Proposed Chinese Embassy

Sarah Champion Excerpts

Monday 19th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Sarah Champion (Rotherham) (Lab)]

(Urgent Question): To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs if she will make a statement on representations made to Five Eyes partners on the potential risks posed by the proximity of sensitive cabling infrastructure to the site of the proposed new Chinese embassy.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs (Seema Malhotra)]

I thank my hon. Friend for her question, and I am grateful for the opportunity to respond to it. She will know that discussions with Five Eyes partners relating to domestic security matters are primarily a responsibility for the Home Office. The decision on planning permission for the proposed Chinese embassy at Royal Mint Court rests solely with the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government in his quasi-judicial capacity. He has set 20 January as the target date for his decision, and I am sure my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham will agree that it would not be appropriate for me to cut across that process.

I appreciate that there has been significant interest in our engagement with allies and partners on this matter. As my hon. Friend knows, we never comment on conversations with allies regarding intelligence matters. I can nevertheless reassure her and the House that we continue to work closely with our Five Eyes partners and other like-minded countries on a wide range of issues, including those pertaining to domestic security. These partnerships are essential for our shared security.

We have been consistently clear that national security is the first duty of Government, and it has been our core priority throughout the embassy process, with the close involvement of the security and intelligence agencies. Our intelligence services have been involved throughout, and a range of measures have been developed and are being implemented to protect national security. The Home Secretary and Foreign Secretary also publicly identified two issues: the consolidation of China’s diplomatic estate in London and public access. Those require resolution before a decision could be made. In November, they wrote to confirm that appropriate resolutions to those issues had been reached. As the director general of MI5 commented last month, our security services have over a century of experience of managing the risks that arise from foreign embassies on UK soil, and I have full confidence in their ability to do so effectively.

[Sarah Champion]

I hear what the Minister has said, but I am not reassured and neither are our partners. We have now had interventions from the Dutch Government, the Swiss Parliament, and the Swedish Parliament, and we have had two interventions from the White House on the risks posed to UK infrastructure by the cabling that runs along Royal Mint Court. Last year, a Minister said that reports regarding the cables were inaccurate. Does the Minister still believe that to be the case? I understand that we are now briefing Five Eye partners that

“no sensitive government data is transmitted through cables”.

Would the Minister confirm that? Surely, that line is a tacit admission that financial services based in London could be affected by Chinese proximity.

Minister, what were the mitigations that MI5 and MI6 suggested to avoid espionage risks, and will their implementation be conditional for planning approval? I remind the House that the US has confirmed three major infrastructure hacks in the past 18 months, while we have faced hacks on the Electoral Commission, the Foreign Office and parliamentarians, to name just a few. A Chinese mega-embassy in the heart of London is an issue of national significance, not purely a planning issue as the Government try to present it. Combined with the heightened risk to dissidents, campaigners and the wider public, is this really a risk we should be taking? Can the Minister offer reassurance to my British Hong Kong constituents that transnational repression will not increase if this mega-embassy is approved? Once planning permission is given, we cannot take it back; we will have lost control. I know I speak for colleagues across the House and the wider country, because they have contacted me, when I say that this is not a risk we can afford to take and the Government should refuse this disastrous plan tomorrow.

[Seema Malhotra]

I thank my hon. Friend for her remarks. I reiterate that our intelligence services have been involved throughout. A range of measures have been developed and are being implemented to protect national security. She will also know that the Government are still to make a decision. That planning decision will be made independently by Ministers from the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government on planning grounds.

It is also important to recognise that we have set clear red lines through this process. That has included, for example, the consolidation of the diplomatic presence of China from seven buildings to one, which will have security benefits. It is also important to say that we do routinely engage with our allies, including the US, which is our closest ally, on a range of issues, including security and intelligence in relation to China. It is important to recognise that we do that routinely and that it is important to discuss national security factors that we may consider.

My hon. Friend referred to transnational repression. She will know that the UK Government will not tolerate any attempts by foreign Governments to coerce, intimidate, harass or harm their critics overseas, especially in the UK. We continually assess potential threats in the UK, and we take the protection of individuals’ rights, freedoms and safety very seriously.