity.
Clause 7 will give power to the Secretary of State to amend those thresholds. That will ensure that they remain relevant as digital markets develop, evolve and grow over time. The DMU will be required to keep the thresholds under review and advise the Secretary of State whether they are still appropriate. The Government anticipate that the DMU may take into account factors such as inflation and currency fluctuation when doing so, using its expertise and while having its finger on the pulse of digital markets. As was the case for clause 6, the affirmative resolution procedure is the appropriate mechanism, as this is a significant power that would alter the scope of the regime.
Clause 8 relates to the turnover condition and sets out further details about the meaning of global and UK turnover. Any activity of the firm will be considered when estimating global turnover. Both digital and non-digital activities will be considered, making it easier for firms to know whether they are in scope without having to distinguish between different types of activity.
For UK turnover, any activity of the firm will be considered, but the turnover must relate to UK users or UK customers. The clause also gives the Secretary of State the power to make provision about how turnover should be estimated, including provision about amounts that should or should not be regarded as comprising turnover. That level of detail would not be suitable for primary legislation. We believe a negative procedure is most appropriate because of the technical and non-controversial nature of any regulations.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 4 to 8 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 9
Initial SMS investigations
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill (Seventh sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateSeema Malhotra
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(1 year, 2 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesOrder. I am a bear of little brain. If somebody does not stand, I do not know that they want to speak.
I just wanted to make a general point in relation to the DMU’s powers, because they are wider and there is a question about mechanisms to address the scrutiny and accountability of DMU decisions. We support the PCI framework and the flexibility, but on the way in which decisions can be made about PCI notices, the changes to allow greater flexibility and changes to orders made, there is the potential for a lot more flexibility, but there is the balance of certainty and scrutiny. Can the Minister address how there will be greater opportunity for scrutiny, transparency and accountability over the DMU’s use of the greater powers?
I will try to cover as many of those points as I can. On the difference between AEC and AECC and adverse effects on consumers and competition, that is effectively built into the regime, anyway. The DMU’s objective is to promote competition for the benefit of consumers, and that must shape the design of all its regulatory interventions, including for PCIs. Under the current drafting, the DMU is able to address the detrimental effects of a competition problem on consumers. The issue is terminology rather than anything else.
The hon. Lady asked about how PCIs will be published. They can be introduced after CR and can be published alongside them, because speed is important, which it is important to highlight. She also asked about where PCIs will be published, which I can summarise. A PCI notice launches an investigation and a summary of that will be published, with the firm having had the full notice.
Will the Minister confirm how soon that will happen? There is a four-month timeline after that full consultation and then the pro-competition orders or alternatives. In terms of the public—
That is a fair point. The best I can say is as soon as is practicable. I talked about the fact that speed is important, but it really depends on the complexity of the case and what needs to be in the summary, how quickly it will take to summarise and so on. There is a drive to get on with this as quickly as possible. The theme throughout the entire framework of the Bill is that detriment happens at speed in digital markets and we have to crack on and get those PCIs in place should they be required.
The decision notices for PCIs will go to the firm first. The full document will be published and an order will be introduced. A summary will be published. Should the PCI be replaced, an order revoked or should there be an acceptance of varying commitments on a PCI, the full document will be published.
The CMA can consult on an order as part of the earlier PCI decision, so the four months may not be necessary. Those timetables are there as a maximum, depending on the complexities.
I would like to pick up on the point about pro-competition orders and the consultation. Clause 49(4) states:
“The provision that may be made in reliance on subsection (3) includes provision requiring an undertaking to act differently in respect of different users or customers (and such provision may be by reference to a description of users or customers, to absolute numbers of users or customers, or to a proportion of the undertaking’s total number of users or customers).”
That appears both broad and specific. Interested parties may want clarity, so is it expected that that detail will be discussed and consulted on?
The way that consultation is done depends. If there is something starkly obvious to everyone, it may be that only minimal consultation is needed. If it is more technical, it will need to be more in depth, which is why we are not being prescriptive from the centre. It is up to the DMU to consider this.
The hon. Lady also asked about a list of PCIs and potential PCIs. It is very much for the DMU to address the recourse to a designated firm’s market dominance. Examples of PCIs that could be introduced include choice remedies that will allow users to make an active choice in the digital services that they use. PCIs could, for example, compel a designated firm to present users with different options for their preferred web browser, and we heard evidence on that from Gener8. Instead of defaulting to a particular browser, PCIs could include interoperability remedies that will enable users to use goods and services from different providers as opposed to being locked into one provider. For example, the DMU might require users of different instant messaging services to be able to communicate with one another.
The DMU could introduce data portability remedies, which would make it easier for users to switch providers. Such remedies could, for example, require a designated firm to make it possible for its users to download and export data to a new phone with a different operating system. PCIs could include data access remedies, which would level the playing field by requiring designated firms to share their data with competitors, which could include the data that large search engines have on users’ search history. Separation remedies would require designated firms to run different aspects of their businesses independently, so that dominant firms cannot use market power in one part of the business to gain power in another, which might involve requiring data stores for different services to be separated. It could require the firm to sell off a part of its business altogether.
Those are examples, but that was not a prescriptive or exhaustive list of PCIs. They are very much up to the DMU to frame depending on the technology and the market dominance that they are trying to remedy.
I seek your guidance, Mr Hollobone. I was just wondering about process. I had one last question for the Minister; I thought that he was continuing his speech, but he has finished it.
I seek clarification from the Minister on clause 51(8), which reads:
“The fact that a pro-competition order ceases to have effect does not affect the exercise of any functions in relation to a breach or possible breach of that order.”
I assume that is referring to historical breaches, but I seek clarification on that because it is not in the wording of the clause.
I was champing at the bit to talk about these clauses. However, I will keep my comments brief because much of Labour’s thoughts align with our thoughts on previous clauses.
Clause 70 gives the CMA the power to require any individual to attend an interview and answer questions for the purposes of a digital markets investigation. That is consistent with the amendments to section 26A of the Competition Act 1998. We welcome those, so it is only right that the powers appear in this legislation, too. These are basic powers and the clause is fairly procedural. The CMA must have the power to give notice to any individual with information relevant to a digital markets investigation, requiring them to answer relevant questions at a place or in a manner specified in the notice. That is fundamental for an empowered regulator. We support the approach, so we have not sought to amend the clause at this stage. We also support the intentions of clause 71, and we believe that the approach is fair and reasonable. The clause is important for clarity. We welcome its inclusion in the Bill and we have not sought to amend it at this stage.
Turning to clause 72, it is right and proper that the CMA must have reasonable grounds to suspect that information relevant to the breach investigation can be accessed from or on the premises. We support that common- sense approach. The provisions are in line with those for other regimes, and will be important in ensuring that if the CMA is required take action for the purposes of a breach investigation, it can do so in a timely and effective manner. We support the clause and have not sought to amend it.
We also support the intentions of clause 73, which gives the CMA the power to enter business and domestic premises under a warrant, without notice and using reasonable force, for the purposes of a breach investigation. Again, the CMA has powers of entry under a warrant through sections 28 and 28A of the Competition Act 1998. It will come as no surprise, given that we support provisions for the CMA to act without a warrant, that we agree that it should be able to act with one. We value the clarification that the CMA must prove that there are reasonable grounds to act. If it has to, it can call on individuals who have expertise that is not available in the CMA but is required if the terms of the warrant are to be fully carried out. That will allow the CMA to act rapidly, which, given the level of these breaches, is vital. We therefore support this clause standing part of the Bill.
Clause 74 sets out the supplementary requirements to the CMA’s power to enter premises under a warrant. We welcome the transparency afforded by subsection (1), and the clarification that although the CMA cannot enter premises outside the United Kingdom, as outlined in subsection (6), it can access information regardless of where it is physically stored. That is an important point, given the nature of SMS firms and their global holdings. For those reasons, Labour is happy to support the clause standing part of the Bill.
Clause 75 makes necessary amendments to a range of sections of the Criminal and Justice and Police Act 2001 to enable the CMA to seize information and take copies of, or extracts from, information when exercising its power under clause 73 to enter business and domestic premises with a warrant. It is a practical clause that aligns with the CMA’s power to seize documents from business premises under section 28 of the Competition Act 1998. We therefore believe that the clause should stand part of the Bill.
Clause 76 requires the CMA to follow the rules of the High Court, the Court of Session or the CAT when making an application. We see it as a natural consequential clause and will therefore support it.
May I make one additional comment? We received evidence from trading standards about their access to information that could be stored online in order for them to undertake some of their responsibilities. Has any consideration been given to whether the search powers that the CMA will be given could be extended to trading standards, which sometimes undertake very similar areas of work?
It is a pleasure to speak to this group of clauses on behalf of my hon. Friend the Member for Pontypridd, who is speaking in another debate.
We support clause 77, which will give the CMA the power to require a skilled person, which could be a legal or other person, to provide a report to it on a matter relevant to the operation of the regime. That is in line with other regimes of that nature, and we therefore support its inclusion.
The clarity afforded by subsection (1), which sets out that the CMA can use this power in
“exercising, or deciding whether to exercise, any of its digital markets functions”,
is welcome. It is also right that the CMA can exercise the power only in relation to a designated undertaking or an undertaking subject to an SMS investigation.
In order to ensure no unnecessary delay, subsections (2) and (3), which will give the CMA the power to appoint a skilled person to provide a report and give notice of the appointment and other relevant matters to the undertaking in question, while also specifying the form of a report, are an important inclusion. That aligns well with subsection (12), which imposes a duty on the designated undertaking or undertaking subject to an SMS investigation, and any person connected to those undertakings, to assist the skilled person in any way reasonably required to prepare the report.
One hopes that designated undertakings would co-operate in such instances, but it is welcome and helpful to have their obligations outlined as they are in clause 77. Clarity on the consequences of failing to comply, in the form of penalties or other enforcement provisions, is also an important and positive step. Labour has therefore not sought to amend the clause at this stage; we believe it should stand part of the Bill, as drafted.
As with any regulatory regime, the CMA should of course preserve relevant evidence. Clause 78 is integral, because it places a legal duty to preserve evidence that is relevant to a digital markets investigation, a compliance report by a designated undertaking, and evidence where the CMA is providing investigative assistance to an overseas regulator. The Bill also confirms that where the CMA has made a formal request for information, there are penalties for non-compliance, or for falsifying, concealing or destroying information.
Labour supports the purpose of clause 78, which is to preserve evidence before and after the CMA has made a formal request. We believe that it is consistent with the existing duty to preserve evidence under section 201(4) of the Enterprise Act 2002 on cartel offence investigations. We note, however, that the duties within this clause do not apply
“where the person has a reasonable excuse to do so.”
I—and, I am sure, others—would welcome clarification from the Minister on that point. We support the intentions of the clause and have therefore not sought to amend it at this stage, but I would appreciate further clarity on the definition and how it will work in practice.
Clause 79 is helpful because it specifies that the CMA cannot require any information subject to legal and professional privilege, or, in Scotland, confidentiality of communications. That is an important point to make and is in line with similar regimes. We support the clarity outlined in subsection (2), which specifies that the limitation applies to producing, taking possession of, and taking copies of or extracts from a privileged communication. I do not need to elaborate much further here. Labour considers this to be a fairly standard procedure and we therefore support clause 79 stand part.
Finally, clause 80 gives the CMA the power to publish a notice of any decision to use its investigatory powers under the digital markets regime to assist an investigation by the regulator in another jurisdiction. The notice may include the regulator that the CMA is assisting, the undertaking that is the subject of investigation, and the matter for which the undertaking is under investigation. Labour welcomes the transparency measures here.
My question is about why that approach has not been afforded to the CMA’s domestic work on digital markets. If the CMA is able to support overseas regulators in ways that might identify the undertaking, I am unclear as to why the CMA is not compelled in the same way for issues that might arise in the UK. I am interested to hear the Minister’s thoughts on that point, because it is an important one for companies likely to be captured in the SMS definition and for challenger firms that might one day find themselves subject to these regulations, too.
I thank the hon. Lady. I will probably write to her with examples of where that measure might come in. As I have said, it does not come in if there is an exemption for people with a reasonable excuse. I am not fleet enough of foot to come up with a good example for her at the moment, but I will certainly write to her.
On the domestic situation for the DMU, I will, again, probably write to the hon. Lady, but my interpretation is that it is easier to deal with the potential for defamation and so on when someone has full control of the case in one jurisdiction. If we are working across jurisdictions internationally it is more complex, so the protections need to be there.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 77, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 78 to 80 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Mike Wood.)
Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill (Eighth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateSeema Malhotra
Main Page: Seema Malhotra (Labour (Co-op) - Feltham and Heston)Department Debates - View all Seema Malhotra's debates with the Department for Science, Innovation & Technology
(1 year, 2 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesGovernment amendment 25 seeks to correct the list of “related requirements” in clause 81 to include pro-competition order directions. The Competition and Markets Authority has the power to impose directions on a firm with strategic market status to take specific action to come into regulatory compliance with a PCO, under section 87 of the Enterprise Act 2002.
As currently drafted, a nominated officer would not be responsible for a direction issued in relation to a PCO because this is not listed as a “related requirement”. The amendment will clarify that nominated officers will be responsible for directions issued in relation to a PCO to which they are assigned by the SMS firm, and that compliance reports in clause 82 will have to cover these directions. The amendment will ensure that the digital markets unit is able to monitor whether an undertaking is complying with directions issued in relation to a PCO. I hope that the Committee will accept the amendment.
Clauses 81 places requirements on SMS firms to assign appropriate senior managers as “nominated officers” to monitor compliance with specific regulatory requirements. That will help to facilitate co-operation between SMS firms and the DMU and ensure that information included in compliance reports is accurate and complete, and that reports are submitted to the DMU in a timely manner. SMS firms will be required to assign nominated officers in respect of each conduct requirement, pro-competition order or commitment made in lieu of a pro-competition order. A nominated officer appointed in relation to a conduct requirement will be automatically responsible for overseeing compliance with any subsequent orders that are imposed by the DMU in relation to that conduct requirement.
Clause 82 place requirements on SMS firms to submit compliance reports to the DMU. A compliance reporting obligation can be imposed by the DMU in relation to conduct requirements and PCOs, and can be extended to cover additional requirements related to those requirements, such as an enforcement order in relation to a conduct requirement. Compliance reports can also be imposed when a firm has had a binding commitment accepted by the DMU, in lieu of the DMU imposing a pro-competition order. A compliance report will include details of how the firm has complied and will continue to comply with the regulatory requirement and any related requirements. Reports will also set out the extent to which the nominated officer assigned to the particular regulatory requirement considers that the firm has complied with that requirement. Information in compliance reports will be essential to the DMU’s assessment of whether an SMS firm is complying with the regime, and will enable the DMU to take swift where it identifies risk of non-compliance.
It is a pleasure to speak to the amendment and clauses on behalf of my hon. Friend the Member for Pontypridd, and I will be brief. Government amendment makes a requirement in a direction under section 87 of the Enterprise Act, given by virtue of a pro-competition order a related requirement for the purposes of clause 82.
Labour supports clause 81, which requires a designated undertaking to assign an appropriate senior manager to the role of “nominated officer” when the CMA imposes a digital markets requirement, for the purpose of monitoring the undertaking’s compliance with that requirement. We strongly believe this level of personal liability is required for big tech firms, which have dominated for too long, to listen and engage fully with this regime. We welcome clarity such as that in subsection (2), which sets out the tasks of the nominated officer and requires them to carry out those tasks in relation to
“digital markets requirements and all related requirements”.
It makes sense that if a nominated officer is assigned to a conduct requirement, they are automatically assigned to any subsequent enforcement orders made in connection to it. We therefore support clause 81 and have not sought to amend it at this stage.
Government amendment 25 makes a change to the Enterprise Act to bring the provisions in line with the current Bill. We support its inclusion. It is vital that existing legislation is brought in line if this regime is going to work to its full effect.
Labour sees compliance reports and the formal duties outlined in clause 82, which ultimately require designated undertakings to provide the CMA with reports setting out how they are complying with requirements imposed upon them, as a natural step in the implementation of this regime. For transparency, accountability and fairness all round it is right that the CMA has a duty to notify a designated undertaking of any compliance reporting requirements and will specify in the notice when reports should be submitted, what information they should contain and what form they should take. Labour has long called for those powers, and we have also argued that they should be flexible, so we are pleased to see provisions that allow the CMA to alter the reporting requirements on a designated undertaking by giving the undertaking a further notice.
Specifically interesting to see in the Bill are the provisions around subsection (5), which permit the CMA to require a designated undertaking to publish a compliance report or a summary of that report. Will the Minister confirm the form and the location that he feels would be suitable for such reports to be published?
We recognise that the provisions in clause 82 allow for the version the designated undertaking is required to publish to be different from the version provided in private to the CMA under subsection (1). For example, some information may be redacted for confidentiality purposes. It is still unclear, though, exactly where the report will be published, so it would be helpful to have the Minister’s response on that point.
The CMA could ask for a public version to be published on its website. It will be reported to the firm in full, but the majority of the publication in all such things will be online.
Amendment 25 agreed to.
Clause 81, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 82 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 83
Penalties for failure to comply with competition requirements
Government amendment 26 seeks to clarify that the CMA can impose a penalty on a former SMS firm that no longer has strategic market status in relation to conduct that occurred before the designation ended or in relation to breaches of obligations that exist after the designation ends. With that aim, the amendment, together with its related amendments, replace the wording “a designated undertaking” with “an undertaking” in clauses 83 and 86. That ensures the change relates to penalties for failure to comply with competition requirements, as well as any penalties for failure to comply with investigative requirements. I hope the Committee will support the amendments.
I thank the Minister for his remarks. We certainly support these Government amendments, and I will reserve the rest of my comments for the clause stand part debate.
Amendment 26 agreed to.
Amendments made: 27, in clause 83, page 50, line 23, leave out “a designated” and insert “an”.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 26.
Amendment 28, in clause 83, page 50, line 24, leave out “designated”.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 26.
Amendment 29, in clause 83, page 50, line 26, leave out “a designated” and insert “an”.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 26.
Amendment 30, in clause 83, page 50, line 28, leave out “designated”. —(Paul Scully.)
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 26.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
It is a pleasure to speak to this group of amendments on behalf of my hon. Friend the Member for Pontypridd, who is still in the debate in the Chamber. As we know, the clause sets out that the CMA can impose monetary penalties on a designated undertaking where it is satisfied that the undertaking has breached a regulatory requirement, including for merger reporting and commitments, without reasonable excuse.
The clause’s wording affords substantial flexibility. Indeed, the provisions are in place only when the designated undertaking has failed to comply “without reasonable excuse”. None of us wants designated firms to be able to block action with excuses, so it would be helpful to hear how the Minister would quantify a reasonable excuse. That said, the Opposition welcome the clause, which is central to the regime. The ability to impose a penalty where appropriate is an important power that we hope will go some way towards encouraging companies to work with the regulator. For those reasons, we will not oppose it.
I turn to amendments 26 to 33, some of which we have already debated. It is helpful that we have made those amendments to ensure that a penalty can be imposed on an undertaking that was once designated and therefore captured by the regime but now no longer to subject to it. That will assist in capturing historical offences of failure to comply and goes to the heart of the importance of compliance.
Clause 84 outlines the maximum penalties that the CMA can impose. As we know, the CMA can impose penalties of up to 10% of worldwide turnover and, in the case of breaches of orders or commitments, of up to 5% of daily worldwide turnover for each day that a breach continues. Subsections (2) and (3) state that the CMA will, in most situations, have the discretion to choose whether to impose a fixed penalty, a daily-rate penalty or both. However, where an undertaking breaches a conduct requirement as opposed to an enforcement order or breaches any requirements under chapter 5 on mergers, the CMA will be able to impose only a fixed penalty.
The Opposition welcome these provisions. They afford the CMA flexibility and discretion, and we believe that financial penalties are an important power for any regulator to be able to impose. We therefore support the clause and do not seek to amend it. As with other formal liabilities, Labour believes that the CMA absolutely should be able to impose penalties on designated undertakings or individuals within them for failing to comply with certain investigative requirements. The powers are important to the regime and we welcome their inclusion.
In addition, clarity on exactly what will constitute, or be defined as failure to comply, is also helpful. We know that actions such as providing false or misleading information in the course of an investigation, or in relation to compliance reporting, will fall under this definition. That is a sensible approach, which we support.
Furthermore, clause 85(2) clearly sets out the circumstances in which the CMA can impose civil sanctions against either a named senior manager assigned to an information request or a nominated officer with relation to a compliance report. We feel that that personal duty is crucial to the success of the regime, as we hope that it will act as a deterrent, as companies will want to avoid personal duties, and that such a level of personal liability is crucial for SMS firms to take the CMA’s powers and regulatory regime seriously. We therefore support clause 85 and its intentions and believe it should stand part of the Bill.
Clause 86 establishes the maximum fixed and daily rate penalties that the CMA can impose under clause 85 on undertakings and individuals. As outlined in clause 86(3), under the provisions, the CMA may impose a fixed penalty on an undertaking of up to 1% of the undertaking’s worldwide turnover, or a daily penalty of up to 5% of the undertaking’s daily worldwide turnover for each day of non-compliance, or both. Similarly, subsection (6) sets out that the CMA may impose a fixed penalty on an individual of up to £30,000, or a daily penalty of £15,000, or both. We welcome that clarity on the face of the Bill. Labour has been clear for some time now that financial penalties are vital for compliance, and that the CMA must have the statutory footing to be able to impose them in the most severe cases of non-compliance.
We further note clause 86(7) to (9), setting out that the Secretary of State has the power to amend the maximum amounts of penalty that can be imposed on an individual. Naturally, that is a point that I must press the Minister on: in what circumstances does he imagine that the Secretary of State would make such changes? It is an interesting power to ascribe to one individual, therefore we welcome subsection (8), which states that the Secretary of State must consult the CMA and such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate before making the regulations. We therefore support clause 86 and believe it should stand part of the Bill unamended. Labour sees clause 86 as fairly procedural, setting out which sections of the Enterprise Act 2002 apply for penalties imposed under clause 83 or clause 85 of the Bill.
I will keep my comments on clause 87 brief as we see it as clarification rather than contentious, in particular given that we agree with the Government’s approach more broadly on enforcement and appeals. My one plea to the Minister is that he and his colleagues in the Department do not bow down to likely pressure from big SMS firms.
We appreciate that in recent months we have faced headlines about some tech companies threatening to withdraw from the UK if provisions on online safety become—as they see it—too cumbersome. However, when it comes to regulating the online space more widely, whether in our digital markets or through safety provisions, we know that companies have remained unregulated for too long, and that that is having a massive impact on consumers. That applies to all of us in Committee and the hundreds of thousands of constituents across the country we represent. That said, we support clause 87 and have not sought to amend it.
Clause 88, too, we see as fairly standard, in that it sets out exactly how the CMA will calculate daily rates and turnover for the purpose of imposing a monetary penalty. This clause clarifies that daily penalties will accumulate until the person complies with the requirement—for example that the requested information is provided—or, where the penalty is incurred in relation to an overseas investigation, when the overseas regulator no longer requires assistance.
Labour further welcomes the fact that clause 88 will give the CMA the discretion to determine an earlier date for the amount payable in order to prevent that amount from accumulating. We of course hope that application of the provisions will rarely be required, but they are welcome additions to have on the face of the Bill.
Lastly, we note that clause 88(2) to (4) gives the Secretary of State the power to specify how turnover is calculated in secondary legislation. Again, I would welcome some clarity on this point. I wonder whether the Minister can further clarify in exactly what circumstances he envisions these powers will be required and, if he can confirm whether, when the Secretary of State has to draw upon those powers, what action will be taken to ensure the secondary legislation required is not subject to further delay? That point aside, we understand the need for clause 88 and welcome its inclusion in the Bill.
Clause 89 is important in that it places a statutory duty on the CMA to prepare and publish a statement of policy in relation to the exercise of powers to impose a penalty under clauses 83 and 85. In doing so, the statement must include considerations around whether a penalty should be imposed, as well as details of the nature and amount of any such penalty. We welcome the provisions in subsection (3) that confirm that the CMA may revise its statement of policy and, where it does so, must publish the revised statement.
We also feel that the requirement of the CMA to consult the Secretary of State before publishing a statement is an important step. However, Labour feels some clarity is needed here to establish exactly when and where that statement will be published. Will the Minister confirm the timelines for when the CMA will be required to publish the statements? It is important that there is no delay; any specific timelines will be gratefully received. Following those assurances from the Minister, I am sure we will be happy to support the clause standing part of the Bill.
Lastly, we see clause 90 as a standard clarification that ensures that where a person has been found guilty of a criminal offence committed under clauses 91, 92 or 93, which we will soon debate, they will not be required to pay a civil penalty for that same offence. It is also right that where a person has paid a civil penalty for an act of the kind referenced under clause 85, they cannot be criminally convicted for that same offence. We also welcome the clarity that the clause does not prevent criminal or civil proceedings from being started where, respectively, a penalty has been imposed but not paid or someone has been charged but not convicted.
Again, we hope that these clauses will never have to be enforced in reality, but they are important additions and Labour support them, given the importance of ensuring the CMA has the teeth to implement this regulatory regime in full.
The hon. Lady mentioned “without reasonable excuse”. The onus is on SMS firms to prove that they have an excuse for committing a breach. That approach reflects the bespoke targeted nature of the regime, which means that firms should be fully aware of whether they are compliant. That same threshold is used in the competition regime already for breaches of specific directions and commitments; other prohibitions in the competition regime are more high level than any other obligations within the digital markets regime, making it harder for firms to assess their own compliance and therefore requiring a different legal threshold.
On updating penalty limits, and the Secretary of State’s power to do so, it is important that the new regulatory regime is agile, flexible and can be adapted to changing circumstances. The power is the same as is already used under the Enterprise Act 2002, which ensures consistency across the legislation and will ensure that the power remains an effective enforcement mechanism in the future. The Secretary of State must consult the DMU and other persons before making changes to the penalty levels. Importantly, proposed changes will be subject to the affirmative procedure and will need to be approved in Parliament. Another hon. Member asked about where the policy will be published; again, that will be online and in full. Clearly, that will be as soon as is practicable, because we want to keep the pace of the policy as fast as possible, in order to keep up to date with any detriment to especially challenging tech, and obviously to consumers as a consequence.
The hon. Member for Feltham and Heston asked about the power to update turnover and how that might be calculated. It is really important that in this area the regulatory regime remains agile and flexible, and granting the Secretary of State the power to specify how turnover is calculated in secondary legislation will allow any future changes in accounting principles, for example, to be taken into account to ensure that these calculations remain relevant. Again, that power is the same as that already used under section 94A of the Enterprise Act 2002, ensuring consistency across the two pieces of legislation.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 83, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 84 and 85 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 86
Amount of penalties under section 85
Amendments made: 31, in clause 86, page 52, line 29, leave out “a designated” and insert “an”.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 26.
Amendment 32, in clause 86, page 52, line 31, leave out “designated”.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 26.
Amendment 33, in clause 86, page 52, line 33, leave out “designated”.—(Paul Scully.)
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 26.
Clause 86, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 87 to 90 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Mike Wood.)
Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill (Tenth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateSeema Malhotra
Main Page: Seema Malhotra (Labour (Co-op) - Feltham and Heston)Department Debates - View all Seema Malhotra's debates with the Department for Science, Innovation & Technology
(1 year, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIt is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Ali. I thank the Minister for his opening remarks, and it is a pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Pontypridd in speaking on this important Bill.
Clause 139 provides an overview of the structure of part 3, which sets out the court-based regime for the civil enforcement of consumer protection law to protect the collective interests of consumers. As the Minister said, that allows for two regimes of civil enforcement—a simplified courts-based regime and the CMA’s direct enforcement regime.
The regime provides for consumer law enforcers to apply for, and the courts to make, enforcement orders, interim enforcement orders, online interface orders, to which only the CMA may apply, and interim online interface orders to which, again, only the CMA may apply. An enforcer or the court could decide to accept an undertaking from the enforcement subject instead of issuing an order, a mechanism that there should be the option for and is in line with the participative approach of working in the Bill.
Chapter 3 would also provide for certain enforcers—defined in clause 143, which we will go on to debate—and the court to attach remedies, known as “enhanced consumer measures”, to enforcement orders and undertakings. Importantly, chapter 3 would provide new powers for the courts to impose monetary penalties on enforcement subjects who have infringed the consumer protection laws within scope of part 3.
I wish to signal the Opposition’s broad support for part 3 and the measures it introduces to ensure swifter enforcement of consumer protection law and more effective redress for consumers. That is a sentiment shared by consumer groups. As one example, the written evidence submitted by Consumer Scotland expressed broad support for part 3, noting how it:
“simplifies and bolsters the enforcement of penalties for relevant infringements of consumer protection law under part 8 of the Enterprise Act 2002.”
I hope we will work constructively through the Committee to ensure that the consumer provisions in the Bill are as robust and fair as possible, and that we will not see the watering down of any measures currently drafted.
Clause 140 defines the scope of the enforcement regime set out by part 3. It sets out how a trader has committed an infringement of the part 3 enforcement regime if their act or omission harms the collective interests of consumers, as well as meeting the UK connection conditions set out in clauses 141, and the specified prohibition condition set out in clause 142.
The Opposition support clause 140 as a necessary element in introducing a robust enforcement regime. It is a stronger consumer protection, which acts where a continuation or repetition of an act, such as misleading information or an omission of information, could continue to harm future customers unless remedied. However, I ask the Minister for clarity on one aspect of the provision. As well as setting out the scope of enforcement, the clause in subsection (2) also defines relevant terms such as “trader” and “consumer”. The explanatory note states that in relation to the definition of “consumer”:
“A consumer must be an individual and so excludes body corporates. The individual must be acting wholly or mainly outside of their business.”
While it is welcome that individual consumers are being protected through the enforcement regime, could the Minister clarify where that leaves small businesses or the self-employed? The notes suggest that the individual is still a consumer when acting for dual purposes. It is clear to me, as a shadow Minister for business looking at the needs of small businesses in particular, that plenty of British businesses are negatively impacted by rogue traders supplying them, whether with office equipment or digital services. There is a segment of those businesses that could be caught inside or outside the definition depending on its interpretation.
It would be helpful if the Minister clarified whether the Government plan, for example, for microbusiness customers to be included in the consumer protection regime. Who would decide if it was 60% consumer or 60% business for the purposes of this legislation? It may be a product that is being delivered, and the business may be run from home. I would be grateful for the Minister’s comment and clarification on that point.
Amendment 59 replaces “trader” with “person”. It ensures that the definition of commercial practice for the purposes of part 3 of the Bill includes an act or omission by a trader relating to the promotion or supply of a consumer’s product to another consumer. I would welcome some clarification from the Minister. Will the amendment mean that where a consumer or private individual commits what would be an infringement by a trader when selling a product to another consumer—for instance through eBay or Facebook Marketplace—they are liable for enforcement action, as a business would be? This is an important area of protection for consumers, so I would be interested to hear more about how it would work in practice. If I understand the provision correctly, it could significantly expand the enforcement regime beyond just businesses.
Clause 141 sets out how traders meet the UK connection condition, which, as set out in clause 140, forms part of the scope of the enforcement regime. It sets out how a commercial practice meets the UK connection condition if at least one of three conditions are met. Those conditions are that the trader has a place of business in the UK, that the trader carries on business in the UK, meaning that their business operates in the UK, perhaps without an office, or that the trader carries on activities that are in any way directed to consumers in the UK. The conditions are necessarily broad but important for the protection of UK consumers. We support clause 141.
Clause 142 defines the specified prohibition condition, which is the final condition setting out the scope of the enforcement regime in part 3. In short, the clause sets out that a commercial practice meets this condition if it breaches provisions listed in schedule 13 and 14. Schedule 13 sets out the enactments, obligations and rules of law to which the court-based enforcement regime applies. The list is very comprehensive, and we support its contents. In particular, we note that chapters 1 to 4 of part 4 of the Bill are included in the schedule, which is welcome. I would welcome assurances from the Minister that the Government consulted widely among stakeholders regarding the compiling of the enactments of the schedule, so that we can be confident that there are no omissions. In addition, I invite the Minister to correct me if I am wrong in my understanding of how the schedule could be amended. There are other schedules with delegated powers, but I wanted to understand what the process would be here if there was a question of needing to amend the schedule if legislation were updated in the future. I would be grateful for clarification on that.
Similarly to schedule 13, schedule 14 lists the enactments to which the CMA’s direct enforcement regime applies. Like schedule 13, this schedule appears to be comprehensively drawn and is thus supported by the Opposition. I note that it also makes reference to other measures of the Bill that will be going through. On the theme of seeking clarity from the Minister, I would welcome assurances that a wide range of stakeholders and legislation has been consulted and reviewed to ensure that this is a comprehensive schedule. I would also ask what the process is for updating the schedule if required in the future.
Clause 143 lists public designated enforcers who would be able to use the court-based enforcement regime. We are pleased to see that this includes the CMA, trading standards, the Financial Conduct Authority, the Information Commissioner’s Office and Ofcom, among others. Certain private designated enforcers would also be able to use the court-based regime, such as the Consumers’ Association. We welcome the clause and the inclusion of a comprehensive list of public designated enforcers, but have the Government consulted with the groups they are planning to include in the clause? Were any groups or bodies that expressed an interest in being designated enforcers omitted from the clause?
Subsection (3) gives the Secretary of State a delegated power to add to or remove a body as a public or private designated enforcer, or to amend its entry. Regulations made under the clause would be subject to the affirmative procedure. However, the power could not be used to remove or vary the enforcement powers of the CMA, trading standards or the Department for the Economy in Northern Ireland. We welcome the protection of those bodies’ powers, but I would like clarification from the Minister on private designated enforcers.
The clause names the Consumers’ Association as a private designated enforcer, but no other group. While I note the criteria in clause 144 for designating a body as a private designated enforcer, it would nevertheless be helpful if the Minister spelled out how a body becomes a private designated enforcer. Would it have to apply? I would also be grateful for clarification of the basis on which the Secretary of State may remove, or seek to remove, a public or private designated enforcer—an issue that I will discuss further.
Clause 144 specifies the criteria that must be satisfied for the Secretary of State to designate a body as a private designated enforcer. This is an important clause. The criteria establish certain minimum standards of governance, transparency and competence that a person must meet to carry out enforcement action, and we welcome the clause. However, I refer the Minister to my question about how the Government expect people to become private enforcers. Would there be an application? Perhaps he would set out the process, and the basis on which he envisages withdrawing designation from an enforcer. Would that be because some conditions are no longer met? Would it be because some sort of complaint is received? It would be helpful to understand how those changes could be made.
Clause 145 identifies the categories of person an application for an enforcement order could be made against, and the types of infringements that they must have committed. An enforcer, as designated by clauses 143 or 144, would be able to apply to the court for an enforcement order or an interim enforcement order if the enforcer considers that they have engaged in, are engaging in or are likely to engage in a commercial practice that constitutes a relevant infringement, or if they are an accessory to such a practice.
We welcome the clause, but I would welcome further clarification on a few issues. First, the legislation states that
“an enforcer may make an application in respect of a relevant infringement”.
Did the Government consider changing “may” to “must”, or are they confident that enforcers will always apply for enforcement in cases where they have identified an infringement? I would welcome hearing the reasoning behind the choice made. Secondly, subsection (4) limits the power to apply for the imposition of a monetary penalty to public designated enforcers. Would the Minister clarify why that power has been withheld from private designated enforcers?
I have already made some remarks on clause 145, but I will just echo my final question. I asked the Minister about the power for public designated enforcers to apply for the imposition of a monetary penalty and why that power has been withheld from private designated enforcers. Clause 146 refers to CMA directions to other enforcers. As the Minister has outlined, the clause introduces provisions such that if an enforcer other than the CMA seeks similar action on applying for an enforcement order for a particular infringement, it may direct which enforcer can make the application. That could lead to, for example, the CMA directing that an application for an order can be made only by itself.
We support the clause, but does the Minister’s Department expect the CMA to engage constructively with other enforcers to ensure that the most suitable enforcer is the one that is allowed to make the application? The underlying policy argument is important; we would not want to see multiple enforcers seeking to take action against the same business for the same infringement. I would like some clarity on how that is expected to work.
Clause 147 would provide that where an enforcer thinks a relevant infringement has occurred or is likely to occur, it must consult the enforcement subject before making an application for an enforcement. Subsection (2) introduces a requirement on the enforcer to alert the enforcement subject to the possibility of a monetary penalty being sought alongside an enforcement order. The explanatory notes state that the policy intent is that prior consultation may quickly lead to the relevant infringement ending and make court action unnecessary. We welcome the clause as a necessary part of the enforcement process, and in the spirit of opportunity for co-operation that underpins the new regime.
Under clause 148, the court would be able to make an enforcement order if, on an application from an enforcer under clause 145, it finds that the enforcement subject has engaged, is engaging or is likely to engage in a commercial practice that constitutes a relevant infringement or is an accessory to the infringing practice. As an alternative to an order, the court would be able to accept an undertaking. Under subsection (3), in determining whether to make an enforcement order the court would have to take into consideration whether the enforcement subject had given an undertaking under clause 155 to a public designated enforcer, or clause 177 in respect of the infringing practice. Where the court makes an enforcement order, it would be required under this clause to indicate the nature of the infringing practice and direct the enforcement subject to comply. We strongly welcome the clause. It is a necessary step in ensuring that the courts have adequate enforcement powers over companies that are causing detriment to consumers.
I have a question for the Minister regarding clause 148(8). It states that as part of an enforcement order, an undertaking may include a further undertaking by the respondent to publish “the order” and “a corrective statement”. As the explanatory notes state, the policy intent behind the subsection is to prevent the company
“further distorting consumers’ purchasing decisions”
by making them aware that a company has had to change its practices. I welcome the subsection as a common-sense step to ensure full clarity for consumers in instances in which enforcement action has been taken, but will the Minister clarify whether he expects the court always to require the publication of the order and a corrective statement? Surely, it would be simpler and better for the consumer for that undertaking to be included in every enforcement order, so that there was confidence that the consumer will be as informed as possible.
Clause 149 will enable the court to include, in an enforcement order or interim order, a requirement to take, as part of enforcement orders,
“such enhanced consumer measures as the court considers just and reasonable.”
The court would first have to consider whether the proposed measures were proportionate and in doing so consider
“the likely benefit of the measures to consumers…the costs likely to be incurred by”
the enforcement agent and
“the likely cost to consumers of obtaining the benefit of the measures.”
We welcome the clause as a further necessary element of the consumer protection and enforcement regime that we are seeking to deliver.
Clause 150 confers a new power on courts to impose a monetary penalty on a company for infringing consumer protection regulations. The Opposition welcome the clause, but why has it taken so long to get to this point? Turning to the details of the monetary penalties, subsection (5) sets out that, where the enforcement subject has a turnover that can be determined, a fixed amount penalty must not exceed £300,000 or, if higher, 10% of the total value of the enforcement subject’s turnover. We support those penalty thresholds, but could the Minister expand on why the legislation has landed on £300,000 as a maximum penalty if it is less than 10% of the company’s turnover? Is that an arbitrary figure or one that has been consulted on and calculated to ensure the maximum deterrent so that companies do not infringe the legislation? Will the Minister clarify the source of the figure?
Finally, I would welcome further clarification from the Minister on clause 150(8), which provides an enforcement subject who is required to pay a monetary penalty with a right to appeal the decision to impose a penalty, its nature or amount on the merits, in addition to their existing appeal rights. I would be grateful if the Minister could clarify the appeals threshold, which appears to be different from the judicial review threshold for companies with strategic market status, as set out earlier in the Bill. Was the threshold set for an informed reason? There seems to be a lower threshold for consumer protection infringements.
In addition, has the Minister considered whether the more merits-based approach could lead to companies, particularly larger ones with significant legal capacity, drawing out the process of monetary penalties being imposed on them by pursuing lengthy court appeals? I want to ensure that we have understood the matter correctly, so I would welcome the Minister’s clarifying the point and saying whether those are unfounded concerns. If they are well founded, we want to have a look at the issue more closely. In short, the Opposition welcome the clause, because we want to ensure that the measure is a robust as possible in deterring companies from engaging in practices that harm consumers.
Under clause 151, the court will be able to make an interim enforcement order on an enforcement subject. It will be able to make such an order if it considers that the subject
“has engaged…or is likely to engage in a commercial practice which constitutes a relevant infringement”.
In addition, interim orders can be made if
“it appears to the court that if the application had been an application for an enforcement order it would be likely to be granted, and…the court considers it is expedient that the infringing practice is prohibited or prevented immediately.”
That includes being able to make an interim enforcement order without notice.
We welcome the clause in principle, as a positive contribution to ensuring that swift action is taken where necessary to protect consumers. However, it would be helpful if the Minister could clarify the scope or give examples of how the power may be used. Examples specified in the Bill papers include preventing a misleading advert from being made public and enforcing the withdrawal of unsafe goods, but it would be helpful to understand the threshold for an order to be made without notice. Is it, for example, where there is current or imminent harm? It is important that that is clarified so that consumers and those who would be enforcement subjects can understand how the power could be used by the court, and so that there is no question about scope.
Clause 152 enables the CMA to apply to the court for an online interface order or interim online interface order in respect of a person that it considers has engaged, is engaging or is likely to engage in a practice that constitutes a relevant infringement. Subsection (3) sets out a jurisdictional test that limits the CMA’s power to apply for an order in respect of a third party overseas; it may do so only if the person is a UK national, the person is habitually resident in the UK, the firm is established in the UK, or the firm carries on business in the UK.
Is the Minister confident that those criteria cover all scenarios in which companies could be involved in misleading practices towards UK consumers, whether they are resident here or not? Why is it just the CMA that has the power to make such applications, and not other public or private enforcers, such as trading standards or local weights and measures authorities? We welcome clause 152, but it would be helpful to understand that further. There has been some discussion of the important role of local trading standards in our enforcement regimes.
Clause 153, which necessarily follows clause 152, gives the court a discretionary power to make an online interface order in response to an application from the CMA under clause 152. We welcome clause 153 and recognise the importance of including digital practices that harm consumers. However, as with clause 152, will the Minister expand on why local weights and measures authorities will not be given powers to apply for orders alongside the CMA?
The Bill represents an opportunity to update the powers of trading standards so that they can operate more effectively in the 21st century. The Chartered Trading Standards Institute notes that officers regularly have to exercise powers of physical entry in order to seize documents that they may wish to use in criminal proceedings, but it also raises the issues that officers have accessing filed documents that are not physical. My question is about how trading standards powers should be reviewed and updated in line with those of other enforcers, and the opportunity to do that in the context of the Bill.
Finally, under clause 154, following an application from the CMA, the court will be able to grant an interim online interface order, where it is considered that a final online interface order would likely be granted but that an interim order is needed to end an infringement immediately. Subsection (2) will permit the court to grant an interim order without giving notice to the enforcement target.
We welcome the provisions, but I have similar questions —they are relevant—to those I asked about the earlier clauses.
Let me try to cover as many of those questions as I can. The hon. Lady asked about the possibility of multiple enforcers in process at the same time. In effect, we are restating the existing arrangements, which have been working. They work with the CMA as the gatekeeper, so the CMA would have to be notified when action has been taken—it can filter anything going on in that regard—and it would have to co-ordinate the approach.
On clause 148, and court powers to make orders and penalties, the hon. Lady talked about subsection (9) on whether an undertaking may include a trader publishing it in a corrective statement and whether I, as a Minister, would always expect that to happen. It is discretionary. The enforcer may require that as appropriate.
On the penalties, the £300,000 basically sits in the middle of the pack internationally. If we look at the regimes around the world, where penalties are imposed on individuals, New Zealand’s consumer protection system has £100,000 and Canada’s consumer regime has £450,000. We sit within that, looking at the international comparators.
Is the Minister saying that the decision to go with the £300,000 was just because it was in the middle of the pack?
It was a fair balance after looking at international regimes—a fair comparison with similar regimes around the world. Similarly, the 10% penalty is reflected in penalties across other regimes.
The hon. Lady also asked about the CMA being able to enforce and why private enforcers did not have the same powers. Only the CMA may impose penalties. Private enforcers may seek a penalty in court, but the CMA is the only body able to issue penalties directly.
Finally—I have probably missed a couple of questions, but I will review them later just in case—on the interim notes, the hon. Lady made a fair point about stopping the immediate harm. I talked about domain names, as well as removing adverts and such things. It is about being able to act quickly. The whole point about the changes to the regime is to ensure that we make it not only as effective as possible in the modern world, but as fast as possible.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 145 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 146 to 154 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 155
Acceptance of undertakings by enforcers
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 155 to 160 restate and enhance provisions in part 8 of the Enterprise Act 2002 that govern the acceptance and enforcement of undertakings by enforcers and the courts.
Clause 155 provides a power for enforcers to accept, vary and release an undertaking from an infringer or accessory. Undertakings may be accepted only where they include provisions that will stop or prevent the allegedly infringing practices. The clause will allow enforcers to continue using co-operative enforcement means, which can lead to faster resolution of consumer harms and reduce the volume of applications for court orders.
Clause 156 enables enforcers to include enhanced consumer measures in undertakings accepted under clause 155. Enforcers must consider those measures to be just, reasonable and proportionate. Clause 157 sets out requirements for enforcers when varying or releasing undertakings that ensure procedural fairness for enforcement subjects. Clause 158 allows for further court proceedings for breaches of undertakings and orders made by the court, giving the court a new power to impose a civil monetary penalty for the breach of an undertaking given to the court.
Clause 159 allows a public designated enforcer to make an application to the court for a consumer protection order if it considers that an undertaking given to it has been breached. If the court is satisfied that that is the case, it may make the requested order, impose a monetary penalty or both. A penalty may be imposed only in cases where the breach was without reasonable excuse.
Clause 160 sets out the types of penalties and the maximum penalty amounts that can be imposed by the court for failure to comply with undertakings given to it or to public designated enforcers. The court has the discretion to impose a fixed amount penalty of up to £150,000 or 5% of global turnover, or a daily rate penalty of up to £15,000 or 5% of global turnover accruing over the days when non-compliance continues, or a combination of both.
Clause 155 provides that where an enforcer could make an application to the court for an enforcement order or an interim enforcement order, it may accept an undertaking from the enforcement subject. Subsection (2) sets out the scope of such an undertaking, which is the infringer or the accessory agreeing not to continue or repeat the infringing practice. The Opposition strongly support the clause as it provides necessary flexibility in the consumer protection regime.
We heard during evidence, particularly from the CMA, that the ability for companies to work co-operatively with enforcers to comply with the new regime is an important part of having the fairest and best possible enforcement regime. Where possible, we should ensure that enforcement is done through co-operation. In evidence to the Committee, the CMA said:
“This is not a regime where we want to operate behind closed doors. The whole design of the regime is a participative approach where we will engage with a broad range of stakeholders, businesses and consumers as we consult on designation, design the conduct requirements, and then enforce against them.”––[Official Report, Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Public Bill Committee, 13 June 2023; c. 6, Q2.]
As a result, we welcome the clause.
Clause 156 enables an enforcer to include enhanced consumer measures as part of an undertaking from a company, if the enforcer considers them just and reasonable. The enforcer will be obliged to consider the likely benefits and costs of the measures as part of its assessment of their proportionality. In particular, it will consider the costs of the measures themselves to the enforcement subject, as well as the administrative costs. As with clause 149, we welcome clause 156 as a further necessary element of the new consumer protection regime.
Clause 157 sets out the process to be followed when an enforcer proposes to materially vary or release an undertaking that it has previously accepted. Specifically, the process requires the enforcer to give notice to the respondent of its intention to vary or release an undertaking, and to consider any representations made in accordance with the notice. The notice must include the time by which representations may be made to the enforcer. We welcome this clause, which provides clarity for the enforcement regime, the enforcement subject and the consumer in the event of a necessary change. What timescale does the Minister expect the process to work to in most cases, or will it be entirely up to the enforcer? It would help both Parliament and the enforcement bodies to understand the timings envisaged in this process, to be sure that they strike the right balance between being flexible and proportionate and are fair to both the enforcement subject and consumers.
Clause 158 would apply in circumstances where the court makes a consumer protection order against an enforcement subject or a member of its corporate group, or where it has accepted an undertaking. In the event of a failure to comply with the order or undertaking, the clause enables the enforcer that made the original application or any other enforcer to make a further application to the same court. In effect, the court will be able to act in respect of not only non-compliance with an undertaking, but the infringing practice and any related consent or connivance with it by an accessory. The court will be empowered to impose a monetary penalty, regardless of whether the enforcement subject has a reasonable excuse for non-compliance, reflecting the serious nature of breaching an undertaking given to the court. We welcome the clause as a way of providing robust enforcement and punishment mechanisms for failure to comply with the regime, but I would welcome clarification from the Minister on subsection (8). Like clause 150, that subsection provides an enforcement subject who is required to pay a monetary penalty the right to appeal the decision to impose a penalty, its nature or amount on the merits, in relation to their existing appeal rights. I am not sure I completely grasped his previous argument on whether there is a lower appeals standard for those elements of the Bill?
Clause 159, similar to clause 158, sets out the process for when a company fails to comply with an undertaking accepted by the enforcer or the courts. The powers granted to the courts and the process by which the enforcer must apply reflect the provisions in clause 158 and, in the same way, we welcome them. However, the same question is raised about what looks like a lower threshold for appeals than in other parts of the Bill.
Finally, clause 160 sets out further details around the monetary penalties the courts may impose for failures to comply under clauses 158 and 159. We welcome any steps to improve enforcement action through the imposition of monetary penalties and therefore support the clause in principle. Despite that welcome, I must ask the Minister why, when it comes to failure to comply with undertakings, the monetary penalty in the clause, which is £150,000, is less than that in clause 150, where the court can issue penalties of up to £300,000? Similarly, clause 160 refers to 5% of the company’s turnover versus 10% in clause 150. I may not understand some of the Government’s rationale behind those different amounts. What are the reasons for the differences in the thresholds and those lower amounts?
I picked up three questions. The reason the hon. Lady could not follow my argument about appeals from the first bit was because that was the bit I forgot to answer. I will cover that because they relate to the same thing.
Timescales will be up to the enforcer. None is set, but there is a general duty of expedition on the CMA set by the Bill overall. On appeals as they relate to both sections—
Is the timescale deliberate, or has the question simply not been fully addressed? It is important to ensure clear expectations of the timing of some of these processes.
I think the reason is the wide range of remediation events that may come before the enforcer to tackle, so they are being given that flexibility, but with an understanding that there is a general rule of expedition on the CMA. That is why we have approached this as we have.
The appeals regime is very different from the bits of the digital markets regime that we talked about earlier. In that case we were talking about a small number of firms with strategic market status, whereas any trader can be subject to this regime. The new monetary penalties that we are introducing are significant. A merits-based appeal is therefore important, because of the range of different-sized companies involved, to ensure fairness and to make sure that the issues involved relate to settled law rather than novel regulations covering digital conduct. Appeals are less likely to be disproportionately lengthy, because the digital market involves a more novel approach, which is why we were worried about extended appeal processes.
As for why thresholds are lower in this part of the Bill than for infringements, infringements, at £300,000, are clearly more serious. What we are talking about here—a breach of undertaking to a court—is still serious, but if someone is stepping down, we believe it is more proportionate to set the threshold at the slightly lower amount of £150,000.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 155 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 156 to 160 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 161
Notification requirements: applications
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 161 to 164 restate and update provisions in part 8 of the Enterprise Act 2002 that enable the CMA to perform co-ordination functions across the consumer enforcement landscape. This will help to prevent duplication of enforcement, which imposes an unnecessary burden on traders and wastes public money.
Clause 161 requires enforcers to notify the CMA of their intention to apply for certain court orders. Clause 162 imposes a requirement on enforcers to inform the CMA of any undertakings given to them. Clause 163 imposes a requirement on trading standards departments in England and Wales to notify the CMA if they intend to start proceedings for an offence under an enactment listed in part 1 of schedule 13 to the Bill. Clause 164 empowers UK courts to notify the CMA of relevant convictions and judgments. Bringing convictions and judgments to the attention of the CMA that it might not otherwise be aware of will allow the CMA to consider exercising its enforcement power under this part of the Bill.
It is a pleasure to speak to clause 161 and the other clauses in this group. Under clause 161, as the Minister outlined, enforcers would be able to notify the CMA before applying for an enforcement order, and could only apply for an order 14 days later, or seven days later when applying for an interim order. The powers also allow the CMA to agree to shorten these wait times. The Bill’s explanatory notes explain:
“The policy intent underlying the notification requirement in this clause is for the CMA to be able to perform a coordinating role in relation to enforcement under this Part. The notification requirement will enable the CMA to facilitate the sharing of information between enforcers”,
and that is outlined as mitigating
“the risk of traders facing multiple actions in relation to the same infringing practice”
—a point that we have raised before. We are supportive of the clause and the principle of enabling the enforcement regime and ensuring that it is joined up and efficient in practice. I seek the Minister’s clarification on whether the Government have had discussions with other public enforcers on the provisions in the clause. Is it the case, as he has said before, that the CMA broadly has a co-ordinating role and other powers, and is that carrying on an existing practice and pattern of engagement between those enforcing bodies?
Clause 162 requires enforcers to notify the CMA of the terms of any undertaking given to it under clause 155 and of the identity of the persons giving it. Again, that is important to enable the CMA to fulfil its co-ordination role. As with clause 161, we support the provisions in the clause. Clause 163 introduces provisions requiring local weights and measures authorities, such as local trading standards bodies, to give the CMA notice of its intention to start proceedings for an offence under schedule 13, which we have debated. The authority must also notify the CMA of the outcome of those proceedings.
The policy intent, as explained by the explanatory notes, is to enable the CMA to play its co-ordinated role granted to it in previous clauses. The notes provide a potential example whereby the CMA could inform one authority that another is prosecuting, or that an enforcement order has been granted in respect of the same infringing practice. That is an important part of the co-ordinating role because it demonstrates that it is not just about the CMA being informed, but the CMA ensuring that other relevant enforcers are informed of what other enforcers are doing. That is then a streamlined and efficient process that does not hit the enforcement subject more than once on the same matter.
Clause 164 confers a power on the courts to notify the CMA of convictions and judgments it makes that may not have been bought to its attention. That is a common-sense provision. However, I would welcome further clarification from the Minister specifically on subsection (2). It states that the court
“may make arrangements to bring the… judgment to the attention of the CMA”.
We know the strain and pressures that our court system is under. I ask the Minister why the provision introduces a power as opposed to a duty. If the CMA is to have, as is intended, a co-ordinating role where it is in the picture on all the relevant information related to those enforcement subjects, are there any circumstances in which the Government believe the courts may not need to inform the CMA? In that case, could the Government clarify what those circumstances might be, or where they might consider it not necessary for the CMA to have this information if it considers it to not be relevant to the function it carries out?
We need to remember that this is not just a function being carried out for today; this is where the CMA will be able to have a record of enforcement measures, any breaches and any other information that would be relevant to any considerations in the future. I would be grateful to understand from the Minister why that important and common-sense provision is a power as opposed to a duty.
The CMA being able to issue permission to bring enforcement procedures is consistent with the position under part 8 of the Enterprise Act 2002. We respect and understand the expertise of all enforcers, including sector regulators, so the CMA is playing a co-ordination role to effectively share information between enforcers, and guarantee that enforcement actions are not duplicated. That will mitigate the risk of a trader facing multiple actions for the same infringement practices. The Government have discussed the provisions with other enforcers, and the CMA already has memorandums of understanding with other enforcers.
On the question of why there is a new reporting requirement in clause 164, actually it is not new. It was already established under part 8 of the Enterprise Act. Again, it ensures that the CMA can consider exercising its enforcement powers where appropriate. It only gives the court the power to notify judgments and convictions to the CMA. It is already there under the Enterprise Act, and that is why we have brought it in here.
Perhaps I could put the point about power versus duty to the Minister again? I understand that many aspects of the Bill have been brought together from other areas of legislation. We have to ask the question within the context of the new regime, which is different to how the situation was prior to the legislation coming in, whether that is worth reviewing. We are talking about a regime in which the CMA is now a co-ordinating body, in which there may be different ways action can be taken and where information from the court could be material. There is not as much of a duty to pass that information on under clause 164, but that could be relevant information that is not there for a matter in the future.
I again draw the Minister’s attention to the massive backlog we have in the courts, and the administrative challenges with some of those procedures. The best intentions may not be a reality, and that may then have consequences for the regime we are trying to set up to be as robust, predictable and efficient as possible.
I take the hon. Lady’s point, but I would say that it has been directly transposed. It is a power not a duty in the Enterprise Act, and that is where we have worked from.
Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill (Eleventh sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateSeema Malhotra
Main Page: Seema Malhotra (Labour (Co-op) - Feltham and Heston)Department Debates - View all Seema Malhotra's debates with the Department for Business and Trade
(1 year, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesWhat a helpful question. I do not have those figures to hand, but I am happy to write to the hon. Member if we cannot find the information for him today. I am grateful for his intervention.
Clause 168 will give the court a discretionary power to make some or all of the requirements of a consumer protection order, including monetary penalties, binding on other members of the interconnected corporate group of the infringer. This power will prevent complex corporate structures from frustrating the ability of enforcement interventions to protect consumers and law-abiding traders. The exercise of the power is subject to two important conditions: first, that the infringing company meets the definition of a member of an interconnected corporate group at the time the order is made or at any time when the order is in force, and secondly that the court may make an order binding on other members of the same corporate group only if it considers it just, reasonable and proportionate. That will require an objective assessment on the facts of each case.
Clause 170 will apply where the court is considering an application for a consumer protection order made in relation to a suspected breach of unfair trading prohibitions. It will empower the court to compel traders to substantiate any factual claim made as part of their commercial practices. The burden of proving the accuracy of claims is on the trader. The clause is crucial to stopping unscrupulous traders making wild promises or getting the enforcer bogged down in disproving claims that should be backed up by evidence.
Clause 171 makes an exception to exempt the Crown from the monetary penalties that the court may impose under chapter 3 when it is engaging as a trader in commercial transactions with consumers.
I commend the clauses to the Committee.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship today, Dame Maria. I thank the Minister for his opening remarks.
The Opposition recognise that clauses 165 to 167 are technical clauses. Clause 165 will provide the criteria to determine which courts within the UK have jurisdiction to hear and determine applications for consumer protection orders. It provides that where the respondent does not have a place of business in the UK, the appropriate court is where a relevant consumer is domiciled. This is a common-sense clause, and we support its inclusion in the Bill.
Clause 166 will have the effect of enabling a consumer protection order made in a court in England and Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland to have effect in each of the constituent nations of the UK. This is a technical clause that the Opposition support.
Clause 167 will allow convictions in criminal courts and findings in civil courts to be admitted in evidence for the purpose of proving that infringing conduct has occurred. The explanatory notes confirm that it will still be necessary to prove that the conduct harmed the collective interests of consumers.
We recognise that these technical clauses are important for the implementation and operation of the new consumer protection regime enacted by this part of the Bill. We therefore support their inclusion.
My hon. Friend the Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark made a point about case numbers and court resourcing. We expect demand on the courts to increase. The last thing that the Minister will want to see is the effective implementation of the regime, or confidence in it, being undermined because the courts cannot take on cases at speed when they might need to do so. I would welcome the Minister’s response on the issue of court capacity, support and resources.
Clause 168 will introduce provisions such that when a court makes a consumer protection order against a corporate body that is or becomes a member of a group of interconnected bodies corporate, the court has a discretionary power to direct that the order is binding upon one or more other members of the same corporate group. Subsection (6) defines two or more bodies corporate as interconnected bodies corporate
“if one of them is a subsidiary of the other, or…if both of them are subsidiaries of the same body corporate.”
Under the clause, a court would be able to make part or all of the order binding on other members of the group where the court considers it just, reasonable and proportionate to do so. The explanatory notes state that when considering whether to extend an order to another group member, the court might take into consideration whether the other member was the brains behind or benefited from the infringement, and whether the extension would help to ensure that financial penalties are paid.
Clause 168 will provide a more robust consumer enforcement regime, helping to prevent companies from restructuring to avoid liabilities and ensuring that significant deterrents are in place to prevent companies from infringing regulations of the new regime. We support the clause.
Clause 169, “Enhanced consumer measures: private designated enforcers”, sets out two conditions that must be met before enhanced consumer measures can be included in an undertaking either given to a private designated enforcer or given through the court via an application from a private enforcer.
The first condition
“is that the private designated enforcer is specified…in regulations made by the Secretary of State”
to act as a private enforcer. In our debates on clauses 143 and 144, I raised questions with the Minister’s colleague the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam about the process of becoming a private designated enforcer. However, I would welcome further clarification from the Minister of how he envisages the process of a private enforcer working in practice. I am not very clear on whether that is through an application or via the discretion of the Secretary of State; it would be helpful and important to clarify that point to ensure that clause 169 is effective in enabling private designated enforcers, so we can be sure we know who they may be in future, and to include enhanced consumer measures in an undertaking.
The second condition, rightly,
“is that the enhanced consumer measures do not directly benefit the private designated enforcer or an associated undertaking.”
Will the Minister clarify some matters in relation to subsections (7) and (8)? Private designated enforcers must have regard to any relevant advice or guidance given by a primary authority. Could he perhaps illustrate that with an example of a primary authority within the meaning of subsection (7)(a) and a situation in which that may occur, so we are clear about the intentions for how the clause will be used?
Clause 170, “Substantiation of claims”, will enable the court to require evidence from traders to substantiate the factual claims used in their commercial practices with consumers when an application for a consumer protection order has been made against those traders. Under subsection (3), it is for the court to decide whether any evidence provided is adequate. If the court decides that it is not, or if no evidence is produced, the court can determine that the claim is inaccurate. This provision will ensure that the burden of proof regarding the accuracy of claims rests with the trader. In effect, claims must be based on evidence that can be verified by the court.
The explanatory notes specifically mention environmental claims—sometimes referred to as greenwashing—and claims about the health benefits of goods as examples where substantiation of claims may be required. Greenwashing generally refers to claims made about the positive impact of a product or service on the environment that could be seen as misleading or untrue. This is a growing area of concern under competition law. We have not tabled amendments at this point, but it is an important area in this and other legislation.
The Government and the EU have announced proposals to introduce new legal instruments to address alleged greenwashing. Ultimately, legislation to regulate claims that businesses in Europe can make in their consumer communications would come into force, as is already the case in France. A European Commission study in 2020 highlighted that 53.3% of examined environmental claims in the EU were found to be vague, misleading or unfounded, and 40% were unsubstantiated. This policy issue has highlighted the absence of common rules for companies making voluntary green claims, which, in a sense, leads to greenwashing. The uneven playing field in the market is to the disadvantage of genuinely sustainable companies. It also has an impact on how effectively consumers can make their purchase decisions.
EU proposals for the green claims directive outline that before companies communicate any of the covered types of green claims to consumers, any such claims would need to be independently verified and proven with scientific evidence. As part of scientific analysis, companies would identify the environmental impacts that are actually relevant to their products, as well as any possible trade-offs, in order to give a full and accurate picture.
There have been calls to review how comparisons between products and organisations should be made, based on equivalent information and data. There have also been calls to look at regulating environmental labels, outlining the fact that there are over 230 different labels, which, according to evidence, leads to consumer confusion and distrust. The Competition and Markets Authority published the green claims code in September 2021. It has also been investigating the sustainability claims of major household brands, and how products and services claiming to be eco-friendly are marketed.
This is a newer area, and as we move towards achieving our net zero targets it is going to become increasingly important to how the marketplace is defined. It is important to know and be ahead of where consumers might be being misled. Some of the work in the run-up to COP26 and since has been welcome, but we cannot take our foot off the accelerator.
On resourcing, the hon. Members for Feltham and Heston and for Bermondsey and Old Southwark were both right to mention the courts backlog. If my ministerial colleague, the Under-Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam, committed to write to the hon. Gentleman, I am sure that he will do that. It has not come across my desk yet, but there will be no delay when it does, short of ensuring that it answers the hon. Gentleman’s questions.
One thing to say about that, of course, is that the fact that we are putting in place a direct enforcement regime may well ease the pressures on the courts, because the CMA can take action without recourse to them. That should help by ensuring that not all such cases need to go to court.
On private enforcement, and how it would work, it could happen on the basis of an enforcer’s application, or on the Secretary of State’s initiative after consultation with a proposed enforcer. I think that the only private designated enforcer currently is Which?. I hope that that answers the question of the hon. Member for Feltham and Heston.
On the hon. Lady’s points about a primary authority, a primary authority can be a local authority, it could provide information about the business to enforcing authorities and help direct their efforts to improve regulatory efficiencies.
On greenwashing, she is right that the CMA is conducting an investigation into ASOS, Boohoo and Asda. We have the green claims code to try to ensure that there are standards in this area. The Government policy in this area, of course, is that misleading information is already a breach of existing consumer laws. The CMA has issued guidance to help businesses to comply with existing obligations in that green claims code.
The hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark asked about product safety. Rather than Deputy Dawg, I would use the analogy of Clint Eastwood in “The Good, the Bad and the Ugly”. We are working very hard on this, in terms of product safety. The Office for Product Safety and Standards, which I work very closely with, comes under my remit. It has put a huge amount of time and effort into market surveillance and ensuring that products online are safe.
We have real concerns over whether that is the case, of course, and we recently met with Amazon to discuss that issue. We have also met with eBay, Wish and other platforms to point out their responsibilities. As far as we are concerned, as distributors they have responsibilities to proactively remove unsafe content. As the hon. Gentleman knows—I have said this to him before—we intend to look at that again through the product safety review, which we are about to announce, and that should clarify those responsibilities and ensure that unsafe products do not hit the marketplace in the first place.
I take the points on takedown powers very seriously, and I heard the same evidence from trading standards that the hon. Gentleman heard. We are keen to look at that matter and, again, it might involve another layer of enforcement so that we can then try to prevent those unsafe products from hitting marketplaces across the UK. Trading standards has the capacity to do that for individual websites, but I understand that there are wider concerns regarding other areas of online activity that we are keen to address.
I thank the Minister for his comments relating to the calls from trading standards to strengthen the legislation, which I also support. Could the Minister perhaps clarify a couple of points?
On greenwashing, my point was about how robust our regime will be in making sure that the green claims code, and how that is implemented, will be sufficient to ensure more compliance—either with the code or with any other ways in which we are going to be taking forward legislation on this—so that we do not have to do a lot more by way of enforcement. That would clearly not be the best outcome in the long term for consumers. Having the information up front and ensuring that labelling and other matters are much more robust is better than having challenges later on, with the associated costs of taking things through the courts. My question was more about how this all sits together, and whether the Government have an overall strategy, which I think is quite important.
Finally, on the product safety review, it has been “about to be published shortly” for quite a long time. Is it coming shortly?
Yes, it is coming shortly.
Turning to greenwashing, we take the matter very seriously, and there are two ways to deal with it. We can do ex ante regulation, which involves building a huge bureaucracy around a certain system and people checking everything, or we can put in an ex post regulation deterrent regime, which involves a code or set of standards that companies should adhere to, and then an enforcement regime that takes breaches of the code very seriously and applies penalties to organisations that do not meet the standards. The latter is a more efficient and effective way to regulate, and that is the approach we are taking. That should prove a deterrent and prevent people from doing the wrong thing in the first place.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 165 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 166 to 171 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 172
Power of CMA to investigate suspected infringements
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 172 introduces provisions empowering the CMA to begin an investigation where it has reasonable grounds for expecting that a person has engaged, is engaging or is likely to engage in a commercial practice that would be considered a relevant infringement. That power acts as a trigger for the use of the CMA’s direct enforcement powers. Under subsection (3), the CMA would be able to publish a notice of investigations setting out what and whom it is investigating and indicating the investigation timetable. If, after giving such a notice, the CMA decides to close the investigation, it would be required to publish a notice of termination.
The clause is welcome. It is a vital part of the new consumer protection regime, and we need to ensure is properly enforced. While I am glad the provisions are being introduced, I note again that it will be a long time before they are in operation. It is not until 2025 that some of the provisions come into force.
It does not appear that publishing of the notice of investigation would be mandatory in all cases. Are there any times or examples of when a notice should not be published? If so, could the Minister share those with the Committee?
Under clause 173, the CMA would be empowered to give an enforcement subject a provisional infringement notice where the CMA has started an investigation under clause 172, which continues. The provisional infringement notice would need to contain certain information, including the grounds on which it is given and the enforcement subject’s acts or omissions that give rise to the CMA belief that there has been an infringement. It must also include the CMA’s proposed directions specifying the conduct required to ensure compliance. If the proposed directions include enhanced consumer measures considered by the CMA to be just, reasonable and proportionate, the notice will also need to state that and include details of those measures.
The notice must also include the process for the enforcement subject to make representations to the CMA about the notice, including the means by which and the time by which representations must be made by the enforcement subject. That must also include a hearing if the enforcement subject decides to make an oral representation and, if the CMA is considering monetary penalties, the detail of that penalty.
This is an important clause in enabling co-operation through the enforcement regime, but I would welcome clarification in a few areas. Subsection (3) sets out how the CMA may give the respondent a notice. Are there any scenarios in which the CMA will not need to give the respondent an infringement notice? If not, is this intended to be a power rather than a duty?
Subsection (4) states that the infringement notice must specify the time by which representations must be made. Does the Minister have in mind an expected time range for those representations to be made? I am sure that there is an intention that this all happens as quickly as possible, but there is no specification or guidance as to what some of the timelines might be. It would be helpful to understand the Minister’s intentions on that further.
Clause 174 grants the CMA a discretionary power to issue a final infringement notice to the enforcement subject. In deciding whether to issue a final infringement notice, the CMA will be required, under the clause, to consider whether an undertaking has been given and, if so, whether the enforcement subject has complied with its terms. A final infringement notice may impose on the enforcement subject a requirement to comply with such directions as the CMA considers appropriate to rectify an infringement and achieve compliance, and/or a requirement to pay a monetary penalty. Subsection (6) sets out that the monetary penalty must be a fixed amount not exceeding £300,000—I think that was described in earlier discussions as the middle of the pack—or, if higher, 10% of the total value of the enforcement subject’s turnover.
Under subsection (8), a final infringement notice could require the enforcement subject to publish the notice and a corrective statement. I ask the Minister—again, in the interests of transparency—why this subsection says “may require” rather than “will require”. I ask in the interests of consistency and transparency for consumers, so I would be grateful for the Minister’s response.
Clause 175 empowers the CMA to include in a final infringement notice enhanced consumer measures that it considers to be just, reasonable and proportionate. This clause is welcomed by the Opposition as an important part of the consumer protection regime.
Under clause 176, the CMA will be able to issue an online interface notice to any person whom the CMA believes has engaged, is engaging or is likely to engage in a relevant infringement. This includes third parties with a connection to the UK—for example, UK nationals and residents, UK-established businesses, and businesses carrying on business in the UK or targeting UK consumers. The purpose of this notice would be to prevent serious harm to consumers where there has been or is likely to be an infringing practice. In effect, the notice would force the infringer or any third party to take down content that is harmful to consumers. Subsection (4) sets out what the directions could include: removing content from, or modifying content on, an online interface; disabling or restricting access to an online interface; displaying a warning to consumers accessing an online interface; and deleting a fully qualified domain name.
Use of those powers has been described as a last resort. Will the Minister clarify whether this would therefore be after a period of notices and whether there is a timeline in which it might be undertaken? If a business was not responsive, would the Minister expect relatively quick use of the powers in order to protect consumers and to deter any further consumer detriment? Also, is it the Minister’s intention that the powers are just for the CMA? Considering some of the discussion that we have been having in relation to trading standards, I wonder whether use of the powers may be open in the future to other enforcers.
In terms of publication of a notice, I think that that is a judgment for the CMA. There may be public interest in making a notice public—for example, to inform traders or consumers about practices of concern. Why would it not publish a notice? Well, it might be, for example, that that might prejudice the CMA’s investigation, which is clearly not something that we would want to happen.
The hon. Lady asked about the timescale for response. That will be something that the CMA consults on, in terms of how the process will happen, and stakeholders will be able to input into that consultation. However, we expect clear timelines to be set for responses.
Why would the CMA not give an infringement notice? Well, it might be that it decides, for example, that another enforcer might be better placed to take forward enforcement in that area. Circumstances will vary widely from case to case, and the CMA will be the best judge of whether publication is desirable in any given situation.
What about other consumer enforcers? We believe that the CMA has a leading and co-ordinating role in both the public enforcement of consumer law and in tackling market-wide practices that hinder consumer choice. The new direct enforcement model will enable the CMA to act faster and take on more cases on behalf of the public, resulting in an estimated further tens of millions—or potentially hundreds of millions—of pounds of direct benefit to consumers. Improving the speed and responsiveness of the CMA’s interventions has the greatest potential to safeguard the wider interests of consumers right across the economy.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 172 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 173 to 176 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 177
Undertakings
We are now getting into the weeds of this. We have similar views about online marketplaces and their responsibilities. In our view, their responsibility as a distributor requires them to ensure that products are safe before they are placed on the marketplace in the first place. There should be no excuse for a distributor not checking the validity of a standards marking, for example. That is a responsibility that I have discussed with various platforms. We want to get to the position where products are verified before they enter the marketplace, through checks and balances. Rather than working reactively, platforms should work proactively in such instances, but part of that crosses over into work that we are doing in the product safety review, which we have discussed previously and will, I am sure, discuss again.
If the CMA is satisfied that a breach occurred without a reasonable excuse it can impose a penalty. That ensures that there are meaningful consequences to breaching an undertaking, to deter unscrupulous traders. Clause 182 states the types of penalties and the maximum penalty amounts that can be imposed by the CMA through a final breach of undertakings enforcement notice. The penalty imposed can be the higher of a fixed amount up to £150,000 or 5% of total turnover. A daily rate penalty can be up to £15,000 or 5% of the total value of the daily turnover, whichever is higher, accruing over the days in which non-compliance continues. Both a fixed amount and a daily rate penalty may be imposed, but they must not exceed the fixed amounts that I have just referenced. I hope that hon. Members will support Government amendment 60, and clauses 177 to 182 standing part of the Bill.
The Opposition support the inclusion of clause 177. We welcome any measures that enable co-operation between enforcement bodies and subjects. I will, however, ask the Minister about timescales. The legislation as it stands contains little in the way of specifying timescales. The Minister might tell me again that this might be relevant for the consultation that the CMA undertakes on the process, but I think this will end up being relevant also for the resources that are in place, the expectations of how quickly all the procedures will be able to operate, and certainly how long it could take during the course of an initial infringement notice and a final infringement notice to reach an undertaking.
Although the inclusion of these provisions is necessary to make the regime a co-operative one, it is important that their inclusion in the Bill does not lead to unnecessary delay by enforcement subjects who might have no genuine intention to reach a commitment with the CMA. I would welcome the Minister explaining how he believes that will operate effectively.
Government amendment 60 ensures that the requirements imposed by undertakings given under clause 177 may include the taking of enhanced consumer measures, as defined by clause 213. We welcome this amendment, which should bring further consistency in the enforcement regime.
Clause 178 is consequential on clause 177. It prevents the CMA, once it has accepted an undertaking under clause 177, from giving a final infringement notice or an online interface notice to the same enforcement subject in relation to the same matter. The explanatory notes explain that the underlying policy intent is that undertakings are an alternative to final infringement or online interface notices and therefore the effect is that a person cannot be subjected to multiple enforcement resolutions of the same matter. Subsection (3) provides the necessary flexibility for the CMA. The CMA can still give a final infringement notice or an online interface notice to the extent that it deals with different matters from the undertaking. We welcome the clause.
Clause 179 sets out the process to be followed when the CMA needs to change or end an undertaking. Where the CMA proposes to accept a material variation of an undertaking or to discharge an undertaking, under this clause the CMA would be required to first give notice to the enforcement subject. If, after considering any representations made in accordance with the notice the CMA decides to take the proposed action, it would have to give further notice to the enforcement subject of that decision. We think this is an important clause.
Under clause 180, the CMA would be able to give a provisional breach of the undertakings enforcement notice where it has reasonable grounds to believe that the enforcement subject has failed to comply with one or more of the terms of the undertaking. It also sets out what the provisional breach of an enforcement notice must include. We welcome this clause as an important provision. It is important for the CMA to be clear on its intentions, for the enforcement subject to have no means of saying it was a misunderstanding, and for transparency for consumers.
Clause 181 introduces provisions enabling the CMA to issue a final breach of undertakings enforcement notice in circumstances where the deadline for the enforcement subject to make representations to the CMA in accordance with the first notice has expired, and if, after considering representations, the CMA is satisfied that the enforcement subject has committed an infringement. The clause also lists what must be included in the enforcement notice.
Subsection (4) lays out the threshold for a monetary penalty. It states that the penalty
“may be imposed only if the CMA is satisfied that the failure in question is without reasonable excuse.”
Like my hon. Friend the Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark, I want the Minister to expand on the word “reasonable”. Will further definition be required? Does he think there will be some case law or further guidance? This is an important matter, because it can lead to questions about whether the CMA’s interpretation of “reasonable” is reasonable. We do not want to go down that route; we want a clear regime that provides less wriggle room for enforcement subjects that have no intention of complying and will use any excuse not to do so. I hope the Minister will look at that further and will give the House confidence that the apparent vagueness of the term will not enable companies that are in breach of their undertaking to escape the monetary penalties that, under the regime, they ought to pay.
Government amendment 61 requires that the information contained in a final breach of undertakings enforcement notice includes information about rights of appeal. We welcome it as a common-sense addition to what must be included in the final breach notice.
Clause 182 sets out the maximum monetary penalty that can be imposed for a breach of undertakings notice under clause 181. It amounts to a fixed amount of £150,000 or, if higher, 5% of the total value of the enforcement subject’s turnover. In the case of a daily rate, it is £15,000 or, if higher, 5% of the total value of the daily turnover of the enforcement subject. We have debated that previously. I assume that that amount relates to this being an enforcement penalty. Will the CMA continue to be the only body that has such fining powers? Will other enforcers, such as trading standards, be able to pursue penalties only through other routes? I would appreciate clarification from the Minister on that.
The Opposition make a reasonable point about the reasonable excuse. We have left the threshold pretty broad to reflect the range of situations that could prevent compliance. We feel that a closed list on the face of the Bill would bind the CMA’s hands and make the measure less effective. As hon. Members know, the Bill requires the CMA, in the guidance on exercising its direct enforcement functions that it produces under clause 205, to provide information about the factors it takes into account in determining whether a reasonable excuse exists, and that will include examples.
The hon. Lady asked how soon after a provisional notice the CMA will issue a final breach of undertakings enforcement notice. She pre-empted my response to that: it will, again, be subject to consultation. Of course, it is at the discretion of the CMA. The CMA will set out its approach to determining the period within which representations have to be made in forthcoming guidance, preceded by the public consultation.
I will take what the Minister said on reasonableness, and we will have a look at it. We may return to this matter, in order to ensure that there is not a gap between what an enforcement subject could argue and what the CMA intends, but I thank him for his response.
It is perfectly reasonable that we have that debate, but we will do so we when we discuss clause 205. It is right that the Opposition challenge us and the CMA to ensure that the guidance is clear, and covers all bases.
Amendment 60 agreed to.
Clause 177, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 178 to 180 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 181
Final breach of undertakings enforcement notice
Amendment made: 61, in clause 181, page 121, line 28, at end insert—
“(e) state that the respondent has a right to appeal against the notice and the main details of that right (so far as not stated in accordance with paragraph (d)).”—(Kevin Hollinrake.)
This amendment requires that the information contained in a final breach of undertakings enforcement notice includes information about rights of appeal.
Clause 181, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 182 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 183
Provisional breach of directions enforcement notice
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 183 to 188 principally deal with the enforcement of directions imposed by the CMA in its final infringement notices, online interface notices, and final breach of undertakings enforcement notices. Clause 183 empowers the CMA to enforce compliance with enforcement directions by giving a provisional breach of directions enforcement notice. That allows the enforcement subject to know the case against them and to make representations.
Clause 184 allows the CMA to give a final breach of directions enforcement notice, if it is satisfied that a direction has been fully or partially breached without a reasonable excuse. The notice must follow a provisional breach of directions enforcement notice and can be given only after the period to make representations has expired and the CMA has considered any representations received. Given the seriousness of the situation and the late stage in the process of enforcing compliance with consumer protection law, the Bill sets out that the CMA will impose a monetary penalty each time it gives a final notice under the clause.
Clause 185 provides for the types of penalties and the maximum penalty amounts that can be imposed by the CMA through a final breach of directions enforcement notice. The total penalty amount can be a fixed amount up to £150,000 or 5% of total turnover, whichever is higher. It can also be a daily rate penalty up to £15,000 or 5% of the total value of the daily turnover, whichever is higher, and accruing over the days while non-compliance continues. It can also be a combination of both, but that must not exceed the maximum penalty amounts in both separate cases.
Clause 186 gives the CMA an alternative means of enforcing compliance with directions given in final infringement notices, online interface notices and final breach of undertakings enforcement notices by enabling applications to court for an order to require compliance. It also provides a backstop power for the CMA to apply for a court order where it considers a person has failed to comply with a direction given in a final breach of directions enforcement notice.
Clause 187 gives the CMA the power to require evidence from the enforcement subject to substantiate factual claims made as part of its commercial practices under investigation. This applies where the CMA gives a provisional notice concerning a suspected breach of the unfair trading prohibitions in chapter 1 of part 4 of the Bill. By placing the burden of proving the accuracy of claims on the trader, the clause is crucial in stopping unscrupulous traders from spreading wild promises or getting the CMA bogged down in disproving claims that should be backed up by evidence.
Clause 188 sets out the process that the CMA must follow for proposing to materially vary or revoke any directions. The clause gives flexibility to the CMA to direct compliance while requiring it to provide a sufficient notice period and clear information to guarantee fairness to the person involved.
Clause 183, in conjunction with clause 184, sets out the CMA’s powers to enforce compliance with enforcement directions. It introduces provisions enabling the CMA to issue a provisional breach of directions enforcement notice where it has reasonable grounds to believe that the enforcement subject has without reasonable excuse failed to comply with the direction. We support the clause.
Under clause 184, the CMA would be able issue a final breach of directions enforcement notice requiring the payment of a monetary penalty upon completion of the process laid out in the clause. We support this clause. Clause 185 is consequential on clause 184 and sets out the maximum monetary penalty that the CMA may impose for a breach under clause 184. Again, we support the clause.
Clause 186 provides the CMA with the power to apply to an appropriate court when a person or company has failed to comply with a direction given under clause 184. Under the clause, the CMA would be able to apply to the court for an enforcement order, an interim enforcement order, an online interface order or an interim online interface order. That would enable the court to act in respect of any practice or conduct that would amount to a “relevant infringement” by making a consumer protection order in addition to or instead of making an order in respect of the breach of directions. We welcome this clause, as it provides a necessary backstop for the CMA to enforce its judgments and penalties.
Clause 187 would enable the CMA to require evidence from traders substantiating the factual claims used in their commercial practices with consumers, which are at issue in a provisional notice involving alleged contravention of the new consumer protection regime. Where the CMA has issued a provisional notice to an enforcement subject and the enforcement subject makes representations to the CMA in response to that notice, the CMA may require the enforcement subject to provide evidence as to the accuracy of any claim made. For the reasons that we debated earlier, we welcome this clause and this power as they will enable the CMA to carry out its functions more effectively on behalf of consumers.
Clause 188 introduces provisions enabling the CMA to make a material variation of, or to revoke, directions that it has given under other clauses as specified. We support the inclusion of clause 188 in the Bill. I hope that what the clause provides for will be able to be done at speed and that we do not see any delays in the use of these powers where needed.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 183 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 184 to 188 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 189
Provisional false information enforcement notice
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Of course—sorry, Dame Maria.
Clauses 189 and 190 empower the CMA to give a provisional false information enforcement notice, followed by a final notice imposing a monetary penalty of up to £30,000 or, if higher, 1% of total turnover. They allow the CMA to enforce against, and penalise, the provision of materially false or misleading information to the CMA without reasonable excuse.
Clause 189 introduces provisions granting the CMA a discretionary power to issue a provisional false information enforcement notice if it has reasonable grounds to believe that a person has provided to the CMA materially false or misleading information. It also lists what would be included in this enforcement notice. It would obviously be a really serious matter if false or misleading information was provided to the CMA. We therefore support this clause.
Clause 190 enables the CMA to issue a final false information enforcement notice. This clause is consequent on clause 189 and we therefore welcome its inclusion in the Bill. Clause 190(4) sets out the maximum monetary penalty for a false information infringement. It is important that there is a sufficient deterrent and also the ability for significant enforcement where it is found that false information has been provided to the CMA and that has been proven.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 189 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 190 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 191
Statement of policy in relation to monetary penalties
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 191 requires the CMA to produce and publish a statement of policy regarding its powers to impose monetary penalties under this part. When the CMA decides on a penalty, it must take into account the statement. The Opposition strongly welcome the clause because it greatly increases the transparency of the monetary penalty system. It should ensure that there is clarity around the regime, thereby increasing its legitimacy. I would be grateful if the Minister will comment on the timeframe to which he expects the statement of policy to be published, whether it will follow a period of consultation, and where it will be published. Will it be publicly available, and will it be laid before this House?
Clause 192 introduces provisions giving the CMA a discretionary power to make the requirements of a final enforcement notice binding upon one or more members of the same interconnected corporate group, where the CMA considers it just, reasonable and proportionate to do so. We welcome that common-sense addition to the Bill. Clause 193 on record-keeping and reporting requirements introduces important transparency into the enforcement process. As such, we welcome its inclusion. It requires the CMA to keep a record of the undertakings that it has accepted, the enforcement directions that it has given, and reviews that it has carried out in relation to the effectiveness of such undertakings and directions.
Subsection (2) introduces provisions requiring the CMA to prepare a report for the Secretary of State on the effectiveness of undertakings and enforcement directions, and the number and outcome of appeals under clause 194. That again is important because it will enable the Government to continue to monitor the effectiveness of the new regime after Royal Assent. The question is whether it goes far enough. We have not tabled amendments to the clause. It is important to begin a discussion, which we will continue as we consider further parts of the Bill, about the reporting, and the transparency of how the measures are used in the CMA’s operations in practice.
Subsection (2) states:
“If requested to do so by the Secretary of State, the CMA must prepare a report on…the effectiveness of undertakings and…the number and outcome of appeals brought under section 194”,
yet we do not know what the Secretary of State might intend in relation to that. The wording implies that the report is not a duty on the CMA, but that the CMA has a duty to keep the information. If somebody deems that information to be in the public interest, or parliamentarians want to know what is happening under the regime, would they be required to undertake freedom of information requests? That does not seem appropriate. If the CMA collects that information, it ought to prepare a report to which Parliament has access.
It would be helpful for the Minister to inform the Committee what the Government intend in terms of report requests by the Secretary of State, and what information he would expect the CMA to share in relation to the regime, and the operation of some of the powers in the Bill. Does he agree that it would be in Parliament’s interest to have sight of that information? I would be grateful for his response on whether clause 193(2) should go further.
Clause 194 introduces provisions that would ensure that all appeals of CMA first-instance direct enforcement decisions are heard by the court. Under the clause, a person may appeal against a decision to impose a monetary penalty, the nature or amount of any such penalty and the giving of directions. We welcome the principle of the clause in allowing for a right of appeal. Again, we have questions on a timeframe for that and whether it will be part of the CMA’s consultations, as the Minister has alluded to, in relation to some of the operations of the regime.
Clause 195 sets out the information that must be included in an order made by the court, or a final notice given by the CMA, that includes a requirement to pay a monetary penalty. The information includes the amount of the penalty, the grounds of the penalty, details such as when it is to be paid and so on. Subsections (3) and (4) additionally set a time limit of 14 days from when the order is imposed for enforcement subjects to apply to change the date or dates by which the penalty must be paid. We welcome the inclusion of the clause in the Bill.
Clause 196 introduces a definition of turnover into the bill for the purpose of calculating a penalty based on turnover. This appears to be a technical clause, specifically in the inclusion of turnover both in and outside the United Kingdom in applying the definition. Subsections (3) and (4) grant the Secretary of State delegated powers to make further regulations on how a person is to be treated as controlled by another person, and to make provision for determining the turnover of a person for the purposes of this part. I must ask the Minister: why is it that these further regulations have been left to secondary legislation and are not on the face of the Bill? I would be grateful if he could confirm and explain that, and also clarify why these powers are subject to the negative procedure rather than the affirmative. We have not sought to amend the clause, but we want to understand the reasons behind it so that we are confident that it should go forward unamended.
Clause 197 introduces a delegated power to the Secretary of State to make regulations to amend the maximum fixed penalties and daily penalties in this part. The regulations will be laid subject to the affirmative procedure, which we welcome. The explanatory notes state:
“The effect would be that any updated amounts specified by the Secretary of State will offset the erosion of the real value of the fixed maxima through inflation.”
That is important, particularly in the current context of spiralling inflation after the disastrous economic management of successive Governments over the last 13 years. Can the Minister provide any clarification on how regularly the amendments will be made? Will it be yearly, or more or less frequently? I would be grateful for the Minister’s confirmation of that, so that it is clear for the House and the CMA.
Under clause 198, “Recovery of monetary penalties”, when the deadline for an enforcement subject to make an appeal against a monetary penalty has expired, or when an appeal has been made and rejected, the CMA would be able to commence proceedings to recover the penalty and any unpaid interest as a civil debt. We welcome the clause and its detail as a necessary element of a new, more robust regime.
Clause 199 introduces provisions setting out further details regarding the payment of monetary penalties. It provides for interest at the statutory rate to be incurred on the balance if the penalty imposed is not paid by the deadline. In addition, it sets out how the penalty is not payable while an appeal application is ongoing. We welcome the clause, but I seek some assurance from the Minister that appeal applications will have a timeline, and will not lead to lengthy, protracted processes, and payments going unpaid because of them.
I fear that I may have missed one or two of the hon. Lady’s points, but I think I got most of them. Guidance under clause 191 will be publicly consulted on, giving those potentially affected by it an opportunity to comment directly. That consultation will happen post Royal Assent, and when finalised it will be published on the CMA’s website. On the Secretary of State requesting reports, clearly we do not know what we do not know. The Secretary of State has flexibility on when they might consider that a report is required under clause 193. The CMA already publishes regular impact assessments and other public reports, including its annual report to Parliament, and scrutiny will continue by traditional means, such as through Select Committees.
The Minister will know that so much has gone to the Business and Trade Committee that there will be great concern about how frequently, and in what level of detail, it will be able to scrutinise all the work done under the regime. It will be a pretty tall order to do that job. I have a question for the Minister that I think is important. We have heard in previous debates about the frequency of reporting and what would be in the CMA’s report for all the new regimes and units that it will undertake. We obviously do not want to overload the CMA with unnecessary reporting, but there should be an expectation about what might be in the annual report, and there should be clarity on what the Secretary of State might expect in a report on the new regime.
Surely Ministers will want to have confidence in what is happening under the regime, and to have some data reported to them if the CMA is collecting it. Will the Secretary of State expect a, perhaps annual, report on the new regime, perhaps for a few years, to know whether it is operating effectively? Secondly, will clause 193(2) give the Secretary of State the ability to request additional or more detailed reports if there are concerns about aspects of the regime’s implementation? I understand the power to ask for more reports, but not having any report requested through the course of the implementation of the operations strikes me as a serious gap, particularly—
I thought that perhaps I had to intervene on the hon. Lady.
Particularly in relation to the early implementation of the regime—I was on my last sentence.
That was a very comprehensive intervention. I think that we are saying the same thing. Of course the CMA will continue to report annually, and of course we would expect it to report on the new powers that it has been granted through the Bill. In addition to that, the Bill gives the Secretary of State the power to request additional reports as he or she sees fit. We think that that achieves an appropriate balance. We do not think that it is right to get in the way of the CMA doing its job by obliging it to report on a more frequent basis. Of course, as part of my role, or my successor’s role if I move from this position back to the Back Benches or wherever, we regularly have meetings with the CMA to discuss its activities and where it is using its powers. Indeed, we write an annual letter to the CMA, which sets out where we expect its focus to lie.
The hon. Lady asked a fair question about the appeals timelines. They will not be consulted on, but they will be subject to the civil procedure rules, and relevant rules in other UK jurisdictions. The civil procedure rules will be amended as part of the implementation of the provisions through the Civil Procedure Rule Committee in the usual way. Of course, we will want appeals to take place as expeditiously as possible, provided that they are fair.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 191 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 192 to 199 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 200
Investigatory powers of enforcers
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 200 introduces schedule 15 to the Bill, which contains amendments to schedule 5 to the Consumer Rights Act 2015, relating to the investigatory powers of consumer protection enforcers. Schedule 15 amends provisions in schedule 5 to the Consumer Rights Act to ensure the enforceability of statutory information notices given to a person under paragraph 14 of schedule 5.
The amendments made through schedule 15 come in two parts. First, we are providing the courts with a new power to impose a civil monetary penalty where the court finds there has been non-compliance, without reasonable excuse, with an information notice given by any consumer enforcer. Secondly, we are providing a new direct enforcement power for the CMA to decide whether an enforcement notice it has issued has been complied with and, if not, to impose a civil monetary penalty for any non-compliance without reasonable excuse.
The schedule also sets out the extraterritorial reach of enforcers’ power to request information by notice. We are legislating to ensure that enforcers can obtain all the necessary information from parties in and outside the UK to inform their analysis and ascertain breaches of the law, subject to certain conditions. The schedule also ensures that a warrant may be granted in relation to material that may be remotely stored in the cloud but still be accessible from the premises. I hope hon. Members agree that the schedule completes the largely successful modernisation of the investigatory powers of consumer law enforcers made by the Consumer Rights Act in 2015.
Clause 200 introduces schedule 15 to the Bill, which amends schedule 5 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015, which in turn details the information-gathering powers available to consumer enforcers for the purposes of civil enforcement of consumer protection law. We support the clause, but I will make a few more remarks on schedule 15.
Schedule 15 makes limited amendments to schedule 5 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 so that an enforcement notice would have to specify the circumstances in which non-compliance with the enforcement notice could result in a financial penalty. The amendments would apply where an enforcer has given an information notice to a person and the enforcer considers that the respondent has, without reasonable excuse, failed to comply with the notice. In such circumstances, the enforcer would be able to make an application to the court.
The Opposition welcome the schedule, but there are questions related to those we have asked in relation to other clauses, specifically around the absence in the Bill of the updating of trading standards authorities’ powers for the digital economy and the 21st century. That is important. We have raised before the ability for trading standards to obtain information online and so on. Can the Minister have a look at that in more detail? In the course of further clauses next week, we may come on to some other amendments as well, but I would be grateful for the Minister’s response.
It is our contention that trading standards do have the powers that they need to access information. There are concerns; I have concerns—I want to ensure that trading standards have sufficient powers in terms of take-down powers. That is something that we are looking at and, as the hon. Lady says, is probably something that we will discuss as the Bill proceeds.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 200 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 15 agreed to.
Clause 201 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 202
Notices under this Part
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 202 sets out the process for giving notices under part 3 to persons within and outside of the UK, including business entities registered or operating outside the UK. It defines acceptable means of service and the meaning of a recipient’s proper address. We welcome the clause.
Clause 203 allows the CMA to make rules, subject to approval by the Secretary of State through secondary legislation, to set out the procedural administrative details of the CMA’s enforcement regime. The rules supplement the framework provided in chapter 4 of part 3. We welcome the clause and the clarification, and also the important points made in the explanatory notes, including the point that the rules will cover “arrangements for complaints’ handling”. The clause is a common-sense provision.
Clause 204 sets out the process for the exercise of the rule-making power under clause 203. We welcome the fact that the CMA will be required to consult with stakeholders during the preparation of the rules, and we discussed that in relation to earlier clauses. The CMA will also be required to obtain the Secretary of State’s approval before bringing any rule into operation or varying a rule. We welcome that measure too.
Under 204(5), the Secretary of State will be empowered to vary or revoke rules or to direct the CMA to vary or revoke rules, and regulations made under the clause will be subject to the negative parliamentary procedure. Although we welcome the clause, will the Minister clarify why that has been left to the negative procedure? The inclusion of affirmative and negative procedures in the Bill seems to be slightly random, so I would be grateful for that clarification.
Under clause 205, the CMA will be required to prepare and publish guidance about its general approach to carrying out its direct enforcement functions. The guidance will provide more detailed information to traders and other stakeholders about how the direct enforcement regime would work in practice. The Opposition welcome the clause because it introduces more transparency and clarity into the regime, but will the Minister tell the Committee what timeframe is considered appropriate for the publication of the guidance? He said that he saw publication happening after Royal Assent, but does he expect it to happen within a certain period of time? I am sure that he wants the legislation to be implemented as soon as possible, as do I.
Clause 206 would protect the CMA against actions for defamation as a result of the exercise of functions under part 3. We welcome the clause. It is important that the CMA is protected in carrying out its job as the co-ordinating enforcement authority.
Clause 207 introduces schedule 16, which contains minor and consequential amendment in relation to part 3. We support schedule 16 and do not consider the consequential amendments contentious. We also support Government amendments 62 and 63.
Clause 208 introduces schedule 17, which provides transitional and saving provisions in connection with part 3. Those provisions concern the operation of the new law introduced by chapter 3 and CMA direct enforcement powers under chapter 4 of part 3. They also relate to the operation of the old law, which constitutes part 8 of the Enterprise Act 2002. It lays out how the new law would apply to conduct that takes place on or after the commencement date of the Bill, and to conduct of concern that a person is likely to engage in, where such conduct is likely to take place on or after the commencement date. The old law would continue to apply to conduct that takes place before the commencement date, as well as to various other forms of conduct. We welcome this technical schedule and clarification, and we support amendment 65.
Clause 209 introduces definitions for references to supply of goods or digital content as used across part 3 and we support the clause. Clause 210 defines how references to the supply of services should be construed across part 3 and we support the clause. Clause 211 defines what is meant by an accessory to the commercial practice of a body corporate. Will the Minister clarify whether he is confident the clause adequately captures anyone who may act as an accessory and how the definition was brought together? Was it through consultation? That will provide full clarity on what constitutes an accessory.
Clause 212 defines what constitutes having a special relationship with a body corporate, covering two scenarios outlined by the Minister. As such, we support its inclusion in the Bill. Clause 213 defines three types of enhanced consumer measures, referred to as redress, compliance and choice measures. I am grateful to the Minister for outlining some detail on that and the definitions, so that those set out in subsections (2) to (4) are straightforward and clear, and that that also applies to their interpretation by consumers. We thus welcome the clause’s inclusion in the Bill.
Clause 214 defines other terms for the purposes of this part, including the definitions of “businesses”, “goods”, “enforcement orders”, “subsidiary” and “supply”, which are important, and we support their inclusion. Further, clause 215 sets out an index of defined expressions and we welcome and support it.
I will make a couple of points, the first of which is on the negative procedure. On regulations, there is a combination in clause 204 of public consultation followed by review by the Secretary of State, which will allow for a significant level of scrutiny. On that basis, we feel the negative procedure is justified and appropriate.
On the guidance, the CMA must undertake several actions, including a public consultation on the practices. This may take some time, and we expect that the guidance may be ready by autumn 2024, but that will depend upon a number of factors. We clearly want it in place as quickly as possible, but we must ensure that it is fit for purpose.
The definition of “accessory” in clause 211 is consistent with, and restates with minor clarifications, the current definition in part 8 of the Enterprise Act 2002.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 202 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 203 to 207 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 16
Part 3: minor and consequential amendments
Amendments made: 62, in schedule 16, page 329, line 17, leave out sub-paragraph (b).
See explanatory statement for Amendment 63.
Amendment 63, in schedule 16, page 329, line 23, at end insert—
“5A In Schedule 14 (provisions about disclosure of information) at the appropriate place insert—
‘Chapters 3 and 4 of Part 3 of the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2023.’”.
This amendment, which is made for drafting consistency, inserts a reference to Chapters 3 and 4 of Part 3 of the Bill into Schedule 14 to the Enterprise Act 2002 instead of achieving the same effect by adding that reference into section 238(1) of that Act.
Amendment 64, in schedule 16, page 337, line 2, at end insert—
“Part 4 of the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2023.”.—(Kevin Hollinrake.)
This amendment adds Part 4 of the Bill to the list of enactments in the new paragraph 20A of Schedule 5 to the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (inserted by paragraph 8(10) of Schedule 16), with the effect that authorised enforcers will be able to exercise the investigatory powers conferred by Part 4 of Schedule 5 to CRA 2015 in connection with infringements of Part 4 of the Bill.
Schedule 16, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 208 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 17
Part 3: transitional and saving provisions in relation to Part 3
Amendment made: 65, in schedule 17, page 338, line 1, leave out from “means” to end of line 11 and insert “—
(a) Part 8 of EA 2002, as that Part had effect immediately before the commencement date, and
(b) any provisions of law (including in particular Schedule 5 to CRA 2015) relating to Part 8 of EA 2002, as those provisions had effect immediately before the commencement date.”.—(Kevin Hollinrake.)
This amendment clarifies that the definition of “the old law” for the purposes of the transitional provisions in Schedule 17 to the Bill includes Schedule 5 to the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (which confers investigatory powers on enforcers).
Schedule 17, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 209 to 215 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered,
That the Order of the Committee of 13 June be varied by the omission from paragraph 1(f) of “and 2.00 pm”.—(Mike Wood.)
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Mike Wood.)
Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill (Twelfth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateSeema Malhotra
Main Page: Seema Malhotra (Labour (Co-op) - Feltham and Heston)Department Debates - View all Seema Malhotra's debates with the Department for Business and Trade
(1 year, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIt is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr McCabe.
Before we turn to the group led by amendment 118, I will make some brief remarks on clause 217 stand part and speak to Government amendment 71. Clause 217 sets out a general prohibition on unfair commercial practices. As the Minister has outlined, it defines commercial practice as
“any act or omission by a trader relating to the promotion or supply of—
the trader’s product to a consumer
another trader’s product to a consumer, or,
a consumer’s product to the trader or another trader”.
Subsection (4) introduces provisions outlining what constitutes an unfair commercial practice, which may include a misleading action, a misleading omission or an aggressive practice, and those are dealt with in the following clauses. In addition, the subsection states that a commercial practice is unfair if it is listed in schedule 18, which we will debate in detail shortly.
We welcome the clause as a necessary provision in prohibiting unfair commercial practice, and I reiterate that we look forward to working with the Minister, including in today’s debate. If there are ways in which we can improve the Bill, we are very happy to work collaboratively so that it is as robust as possible. The amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark in the light of our discussions with stakeholders will play an important part in those deliberations.
Amendment 71 ensures that the definition of commercial practice for the purposes of chapter 1 of part 4 of the Bill includes an act or omission by a trader relating to the promotion or supply of a consumer’s product to another consumer. We welcome this amendment, which importantly ensures that the actions of rogue traders still fall under the definition of commercial practice and supports the integrity of the regime.
Clause 218 introduces provisions defining commercial practices that are misleading actions. We welcome the clause, which provides a necessary definition of a misleading action, and support its inclusion in the Bill.
Clause 219 introduces a definition of commercial practices that count as misleading omissions. Under the clause, a misleading omission would constitute the omission of material information and information that the trader is required by another enactment to provide. As with clause 218, it is a common-sense, straightforward clause and we support it.
Clause 220 sets out how an aggressive practice could constitute harassment, coercion or undue influence. That can involve behaviour before a contract or purchase is made, but it can also occur after a transaction has taken place. We support the definition’s inclusion in the Bill, but I ask for clarification. I draw the Minister’s attention to subsection (3)(a), where the Bill states that
“‘coercion’ includes the use or threat of physical force”.
Does the Minister intend that coercion includes many other threats, be they financial or personal blackmail, to suggest just a couple? Is there a wider definition or guidance on interpretation that would be helpful in providing clarification for the consumer as well as for those making a decision under the clause? I would welcome clarity from the Minister on that.
Clause 221 defines commercial practices that contravene the requirements of professional diligence. That includes practices that fall short of the standard of skill and care that a trader may reasonably be expected to exercise towards consumers and that is commensurate in the trader’s field with honest market practice or the general principle of good faith. That is important for rooting out rogue traders who may not be qualified for their profession, whether they are builders, electricians or other experts. We welcome the definition.
Clause 222 sets out where a commercial practice would be considered to have omitted material information. Subsection (2) lists what would constitute an omission, including the main characteristics of a product, the business address and the delivery price, among other things. Although we support the list of omissions and welcome its inclusion in the Bill, elements of the clause could go further to provide more protection to consumers, as reflected in amendment 127, tabled by Opposition Front Benchers, and amendment 126, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark, which we will come to.
I think there is just one key point that the hon. Lady asked me to address, which is about other types of coercion. Looking at the definition with regard to practices, clause 220 talks about “coercion or undue influence”. Under subsection (3),
“‘undue influence’ means exploiting a position of power in relation to consumers so as to apply pressure in any way”.
I think that covers the definition, as she requested.
Amendment 71 agreed to.
Maybe it is still in the internal post. I thank the Minister for the letter; it would be nice to know what it says. The point is that the Bill does not make clear how customers will secure redress. It presents a convoluted route of multiple agencies and potential court action that people simply will not want to take.
My amendment does not go as far as some have suggested. It is a moderate suggestion. There have been suggestions that there is full and shared liability for platforms for any product sold and that some of the measures should be retrospectively implemented so that there should be penalties on those who have sold goods that they know to be counterfeit or dangerous going back for years. I hope that amendment 121 in particular, but also other amendments in this group, are useful to the Government in delivering their aims and defending customers and businesses.
The wording of amendment 124 is crucial; I hope that the Minister will come back to this when he responds to the debate. It would “require the removal”. It is not a request to remove a product; it is a requirement to remove a product. It could be put in the hands of all the bodies in clause 143, with penalties and timely action to prevent a fatality if this is not done quickly enough. The use of the word “require” is deliberate, because the power to request is in other legislation. For example, the police can request the removal of video footage from YouTube that is incitement to violence or hatred, is homophobic or is incitement to violence between gangs. One meeting I had with the Met revealed that more than 300 requests to take down videos had been ignored by YouTube. They included calling for revenge and the murder of specific individuals in revenge attacks between gangs in London. The police should have a stronger power than that, but as with this legislation, the power to request that something is removed is insufficient; it must be the power to compel the removal, similar to—for those familiar with local authority powers—a cease and desist order by a planning body. That would be a comparable power if the Government are keen to have something stronger than that offered in the current legislation.
I hope that amendment 124 helps British businesses, jobs, standards and customers and helps the Government —that is why I am here today. Ministers claim that they want to make the UK the “safest” place in the world to be online, and here are the means to deliver that laudable aim.
I congratulate my hon. Friend on his tour de force in going through his amendments and the reasons for tabling them. We can all agree that as a package, the amendments move us further forward in ensuring that there is adequate regulation of products sold in online marketplaces. My hon. Friend also made reference to the work of Electrical Safety First and its research. Having met the organisation, spoken at its event in Parliament and seen the important work it does through the all-party parliamentary group on online and home electrical safety, I think I can say that we all recognise that we must ensure the steps taken in the Bill will be adequate to deal with the challenges we know consumers face and which can put families, lives and businesses at risk.
My hon. Friend spoke to his amendments. Amendment 118 makes someone marketing goods online a trader. Amendment 119 makes it an unfair commercial practice to sell goods online unless the specified safety requirements have been complied with. Amendment 124 provides for a takedown power, about which the Minister has made some positive comments. We believe very strongly that that is needed, and I hope that he will give a commitment today about how we can take it forward, and whether the Government will accept the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark, which we support, or introduce their own during the course of the Bill.
I will speak just briefly to schedule 18 and then to amendments 68 and 69. I thank the hon. Member for Gordon for his amendments and his explanation of them.
Schedule 18 introduces—
Order. The general debate comes at the end. We need to stick with the amendment.
That is fine. I have one line, but it can come later.
Amendment 68 would ban the practice of greenwashing. Making unsubstantiated claims about the sustainability of products and services would be an unfair commercial practice. Amendment 69 is consequential on amendment 68 and would require the Government to define which products and services can be labelled “sustainable”, and requires that the definition complies with international standards.
I support the principle of the amendments tabled and the arguments made. They are along the lines of the discussion that we had in Committee last week when I spoke to the issues around greenwashing, our standards and support for evidence. I asked the Minister what overall strategy he has to ensure that green claims are accurate and evidenced, and I asked that we have a strategy for the prevention of false claims as well as a mechanism for enforcement against them. As has been argued, that issue is on the increase, particularly for younger people.
Research has shown that those under 35 across the world make decisions about products, services and even their employment on how much they trust the information that they see in relation to sustainability and climate responsibility. If we do not tackle that issue, we will see a further increase in people misleadingly marketing products because they know that those issues drive consumer purchases. They have great influence on consumer purchases and decisions.
The Minister might refer to the green claims code introduced by the CMA. Important work has been done, but in the absence of any real leadership or strategy from the Government I want to ask the Minister whether they intend to put the green claims code, or its successor, on a statutory footing. Making sure that we have a robust legislative underpinning and strategy for such issues is increasingly important, because many stakeholders see a gap.
Greenwashing was also mentioned by consumer groups in the Committee’s evidence sessions. I would press the Minister on whether the Government have plans to introduce amendments on the issue, and to strengthen voluntary or other codes relating to green claims and expectations. In an increasingly green economy, consumers are at risk of falling victim to misleading green advertising, and legislation needs to catch up.
Amendments 68 and 69 would add the practice of greenwashing to the list of banned practices in schedule 18, and would introduce a requirement for the Government to consult on the matter. I thank the hon. Member for Gordon for his amendments, and I absolutely agree that consumers should not be misled. I admire his commitment to recycling, which is admirable. I wondered whether I should touch on that, given the difficulties that the SNP has got into with its deposit return scheme, but—
I beg to move amendment 115, in schedule 18, page 343, line 2, at end insert—
“32 At any stage of a purchase process, presenting a price for a product which omits obligatory charges or fees (or an estimate thereof) which are payable by the majority of consumers, which are not revealed to the consumer until later in the purchase process.”
This amendment adds the practice of “drip-pricing”, a pricing technique in which traders advertise only part of a product’s price and reveal other obligatory charges later as the customer goes through the buying process, to the list of unfair commercial practices.
Amendment 115 would add the practice of drip pricing to the list of unfair commercial practices. Drip pricing is a pricing technique whereby traders advertise only part of a product’s price and reveal other obligatory charges later as the customer goes through the buying process. For example, an airline may advertise a flight abroad at a certain cost that does not include an obligatory seat charge. That is added only later in the purchasing process, by which point the consumer has already prepared to purchase the product and is less likely to stop the purchase. The argument that this practice should be included in the Bill was well documented during the Committee’s evidence sessions. The consumer group Which? stated:
“We think that drip pricing is another practice that is very harmful. There is a lot of evidence that that is the case, and it should be included on the face of the Bill.”––[Official Report, Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Public Bill Committee, 13 June 2023; c. 13, Q16.]
That sentiment was reflected in Committee by Citizens Advice, the National Consumers Federation and Consumer Scotland, all of which argued that schedule 18 could be improved by adding the practice of drip pricing. Which? provided evidence of consumer detriment in its written submission, which states:
“We know that in many online markets people overpay for products and services because only part of an item’s price is initially shown and the total amount to be paid is revealed only at the end of the buying process. For example, multiple hotel booking firms were shown to have failed to have displayed compulsory charges such as taxes, booking or resort fees in the headline price. However, while the use of these practices is common, the CMA has found its enforcement against drip pricing has been inhibited by the absence of an explicit ban.”
In its 2021 paper, “Reforming Competition and Consumer Policy”, the CMA notes:
“Drip pricing causes real detriment to consumers...Advertising of Prices market study concluded that of a series of different price framing practices, drip pricing was clearly the most harmful frame for consumers in terms of purchasing and search errors, and that raised levels of consumer learning did not fully mitigate issues with the practice. Lengthy transaction processes associated with drip pricing can ensure consumers gain a greater sense of ownership of a product and are less likely consider other offers once additional costs are revealed.”
It is clear that the introduction of drip pricing to the list of unfair commercial practices would be supported by consumer groups and the CMA, so I urge the Minister to consider supporting the amendment. I look forward to his response.
I share the hon. Member’s concerns. That is why we commissioned research earlier this year, which we will publish shortly. It will detail how widespread and harmful the practice is. The Prime Minister has already said that we will gather evidence on what steps the Government should take to tackle drip pricing, so I think we are aligned in our commitment to tackling the issue.
One of the key challenges, which I do not think the hon. Lady addressed, is distinguishing drip pricing that is harmful or anti-competitive from practices that may offer greater value to the consumer—for example, a company offering optional extras such as faster postage or insurance. We will consult during the passage of the Bill on which elements of drip pricing might need tackling, and on whether further action is required. We believe it is important to conduct that exercise first, so that we have a proper, evidence-driven policy. I hope the hon. Member will withdraw the amendment.
I thank the Minister for his comments. There are issues to consider in relation to the amendment, but I think the broad thrust of the argument for taking action is clear. The Minister says that the findings of the research will be published shortly; I am assuming that “shortly” is not in more than a year’s time. We need to clarify that with the Government. If shortly means shortly, however, then I would be grateful for confirmation that, on the basis of the research, the Minister intends to address drip pricing; that may determine the wording in the Bill. Can the Minister confirm that there is an intention to address the issue during the passage of the Bill, perhaps through a Government amendment? The Opposition are very willing to work with the Government on that.
I am keen to make a commitment to work with the hon. Member on the issue, and to ensure that a measure is brought forward as quickly as possible. I cannot give a precise date, but it will be very shortly.
On the basis that shortly means shortly, I am willing to withdraw the amendment. Will the Minister clarify that he expects the research to come forward before Report, so that we have time to look at it? That would be a good point at which to bring forward an amendment on the issue.
I cannot say when Report will be, and I do not have the timetable for that, or for the consultation on the work that we may need to do on the issue. I cannot make that precise commitment, but we are very committed to delivering on drip pricing. As the hon. Member knows, the Prime Minister spoke on it, so I cannot imagine that there will be any undue delay.
On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I beg to move amendment 116, in schedule 18, page 343, line 2, at end insert—
“32 Commissioning, incentivising or authorising the writing or submission of false consumer reviews or endorsements, in order to promote products.
33 Offering or advertising to submit, commission or facilitate false consumer reviews or endorsements.
34 Displaying consumer reviews of products on an online interface—
(a) without taking reasonable and proportionate steps to ensure that such reviews are submitted by consumers who have used or purchased the products in question;
(b) where any consumers who provided reviews were incentivised to describe certain products in a particular way, without taking reasonable and proportionate steps to ensure this is not the case; or
(c) in a way that deceives or manipulates consumers, or where a practice has been undertaken in relation to reviews that otherwise materially distorts or impairs the ability of consumers to make free and informed decisions, without taking reasonable and proportionate steps to ensure this is not the case.”
This amendment adds the practice of commissioning fake reviews, offering services to write fake reviews, and displaying consumer reviews without taking reasonable steps to verify their accuracy, to the list of unfair commercial practices.
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 125, in schedule 18, page 343, line 2, at end insert—
“32 Stating or otherwise creating the impression that reviews of a product are submitted by consumers who have actually used or purchased the product without taking reasonable and proportionate steps to check that they originate from such consumers.
33 Submitting or commissioning another legal or natural person to submit false consumer reviews or endorsements, or misrepresenting consumer reviews or social endorsements, in order to promote products.”
This amendment would add fake reviews to the list of banned practices.
I am pleased to speak to amendment 116, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Pontypridd and me. I will also touch on amendment 125, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark. They are similar provisions, and he will want to make his own arguments for amendment 125.
Amendment 116 adds the practice of commissioning fake reviews, offering to provide the service of writing fake reviews, and displaying consumer reviews without taking reasonable steps to verify their accuracy to the list of unfair commercial practices. Amendment 125 would similarly add fake reviews to the list of banned practices. We support both the amendments, but I will speak to amendment 116 in more detail, as it provides a more comprehensive legislative basis for banning fake reviews, and was recommended by the consumer group Which?.
When the Bill was published, the Government announced with much fanfare that they would introduce provisions banning the unfair commercial practice of fake reviews. However, nowhere in the Bill is there any measure that bans fake reviews. The supposed banning of fake reviews can be found in clause 234, which gives the Secretary of State the power to add to the list of banned practices. Unless the Minister corrects me, all we have is a promise from the Government that at some point in the future—beyond 2025—fake reviews might be banned. As Which? said during the Committee’s evidence sessions,
“We do not think that we should wait. Clearly, fake reviews are harmful, so the buying, selling and hosting of fake reviews should be included in schedule 18.”––[Official Report, Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Public Bill Committee, 13 June 2023; c. 13, Q16.]
It was not just consumer groups that expressed that sentiment; the British Retail Consortium also stated:
“We are concerned about fake reviews. We support the banning of them. We wish that what the Government propose for them was on the face of the Bill.”––[Official Report, Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Public Bill Committee, 13 June 2023; c. 49, Q78.]
I would be grateful for the Minister’s explanation of why the Government have left a ban out of primary legislation. One view is that the Government intended to include a ban, but ran out of time. Well, we have time to catch up during the passage of the Bill. Retail and consumer groups consider this measure very much noticeable by its absence, and it is important and significant that we address it during the passage of the Bill.
I have no doubt that the Minister will stress the need for further work and consultation on the issue. If so, perhaps he could also reflect on the considerable evidence of consumer detriment caused by fake reviews. Which? research from 2020 found that consumers are far more than twice as likely to buy poor-quality products that have been boosted by fake reviews. That affects the Minister’s constituents, mine, and those of every Member of this Committee.
As the CMA has noted, the average UK household spends £900 a year as a result of being influenced by online reviews. That demonstrates how significant the financial damage of fake reviews can be. In the Department for Business and Trade’s research from April this year, 11% to 15% of reviews in the category that it assessed were fake. That is the Government’s own research. The evidence is clear: action on fake reviews is needed now to protect consumers from their negative consequences. I would go so far as to say that the Opposition are doing the Government a favour by introducing these amendments. We have done the Government’s work for them.
I urge the Minister to support the amendments. Perhaps he will want to bring forward his own, as the Government are known to take good ideas when they see them, many of which they take from the Opposition. We understand that there has been significant dysfunction in Government, which may have got in the way of their doing the work that the country needs them to do. I therefore urge the Minister to support the amendments. He may also want to bring forward his own amendments at a future stage of the Bill or in the other place. I jest, with good reason, but we are not precious; we just want the right thing to be done. I hope that in his response, the Minister will confirm what action the Government will take during the passage of the Bill.
I very much support amendment 116, to the extent that I withdrew my attempt at an amendment that would have countered fake reviews. It is clear that fake reviews are a matter of real concern, not just for reputable companies, but for consumers, who like to rely on customer feedback before making some of their most important financial choices. Schedule 18 defines and sets out unfair practices, and it is only right that fake reviews be added to them. We again come back to the fundamental principle that if a market is to work effectively and efficiently, people need access to timely and accurate information. That goal of having accurate information in the marketplace is subverted considerably when fake information and misinformation are allowed to abound.
I am not sure that I can take that analogy any further. I think we are all in agreement. They say that the art of originality is to remember what you have heard but forget where you heard it. The Opposition say that we are stealing their good ideas, but obviously we committed some time ago to taking action in this area. I am not averse to taking some of the good ideas that we hear from the Opposition from time to time, but we also have to ensure that we reject the many bad ideas we hear from them in debates.
The Government agree that legislation to tackle fake reviews should be strengthened. We anticipate doing so by adding to the list of banned practices. However, it is important to get the details of those proposals right. That includes defining what we mean by fake reviews and how “reasonable and proportionate” steps will be understood. Similarly, we want those rules to encompass the manipulation of reviews that may harm consumers, which also needs detailed work with stakeholders to define. For example, the issue is not just about people trying to boost reviews, as the hon. Member for Feltham and Heston stated; it is also to do with people removing negative reviews inappropriately, which might affect ratings on review sites. The Government will therefore be consulting on fake reviews during the passage of the Bill to ensure that these rules work as intended and are clear for businesses. We will be doing that shortly, in the autumn.
The hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark talked about ESF and Which?. I have spoken to both organisations and met them regularly. In fact, one of my first jobs in my ministerial role was to speak at an Electrical Safety First conference. On that note, I hope that hon. Members will withdraw their amendments.
I am slightly disappointed by the Minister’s response; it does not sound as if there is anything other than long grass here. Significant groundwork has been done, both within Government and with stakeholders. Having another consultation in the autumn is like long grass: it is designed to spin things out until we reach 2025 and then there is something to add to the schedule. Unless the Minister wants to tell me that there is an intention to do more during the course of the Bill, we will be pushing this to a vote.
Schedule 18 introduces a list of commercial practices that will automatically be considered unfair in all circumstances and will be prohibited. The list is long and comprehensive, and the Opposition welcome every practice listed, including a seller’s claiming to be a signatory to a code of conduct when they are not, falsely claiming that a product is able to prevent disease, providing inaccurate information about the availability of a product, and threatening a consumer if they do not buy a product.
However, we are concerned that there are significant omissions, which we addressed during our debates on the amendments. We will be happy to consider alternative wording, but we will continue to pursue additions that we believe would strengthen the Bill and its implementation. Nevertheless, we support the inclusion of this important schedule in the Bill.
As has been said, the schedule protects consumers from the most prevalent and harmful commercial practices engaged in by deceitful traders. It largely replicates schedule 1 to the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 and provides a list of 31 commercial practices that are banned in all circumstances due to their inherently unfair nature. Among those practices are operating pyramid promotional schemes, displaying trust marks without obtaining the necessary authorisation, and stating that a product can be legally sold when it cannot.
Question put and agreed to.
Schedule 18 accordingly agreed to.
Clauses 218 to 221 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
I beg to move amendment 127, in clause 222, page 149, line 21, at end insert—
“(j) for goods and services offered on online marketplaces, whether the third party offering the products is a trader or not, on the basis of the declaration of that third party to the provider of the online marketplace.”
This amendment would add whether or not a third party seller on an online marketplace is a trader or a consumer to the list of omissions of material information in an invitation to purchase.
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 126, in clause 222, page 150, line 11, leave out “and its price”.
This amendment expands the definition of an invitation to purchase to cases where the information provided to the consumer covers the characteristics of the product but not its price.
It is a pleasure to speak to amendment 127, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Pontypridd, and to make some remarks about amendment 126, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark.
Amendment 127 would add whether a third-party seller on an online marketplace is a trader or a consumer to the list of omissions of material information in an invitation to purchase. We have already raised concerns about the safety of products sold in online marketplaces, specifically through third-party sellers, and these concerns are accentuated by the inexplicable delay—it has been over a year since its publication was first promised, as we have discussed—of the product safety review into precisely this issue. In the meantime, the amendment would provide an extra safeguard for the consumer by making it mandatory for them to be informed about the status of a seller when they purchase a product online. That is particularly important in an increasingly digital economy, in which almost every individual or business can sell but consumers are unaware that they have different rights and forms of redress, depending on the status of the seller.
Consumer rights groups regularly conduct studies of products sold by third-party sellers on online marketplaces to test whether they comply with UK safety requirements. For example, in February this year, Which? sent 10 plug-in mini-heaters bought from online marketplaces such as Amazon and eBay to be tested at its product safety lab. All of them failed and were illegal to sell in the UK. That is especially dangerous for consumers in the light of the Conservatives’ cost of living crisis, which is resulting in people being pushed to buy cheaper, less reliable products.
Although only comprehensive Government action on this front will lead to the issue being properly tackled, the amendment would go part of the way towards providing the consumer with more power in online marketplaces, by informing them of the status of a seller and that their rights of redress when purchasing some products will vary from the rights they have when buying from the high street. It is a common-sense amendment that will help inform consumers in our digital economy and subsequently reduce the risks they face when buying from online marketplaces, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Amendment 126 would expand the definition of an “invitation to purchase” to cases where the information provided to the consumer covers the characteristics of a product but not its price. My hon. Friend the Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark will speak to the amendment, which raises important questions for the Government. Removing the price from the definition of an “invitation to purchase” would ensure that many rogue traders, and the services they offer, were in scope of the definition.
As the Chartered Trading Standards Institute has pointed out, many rogue traders who target vulnerable consumers do not give a price when offering to do work. This means that it would automatically not be considered an “invitation to purchase”, and the regulations in clause 222 would not apply. By removing the reference to “price” in the definition of an “invitation to purchase”, the amendment would ensure that more rogue traders fall under the definition and can be caught by the legislation. The Minister may have his own views on the amendment. This is a really important issue, so I would welcome his response on the effectiveness of the amendment in addressing the issue and on the impact it could have.
I have a few brief supplementary comments, further to the excellent speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Feltham and Heston. I just want to point out an anomaly and the problematic nature of the wording of the Bill, which I hope the Government will re-examine before they go further.
Amendment 126 would expand the definition of “invitation to purchase” to cases in which the information provided to a consumer covers the characteristics of a product, but not its price. That might sound counterintuitive, as it did to me when I first went through this with organisations, but it would expand the goods and services covered by the legislation. That is important, because the use of “price” in the wording of the Bill could prohibit action against a rogue trader. The existing wording might stop the Government meeting the aims that they are setting out to achieve.
The suggestion is that the specific requirement that the price be covered, if that is not the price paid, will potentially prevent action from being taken against a trader who deliberately advertises a price, but then changes it. An example might be where someone arranges for a person to come and fix a car part, a boiler or a pipe leak, and that person then arrives and says, “The product you’ve looked at online is not compatible with your boiler,”—or their fittings, their car or whatever it might be—“but guess what: I’ve got a different one in the van that’s a bit cheaper,” or a bit more expensive, “but will do the job better for you.”
By making a slight change to the wording of the Bill to remove the words “and its price” on page 150, amendment 126 would deal with that kind of rogue practice, which is out there and which has been raised by trading standards. The fear among the bodies that are trying to secure greater action against rogue traders is that the existing wording of the Bill allows wiggle room and will let the dodgy practices continue. I hope that airing that specific, possibly niche concern today will give us greater time to capture it and ensure that the Bill does not preclude action against rogue traders where specific prices are agreed up front but that is not the deal that takes place, because someone pays for a cheaper or even a more expensive alternative that does the same job.
Having flagged that concern, I hope that the Government will look again at the wording and at how they will meet their overall aim, which I support.
It is an interesting point. We took the decision to strengthen the existing provisions in the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 in relation to invitations to purchase by removing the need for enforcers to prove that the transactional decision test has been met. This significantly increases the criminal liability of unscrupulous traders.
Amendment 126 would expand the definition of an invitation to purchase still further to cases in which information about products is presented to consumers without a price shown. We are concerned that that would expand the definition too far. Moreover, other provisions in chapter 1 of the Bill will achieve a similar aim: they will prohibit traders from making misleading statements or omissions in respect of all commercial practices. We feel that that covers this issue. However, I am happy to have further conversations with the hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark, certainly based on the evidence he has received, which I am happy to look at.
Amendment 127 would require that information as to whether a third-party seller or online marketplace is a trader or a consumer be added to the list of material information in an invitation to purchase. We have the same aim. Clause 222(2)(c) will require
“the identity of the trader and the identity of any other person on whose behalf the trader is acting”
to be disclosed. Moreover, subsections (2)(d) and (e) will require a range of contact details to be provided to consumers about who they may be buying from.
Accordingly, I hope that hon. Members will not press their amendments.
I thank the Minister for his comments. We still take the view that this needs to be tighter. In the light of his intentions, which we understand, we will take it away and look at it again. I do not want to lose our amendment, but we will not press it to a vote today. Perhaps we can come back to it at a future stage of the Bill.
I am grateful to the Minister for saying that he will look at the evidence. I am happy not to press amendment 126.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw amendment 127.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 222 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 223
Public enforcement
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 223 sets out who is responsible for enforcing the prohibition on unfair commercial practices. Trading standards have a duty to enforce the prohibitions in their areas across Great Britain. The Department for the Economy in Northern Ireland has a duty to enforce the prohibitions in Northern Ireland. The CMA has the power to enforce the prohibitions on a civil and criminal basis in the UK.
We welcome clause 223. As the Minister states, it introduces provisions relating to the enforcement of the prohibition of unfair commercial practices, setting out how local weights and measures authorities—trading standards—will have a duty to enforce the prohibitions. The CMA will also have enforcement powers. We have talked several times in this Committee about the importance of trading standards in enforcing the regime. How involved have the CMA and trading standards been in the discussion around the powers in the Bill?
Is the Minister confident that local trading standards officers have the resources to enforce the regulations, especially after 13 years of what can only be described as a managed decline of local trading standards authorities, with local services facing a 52% reduction in service capacity under the Government’s watch since 2010? It is important to know that, because where increased expectations are coming through in legislation the question is whether there will be capacity to deliver on the new demands. I would be grateful for his response.
I have meetings with the national teams of trading standards, and indeed the CMA, on a regular basis. We have had numerous discussions about the legislation, if the hon. Lady means her question broadly. Indeed, she was able to question some of those witnesses in the recent evidence sessions. Clearly, resources for trading standards are a matter for local authorities, not central Government. It is for local authorities to determine where those resources are committed.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 223 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 224
Rights of redress
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Under clause 224, as the Minister says, the consumer will be able to enforce their right to redress relating to unfair commercial practices, subject to conditions, including that they have entered into a relevant contract, that the trader has engaged in a prohibited practice, that the prohibited practice was a significant factor in the consumer’s decision to make payment, and that the product concerned is not of an excluded type. Those are important provisions, including in the context of our debate about greenwashing. That is why it is important that we take forward the issues we have debated. None the less, we welcome the clause and these important provisions.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 224 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 225
Rights of redress: further provision
I beg to move amendment 67, in clause 225, page 152, line 30, at end insert—
“(4A) The Secretary of State must by regulations make any further provision necessary to ensure that the rights of redress available under this Chapter are equivalent to, and not lesser than, those available under the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (S.I. 2008/1277).”
This amendment seeks to ensure that the “Consumer Rights to Redress” that will be set out through secondary legislation cannot offer a reduced level of the protection than the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008.
As the explanatory statement sets out, amendment 67 seeks to ensure that the consumer rights to redress introduced through secondary legislation by Ministers cannot offer less protection than the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008. That statutory instrument was effectively the successor to the Trade Descriptions Act 1968 and was designed to implement the unfair commercial practices directive as part of a common set of European minimum standards for consumer protection. Consumers, not just in Europe but throughout the UK, have benefited immensely from those protections. It is important as a point of principle that as legislation is repealed or evolves, there should be no inadvertent reduction in baseline consumer protections. There should be a reduction in consumer protections only where the Government deliberately choose to do so and we have an open debate.
The amendment is very much about ensuring that nothing slips down the drain inadvertently in terms of consumer protection. If the Government are not minded to accept it, what existing protections will they unwittingly let fall by the wayside? The amendment would capture the baseline level of protection through future secondary legislation. I look forward to the Minister’s remarks.
I am pleased to speak to amendment 114, which stands in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Pontypridd. I will also make reference to amendment 67, tabled by the hon. Member for Gordon.
Amendment 114 would require that the Secretary of State prepare and lay before Parliament a report on the merits of introducing a consumer right to individual and collective redress through secondary legislation, as is the case in EU member states. Amendment 67 would ensure that the consumer rights to redress set out in secondary legislation cannot offer less protection than the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008. We support the principle of amendment 67, which would have a similar effect to amendment 114 by ensuring a more robust consumer right to redress.
More specifically on amendment 114, I refer the Minister to the written evidence of Which?, which notes that
“the Bill states that ‘Consumer Rights to Redress’ may be provided for in future secondary legislation, so it will give the Secretary of State powers to amend these rights. These rights are fundamentally important, as they include payment of damages when a trader misleads a consumer. We want assurances that they will not be downgraded as a result of this process, and a commitment from the Government to strengthen redress procedures when these new regulations are drafted.”
Amendment 114 would require a commitment from the Government to report on doing that, aiding the process of strengthening redress procedures when new regulations are drafted. I urge the Government to support amendments 114 and 67, and to ensure that consumer rights to redress are as strong as they can be, particularly in an increasingly digital economy.
Amendments 67 and 114 deal with consumers’ private rights to redress. I agree with the hon. Members for Feltham and Heston and for Gordon that it is vital that consumers have robust private rights of redress.
Amendment 67 would limit changes by regulation to the consumer rights of redress to those that are equivalent to the remedies in the CPRs—the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008. The Bill includes powers to amend rights of redress. That could include how such rights are exercised; the powers could also be used to make those rights clearer and simpler. Those would be positive changes for consumers that might not meet the test of equivalence to the current regulations that the amendment would impose. We would like to retain the ability to exceed the existing private redress provisions, if appropriate, which may encourage more consumers to make use of these rights. The first regulations made using the power will be to create the new regime to replace the current private redress provisions in the CPRs. Accordingly, those regulations will be subject to parliamentary approval via the affirmative procedure, thereby providing for appropriate parliamentary oversight of use of the power.
I turn to amendment 114. The courts already have the power to make an enforcement order against an infringer, or to accept undertakings from them to provide redress to affected consumers, through the measures in part 3. Enforcers can also accept undertakings from infringers to provide redress to affected consumers. For example, in 2021 the CMA secured an undertaking from Teletext Holidays to pay over £7 million in outstanding refunds from package travel trips cancelled due to covid-19.
The Bill will make the power to require enhanced consumer measures directly available to the CMA. Consumers also already have individual private rights of redress. In the “Reforming competition and consumer policy” consultation, we consulted on whether to introduce a right for consumers to bring collective redress. Responses were mixed, with concerns raised about unintended consequences such as the creation of a claims culture and inadvertently disincentivising the bringing of proceedings by consumer groups.
The hon. Member for Feltham and Heston referred to the EU situation. The outcome, however, is similar to the desired situation under the EU’s directive on collective redress, which requires member states to designate entities, such as consumer organisations, that can bring actions for collective redress on consumers’ behalf. The EU does not mandate that member states introduce direct rights for individual consumers to bring an action for collective redress.
We will keep the evidence under review, but our priority is to embed the CMA direct enforcement regime and understand the impact that it makes. On that basis, I hope that hon. Members will not press their amendments.
Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill (Fourteenth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateSeema Malhotra
Main Page: Seema Malhotra (Labour (Co-op) - Feltham and Heston)Department Debates - View all Seema Malhotra's debates with the Department for Business and Trade
(1 year, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIt is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship on hopefully the last day of this Bill Committee, Dame Maria. Chapter 4 of part 4 of the Bill aims to strengthen the quality of alternative dispute resolution available to consumers. The chapter replaces EU-derived regulations on ADR with a stronger regime that requires ADR providers to be accredited. Clause 283 defines ADR, which includes mediation, arbitration, early neutral evaluation and action under an ombudsman scheme, and who is an ADR provider. It applies only where ADR is provided in the context of a consumer contract dispute.
Government amendment 83 makes a consequential change to clause 283 in connection with amendments to clause 287. Clause 284 defines consumer contracts and consumer contract disputes. Consumer contracts include suppliers of electricity, gas, water and heat. Government amendments 84 to 88 add references to Scottish and Northern Irish legislation in relation to the supply of those utilities, which were omitted on introduction. Government amendment 89 removes a superfluous definition. Clause 285 prohibits ADR providers from carrying out ADR unless they are accredited or acting for someone who is. That is subject to the exemptions provided in clause 287. It also prohibits ADR providers arranging for third parties to carry out ADR on their behalf unless their accreditation or exemption permits that.
Clause 286 restricts the fees that accredited ADR providers may charge consumers to fees approved by the Secretary of State and those that are published. That will prevent excessive fees and ensure transparency in fee charging. Government amendments 90 and 91 clarify that the limited conditions under which fees may be charged apply only to accredited ADR providers. I commend the clauses to the Committee.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dame Maria. I thank the Minister for his opening remarks. This is an important part of the Bill. Clause 283 defines ADR and related terms for the purposes of the chapter. Part 4 makes accreditation of ADR providers compulsory unless an exception applies. It includes examples of ADR, such as mediation, arbitration, early neutral evaluation and action under an ombudsman scheme. In her evidence, Tracey Reilly from Consumer Scotland welcomed measures in the Bill as making it
“easier for consumers to seek redress through ADR systems that are appropriately regulated and standardised.”––[Official Report, Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Public Bill Committee, 13 June 2023; c. 36, Q49.]
We welcome the straightforward definitions, as well as the broader chapter, which will hopefully increase trust in and use of ADR services in disputes between businesses and consumers. The Government’s policy paper on ADR released in April highlights that
“46% of consumers using alternative dispute resolution had problems including concerns over the time the process took, customer service or a perception that the process favoured the business. 54% of cases took longer to resolve than the 3 months allowed—16% of consumers who went to court did so because the business refused to comply with a previous alternative dispute resolution decision.”
That demonstrates the scale of the challenge that we face in reforming ADR provisions so that they work for consumers. We welcome this chapter as a first step in seeking to meet that challenge.
As Graham Wynn, of the British Retail Consortium, noted in his evidence,
“the accreditation system and making sure that companies abide by what they are supposed to do in ADR is vital to have confidence in general.”––[Official Report, Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Public Bill Committee, 13 June 2023; c. 51, Q84.]
Not having a full assessment of ADR providers has been an issue with the current arrangements.
Amendment 83 provides a signpost to clause 287, which identifies who are the exempt ADR providers for the purposes of chapter 4. We recognise that this amendment provides greater clarity in the legislation.
Clause 284 defines other terms for the purposes of this chapter, and they include “Consumer contract” and “Consumer contract dispute”. We welcome these definitions, and we support amendments 84 to 89.
Clause 285 introduces provisions prohibiting a person from carrying out alternative dispute resolution in relation to a consumer contract dispute unless they are accredited or exempt, or acting under “special ADR arrangements”. The explanatory notes state:
“Special ADR arrangements are designed to cover ADR schemes under which the ADR is provided through persons who might, for instance, be styled as ‘case handlers’, ‘adjudicators’ or ‘ombudsmen’”—or women—
“who are employed, or engaged by, or on behalf of, an ADR provider running the scheme. In that case, the person providing the ADR would not need accreditation, so long as the ADR provider running the scheme is accredited or exempt and is permitted to make special ADR arrangements.”
We will need to ensure that there is clarity in distinction and that there is cover in terms of regulatory cover and also expectations of quality, and we recognise that this clarity about special ADR arrangements will be important for that purpose. This is a welcome clause, ensuring that ADR providers are accredited and not liable to act against the interest of a consumer seeking redress. With regard to the exemptions, I will make a few remarks on clause 287.
Clause 286 limits the fees that accredited ADR providers may charge consumers to those charged in accordance with provisions approved by the Secretary of State, and published in a way likely to come to the attention of consumers. Although the Opposition welcome the provisions limiting the fees that consumers can be charged, I would welcome the Minister expanding on this clause slightly. I would, for example, welcome further explanation of the process by which the fees will be approved by the Secretary of State, and their transparency. It is important that there is predictability, fairness, consistency and transparency for consumers when it comes to any fees around ADR, so it will be important to have clarity from the Minister in this regard.
Finally, we support amendments 90 and 91.
Clearly, the Bill sets out the fact that ADR providers are restricted in what they can charge for. It is therefore very much the assumption that the fees that they charge will be fair and transparent; that is the basis of this. I am not sure what clarification the hon. Lady might be seeking other than on those particular points.
This is more about ensuring that there is a fair process and that it is clear, so that we do not have a situation in which consumers are being charged more than they ought to be because there has not been clarity about the Government expectations as to how those fees will be set. I was just seeking clarity on that.
I do not have anything further to add. Perhaps we can have a discussion about this offline.
Amendment 83 agreed to.
Clause 283, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 284
Other definitions
Amendments made: 84, in clause 284, page 189, line 34, leave out “(the gas code)” and insert “, or by section 12(1) or (2) of the Energy Act (Northern Ireland) 2011 (2011 c. 6),”.
The provisions of the Gas Act 1986 referred to in clause 284(3)(b) do not extend to Northern Ireland. This amendment would add a reference to the corresponding legislation in Northern Ireland.
Amendment 85, in clause 284, page 189, line 39, leave out “(the electricity code”) and insert “or by paragraph 3(1) or (2) of Schedule 6 to the Electricity (Northern Ireland) Order 1992 (S.I.1992/231 (N.I.1))”.
The provisions of the Electricity Act 1989 referred to in clause 284(3)(d) do not extend to Northern Ireland. This amendment would add a reference to the corresponding legislation in Northern Ireland.
Amendment 86, in clause 284, page 190, line 4, at end insert “or Part 2 of the Electricity (Northern Ireland) Order 1992”.
Part 1 of the Electricity Act 1989 does not extend to Northern Ireland. This amendment would add a reference to the corresponding legislation in Northern Ireland.
Amendment 87, in clause 284, page 190, line 6, at end insert “or Part 2 of the Gas (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 (S.I.1996/275 (N.I.2))”.
Part 1 of the Gas Act 1986 does not extend to Northern Ireland. This amendment would add a reference to the corresponding legislation in Northern Ireland.
Amendment 88, in clause 284, page 190, line 8, at end insert—
“(b) a person supplying water under a water services licence within the meaning of the Water Services etc. (Scotland) Act 2005 (asp 3), or
(c) a water undertaker within the meaning of the Water and Sewerage Services (Northern Ireland) Order 2006 (S.I.2006/3336 (N.I.21)).”
The definition of “water supplier” in Part 1 of the Water Industry Act 1991 only extends to England and Wales. This amendment would add references to the corresponding suppliers in Scotland and Northern Ireland. In the current text of the definition, the words after “means” will become paragraph (a).
Amendment 89, in clause 284, page 191, leave out line 4.—(Kevin Hollinrake.)
The amendment deletes an unnecessary word: the term “business” does not need to be defined as it is not used in Chapter 4 of Part 4 of the Bill.
Clause 284, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 285 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 286
Prohibitions relating to acting as ADR provider
Amendments made: 90, in clause 286, page 191, line 39, after “the” insert “accredited”.
This is a drafting amendment to clarify which ADR provider is referred to in clause 286(2)(a).
Amendment 91, in clause 286, page 192, line 4, after “the” insert “accredited”.—(Kevin Hollinrake.)
This is a drafting amendment to clarify which ADR provider is referred to in clause 286(2)(c).
Clause 286, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 287
Exempt ADR providers
Clause 287 and schedule 22 exempt various bodies that, so far as they provide ADR, it is not considered appropriate to regulate, and also exempt ADR under statutory redress schemes regulated by other legislation. Clause 287 allows the exemptions to be reviewed and updated.
Government amendments 92 to 96 amend clause 287, and Government amendments 108 to 111 amend schedule 22. They distinguish more clearly between the two categories of exemption. They also add exemptions for the local government and social care ombudsman, the Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration and redress schemes for social housing, lettings agencies and property management.
Clause 287 introduces schedule 22 into the Bill, which sets out the persons exempt from ADR provisions. I will also make a few remarks on schedule 22. Clause 287 also introduces a provision for the Secretary of State to add or remove from the list of exemptions. I want to clarify with the Minister why this delegated power has been left to the negative procedure. There may be a good reason for that decision, but it would be helpful to understand that.
We support amendments 92 to 96; the Minister has spoken to them. Schedule 22 sets out the list of ADR providers exempt from the regulations. As the explanatory notes explain and the Minister said:
“These include persons or bodies providing, or administering, dispute resolution services which are regulated under other legislation, who are exempted in order to avoid duplication or conflict between statutory regimes”.
That is important because obviously we do not want to have over-regulation or confusion between different parts of statute.
I ask the Minister for assurances that consumers using exempt providers will be able to expect the same level of protection from those that are non-exempt ADR providers. We do not have time in Committee to go through all the comparable regulations that exempt providers will be subject to, but from a consumer perspective the expectation should be that the protections, in terms of expectations of service and the regulations, will be comparable. I would be grateful for the Minister’s confirmation of that, and an assurance that the analysis has been done, because legislation is passed at different times and we want to be sure of that consistency.
Amendment 108 alters the list of persons in part 1 of schedule 22. There are other changes within amendments 108 to 111. We have no issue with any of those amendments, and we support them.
On the use of the negative procedure, we feel that these are technical and mechanical changes, just to ensure that the statute remains up to date and clear, and to prevent excessive use of parliamentary time. Clearly, ADR providers are regulated by other means. We see no duplication in their regulation. The Financial Ombudsman Service, for example, is already regulated and overseen by the Financial Conduct Authority. We think that it would be needless to duplicate that kind of oversight.
Amendment 92 agreed to.
Amendments made: 93, in clause 287, page 192, line 19, leave out subsection (3) and insert—
“(3) Regulations under subsection (2) may, in particular—
(a) provide for an entry in Part 1 of Schedule 22 to apply to a specified person or to any person of a specified description;
(b) provide for an entry in Part 1A of that Schedule to apply to a specified scheme or any scheme of a specified description;
(c) limit the scope of the exemption given to a person by virtue of an entry in Part 1 or IA of that Schedule, whether in relation to carrying out ADR or making special ADR arrangements (or both).”
This amendment clarifies the scope of the power to make regulations under clause 287(2). The effect of the exemption given to a person by an entry in Part 1 or 1A of Schedule may be limited, for example by reference to the purposes for which an otherwise prohibited activity is carried out or to the kinds of otherwise prohibited activity that are (or are not) exempt.
Amendment 94, in clause 287, page 192, line 34, leave out subsection (5) and insert—
“(5) Subject to any limitation on its scope provided for by Schedule 22—
(a) an exemption given to a person by virtue of an entry in Part 1 of that Schedule covers anything done by the person in the exercise of the person’s functions that would otherwise be prohibited, and
(b) an exemption given to a person by virtue of an entry in Part 1A of that Schedule covers anything done under or for the purposes of an exempted redress scheme that would otherwise be prohibited.”
The amendment clarifies the general scope of an exemption that will apply by default, unless there is provision in the Schedule for it to be more limited.
Amendment 95, in clause 287, page 192, line 37, after “section” insert
“—
‘prohibited’ means prohibited by section 285(1) or (2);”.
The amendment defines “prohibited” for the purposes of the clause by reference to clause 285.
Amendment 96, in clause 287, page 193, line 1, leave out subsection (8).—(Kevin Hollinrake.)
The amendment omits a subsection that is no longer needed as a result of the other government amendments to clause 287 and Schedule 22.
Clause 287, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
On a point of order, Dame Maria. I would be grateful for your guidance. The Minister made some remarks in response to my questions and I did not get the chance to intervene on him. I know that we have moved on, so is it best that I write to him on the questions that he did not answer on comparable regulation?
I think that it would be easier for the Committee were you to deal with those things outside of the Committee now that we have moved on, but obviously if pertinent issues are raised by further parts of the Bill, you might be able to cover some of those issues then.
Schedule 22
Exempt ADR Providers
Amendments made: 108, in schedule 22, page 356, leave out from beginning of line 31 to end of line 11 on page 357 and insert—
“List of exempt persons
The Commission for Local Administration in England (also known as the Local Government and Social Care Ombudsman) and each Local Commissioner within the meaning of section 23(3) of the Local Government Act 1974
The Consumer Council for Water
The Health Service Commissioner for England
The Legal Ombudsman
The Northern Ireland Public Services Ombudsman
The Office of the Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education (registered company number 04823842) in relation to its functions as the designated operator under section 13 of the Higher Education Act 2004
The Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration
The Pensions Ombudsman”.
This amendment alters the list of persons in Part 1 of Schedule 22. The listed persons will, subject to any limitation on their exemption provided for in the Schedule, be exempt from the prohibitions in clause 285. The first, sixth and seventh entries are new. Other entries currently in Part 1 are omitted because they are superseded by entries in Part 1A of Schedule 22 as proposed by Amendment 109.
Amendment 109, in schedule 22, page 357, line 15, at end insert—
“Part 1A
Exempt redress schemes
An approved estate agents redress scheme
An approved postal operators redress scheme
An approved social housing ombudsman scheme
Approved public communications provider dispute procedures
The Financial Ombudsman Scheme
A qualifying lettings agency work redress scheme
A qualifying property management work redress scheme
A qualifying redress scheme for the gas or electricity sector”.
The amendment inserts a Part 1A in Schedule 22 listing schemes or similar arrangements that are to be “exempt redress schemes” for the purposes of Chapter 4 of Part 4 (ADR).
Amendment 110, in schedule 22, page 357, line 18, leave out “Part 1” and insert “this Schedule”.
This amendment is consequential on the insertion of Part 1A of Schedule 22 proposed by Amendment 109.
Amendment 111, in schedule 22, page 357, line 28, at end insert—
“‘approved social housing ombudsman scheme’ means a scheme which is approved for the purposed of Schedule 2 to the Housing Act 1996;
‘qualifying lettings agency work redress scheme’ means a redress scheme which is approved as mentioned in section 83(1)(a), or is a government scheme for the purposes of section 83(1)(b), of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013;
‘qualifying property management work redress scheme’ means a redress scheme which is approved as mentioned in section 84(1)(a), or is a government administered redress scheme for the purposes of section 84(1)(b), of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013;”.—(Kevin Hollinrake.)
The amendment defines three expressions used in entries in Part 1A as proposed to be inserted by Amendment 109.
Schedule 22, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 288
Applications for accreditation etc
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
As the Minister outlines, clause 288 sets out how persons or companies wishing to become accredited as ADR providers should apply for accreditation under chapter 4. Specifically, the clause sets out how a person wishing to be accredited must apply to the Secretary of State.
I want to raise a concern with the Minister about some of the details that are lacking in the Bill and, from what I could see, the Bill’s supporting documentation; he may want to direct me to other documentation that we have missed. My question concerns subsection (4), which states:
“The Secretary of State may determine the procedure to be followed in relation to an application for accreditation.”
Subsection (5) then lists some criteria, but the procedure is still very open. If a consumer wants to know how people or organisations are accredited, the Bill does not provide clarity. That gives rise to concerns about what scrutiny will be possible if the procedure is not, for example, set out in detailed regulations. I would therefore be grateful if the Minister could explain what further detail there is.
The providers will have quite a significant role in dealing with disputes. As I have said previously, we have heard about the Government’s research into consumers’ experiences, and the quality of ADR providers will be in part determined by the quality of the process by which they are accredited. That is why this issue is important. I would be grateful for the Minister’s response, because a lot could be left to the Secretary of State’s discretion. The Minister might become the Secretary of State—we do not know, although obviously that would be a great thing for the Minister—but we have to make legislation that is future proof for future regimes, so that people can have confidence in it.
If further detail on the procedure is to be published, when might that happen? Will it be after the Bill has attained Royal Assent, which, according to the impact assessment, may not happen until 2025? If further guidance is needed on what people need to do to be accredited, that will cause further delays. Are we potentially talking about 2026 before ADR providers are in place? That feels like quite a long way away.
The ADR provisions are important for increasing consumer protection, and we welcome them. However, this key part of how we ensure the quality of that provision, which would deal with the issues of confidence I referred to in my previous remarks, should be more clearly addressed. If necessary, more detail should be in the Bill itself.
Clause 289 deals with how the Secretary of State would determine applications for accreditation or for the extension of an accreditation, but does not provide us with detail about how those decisions will be made. That relates to the same points I raised in relation to clause 288, and the Minister may therefore want to address it directly.
Amendment 97 makes it clear that new accreditation conditions imposed when extending an accreditation are not limited to any particular part of the extended accreditation. We support the amendment.
Amendments 98 and 99 are drafting amendments to clarify which accreditation conditions can be varied or removed by the Secretary of State when extending an accreditation. I would be grateful to discover whether any of the changes that might be made for ADR providers will be published so that they are on the public record. I do not know whether there will be a public record of ADR providers, so perhaps the Minister will also clarify that. If there is to be a public list, where will it be? That point relates to other issues, such as how people will be aware of those who might be able to provide the service.
Government amendment 100 will make it clear
“that accreditation conditions can be worded so as to make an accredited ADR provider directly responsible for things done by another ADR provider who carries out ADR under special ADR arrangements made by the accredited provider under its accreditation. This could enable regulatory action under clause 290 or 293 to be taken against the accredited ADR provider in relation to acts of the other ADR provider.”
This is important. It is a common-sense amendment, and it will extend protections for consumers.
Clause 290 will enable the Secretary of State by notice to revoke, suspend or limit an accreditation, or impose further conditions on a previously accredited ADR provider. Will the Minister clarify how that might come about? I should say that ADR providers could apply to have their accreditation revoked, and there are grounds on which the Secretary of State could apply specified sanctions. How will the changes come about? How will the information need to be received to meet a condition under subsection (3), listing contraventions? Might one route be through a consumer complaints system on the ADR process? How will that work?
Perhaps I missed it, but I am not clear about when a consumer with concerns might challenge an ADR provider’s service or whether that is a route through which such matters might come to the notice of the Secretary of State in order to revoke, suspend or limit an accreditation or impose further conditions. Will the Minister clarify how the system is joined up from the perspective of the consumer and how the process will be managed? That would be extremely helpful. Otherwise, we welcome the clause as a necessary element of the new ADR provisions and as necessary to ensure that any ADR providers not fulfilling their duties to protect consumers can be stopped from acting as such a provider.
Clause 291 sets out how the fees that accredited ADR providers will be required to pay to the Secretary of State will be determined. We recognise the need for the clause, and the potential need for ADR providers to pay periodic fees to maintain their accreditation and commitment to remaining accredited. However, I would welcome further explanation from the Minister because we are not clear about the amount to be paid in fees, the frequency of the fees or their purpose—where they will go. That is not clearly set out in the Bill or in the accompanying paperwork. Will the Minister clarify whether some of these issues will come back in secondary legislation or whether we can identify the answers to those questions in other parts of the supporting paperwork?
I think the legislation might suggest that the fees cover the costs of the functions under the chapter, but it is important for legislative scrutiny that we have clarity on that. Small businesses might be involved, and we want clarity and fairness in the process.
Amendment 101, which we support, will correct a mistake in clause 291. We support clause 292. Schedule 23 sets out the criteria for an ADR provider to become accredited, including the provision of information to consumers, the independence and impartiality of the provider, and so on. We welcome the schedule in ensuring that there are important and clear criteria for people acting as ADR providers.
The hon. Member for Feltham and Heston has raised a number of points for me to respond to. As an overarching point, we are moving from a voluntary to a mandatory system of ADR regulation, so we should not look at it as if we were starting from scratch. We are improving an existing system, which should give us some assurance that this is an improvement, not a step back from improving standards in this area.
One of the hon. Lady’s principal points was about the criteria that we apply for accrediting an ADR provider. They have to be kept high-level, because there are a wide variety of different providers, so it would be wrong to be too specific about the criteria we apply. However, clause 292 and schedule 23 both set out the principles behind what accreditation will look like at every scheme level, including standards on accessibility, expertise, fairness, independence, impartiality and transparency. Clause 292 will allow the criteria to be kept under review and to be modified if necessary and appropriate. On the public record, yes, there will be a list of ADR providers.
I recognise what the Minister says about moving to a mandatory system and the improvements being made, which is why it is important that we do not leave gaps. However, I want to push him on my point about expertise.
I will come to that. Criterion 3 in schedule 23 clearly sets out that a provider will be required to have the relevant expertise. Has the hon. Lady read that criterion?
I have, and I quoted it to the Minister. What I asked him was how he will determine expertise, because in other legislation on ADR that we have debated, there has been some process. Have the providers been accredited? Is it based on experience? Do they have particular qualifications? Otherwise, expertise can be very subjective. That was the question I asked.
And that was the question I answered. In response to the hon. Lady’s points, I said that the criteria have to be kept high-level. It would be wrong to be too specific about how we judge “expertise”, because of the wide variety of different ADR providers. What we all need to do is trust the process, which the Secretary of State oversees, of trying to make sure that each provider has the relevant expertise in each scheme area. As I said, there are schemes already in place that we are now putting under the mandatory regime. Of course, expertise will be judged on a scheme-by-scheme basis, but it is difficult to set out exactly what expertise we will require in any particular scheme, other than that we would expect the person to have the relevant experience and expertise.
Of course I will trust the process, where I am sure that the process is a robust one. I do not think that we need to debate the issue much further, but it is not resolved, if I may say so. As I mentioned, I have been involved—it may have been with the Minister’s predecessor—with previous legislation relating to the ADR process. Anyone can say that they have expertise in something, but the important question is what their qualification is and how it is determined. I will look again at the issue, and I may follow up with the Minister in writing.
May I just remind members of the Committee that interventions should be pithy?
Chapter 1 of part 5 of the Bill enhances the UK’s ability to co-operate internationally on competition and consumer matters, as open and fair competition globally ensures the best opportunities for UK businesses and consumers. Clause 302 would introduce a new power for the Competition and Markets Authority and certain consumer protection regulators to provide investigative assistance to an overseas regulator. This power will apply to civil investigations or proceedings related to competition and digital markets and consumer protection.
The clause sets out three core requirements that must be met before investigative assistance is provided. First, the overseas regulator requesting assistance must be carrying out a function that corresponds to a function that the UK regulator has under UK law. Secondly, the UK regulator must assess whether it would be appropriate to provide the assistance requested by the overseas regulator, using the conditions set out in clause 304. Thirdly, the Secretary of State must have authorised the UK regulator to provide the assistance in accordance with clause 305.
Clause 303 sets out that the request must be made in writing by the overseas authority, describe the matter for which assistance is requested, and detail any potential penalties that might be imposed following the overseas investigation. Clause 304 provides a framework for UK authorities to assess whether it is appropriate to provide the investigative assistance requested by an overseas authority; it also sets out the circumstances in which a UK authority has no discretion and must reject an incoming request for investigative assistance—for example, if there is no reciprocity and no overriding public benefit to the UK in providing the assistance in any event.
Clause 305 outlines the factors that the Secretary of State must consider in deciding whether to approve a request for assistance. For example, the Secretary of State may reject a request for assistance where they consider that it would be more appropriate for any investigation to be carried out by the UK authority solely for its own purposes. Clause 306 requires the UK authority to notify the Secretary of State where it has received for assistance and considers it appropriate to provide the requested assistance.
Clause 307 places a duty on the CMA to publish guidance in connection with requests for investigative assistance and the provision of that assistance. Any regulator with the powers to provide investigative assistance must have regard to that guidance, which must be approved by the Secretary of State. Clause 308 and schedule 25 amend the existing legislative framework to ensure that the new investigative assistance regime slots in properly and runs smoothly. For example, the usual time limits for the CMA to be able to impose civil penalties for failures to comply with merger information notices would not work in cases where the CMA is providing assistance, so schedule 25 creates a bespoke time limit specifically for such cases.
Clause 302 acts as a gateway to investigative assistance provisions. This is an important provision, enabling regulators in the UK to assist an overseas regulator. The Minister outlined the conditions under which the UK regulator may assist. We understand that the issues around consumer protection and competition must increasingly be dealt with internationally, because they are increasingly digital in nature and when they arise abroad can impact consumers here, as well as the other way around. As we have gone through these matters with short remarks today, my overall comment is that while we need this provision, the safeguards that might be needed and what is or is not to be published are less apparent.
There are just a couple of points to make, I think. On clause 302, the hon. Lady asked whether the police would be involved in any of the investigations. The clause sets out clearly that those are civil matters, not criminal matters. The overseas regulator requesting system is supposed to carry out a function that corresponds to a function that the UK regulator has under UK law.
Either I was not clear, or the Minister mistook me. I was not talking about the police being involved. I was asking whether there are processes of sharing information akin to the way that information is shared with police, so that it can be done in more confidence. The question was about what will be known to those whose information may be shared, if there is that request.
In the course of anybody’s work, if there is evidence of criminal activity, we would expect an enforcement agency or regulator to share that with the relevant enforcement authorities, including the police. Was that the point the hon. Member was trying to make?
If I can put it a bit more simply, my question was about how the information will be shared, who will know that the information is being shared, and what that information is being shared about?
If the hon. Lady has any further points that she wants clarified, perhaps she will write to me, as I am not quite sure what she is referring to.
The hon. Lady asked about safeguards and the considerations to be taken into account when agreeing to requests for assistance. The clauses provide significant safeguards with regard to the conditions that the authority itself needs to consider and, when it comes to the authorisation by a Secretary of State, consideration of appropriate protections, for example, around confidentiality and other considerations set out in the Bill.
Further details about the process and how investigative assistance will work in practice will be set out in detailed guidance. That is another point that the hon. Lady referred to—discussions between the regulator and the Secretary of State—that we expect to see in guidance. We expect the regulators and the Secretary of State to engage closely in considering whether to provide assistance. Guidance will be put in place and agreed between the regulators and the Secretary of State to set out how the measure will work in practice.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 302 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 303 to 308 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 25 agreed to.
Clause 309
Disclosing information overseas
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 309 provides clearer rules and more efficient gateways for information sharing between UK authorities and their overseas counterparts. The powers will apply to all UK public authorities covered by part 9 of the Enterprise Act 2002—primarily authorities with functions in connection with competition and consumer protection law. The existing overseas disclosure gateway in part 9 will be replaced with three new gateways. Under the first, a relevant UK authority may share information with an overseas authority for the joint purpose of facilitating both its own statutory functions and the functions of the overseas authority.
Under the second new gateway, a relevant UK authority can share information only to facilitate the functions of an overseas authority. When deciding whether to make a disclosure under the two gateways, the UK public authority will need to have regard to a number of factors, such as whether the laws and the practices of the other country can ensure that confidential information is appropriately stored and protected.
When deciding whether to make a disclosure to facilitate the functions of the overseas public authority only, the UK authority must give due regard to an additional layer of considerations. That includes whether the reason for the request is sufficiently serious to justify the disclosure of information. The Secretary of State will retain a power to modify, add to, or remove any of the considerations for each gateway. That is to ensure that the list of considerations remains balanced and appropriate.
There are restrictions that apply to the use and further disclosure of any information that is shared under the two gateways. The restrictions mean that, unless the disclosing authority provides its consent, information disclosed must not be used by the overseas authority for any purpose other than the one for which the information was originally disclosed; nor may the information be passed on to a third party. The Secretary of State will retain the existing power to prevent overseas disclosure of information if they consider the relevant proceedings or investigation would be more appropriately brought or carried out by authorities in the UK or in another country.
Finally, the clause introduces a new gateway for overseas disclosures by a UK public authority for the purposes of facilitating the terms of a designated co-operation arrangement. The Secretary of State will have a power to designate suitable co-operation arrangements in regulations if they are satisfied that they meet the safeguards set out in the legislation.
I thank the Minister for his detailed remarks on clause 309. I will keep my remarks brief. I have concerns about some of the detail. The clause deals with disclosing information overseas. It will amend part 9 of the Enterprise Act by replacing the current overseas disclosure gateway in section 243 with new provisions governing the ability of the CMA and other UK public authorities to exchange information with overseas public authorities.
As the Minister outlined, there will be three new gateways that allow for overseas disclosures in defined circumstances, with safeguards to protect specified information. We welcome the clause. It will be important to see how it is taken forward in the guidance. It is important to have this provision in legislation, not least because tackling competition issues requires us to play an active role in global competition and consumer protection policy.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 309 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 310
Duty of expedition on the CMA and sectoral regulators
Clause 310 introduces a statutory duty of expedition in relation to the CMA’s competition and consumer law functions, including the functions relating to the new digital competition regime. Schedule 26 makes changes to the legislation that empower the sector regulators to exercise their concurrent competition powers so that they are under an equivalent duty when they do so. The new duty will require the CMA to have regard to the need for making a decision, or taking action, as soon as is reasonably practicable. It will apply to casework functions and decision making, but will exclude auxiliary functions such as the publication of guidance.
The impact of the new duty of expedition will vary on a case-by-case basis. For example, if a business asks for repeated extensions to deadlines for providing information, the duty will bolster the CMA’s ability to move the investigation along. The CMA will need to continue to ensure fair process and make evidence-based robust decisions. Parties will continue to have a right to appeal against decisions made by the CMA.
The Minister has outlined the detail of the clause. Again, I will keep my remarks brief. Clause 310 would insert a new schedule into the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 to provide for a statutory duty of expedition in relation to specified CMA competition, consumer law and digital markets functions. The new provisions expand and replace the duty that previously applied in relation to the CMA’s functions. A new provision inserted by the clause specifies that, in making any decision or taking any action for the purposes of any of its functions within the new schedule, the CMA must have regard to the need to do so as soon as is reasonably practicable. That obligation would apply to all steps of the relevant investigatory, regulatory or enforcement process. The clause also introduces schedule 26, which imposes a duty of expedition on sectoral regulators in respect of their competition functions that are exercisable concurrently with the CMA. We support the schedule.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 310 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 26 agreed to.
Clause 311
Interpretation
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
We have no further comments, Chair.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 316 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 317 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
New Clause 1
Decision not to make final offer order
“(1) The CMA may decide not to make a final offer order in relation to the transaction where it has reasonable grounds to believe that there has been a material change of circumstances since the final offer initiation notice was given.
(2) For the purposes of this section and section 42(3) a material change of circumstances includes an agreement between the designated undertaking and the third party with respect to terms as to payment in relation to the transaction.
(3) Where the CMA decides not to make a final offer order, it must give a notice to that effect to the designated undertaking and the third party.
(4) The notice must include the reasonable grounds referred to in subsection (1).
(5) As soon as reasonably practicable after giving a notice under subsection (3), the CMA must publish a statement summarising the contents of the notice.”—(Kevin Hollinrake.)
This new clause, together with Amendment 10, ensures that the CMA can end the final offer mechanism without making a final offer order at any time after giving a final offer initiation notice. It would appear after clause 41.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 8
Limit on secondary ticketing
“(1) The Consumer Rights Act 2015 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 91 (prohibition on cancellation or blacklisting) insert—
‘91A Limit on secondary ticketing
(1) This section applies where a person (‘the seller’) re-sells a ticket for a recreational, sporting or cultural event in the United Kingdom through a secondary ticketing facility.
(2) The operator of the facility must—
(a) identify the maximum number of tickets available for a consumer to buy from the primary market for any event for which tickets are being re-sold through their facility; and
(b) check that the seller has not bought more tickets than they are permitted to buy as set out in subsection (2)(a) with the intention to re-sell, unless the seller provides proof that they have bought more tickets than they are permitted to buy from the primary market with the consent of the event organiser.
(3) The operator of the facility must not allow the seller or any associate of the seller to list more tickets for an event than can be bought by a consumer through the primary market.
(4) If the operator breaches its duties in subsections (2) and (3), they are jointly liable with the seller for enforcement action against them as set out in section 93’”.—(Seema Malhotra.)
This new clause would amend the Consumer Rights Act 2015 to introduce provisions banning sellers on secondary ticketing sites from selling more tickets than can be bought by consumers on the primary market.
Brought up, and read the First time.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 9—Secondary Ticketing: duty to verify seller’s details—
“The Consumer Rights Act 2015 is amended as follows—
‘After section 90 insert—
‘90A 90A Duty to verify seller’s details
(1) The operator must—
(a) obtain from any seller using their facility the information set out in subsection (2), and
(b) verify that information.
(2) That information is—
(a) proof that the seller owns the ticket they are intending to sell through the facility,
(b) proof that the information specified in section 90(3) is accurate; and,
(c) the seller’s address.
(3) If the operator breaches the duty under subsection (2), the operator is jointly liable with the seller for enforcement action against them as set out in section 93.’’”
This new clause amends the Consumer Rights Act 2015 to impose a duty on secondary ticketing platforms to verify further details from sellers using their platform.
New clause 10—Secondary ticketing regulation: reporting requirement—
“(1) The Secretary of State must—
(a) prepare a report on the merits of introducing a new regulatory function for regulating the secondary ticketing sector; and,
(b) lay a copy of this report before parliament.
(2) The report must include consideration of the recommendation to introduce a new regulatory function to the secondary ticketing sector as set out in the CMA’s ‘Secondary Ticketing’ report published in August 2021.
(3) The report must be laid within the period of 12 months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed.”
This new clause would introduce a reporting requirement on the Secretary of State to produce a report on the merits of introducing a new regulatory function in the secondary ticketing sector, as recommended by the CMA in their August 2021 ‘Secondary Ticketing’ report.
These new clauses all relate to the secondary ticketing market. In particular, they aim to further regulate the market in order to protect consumers in a sector where they are all too often left to fend for themselves. I do not plan to press these new clauses to a vote today, but I do want to speak to them. The Minister’s response will determine how we choose to move forward on Report or in further stages, because this is an important issue.
New clause 8 would amend the Consumer Rights Act 2015 to introduce provisions banning sellers on secondary ticketing sites from selling from more tickets than can be bought by consumers on the primary market. That is a direct recommendation from the CMA’s August 2021 “Secondary ticketing” report. The intent is simple: it would filter out sellers who have obtained tickets through the use of illegal bots with the intention to sell them on at a significantly inflated price. It would also reduce the risk of consumers being sold fake tickets.
New clause 9 would amend the Consumer Rights Act 2015 to impose a duty on secondary ticketing platforms to verify details from the sellers who use them. That would make it harder for bad actors who intend to scam or rip off consumers to use secondary ticketing platforms, as it would be far easier to track their details. That is also a direct recommendation from the CMA’s 2021 report. New clause 10 would introduce a requirement on the Secretary of State to produce a report on the merits of introducing a new regulatory function in the secondary ticketing sector, as recommended by the CMA in its report.
I will take a step back from the specifics of the new clauses to briefly address the broader picture of the secondary ticketing market, where consumers are continually ripped off or put at risk of falling victim to a scam. I am sure that many Committee members, and those who may be watching our proceedings, will have either had their own experiences or heard of constituents being ripped off or scammed for tickets to musical or sporting events. That is not to say that every person who resells on the secondary ticketing market is attempting to scam or rip off consumers—far from it. However, the Minister will know that when those scams and rip-offs occur, there is little in the way of enforcement against either the seller or the platforms that host and legitimise them.
The CMA’s 2021 report helpfully outlined the major areas of concern in the current secondary ticketing market. It said:
“We are concerned that some approaches used by professional resellers to buy up tickets may be illegal – involving committing fraud and/or breaching legislation introduced to prevent the bulk purchase of tickets using computer bots...Such illegal activity will reduce the number of tickets available at face value on the primary market – and increase the number of tickets advertised through secondary ticket platforms at significantly higher prices. The CMA often receives complaints about these practices but does not have the powers to tackle them.”
It went on to say:
“We are concerned that professional resellers may be i) speculatively advertising tickets that they do not own and ii) advertising tickets with inaccurate information about the ticket or the seller’s identity, which sellers are required to provide, by law, when listing tickets for sale. The CMA’s recent enforcement cases required viagogo and StubHub to put in place certain safeguards to ensure key information was gathered and displayed to consumers and that where such information was being displayed inaccurately this could be addressed. However, even if platforms comply in full with these obligations, speculative listings and inaccurate information may still appear if the resellers do not provide correct information to the platforms about themselves and/or the tickets they are listing.”
In each of those cases, there is a clear risk of consumer detriment, through being scammed or ripped off. As a result, the CMA in the same report made a series of recommendations to Government that would enable more robust enforcement in the sector. But shortly before the Bill was introduced, the Minister wrote to the CMA, stating that the Government would not adopt its recommendations. Specifically, and as part of what seems to be the quite weak rationale by the Government for not adopting those proposals, there was the suggestion that the conviction of just two ticket touts three years ago acts as a robust enough deterrent to bad actors. That seems more like the Government kicking the can down the road and failing to act in the interests of consumers, which was so powerfully highlighted by my hon. Friend the Member for Washington and Sunderland West (Mrs Hodgson) on Second Reading.
I urge the Government to consider seriously these new clauses. This need not be party political; in fact, it is far from that. They are direct recommendations from the CMA, given the work that it has done and that it does. It is a regulator whose judgment we all clearly and rightly value, considering the increased powers—and expectations for its work—granted in the Bill. The new clauses are cost free and would significantly increase the protections available to consumers using the secondary ticketing market in the UK—they would dramatically increase protections for all consumers. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Two of these new clauses seek to add further regulation on secondary ticketing and platforms. The third would provide for a report on the introduction of a new regulatory function for the secondary ticketing market, to be prepared within 12 months of the Bill receiving Royal Assent. I thank the hon. Member for these new clauses. I am also grateful for the work of her colleague, the hon. Member for Washington and Sunderland West, who has worked so hard in this space.
The new clauses reflect the recommendations made by the CMA in its secondary ticketing report from 2021, as the hon. Member for Feltham and Heston said. She also referred to our position, which we set out on 10 May 2023. At this point, it is too early, we believe, to bring forward further regulation on secondary ticketing.
One overarching point that I think it is fair to make here is that we should all encourage the primary market to do more to inhibit touting and report breaches of existing law. If anybody went to Glastonbury recently, they would have found great difficulty in—in fact, the impossibility of—selling on tickets, because they are limited to the person who bought the tickets in the first place, so it is clear that primary markets can do more to clamp down on secondary ticketing malpractice where it exists.
The Bill, under part 3, will itself give more powers to the CMA and other public enforcers to enforce existing consumer protection law, which includes legislation applicable to the secondary tickets sector. The shadow Minister referred to good work that is going on in this area, including existing laws. As she said, the National Trading Standards eCrime Team successfully prosecuted two ticket touts for fraud and consumer law breaches. They received prison sentences of four years and two and a half years and were subject to a £6.2 million confiscation order. Despite the imposition of additional regulation by the Breaching of Limits on Ticket Sales Regulations 2018, it is those general consumer protection law powers that the regulators have tended to use most effectively.
New clause 8 would make the platform liable where the number of tickets resold on a platform by an individual seller exceeded the maximum set by the event organiser in the primary market. It is already an offence to use automated software to buy more tickets for events than permitted, with a view to financial gain. If the rules are applied, there should be no need for further action on the secondary market, such as that proposed. However, we will work with the CMA to monitor the market and technological developments to assess whether the measure is both practical and necessary.
New clause 9 seeks to put a strict obligation on a secondary ticketing facility to verify certain information provided to it by a seller. The CMA acknowledges that placing a strict liability on platforms in this way would be an unprecedented step. Moreover, thanks to previous enforcement work of the CMA and others in the secondary ticketing market, choices and associated costs are more transparent than they were five years ago. Therefore, it is not clear to me that the proposal would amount to proportionate regulation.
I thank the Minister for his response. I think his overall message is that the existing legislation is enough and is proportionate. I take on board that he will keep it under review. He will know that there are different views on whether the regulations are enough, and it will be important to do further work with stakeholders on this. If there are ways that existing regulations can be used further to deal with at least some of the challenges, we would obviously all want to see that.
The principle of not having regulation that we do not need if it can be dealt with by existing regulation is an important one that we all share. I think the question is whether it is enough, because currently the story suggests that it is not. However, I will not press the new clause to a vote today. We reserve the right to bring it back on Report, by which time we will have had further discussions with stakeholders on this. I hope it will be an issue on which we can move forward with the Government if we can demonstrate that there is a need to do more. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
I gently remind the Committee that we have a hard stop at 11.25 am.
New Clause 11
Annual Report on Operation of CMA Functions Under Parts 2 and 3
“(1) The CMA must, within 12 months of this Act being passed and every 12 months thereafter, prepare a report on—
(a) the effectiveness of the operation of the CMA’s functions under Parts 2 and 3,
(b) the impact of the operation of those functions on maintaining competition in digital markets, and
(c) the impact of the operation of those functions on the enforcement of consumer protection law.
(2) The CMA must arrange for a copy of the report prepared under subsection (1) to be laid before each House of Parliament
(3) This new clause would introduce an annual reporting requirement on the CMA to report to Parliament on the operation of their functions under Parts 2 and 3 of the Act.”—(Seema Malhotra.)
This new clause would introduce an annual reporting requirement on the CMA to report to Parliament on the operation of their functions under Parts 2 and 3 of the Act.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 11 would introduce an annual reporting requirement on the CMA to report to Parliament on the operation of their functions under parts 2 and 3 of the Act, complementing the new clause debated earlier in Committee that would have introduced such a report in relation to part 1 of the Bill. Specifically, the report under new clause 11 would need to include the effectiveness of the operation of the CMA’s functions under parts 2 and 3 and the impact of the operation of those functions on maintaining competition in digital markets and on the enforcement of consumer protection law.
The report would have to be laid before both Houses of Parliament and be produced annually. The core principles behind the new clause—principles I would hope the Minister agrees with—are transparency and scrutiny. The legislation rightly confers significant powers on various regulatory bodies in the UK, not least the CMA. However, to ensure those powers are used as effectively and as fairly as possible, Parliament must be able to fully scrutinise their use and effectiveness in achieving their aims.
There is also the question of where the report goes and who scrutinises it on behalf of Parliament and the public. While I appreciate and recognise that the CMA will have frequent communication and contact with various Departments and Secretaries of State, opportunities for scrutiny are more disparate. With the former Regulatory Reform Committee being subsumed by the Business and Trade Committee, much of the opportunity for scrutiny is supposed to lie there. However, House of Commons Library research highlights that in the past five years, the CMA has appeared before the Committee just five times, and three times since 2021. The CMA does an incredibly significant job in our economy. While an average of one Select Committee appearance a year is appreciated, with the new functions granted by the Bill, one cannot help but feel that the oversight and scrutiny need to become more frequent and detailed to ensure parliamentarians and the public are as informed of the CMA’s work as possible.
I note the Regulatory Reform Group, made up of MPs from the Minister’s own party, has recently called for a cross-party Committee to oversee the performance of regulators and to offer a systematic appraisal of the UK’s regulators that cover key economic sectors. Its members are not the only ones concerned by the overall lack of transparency and scrutiny of the performance of regulators and competition authorities. There is a need for better mechanisms to allow issues to be identified earlier and reforms to be made.
Clearly, there is appetite in Parliament for further scrutiny of our regulators, not least the CMA. That is not to criticise the regulators in any way, but it is a reflection of their increased importance, our increased responsibility and the growing impact of their work in a digital economy, subject to that greater scrutiny. As a result, I hope the Minister agrees that parliamentary scrutiny of the kind that the new clause would provide is important for the effective operation of this new regulatory regime. I urge him to consider supporting the new clause—I know he has been sympathetic to similar clauses in earlier parts of the Bill—so that we see reports and discussion on the scrutiny measures of this House.
I wholeheartedly agree that the CMA should be firmly accountable to Parliament across its digital competition and consumer functions. However, that is already the case. The CMA is already required to present an annual report to Parliament. That includes a survey of developments relating to its functions, assessments of its performance against its objectives and enforcement activity, and a summary of key decisions and financial expenditure. The CEO and chair of the CMA regularly appear before the relevant Select Committee—five times as the hon. Member said. Most recently, they appeared before the House of Lords Communications and Digital Committee. Indeed, they meet me on a regular basis, and we also provide an annual strategy steer.
In relation to the CMA’s new consumer direct enforcement functions under part 3 of the Bill, clause 193 gives the Secretary of State the power to request a report from the CMA from time to time on the effectiveness of interventions. Such a report must also be published by the CMA, so that it is available to parliamentarians and the public. I noted her points on the Regulatory Reform Group. I met Lord Tyrie and my hon. Friend the Member for Hitchin and Harpenden (Bim Afolami). They made some interesting points, which I am sure the wider House will have heard. These matters should be kept under review, but for these reasons, I hope the hon. Lady will withdraw the new clause.
I thank the Minister for his remarks. New clause 11 was inspired by new clauses with a similar purpose in the United Kingdom Internal Market Act 2020, so there is an important precedent. I will not press the new clause to a vote, but we will keep the matter under review. I take this opportunity to thank all the Clerks who have been involved in the Committee. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
On a point of order, Dame Maria. I put on the record my thanks to all the Clerks and the many people who worked on the Bill, including all the officials and my private office, for doing a tremendous job. I thank Opposition Members for their constructive dialogue.