Out-of-Turn Supplementary Estimates 2022-23

Baroness Winterton of Doncaster Excerpts

Monday 24th October 2022 Commons Chamber

[Andrew Griffith]

I defer to my right hon. Friend on all matters economic, but he is absolutely right that the Government had to act and come forward with an estimate, and that global gas and energy prices are volatile. We are proceeding on the basis of a particular set of assumptions, but if those things change, of course we will return to the House with an update.

The second departmental request relates to capital funding for the Bank of England. Since 2009, the asset purchase facility, a subsidiary entity of the Bank of England, has been a policy tool of the independent Monetary Policy Committee. The APF supported the MPC’s objective of stimulating the economy to try to keep inflation at its 2% target. By far the largest element of the APF was so-called quantitative easing, under which the Bank of England has purchased to date a total of £856 billion-worth of gilts and corporate bonds. The Treasury rightly indemnifies the APF and the Bank against any losses from those authorised operations.

In 2012, the Bank and the Treasury agreed that it would be prudent for cash management purposes that any excess cash in the APF would be transferred to HMT at the end of each quarter and that if there were a deficit, the cash would be transferred in the other direction. To date, the APF has regularly transferred cash to the Treasury. In February, however, the MPC announced that it would start unwinding QE, initially by not reinvesting redemption proceeds. Further, on 21 September, the MPC announced its decision to unwind £80 billion of its stock of gilts acquired under QE over a 12-month period, including through a programme of active gilts sales that are due to start soon.

Accompanied by the recent rise in the Bank rate, that means that the overall net position has altered from one of receiving cash over the past 10 years to having to pay out under the indemnity. The outflows requested today are therefore the counterpart of previous receipts in the life cycle of the scheme. The eventual size of the net payments to or from His Majesty’s Treasury should not be used as a measure of the success of asset purchases or of the impact of the schemes on the public purse as a whole. The schemes should instead be judged by the degree to which they meet their objectives for monetary policy and financial stability. I should point out to the House that the value of these payments is difficult to predict. Future market prices and the Bank rate will impact on the amounts required, and the Bank of England MPC decision on sales may itself change over time. Any adjustment in the payments, either up or down, will be reflected in the Treasury’s usual requests in future main or supplementary estimates in the normal way.

Given all that, this is an important motion for the continuation of Government business, and I commend it to the House.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

I call the shadow Minister.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

I am glad the Minister agreed that the £60 billion for the energy scheme will of course adjust according to market prices, and let us hope that the current downward trend in some of the gas prices is continued. We need a mild winter and other bits of good fortune, otherwise we could be back facing even bigger bills. I am sure we are all appreciative of the fact that the new Chancellor wishes to review the scheme after March, because this is a very expensive scheme and there may be better ways of doing it to contain the expenditure.

I hope, for example, that consideration will be given, where price controls are still being offered to consumers, to limiting the amount of subsidised fuel any household can buy to a reasonable amount for a normal household, so that those who are in richer households and making much bigger demands on the fuel system would pay for the additional fuel they need—if they are lucky enough to have a heated swimming pool, or whatever it is—and would pay the full price on the extra fuel that such luxuries require. That is offered as a hopeful idea of how one can start to grapple with the very high costs of this scheme without in any way undermining the crucial guarantee to all those who are struggling with their bills already and want this kind of security.

I also have some concerns about the Bank of England estimate. It is quite true that, from Chancellor Darling onwards, quantitative easing decisions have always been jointly taken by Chancellors of the Exchequer and Governors of the Bank of England. One of the main reasons why they have always been joint decisions is that the Bank of England always understandably insisted on a complete capital guarantee against losses on the bonds, because it was envisaging buying so many bonds that they became very big for the Bank of England balance sheet, and it wanted to be reassured that the Treasury and taxpayers stood behind the system in case of losses.

To the extent that this supplementary estimate is to make good losses on bonds that the Bank of England is selling, I have these questions. First, why does the Bank of England think it must sell bonds at this juncture, when the United Kingdom bond market, the American bond market and lots of other bond markets around the world are particularly depressed by the need for a counter-inflation strategy based on high interest rates? We are crystalising a loss that, as I understand it, the Treasury then has to pay for, whereas if we have an unrealised loss, no payments are of course needed until eventual redemption, and very often the redemption value of the bond is considerably higher than today’s price in the market. I cannot quite understand why the Bank needs to sell these bonds now, and as this has always been a joint policy in which Chancellors have been very heavily involved and have heard Bank of England advice—Chancellors had to sign it off because the taxpayer is at risk, not the Bank of England itself—I hope this will be carefully re-examined.

To those who say that we do need to be selling bonds as well as putting up interest rates to curb inflation, I would say they should be careful not to overdo it. If the Bank really does feel it has to tighten even more, it can do so by a further rise in interest rates; it does not have to do so by selling bonds. Very directly, as we see tonight, the sale of these bonds can realise a loss and then can trigger a cash requirement on taxpayers and the Treasury at an extremely bad time for such a cash requirement. I think all of us have much better priorities than paying for bonds that are underwater, when we see the current state of the economy and the need to route more money to individuals and companies in the right ways, to see off a longer and deeper downturn and provide some balance in the public accounts. I ask the Minister and Chancellor to think again, and to talk again to the Governor of the Bank of England about their joint responsibility. They must ask whether this is really the right time to be crystalising losses, resulting in unspecified amounts of money that will have to be paid.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

I call the SNP spokesperson, Alison Thewliss.