Nuclear Safeguards Bill (Sixth sitting)

Debate between Robert Syms and Alan Whitehead

Committee Debate: 6th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 14th November 2017 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Whitehead]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause refers to the possibility of seeking a transition period prior to the UK leaving Euratom of not less than two years. It states that during that transition period,

“conditions under which the UK is a member of EURATOM before exit day shall continue to apply…obligations upon the UK which derive from membership of EURATOM before exit day shall continue to apply…structures for UK participation in EURATOM that are in place before exit day shall be maintained”—

and most importantly—

“financial commitment to EURATOM made by the UK during the course of UK membership of EURATOM before exit day shall be honoured.”

Nothing in the new clause suggests that we shall be members of Euratom in perpetuity.

[Sir Robert Syms (Poole) (Con)]

As I understand it, the hon. Gentleman is suggesting that we continue to be a member of Euratom for two years, during which time we would presumably continue to pay our contribution, while at the same time employing inspectors in the UK— we are actually trying to recruit people at the moment. Would it not impose additional costs on the industry if we are both recruiting inspectors and staying in Euratom? Is that not double jeopardy?

Nuclear Safeguards Bill (Fourth sitting)

Debate between Robert Syms and Alan Whitehead

Committee Debate: 4th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 2nd November 2017 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Whitehead]

That is absolutely right; that is the process by which the Bill comes into place, and that is the whole intent behind the trajectory of the Bill and the discussions ahead of it.

[Sir Robert Syms (Poole) (Con)]

Getting an agreement with Euratom might well be one of the easier things, but it will get caught up in all the other negotiations, which means the EU might not say yes until the other things are considered. Even if there is an agreement before March 2019, it might not be ratified by the EU for some months—perhaps years—because the whole process could take a while. That leaves a gap in which we need a regime that the world has confidence in, so that we can continue to have a nuclear industry. If we simply put our eggs in one basket by waiting for an agreement with Euratom, the risk is that we will be sitting around, unable to import, export or employ people. This is simply the Government’s straightforward backstop position, which I think is sensible.

[Dr Whitehead]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention, but I cannot help feeling that there is some degree of misunderstanding going on here, for two reasons. First, it is not the case, and never has been, that the Opposition understand the process of moving from Euratom to our own arrangements—parallel to, and as close as possible to, Euratom—as involving any gap at all. Clearly, we need to have a regime in place to deal with whatever contingent circumstances take place; we are completely at one with the Government on that. We do not know exactly what those circumstances will be, so we need to be ahead of the game and have those contingent arrangements in place. Everybody, on both sides of the Committee, is in complete agreement on that point.

Secondly, however, it is not necessarily the case that the close association that we might want to seek will get embroiled in the rest of the EU withdrawal negotiations, because the Euratom treaty is separate from the EU treaty. Even if one considers them to be conjoined, it is more than possible—in fact, highly probable—that the actual negotiations will proceed on the basis of those two separate treaty arrangements, and therefore will not get entangled in those overall negotiations.

We are seeking clarity on what those arrangements might be; arrangements that would not stop the Bill from happening but might be there in place of the Bill, circumstances permitting. One builds the house and the roof hoping that it will not rain—at least not while one is still building—but clearly one has to proceed in all circumstances. That seems to me to be essentially what we are doing today in Committee. It is a separate point from what we might to seek to achieve in terms of our future relationship with Euratom, and that is what the amendments are about.

To end the suspense for the Committee, if it is still wide enough awake to be in suspense—I am sorry if I have gone on for rather a long time on this point—we particularly want to press for the purpose clause, because we think that would clarify a number of the other intentions. I understand that the new clause has essentially been moved up in the order of consideration and is being debated today, but nevertheless as a new clause it will be voted on at the end of our proceedings, so it is not a question of asking whether we want a Division on it, because that will not happen this afternoon. The new clause has been moved into this debate, absolutely rightly, and has served its purpose well in framing the debate in the proper place; and because the amendments are contingent, in effect, on that clause, it is not our intention to divide the Committee on those individual measures this afternoon. However, depending on what happens with the vote on the purpose clause at the end, it is conceivable that we would return to them on Report. However, for this afternoon’s purposes, we do not intend to divide the Committee. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Energy Bill

Debate between Robert Syms and Alan Whitehead

Wednesday 4th December 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Syms]

Absolutely. At the end of the day, we must have the capacity to generate for what people want. We can make savings with insulation and things that we do with electrical equipment. We can do an awful lot to save energy, which will take care of some of the demand. However, with a growing, successful economy—there is every reason to look at the British economy with great optimism—I suspect that we will need more capacity. Not only do we need plans for investment; we need people breaking the ground and building these things, so that they can provide for what we want.

I have reservations about the amendment. I know that people talk about 2021 or 2023, but that will come very quickly, so although the investment and capacity might not come that quickly, my general view is that we should be a little cautious about the Lords adding more constraints, costs and limits on an important source of power at this point.

[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

I am a little bemused by some of the talk that we are hearing this afternoon about the capacity crunch and the extent to which the amendment might exacerbate it over the next period, bearing in mind, first, that it would not take effect until after 2023 in any event and, secondly—this has perhaps gone rather unremarked—that the power plants that are not producing and that are offline and either light mothballed or deep mothballed are not coal-fired but gas-fired plants. About six of them are mothballed—even though those operators could operate perfectly efficient gas plants for their own operations—not because they cannot produce on a reasonable basis, but because of the spark spread for gas and electricity prices. Therefore, it is not a capacity crunch because there is no capacity; it is a capacity crunch, potentially, because of the way that plants operate relative to each other.

Nothing in the long-term prognosis has changed, in terms of what we have to do in the longer term or how we have to deploy capacity. Getting the right amount of capacity and the right amount of reserve capacity in the market is a combination of ensuring that capacity is properly utilised and that new capacity comes on stream in the right proportion to support the changing nature of our energy production market. As regards that progress over the next period, up to 2030, one of the remarkable things written in most DECC documents to come out on the matter concerns where we need to go in decarbonising our energy supplies.

DECC’s central target is an overall level of emissions of 100g per kWh by about 2030. Everyone knows what that means. Unless we hear this afternoon that the target has changed, there will no longer be room for large amounts of unabated coal to continue to operate in the system, whether in new, existing or refurbished plant, without carbon capture and storage in the period leading up to 2030.

There is currently a disjunction between what DECC says about its target and what the policy appears to suggest when it comes to whether those coal plants will become able to play a part in our future energy mix with carbon capture and storage, or will no longer play a role as base-load generators but either convert to other forms of supply—as Drax is doing in moving to biomass—or run at much lower levels, as peak and back-up plant, over a period, to keep within the overall targets. The amendment connects what we think that we are doing with what we ought really to be doing over the coming period and starts to dissolve the disjunction between what we think is in policy and what appears to be in policy.

One of the effects of uncertain signals about the direction in which we are going in respect of, for instance, decarbonisation targets is that people do not invest in one thing rather than another; they do not invest in anything. They do not do what they might otherwise have been doing, because they are not sure what the signals are telling them. I believe that the amendment gives a certain rather than an uncertain signal in regard to the long-term future of coal, thus enabling those who are thinking of investing in coal over the coming period to be clear about what to do, rather than unclear, as they are at present.

Ministers seem to be saying today that there will be much more operation of coal, and perhaps some new investment in coal, but they know that it cannot really be unabated, and they know that it cannot really operate for all those hours over the period. How certain can an investor be that what he invests in will not to be stranded in the intervening years? It depends whether we believe what Ministers are saying, or believe what is in the documents that they claim to support in their daily work at the Department.