Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Robert Neill Excerpts

Consideration of Lords amendments & Ping Pong & Ping Pong: House of Commons
Wednesday 27th January 2021 Commons Chamber

We will support the amendments, but we do not support the Bill. Very real concerns remain in Scotland, and indeed across the four nations, that this Bill could be used to suppress dissent. That is not part of Scotland’s enlightenment tradition, and we will not see it done in Scotland’s name. The Scottish Parliament has withheld its consent, and in so far as the current litigation requires changes to the law of Scotland, we will deal with that ourselves in our own Parliament.

[Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con) [V]]

This is a very important Bill, not least because it touches on that really difficult balance that we often have to struggle with—perhaps not to this degree very often, in a democracy—between keeping the nation and our fellow citizens safe and our commitment to the rule of law. There are rare occasions when those can rub up against each other, sometimes uneasily, but whenever possible, I think we would all agree, the rule of law ought to be as paramount as it can be, subject to that duty to protect our citizens and our national interests. So are there ways in which we can reconcile this?

Can I, too, refer to my good and personal friend and constituency next-door neighbour, my right hon. Friend the Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (James Brokenshire), and wish him well? I think the consensual and constructive approach that he adopted has done a great deal to smooth the passage of this Bill through potentially difficult matters.

I welcome the approach that the Solicitor General adopted in his opening speech, but can I perhaps press him on one or two matters precisely from the rule of law point of view? I would not seek to trespass on some of the expertise of others in relation to operational matters of the security services. I do not think anyone would wish to make life harder for those brave men and women who put their lives at risk to protect ourselves, and sometimes have to authorise operations that otherwise we might find unpalatable. I recognise that, but there are still rule of law issues that I think need to be addressed and ventilated. They were in the upper place, and we need at least to pay attention to them here.

In relation to Lords amendment 1, I hear what the Solicitor General says, but I am struggling at the moment to see why it is convincing to say that it is not reasonable to have, as the shadow Minister said, a reasonableness test. One would have thought that it was logical, if we are to have a statutory scheme, that that scheme should set out what the test shall be. By and large, I would have thought that an objective test, of a high but well-established standard, would be sensible and potentially a safeguard for operatives should their use of the test subsequently be challenged.

I note and understand the Solicitor General’s point about the potential inconsistency with the terms of different parts of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, but as Lord Anderson of Ipswich and Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd pointed out in the other place—both highly experienced lawyers and people with experience in sensitive matters—there is potentially a greater inconsistency between the wording in the Bill, and therefore potentially the governing statute when it comes into law, and the code of practice. The code of practice, at paragraph 6.4, provides that

“it is expected that the person granting the authorisation should hold a reasonable belief that the authorisation is necessary and proportionate.”

As Lord Anderson pointed out, that of course is not law, but it is something that, should there be any challenge, would doubtless be taken into account. It seems undesirable that there should be a difference in wording between the code of practice and the statute that governs it.

Would the Solicitor General think again about what is so objectionable about the existence of a reasonableness test and how that would actually compromise the effective operation of operatives in the field? I do not see that. As Lord Thomas put it, at the end of the day

“it is very important to make sure that the language of the statute is clear. Nothing could be less desirable than the language of paragraph 6.4…using the words ‘it is expected’”.—[Official Report, House of Lords, 11 January 2021; Vol. 809, c. 553.]

Basically, if it is a statutory scheme, the statute ought to be clear. I would like to hear some further justification from the Solicitor General on that, because it seems to me that if we are creating one inconsistency, we are potentially creating another. I think the words of the former Lord Chief Justice deserve some consideration.

In relation to Lords amendment 2, what was said by my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, is right. Although the amendment is well intentioned, it seems to me that practical risks could arise. Those of us who have some experience of serious organised crime will know the lengths to which these gangs are prepared to go to prevent infiltration and the ruthlessness with which they operate. On balance, I think the Government’s case against that amendment is made out.

In relation to Lords amendment 3, I do not think anyone would wish to have a situation where villains—people who would do us great harm, either as terrorists or as serious organised criminals—might seek an opportunity to use the criminal injuries compensation scheme or some other scheme to make claims against the state for circumstances that, in effect, they brought upon themselves, such as injury which they brought upon themselves because of the activities in which they were engaged. I am sure we would all agree with that.

I hope the Solicitor General will address the issue raised by Lord Cormack and others in the debate in the other place: what about the innocent victim, the person who is collateral damage? Say that in pursuant to a properly granted authorisation, a CHIS carries out an activity that unintentionally—perhaps as a result of a car chase, which is the example that Lord Cormack gave—causes injury to a passer-by, a bystander or someone who happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. Surely the Government would accept that morally there can be no justification for that person not being properly compensated. What is the scheme, therefore, by which they are to be properly compensated? I would have thought there was a way forward for the Government to achieve compromise on this. The suggestion is that the Government say, “There are means of doing this”, and I hope the Solicitor General can spell that out.

The person ought at least to be able to go to the criminal injuries compensation scheme. I am told that in Australia and some other jurisdictions, there is a separate indemnity scheme. Either way, the innocent victim of work that is necessarily and properly undertaken to protect the broader interests of the state and its citizens should not go without the scope for recompense. I hope the Solicitor General will address that when he responds to the debate.

Lords amendment 4 raises very sensitive issues. We all accept that there have to be particular protections in law for children and vulnerable people, so I am very sympathetic to the spirit of the amendment, but I do listen to what the Solicitor General says, and I take on board in particular the view of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner as to what actually happens in practice. I hope that the Solicitor General will undertake that the Government will continue to keep a most careful watch on how young people and potentially vulnerable people are used on the very rare occasions when it might be thought necessary to authorise activity involving them.

That brings me to Lords amendment 5 and the amendment in lieu, where it is the second part that is the issue. It was generally accepted that although in an ideal world judicial pre-authorisation would be preferable from a legal point of view, there were arguments about operational difficulties that could arise. Could the Solicitor General do more to address the very important point that Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd made in moving his amendment, which the Government seek to reverse by the amendment in lieu? We have set up a system with a judicial commissioner, who is to be notified, and who then has a duty to consider that notification and come to a view on it. If they are under a duty to do that, and their conclusion is that the authorisation should not have been granted, are we really to leave it hanging there and to leave it to a rather fudged system of, “Let’s have a word and see what can be done”? If a judicial commissioner—in effect a judge, as Lord Thomas pointed out—says that something was not lawful, because that would be the ground on which they would find that was to be the case, are we then to have a means where something that is unlawful is to carry on, but without more ado? That does not seem to be consistent with our commitment to the rule of law.