(12 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberAs my hon. Friend will know, it has always been the case that a dead person’s estate cannot sue for defamation. It is worth the Public Bill Committee considering the issue of deceased people’s reputations and the injury that defamation causes to their family. I am not sure whether the Joint Committee did so. However, there are very good reasons why a deceased person’s estate has never been able to sue for defamation.
I want to take the point that the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Steve Rotheram) made slightly further. The right hon. Gentleman must be aware of the amount of intimidation of ordinary people on the internet, particularly schoolchildren. There are tweets that lead young people to feel so devalued that they attempt to take their own lives. I do not want to exaggerate the situation, but that is becoming a more regular occurrence. Something has to be seen to be done so that “trolls”, as Members have described them, are stopped in their tracks from hurting people to such a degree that they attempt to take their own lives.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for raising that concern. I am afraid that many colleagues will be familiar with the type of bullying, harassment and intimidation that he talks about, which ultimately leads to people considering taking their own lives. When the Government drafted the Bill, they were keen to address a void that has not previously been filled. Clause 5 will allow websites to have action taken against them, but websites will be given greater protection from being sued if they help to identify those posting defamatory messages. It is hoped that that will lead to greater responsibility among both those who operate websites and those who post messages. People will know that they when they put a post on a website, it is possible that their details will be passed on to a potential claimant bringing an action.
The hon. Gentleman is probably right, but as we have not seen the regulations—they have probably not been drafted—I am not sure. I commend him for his work on this. He has been involved in this issue since he was first elected, as have many colleagues on both sides of the House.
As has been said, many proposals in the Bill, including clause 5, will be introduced by regulations, probably via a negative resolution of the House, meaning, as I have just said, that we are in the dark on exactly how the measure will operate in practice; how a website operator is expected to respond, which was the point raised by the hon. Gentleman; and what protections are given to whistleblowers. For the sake of proper parliamentary scrutiny, it is imperative that the Government publish their regulations before Committee and subject resolutions to the positive procedure. That will allow Parliament properly to consider detailed plans that will have huge impacts on the operation of the Bill and defamation procedures.
Clause 6 creates a new defence of qualified privilege on peer-reviewed material in scientific or academic journals. We welcome the adoption of that recommendation from the Joint Committee.
Clause 8 introduces a single publication rule so that the one-year limitation period in which libel action can be brought will run from the date of the first publication of material, even if the same article is subsequently published on a website on a later date. The reform intends to end the current situation in which material in online archives is regarded as being re-published every time it is downloaded, which, in effect, leaves the archive operator with a limitless risk of being sued.
The Opposition also welcome clause 9, which seeks to deter those eyeing London as a location to pursue libel actions that they would not dream of pursuing in other jurisdictions. In recent years, our courts have clamped down on libel tourism, and I hope the measure, which gives courts more power to decide whether a case can be heard, will help. We need to reduce the potential for trivial claims and address the perception that English courts are an attractive forum for libel claimants with little connection to this country. We welcome steps to tighten the test to be applied by the courts in relation to actions brought against people who are not domiciled in the UK. I am, however, concerned about cases brought by EU citizens or in a state that is, for the time being, a contracting party to the Lugano convention.
This is a minor point about libel tourism, but if the law does not apply to the jurisdiction of Northern Ireland, those who would be precluded from taking an action and seeking a remedy in England could do so in Northern Ireland. Therefore, there needs to be consultation across the jurisdictions of the UK to get this right and tie it up completely.
I am sure that the Justice Secretary has heard the hon. Gentleman’s intervention and will take on board the point he has made.
It is not clear either whether high-profile cases, such as that of Dr Peter Wilmshurst, to which the Chair of the Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport referred, or that of Rachel Ehrenfeld, would have been prevented if clause 9 had been in place at the time. If the Justice Secretary or the Minister winding up the debate cannot address this issue, it will need to be looked at further in Committee.
Clause 11 removes the presumption in favour of jury trials in defamation cases. Although this reversal will, we hope, help to reduce costs and improve clarity, there is a danger in restricting jury trials, particularly where the key issue is who is telling the truth. However, the Bill still gives the court the discretion to order a jury trial where it considers that to be appropriate, which is an important safeguard. I note the comments made by the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis), and we expect that the Committee might want to explore the criteria for the judge to consider when deciding whether a jury trial should be ordered.