Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill Debate

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Department: Cabinet Office

Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill

Robert Goodwill Excerpts
Michael Gove Portrait Michael Gove
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The formal motion of no confidence that is traditionally requested by the Opposition and has to be granted within a day is a classic example, but on the question of military intervention, I personally believe—again, it is for the House to take a view—that that is a proper exercise of the prerogative power in certain circumstances. That is perhaps for debate in other forums, but it would not count in the way that the hon. Gentleman suggests.

Robert Goodwill Portrait Mr Robert Goodwill (Scarborough and Whitby) (Con)
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Does the Minister agree that in that situation it would be open to any Member of this House to ask a Minister or the Prime Minister at the Dispatch Box whether he or she considered it to be a matter of confidence and then what followed from that would bear that out?

Michael Gove Portrait Michael Gove
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My right hon. Friend is exactly right. If any Prime Minister felt that the House’s decision not to grant supply, the House’s decision to censure an individual Minister or the House’s decision not to authorise support for military action was a matter of confidence, that might mean that it would be appropriate to request a Dissolution at that point.

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Michael Gove Portrait Michael Gove
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Again, my hon. Friend makes a very important point. Alongside the Bill, we have produced a brief statement of Dissolution principles. He is absolutely right. Our broad understanding of Dissolution principles derives from a letter written by Sir Alan “Tommy” Lascelles pseudonymously—I am glad to be able to use that word in the House of Commons—to The Times in the 1950s. He argued that a Dissolution should not be granted if the monarch thought that there were a viable alternative that could command a majority in the House of Commons—or, indeed, if it were a time of economic crisis or peril in which it would be inappropriate for a general election to be called. We think that it is very difficult, as my hon. Friend the Minister for the Constitution and Devolution and others made clear in evidence to the Joint Committee, to provide an exhaustive list of example cases in which it would be inappropriate for a Dissolution to be granted when requested. One thing we would like to do in Committee is have proper consideration of them.

It is important that our constitution always remains flexible and agile. I could conceive of circumstances—immediately after an election defeat, for example, when a Prime Minister is still perhaps clinging on, seeking to form a coalition or a confidence and supply arrangement and failing to do so—when that Prime Minister might seek an immediate other Dissolution shortly afterwards. In such circumstances, I can see that it would not be appropriate for a Dissolution to be granted. As I say, it would be helpful for everyone to take part in the debate to outline the circumstances that they think should guide the operation of the principles.

Robert Goodwill Portrait Mr Goodwill
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Is it not also the case that, if there were a vote in the Commons that many considered to be a confidence vote, but the Government refused to accept that, it would be open to the official Opposition to table a confidence motion, in which there would be no doubt whatsoever?

Michael Gove Portrait Michael Gove
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Exactly so, and it is absolutely important, as my right hon. Friend points out, that we stick to the principle that, immediately upon receipt of a request from the Opposition for a vote of no confidence, such a debate is granted and that the Prime Minister of the day would make their case. Following the defeat of an earlier attempt by my right hon. Friend the Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May) to secure support for her withdrawal Bill, a motion of no confidence was tabled by the then leader of the Labour party. That motion of no confidence was defeated and that allowed the Prime Minister to consider other ways of fulfilling that mandate.

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Cat Smith Portrait Cat Smith
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I suppose the difference is that when there is a five-year Parliament and all the parties know when the election is happening, there is a level playing field, unlike when a Government can call a general election unexpectedly if the advantage lies entirely with the governing party and not with any of the Opposition parties. The Bill therefore skews power towards the Executive and towards incumbent governing parties. It also gives Prime Ministers the power to haggle with Parliament by threatening early Dissolution and early elections. I would also argue that the Fixed-term Parliaments Act—although it is flawed and I certainly support its repeal—puts us more in line with other democracies that constrain the power of Prime Ministers.

Turning to the monarch and the attempt to restore the royal prerogative with legislation, if the Crown is left as the only check on untimely requests for Dissolution, that would inevitably draw the Crown into controversy if such requests were refused. Perhaps the Minister will shed some light on that in her closing remarks, but I struggle to see the circumstances in which a sovereign might decline a request for an election. I would argue that the most effective way of avoiding such a constitutional crisis would be to leave decisions on Dissolution to Parliament, which is the right place for what is a quintessentially political decision. The House of Lords Constitution Committee said when it published its report on the Fixed-term Parliaments Act in September:

“Reform of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act must keep the Queen out of politics.”

I sincerely agree with that. The Government’s proposal that the monarch should be the only check on a questionable request for Dissolution inevitably risks dragging the monarch into politics. I argue that the easiest way out of such a situation would be a parliamentary vote on Dissolution, which would protect the monarch from being dragged into politics.

Robert Goodwill Portrait Mr Goodwill
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Will the hon. Lady give way?

Cat Smith Portrait Cat Smith
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I would like to make a bit more progress.

I put on the record my thanks to Professor Meg Russell and Professor Robert Hazell for their evidence to the Joint Committee, which I have found very useful, as well as for their informative podcast, of which my hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) was a feature.

The arguments that I have heard for leaving Dissolution in the hands of Parliament have convinced me that it would be the easiest way to keep the courts out of these decisions. Clause 3 will be a topic of quite heated debate. It is impossible to imagine the crack through which the courts could intervene had a House of Commons decision to trigger a statutory power of Dissolution been recorded. If the Government adopted that approach, we could remove the ouster clause, which would then be self-defeating in its current terms.

As long as Prorogation continues as a prerogative power, one way to avoid Parliament being prorogued against its will would be to make the prerogative power exercisable at the request of Parliament, rather than on the advice of the Prime Minister. An alternative would be to abolish the prerogative power and put Prorogation on the same footing as the power of Adjournment, thereby enabling Parliament to be prorogued when the House of Commons passes a motion to that effect.

Ultimately, I believe that Dissolution should remain in the hands of Parliament, not the Executive. The Bill is very much about the question of where power lies. The Fixed-term Parliaments Act was problematic and there are certainly aspects of it that I will be quite happy to see the back of, but the principle of having fixed terms is not in itself necessarily a bad thing—indeed, it puts us on a level footing with many other western democracies and progressive democracies around the world, and in line with our own Parliaments here in the United Kingdom.

Prorogation should be in the hands of Parliament, not the Executive, so I urge all colleagues, as this Second Reading debate continues, to consider where power should lie and how checks on that power can be put in place. If indeed we are to place power in the hands of people, I argue that the situation is far stronger if that power lies in the hands of the elected representatives in this House, rather than in the hands of one Prime Minister.

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Brendan O'Hara Portrait Brendan O'Hara (Argyll and Bute) (SNP)
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May I, too, say how pleased we are to see the hon. Member for Norwich North (Chloe Smith) back in her place? I look forward to many confrontations with her in the coming weeks and months. Let me say at the outset that the SNP will be opposing the Second Reading of this Bill when the House divides this evening. We will do so not because we are particularly wedded to the Fixed-term Parliaments Act, but because we believe that the Bill is a much wider part of a fundamental attack on our democracy.

One should not view the Bill in isolation. I believe that when Members look at it in the wider picture and place it alongside the voter suppression Bill, the Government’s plan to neuter the Electoral Commission and the draconian Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill, they will reach the same conclusion that many of us have reached: this Bill is simpler another part of a brazen attempt by this Government to further centralise control, give more power to the Executive, strip parliamentarians of their powers and deny the judiciary the ability to scrutinise what they are doing, while at the same time eroding the public’s right to protest against them. This is an unashamed power grab by the Executive, and we believe that it will be seen as such when seen in the context of the wider picture.

Robert Goodwill Portrait Mr Goodwill
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Surely we are just reinstating the status quo before 2010.

Brendan O'Hara Portrait Brendan O'Hara
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I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his intervention. No, we are not doing that, and I will come on to exactly why we are not. Although I acknowledge that the 2019 Labour manifesto said that they would repeal the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 and I understand that they intend to abstain in tonight’s Division and amend in Committee, I would caution that any support for this Bill has to be contingent on what is coming to replace it. I say to anyone who might not like the current Act and wishes to see it repealed to be careful what they wish for. To address the point made by the right hon. Member for Scarborough and Whitby (Mr Goodwill), let me say that although in and of itself repealing that Act might look fairly innocuous and taken in isolation might even be seen as trivial and almost unimportant, I caution that if it is viewed as part of that wider, much larger strategy to centralise power and control with the Executive, this is a far cry from a benign piece of legislation, as they would have us believe.

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Robert Goodwill Portrait Mr Robert Goodwill (Scarborough and Whitby) (Con)
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First, may I put on the record how much I welcome the Bill? Indeed, having served on the Joint Committee chaired so ably by the noble Lord McLoughlin, who has gone on from a distinguished career in this House to—I hope—even greater things in the other place, I can probably own up to knowing more about the constitutional convolution surrounding this subject than it is healthy for any person to know, with the possible exception of the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant).



I was slightly confused by the points made by the shadow Minister, as Labour has a manifesto commitment to repeal the Fixed-term Parliaments Act. I am not sure whether we will see some backtracking on that. I was also confused when she said that the Prime Minister of the day could take the opportunity of the Opposition being in disarray to call a general election. I have to say that I could probably pick any day in the past five years, and no doubt in the next four years, when that particular situation could be in force.

When we started out on this journey, I took the view that we should go as far as possible to restore the situation to as it existed before the Fixed-term Parliaments Act. At the end of our deliberations, I remained of the same view, but we all came to understand better the historical and constitutional context. It is important that we restore the royal prerogative. Less important is the academic discussion about whether it was merely in abeyance and could be restored or had been abolished. The Lascelles principles were discussed: the reasons why the King or Queen could refuse the initiative from No. 10 and, of course, the discretion around a request—or is that advice?—to Her Majesty. Indeed the hon. Member for Argyll and Bute (Brendan O’Hara) talked about whether the Lascelles principles would still be in place. We learned about the golden triangle—the communications between the Queen’s private secretary, the Cabinet Secretary and the Prime Minister’s private secretary—who would head off an embarrassing situation for the monarch who might have to turn down an election because it was too soon after the previous election, because an alternative Government could be formed, or because other situations might mean that it was inappropriate to call that particular election.

Jackie Doyle-Price Portrait Jackie Doyle-Price
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To emphasise the point that my right hon. Friend has just made, the truth is not that a monarch would never be put in a position where she had to say no, but that what happens in our constitution means that that question is never put until it is an acceptable time for a general election. Putting it in rules in the Fixed-term Parliaments Act got in the way of a functioning electoral democracy.

Robert Goodwill Portrait Mr Goodwill
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That is right. I am a big subscriber to the view that if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it. The situation that we had worked for many years—during constitutional crises, world wars and great political events in this country. The people of this country have a great regard for Her Majesty the Queen, and I feel that if anyone was going to be put in that position, she is probably the best person—with advice from those around her, including the golden triangle, to make that decision.

Having been a member of the coalition Government, I have to say that the Fixed-term Parliaments Act worked well during the coalition period, steadying the nerves of our Liberal Democrat partners against a snap election. If the same situation were to happen again—perhaps a Labour-SNP coalition, but probably not any time soon—it could be dusted off again. I am not sure whether those two coalition partners would make very good bedfellows—certainly the image of Morecambe and Wise sat reading their bedtime books does not spring to mind, but who knows what might happen at some point in the future.

In the meantime, this Bill restores the situation as it was before 2020. It is a procedure that has stood the test of time and, most importantly, cannot be challenged in the courts. Let us remember the autumn of 2019 when, three times, Labour proved that it was frightened of the electorate and did not give the two-thirds majority for an election. Indeed, in December 2019, we discovered precisely why it was frightened of the electorate; it was brought to book by the electorate for ignoring them since the referendum decision was made. Hence I very much support the need for the ouster clause in clause 3, which ensures the belt and braces situation to which the Secretary of State referred.

Finally, there is one improvement that we should consider either for this Bill or for the forthcoming elections Bill. Currently, when an election is called after the customary wash-up, we have an election campaign that lasts 25 working days. With weekends and bank holidays, that means that we have more than 35 full days on the campaign trail. That is far too long. My view is that a campaign of that length is more likely to turn off voters than to motivate them—I suspect that Brenda from Bristol would agree with me.

I know that the returning officers will have all sorts of reasons why they need more time, and no doubt the party campaign managers will say that they do not have enough time to organise their campaigns. I know that the situation is different with overseas and more postal voters, but surely there are technical solutions to those issues. Perhaps, once every four of five years, our hard-working council officials could do some overtime at weekends if necessary. Let us have a 25-day election campaign and not a 25 working day election campaign.

Elections never used to be this long. Many people have already decided how they will vote. We should minimise the time for which the Government are possibly hamstrung during an election and cannot be scrutinised or challenged by Parliament. I welcome the repeal of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act, but look forward to provisions to fix the length of the election at 25 days only.