Cabin Air Safety/Aerotoxic Syndrome

Debate between Robert Goodwill and Dawn Butler

Thursday 17th March 2016 Westminster Hall

[Mr Goodwill]

I will go on to describe the levels that those in aircraft cabins are likely to be exposed to under normal operations when a fume event has not taken place. However, as I was saying, neither of my two friends who are suffering from career-finishing symptoms—they are not able to work—had been involved in either the aviation industry or in agriculture. I suspect that if they had been involved in agriculture, I would have been asking questions about whether their exposure to sheep dip or to other agrochemicals may have been to blame. Similarly, if they had been in the aviation industry, I would perhaps be asking the same questions.

The Government take the health and air safety of passengers and crew extremely seriously. The United Kingdom is recognised throughout the global aviation community for its high standard and excellent record of safety in commercial aviation. I must make it clear that the Government must always act on evidence and we have over the years worked hard to collect evidence, as did the previous Government when the problem first came to public awareness. There has been much public debate about the issue as so many people are aware of the problem.

There are currently two inquests into deaths where the relatives of the deceased are trying to establish whether contamination by cabin air could have been the cause of death. Both inquests are still open, and in both cases the CAA rather than my Department has been named as an interested party. Both of the deceased were employed by the same airline, and so far the evidence that has been gathered does not support the view that the deaths were connected to contamination of cabin air.

In the case of Richard Westgate, the Dorset coroner’s January pre-inquest review has been adjourned to 30 March 2016 to allow time for medical experts’ reports to be submitted, but he did release a prevention of future deaths report in 2014, which some have taken as a signal that the death might be attributed to contamination of cabin air. However, there was no evidence to suggest that this was the case, and we await the full inquest verdict with a great deal of interest.

In the case of Matt Bass, who has been mentioned during this debate and whose case is before the Berkshire coroner, the January pre-inquest review has been adjourned until 15 June 2016 to allow time to locate medical samples and to instruct the experts. I offer my deepest sympathies to the families and friends of the deceased, but, as the two inquests have not been concluded, it would not be appropriate for the Government to comment in further detail.

[Dawn Butler]

The Bournemouth coroner, in respect of Mr Westgate, issued a regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths under the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013 in relation to both British Airways and the CAA on 16 February 2015. In it he states:

“In my opinion urgent action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe that your organisation has the power to take such action.”

Is that part of your consideration?

[Mr Goodwill]

As I said, the inquest has not been finalised and no verdict has been reached. In many ways, the precautionary principle may have prompted the coroner to issue that advice at that time, but the case is still before the courts. Similarly, if the case was before a criminal court, one would not want to comment before the verdict. It would be inappropriate for the Government to do so and my legal advice is that we should not comment before the verdict. In at least one of the cases we will not have long to wait for the verdict, and we will look very carefully at the scientific evidence brought before the inquest and how that is interpreted.

--- Later in debate ---

[Rachael Maskell]

That is the crux of the debate. The reality is that it may be possible to detect a serious fuel event; but what about a minor one, where there is slight leakage into the cabin?

[Dawn Butler]

rose—

[Mr Goodwill]

I will also give way to the hon. Member for Brent Central before I respond.

[Dawn Butler]

To pick up on that point, there are also some toxins that one cannot smell, so is not the way to gather the empirical evidence, as has been said, just to monitor what is going on in the aircraft at the time? The Minister is absolutely right: the airline industry has a culture of reporting the errors or mistakes that people make, so that it can improve its system. However, that is exactly what is not happening with these incidents, because they are not being monitored.

[Mr Goodwill]

A lot of air quality monitoring has been carried out on aircraft. The problem is that fume events are relatively rare and therefore there has not been the ability to pick one up during one of those monitoring situations.

Under the CAA’s mandatory reporting scheme, the trigger for a report is an event that is considered by the crew to be a

“safety-related event which endangers or which, if not corrected or addressed, could endanger an aircraft, its occupants or any other person.”

None of the flights where fumes and smells were reported in post-flight questionnaires met those criteria; they are the ones that we actually tested. However, I have some data from the CAA on the number of those reports where smells have been reported in the cabin. We heard from the hon. Member for Stalybridge and Hyde that he had been given the figure of about one in 2,000 flights. We heard from the hon. Member for Heywood and Middleton (Liz McInnes) that it is about one in 100. The evidence that I have is that in the last decade we have seen annually between 282 and 471 reports of smells or fumes in the cabin. The last year that we have report numbers for is 2014, when there were 426.

However, it must be emphasised that up to now, reports of fumes have included all causes of smoke, odour or fumes, both internal and external, and not just incidents of bleed-air contamination. The CAA estimates that a maximum of 10% of those incidents reported are regarding bleed-air contamination—in other words, less than one a week—and therefore it has not been possible as yet to have testing equipment on an aircraft when one has happened. I hope that that puts into context the frequency with which these situations occur.