Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill

Robert Buckland Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 20th November 2023 Commons Chamber

[Alex Davies-Jones]

My hon. Friend has made an important point about an issue faced by all our constituents who are struggling to get out of contracts that do not give value for money, and subscription traps, which we will discuss later this evening. These are issues that should have been dealt with in the Bill, and could have been had it been afforded parliamentary priority. Sadly, many opportunities have been missed and will need to be returned to, and we will be urging the Government to do that in due course.

The Conservatives have needlessly delayed the introduction of the Bill. Their focus on infighting and general chaos has prevented them from presenting suitable legislation. The Bill was first promised in Parliament more than a year ago, and since then, owing to Tory delay, we have fallen behind our European neighbours in this vital policy area. Failure to act against gatekeepers to access points in the digital economy—from web browsers to search engines, and from mobile operating systems to app stores and broadband contracts—is having a huge impact on business growth and consumer prices. Let us be clear: a failure to regulate and level the playing field is having a huge impact on consumers, who ultimately pay the price.

This is a complicated Bill, which has rightly received substantial coverage in the media since it was first published. It is only appropriate for me to begin my consideration of the first group of amendments by raising particular concerns about the Government amendments relating to the countervailing benefits exemption—notably, amendments 13 and 14. As we all know, the countervailing benefits exemption allows the Competition and Markets Authority to close an investigation of a breach of a conduct requirement if a big tech firm can demonstrate that its anti-competitive conduct produces benefits that outweigh the harm. These amendments change the test for the exemption from indispensability—a recognised competition law standard that ensures that a big tech firm cannot proceed with anti-competitive conduct without good reason—to an untested, potentially ambiguous standard. There is a danger that this new, untested standard could allow big tech firms to evade compliance and continue with conduct that harms UK businesses and consumers. They might also inundate the CMA with an excessive number of claims of consumer benefit, diverting its limited resources away from other essential tasks.

The Minister must be realistic. It is highly unlikely that anti-competitive conduct on the part of regulated firms will ever have a consumer benefit. The amendment creates an unnecessary loophole that Labour colleagues and I find very concerning. I would also be grateful if the Minister could clarify whether these amendments create a new legal standard that could allow regulated companies to evade compliance. There is also the question of how the amendments will protect the CMA from being inundated with claims of countervailing benefits from regulated companies. Labour is concerned by these amendments, and I therefore urge Members across the House to support amendments 187 and 188, tabled in my name, which seek to undo the Government’s mismanagement.

I will turn now to the changes in the appeals mechanism. The Minister knows about, and will have heard, the concerns of colleagues on the Conservative side—on all sides, actually—about the changes in the appeals process, as outlined in Government amendment 51 to 56. We have all heard the passionate calls from businesses that have risked their reputations and market share by sticking their heads above the parapet to warn of the risks of watering down the appeals process. It is testament to their hard work that we are at this point today.

As colleagues will be aware, the Government amendments would change the appeals process and standard for penalty decisions to full merits only. As we know, penalties such as fines are the most significant deterrent to prevent short message service firms from breaking the conduct requirements established by the CMA. Although timing—a key concern when considering the impact of full merits on other parts of the Bill—is not of paramount importance when it comes to fines, it is foreseeable that full merits appeals could allow SMS firms to reduce significantly the size of penalties, thus reducing their incentive to comply.

The Minister will come to learn that collegiate, sensible agreement has been a common theme as the Bill has progressed, particularly in line-by-line scrutiny in Committee. Indeed, we broadly welcome the Government’s decision to maintain the judicial review standard for appeals on regulatory decisions. Labour feels that will ensure that the Competition and Markets Authority has the tools to act and is not bogged down in complex, lengthy and costly legal wrangling, which would render the new regime completely ineffective.

However, the Minister must clarify how the amendments will not impede the CMA’s ability to keep pace with rapidly moving digital markets. The regulator must retain the flexibility to construct remedies that target the harms to UK businesses and consumers stemming from big tech’s dominant position in digital markets. Looking back on the contributions of the Minister’s predecessor in Committee, we were all assured with a level of certainty that there would be no changes to weaken the appeals process, so it is a frustrating reality to see yet another U-turn from this Government—sadly, we have all become more than used to their slapdash way of governing and making law.

As we know, introducing full merits appeals for all regulatory decisions would have allowed complex, lengthy and costly legal wrangling, which would render the new regime ineffective. It must therefore be clarified that the Government’s amendment allows full merits appeals only for the level of the fine and for the decision to issue a fine. It must not permit a review of the CMA’s decision to create a conduct requirement or implement pro-competitive intervention, or of the CMA’s decision on whether a conduct requirement has been breached and how to remedy that breach. I would therefore be grateful if the Minister clarified exactly whether that will be the case.

I am conscious of time so I will push the Minister to clarify a number of important points. Government amendment 64 gives the Secretary of State the power to approve CMA guidance, which will be critical to regulated firms, particularly on how they should comply with the conduct requirements placed upon them. What is unclear is when and how, and in what timeframe, guidance must be submitted to the Secretary of State. I know that many of us would be grateful for some straightforward clarity from the Minister on that issue.

Lastly, I am keen to highlight Labour amendments 194 to 196, tabled in my name, which aim to improve the consultation rights of challenger firms. Under the current drafting, firms with strategic market status will have far greater consultation rights than those that are detrimentally affected by their anti-competitive behaviour. The amendments would give third parties the ability to provide critical information for the CMA’s consideration, and feedback on its work. That is vital, particularly for challenger companies whose growth may see them captured by the regime at a future point. I hope that the Minister will consider the merits of introducing similar amendments in the other place. He would have widespread support from colleagues across the House if he were to go ahead and do so.

We have heard the concerns of Members across the House about how the changes have been implemented, so I urge the Minister to listen carefully to the debate as it progresses and to do the right thing by working collegiately for the benefit of good legislation.

[Sir Robert Buckland (South Swindon) (Con)]

In rising to address the House, I draw Members’ attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests: I am an independent adviser in a collective action being brought in the Competition Appeal Tribunal for alleged anti-competitive behaviour relating to cryptocurrency. Although I will not address my remarks to any part of the Bill that might be perceived as relevant to the funding of litigation relating to such actions, I thought it right to be comprehensive in my declaration.

I wish to couch my remarks in this way: I am a firm supporter of the need to provide effective regulation in a market that is vulnerable—and, some would say, prone—to monopolistic abuse of market power. It is clear that regulation is not only desirable but essential when it comes to representing the interests of the consumer, and that is the place from which we all need to start.

In the sturm und drang that has accompanied some of the coverage of the Bill, it is perhaps inevitable that focus has been placed on the interests of one sector, as opposed to those of another—the large-scale enterprise against the small start-up. In all that, we risk forgetting the essential truth of why we are legislating in this way, which is first and foremost to ensure that any regulator is working in the interests of the consumer. My amendment deals precisely with that issue, by imposing an overarching and paramount duty on the regulator, and indeed the courts, to serve the interests of the consumer. Accompanied with a duty of expedition, that underlines the thrust of why I have decided to speak in this debate and to table amendments. Much needs to be done in the process of dealing with competition issues, which of course means the operation of the CMA and the Competition Appeal Tribunal. This debate—indeed, this whole process—can be a moment for us to reflect, and to take action and ensure that the way such disputes are dealt with in future will be more efficient, more speedy and in the interests of the consumer.

Ex-ante regulation is very difficult; it is all about predicting the future. Indeed, I am glad to see my hon. Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Damian Collins) in the Chamber. He followed that market very carefully and knows its ever-changing nature. It is difficult to predict what the world will look like in six months, let alone in five years. It is right to remember that the basis of the Bill, and of today’s debate, goes back four years to the Furman review, which rightly set out the parameters that have led to the development of this much-needed legislation.

In one respect, the review has been somewhat prayed in aid in a way that is potentially misleading. Recommended action 12 of the Furman review speaks about the ability of an affected company to appeal a decision—this is relevant to amendment 185 to clause 102. The review states:

“To facilitate greater and quicker use of interim measures to protect rivals against significant harm, the CMA’s processes should be streamlined.

The ability for an affected company to appeal a decision or an interim measure is a vital safeguard of their rights, and a check on the quality of CMA decision-making. Appeals processes need to strike a balance between protecting those affected by any unjustified decision and ensuring that CMA powers can be exercised effectively to protect those who would be left exposed by underenforcement or undue delay.”

It goes on:

“The competition framework would be improved for digital markets by focusing appeals on testing the reasonableness of CMA judgement, that procedure has been appropriately followed, and that decisions are not based on material errors of fact or law—a standard more closely relating to that of judicial review.”

As I read it, that is an invitation to ensure that there is not a completely unbridled merits-based approach. It is a world away from suggesting that somehow, in this world of ex-ante regulation, we should be immediately narrowing down the options of any court or applicant relating to potential claims on merit.

Ex-ante review work is not easy, but it is not unprecedented in United Kingdom regulation. We have had telecoms regulations for a long time, with the work of Ofcom in policing that. In that area, for a long time the decision making and the appeals process were allowed to be based on merit, before a reversion or a narrowing down to judicial review principles. Indeed, that was laid out for a long time—much longer than the period I envisage in my amendment—in order to reflect the importance of achieving maximum clarity as early as possible. I do not want to see anything that creates uncertainty in this market, because that will lead to a lack of investment, and perhaps a reduction of the sorts of investments that we want to see domestically and internationally in this important and vital market for the future of our British digital services industry.

[Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)]

My right hon. and learned Friend is making an important and eloquent speech. Can I emphasise the point that he makes about certainty, and return to the intervention by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright) about the importance of having clarity on what the test will be and at what stage it applies? We all understand proportionality tests, and we certainly all understand classic judicial review tests, but it is important in this emerging market that people know at which stage which test applies. I appreciate the Minister saying that he will clarify that later in his speech, but I am not sure that the wording proposed by the Government gives us that clarity. Will my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for South Swindon (Sir Robert Buckland) consider what more needs to be done around that?

[Sir Robert Buckland]

What my hon. Friend outlines is precisely what we are seeking. In making these arguments, we are not in some way the friends of big tech; we are not here to represent a particular sectoral interest. My amendment was drafted by me and by senior counsel from Monckton Chambers, including Philip Moser KC, who regularly appears both for and against big tech in these matters. I thought it right to seek some independent pro bono advice on the operation of competition law to make sure that, in developing the law in this way, we do not create entirely untested mechanisms that would—guess what?—require litigation to clarify.

The point is that we should be seeking to minimise more interpretive language that will require to be tested in the courts. That is why I take slight issue with what was said by the hon. Member for Pontypridd (Alex Davies-Jones), whom I respect very much. In amendment 186, I seek to replace the word “indispensable” with “necessary”, because I think that is a much clearer term that everyone would understand and that would, in itself, be a high threshold for the affected company in demonstrating consumer benefit in the countervailing consumer benefit test.

I think that, rather than trying to use and develop new language, we should look back and learn from the experience of telecoms regulation. One of the problems in, in effect, handing considerable power to the new digital markets unit is that the legal landscape relating to this activity is unformed. Unlike the landscape that underpinned the Competition Act 1998, we do not have the advantage of years of EU and UK court interpretation that was then applied by guidelines issued by the CMA.

[Grahame Morris (Easington) (Lab)]

The right hon. and learned Gentleman is articulate in presenting the case and knowledgeable about the issue, but may I distil it down to an issue of fairness that everyone can understand? Before our very eyes, the landscape is changing. Long-established titles, newspapers and publications are disappearing and retrenching. Thousands of journalists are losing their jobs. Is it not a matter of basic fairness that people who create the content should be properly compensated?

[Sir Robert Buckland]

The hon. Gentleman is right to make that point. That is why in other jurisdictions we have seen agreement reached between big tech and newspaper titles to ensure that there is that element of fairness. I agree with him; I want to see similar fairness and equity applied across the market. What I and others who agree with me are trying to do is to ensure that, in creating this brave new world of energetic and efficient regulation, we do not as a Parliament upset the balance by giving too much power to a particular regulator. A lot of us in this place have watched with concern the failure of other types of regulation—in our water industry or our energy industry, for example. I do not think anybody would deny that, at times, we have got regulation wrong. That is why it is important that we have this debate.

There are people outside this place who have put pressure on us by saying, “The Bill is in perfect order. There is no need for you to look at it any more; great minds have thought about it.” I say to them that it is for this place to make those decisions. I do not look kindly on comments made by the chief executive of the CMA about the merits of what this place is considering while the Bill is in Parliament. I absolutely accept the independence of the CMA and the important role that it plays, but we should not confuse independence with lack of accountability. That is a point that I will warm to in a little while, when I address the relationship between regulators—in this case, the CMA—and Parliament. At the moment, that relationship is wholly inadequate.

I was making the point that, unlike the Competition Act 1998, there is a relative lack of worked-out court interpretation of this Bill’s subject matter. That has led to distinguished commentators—no less than Sir Jonathan Jones, former Treasury counsel—making the point in evidence to the Committee that, in effect, the DMU would be able to decide who was going to regulate, set the rules that apply and then enforce those rules. The phrase “legislator, investigator and executioner” was used. While that is colourful language—perhaps too colourful for a dry debate about competition law—it is important that we reflect on the view of that former Treasury solicitor and be very careful that in going down this road, we are not making false comparisons.

A lot has been said about Ofcom and its decisions, and comparisons have been made, but we must not forget that those Ofcom decisions were heavily governed by EU framework directive 2002/21. Article 4 of that directive says that on ex-ante telecom appeals,

“Member States shall ensure that the merits of the case are duly taken into account and that there is an effective appeal mechanism.”

That is a bit different from the provisions in the Bill. A simple JR-type review is precisely that, and no more.

I listened with interest to the intervention made by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright), who made a really good point that needs answering. We need to understand where proportionality comes into this. If the principle of proportionality is being used in the first instance, that is all well and good, but we need to understand how that fits with the provisions of the Bill: whether it implies that the courts deem every decision made by the DMU to be proportionate, or whether there is a way to challenge a particular decision by saying that it was not made according to the DMU’s own principles, acting in a proportionate way.

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

It seems to me—I would be interested in my right hon. and learned Friend’s view—that on the basis of the Government’s proposed wording, it is more likely that a firm will be able to challenge whether the CMA has applied its proportionality test appropriately, but the means by which it will do so will be under JR principles on appeal, rather than on a merits basis. It is not that proportionality is not subject to challenge, but that that challenge is limited by JR principles at the appeal stage. Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree?

[Sir Robert Buckland]

That is what we need to bottom out. The primary worry that a lot of us have about the JR principle is that it means that any challenge will probably be vanishingly small, which is not good for ensuring that the regulator is working in the best way. None of us wants to encourage incontinent litigation—or incontinent legislation, bearing in mind the importance that we place on it—but sometimes, challenge is essential to create greater certainty. There will be ambiguities; there will be occasions where there needs to be a test. We should not be frightened of that.

[Damian Collins]

I am following what my right hon. and learned Friend says carefully. Does he agree that we have to consider the nature of this business landscape? For these firms—some of the biggest companies in the world—litigation is a cost of doing business. Their track record shows that they use almost all grounds there are to challenge any decision made by any regulator. Not even a regulator is resourced sufficiently to be able to contest those challenges, and the people who seek to bring them know that they will take years and cost a huge amount of money, and that the business may even be closed by the time a resolution has been found.

[Sir Robert Buckland]

I fully take on board my hon. Friend’s concern. He is right to say that, which is why this should not just be about what might happen in terms of raw dispute; it has to be the culture of the new regulator to work with any potential subject—any company that might be a subject of an investigation—in a co-operative way. That raises the issue of how open the parties are with each other about the basis of their assertions and of how data is shared—that goes right into the Competition Appeal Tribunal itself. A lot of people would be surprised that the disclosure rules in the CAT are not as open as one would expect them to be if one is challenging a decision. We have to work our way through that, in order to change that attitude and reduce the amount of potential litigation by making sure that there is agreement.

I accept that the Government have moved on the JR test with regard to penalty, but a potential problem could result from the Government’s amendment on that: there will not be a change of culture, there will be a readiness by big tech to admit breach and then all resources will be thrown into contesting the penalty. There we will get the litigation, the real argument and the high-stakes money. To paraphrase my hon. Friend, we will get the actuarial calculation that it would be worth throwing a lot of money at litigation to reduce a penalty that could be a big percentage of turnover. We are potentially talking about huge penalties for these companies.

That issue does worry me and I hope that it demonstrates to the House why I am properly sensitive about the need to make sure that we do not just open the door to abuse by another means. I am a huge follower of Theodore Roosevelt and a great believer that his approach to fighting the J.P. Morgans and the Standard Oils of his day is exactly how we should operate in the monopolistic markets of today and tomorrow. My hon. Friend is right to say that this market is fast developing. When the Furman report was produced, we were looking at a different world in big tech. With the rise of artificial intelligence, we are seeing it evolve further.

[Damian Collins]

I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend for giving way, particularly as we are on the subject of Theodore Roosevelt. Does he agree that we have to be careful when considering consumer detriment in this case? The argument was not successfully made in the United States that J.P. Morgan could say that he may have a railway monopoly but the ticket prices were relatively low and so there was no consumer detriment. That was not considered to be a binding argument, so because the cost of an app in an app store might be low, that does not mean to say that the company can get away with overcharging.

[Sir Robert Buckland]

Again, I am grateful to my hon. Friend. He is right: there is a danger that in regulation we focus on the cost of the good or service, rather than on the overall environment and quality of the market. Some would say that that has been a particular issue in the way that regulation has operated in the water sector. That is why this is a good moment for all of us, as a House, to pause and reflect on where we have gone wrong with regulation in the past and how we can get it right from here on in.

There are some options the Government can look at when dealing with the JR standard. I have mentioned the importance of making sure that there is accountability, but we should not just be looking at the sunset option that I have set out in my amendment; we should look again at whether the clarification of the proportionality test could help everybody to understand precisely how the JR principles will work. If we miss the opportunity on this occasion to get this right, I am not sure we will be doing anybody any favours, least of all the consumer and especially not the DMU itself, which needs to develop in a way that is truly accountable.

The thrust of some of my amendments relates to the regulator’s accountability to this place, which is why they include a requirement to report regularly to Parliament and to Ministers. New clause 12 relates to the appointment of the senior director of the DMU, which I think should be done directly by the Secretary of State. That is not a challenge to the independence of the body; Ministers regularly appoint independent directors and inspectors, for example, and it does not undermine the integrity and quality of their role. However, through those amendments I am seeking to make the case that we should not confuse independence for lack of accountability. I do not use that word as a way of avoiding a greater accountability to this place.

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[The First Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

Order. I have to get five more speakers in, plus the Minister. As the right hon. and learned Gentleman will shortly have been on his feet for nearly 25 minutes, this is just a quick reminder that he needs to give others time to speak.

[Sir Robert Buckland]

Of course. I have just cleared my throat, Madam Deputy Speaker, and by my standards this is a very short speech.

I will deal in summary with the other amendments. What I am seeking with those amendments is to ensure that, in using definitions, we do not end up creating mission creep for the DMU. I want the DMU to focus on the emerging digital economy; I do not want it to end up dealing with, for example, supermarkets such as Tesco, which will increasingly use online services to allow customers to shop. I do not think that is the intention of those proposing the Bill, but we need to make it clear in the Bill that that sort of mission creep will not be part of how the regulator develops.

I also want to make the point that, when looking at entrenched market power, focusing purely on size can sometimes be deceptive. Rather small enterprises can often have a disproportionate effect on a market. They do not necessarily need to be big. While we rightly understand that generally the bigger the entity or organisation, the bigger the impact it has, it is not always the elephant that makes a difference; it is sometimes the mouse. That is why focusing on market power rather than size is a better way of dealing with effective regulation.

In summary, I want to hear from my hon. Friends on the Front Bench a response to the challenges that I have laid out. I do not seek to press the amendments to a vote this evening, but I am sure that they will be returned to in the other place. Surely it is in the interests not only of the people we serve, but of the wider British economy that in passing such pioneering legislation, which in many ways puts Britain in a different place from other jurisdictions, we do not end up disincentivising the sort of investment that I know is part of the Prime Minister’s aspiration to make this country a world leader in artificial intelligence and machine learning safety and a place where digital businesses will want to invest. It is as simple as that. That is why it is vital that in this Bill we strike as perfect a balance as we can, because in this complex, ever-changing market it is very difficult to predict what the future will be.

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

I call the SNP spokesperson.

--- Later in debate ---

Although regulatory decisions will be made under judicial review principles, we are introducing a requirement for proportionality in the DMU’s core regulatory tools, conduct requirements and pro-competition interventions at the point at which they are imposed. Let me be unequivocal and clear that we are introducing proportionality at the point of intervention so that it can be grounds for appeal via the legislation, on top of the procedural and legality grounds commonly associated with judicial review.

[Sir Robert Buckland]

I warmly welcome my hon. Friend to his place, as this is my first chance to do so. Are we now to understand that, with regard to the judicial review standard, proportionality will, in effect, be built in, and that we are going beyond the principles of plain, vanilla JR into the more widely understood term? Am I right?

[Saqib Bhatti]

I suggest that I write to my right hon. and learned Friend, and to all right hon. and hon. Members who have raised the important question of proportionality, to clarify the position. We want this legislation to have clarity for consumers and certainty for businesses because, as my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Sir Jacob Rees-Mogg) said, this is an ever-changing market, so it is essential that we have clarity and certainty.

[Sir Robert Buckland]

The point about proportionality extends into clause 29, where the Government have now removed the indispensability test, leaving bare proportionality. My amendment asks for a necessity test. What assessment has my hon. Friend made of the removal of “indispensability”? Does he still think that the threshold for countervailing benefit will be sufficiently high to ensure that the CMA does not disapply or discontinue investigations inappropriately?

[Saqib Bhatti]

That is an important point, and I appreciate my right hon. and learned Friend giving me the opportunity to clarify it. I want to be unequivocal that, from my perspective, the threshold is still high and we have provided clarify. If he requires even further clarity, I am happy to write to him to be completely clear.

--- Later in debate ---

My right hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for South Swindon talked about Tesco. I think that we have clarified that issue, but to clarify it further, for a firm to be designated by the DMU, it has to satisfy three fundamental points: it has to have digital activities, it has to have substantial and entrenched market power, and it has to hold a strategic position in the market. I do not want to pre-empt what the CMA or DMU may do in terms of Tesco’s designated status; that is not my job today at the Dispatch Box. However, I hope that the tests that I have set out reassure Members that companies such as Tesco will not fall under this measure because they have highly competitive markets, including in the online world.

[Sir Robert Buckland]

Perhaps the Minister will forgive me for juxtaposing his reluctance to make things clear in primary legislation when discussing this clause and what the Government seek to do in part 4 on subscriptions. It seems to me very odd to conduct a subscription regulation mechanism by using primary legislation. There is a conflict in the logic being applied here, and I am sorry that I have to point that out to him.

[Saqib Bhatti]

I am sure that the Under-Secretary of State for Business and Trade, my hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake) will appreciate the pass that I am just about to give him; I am sure that he will address that issue in his speech.

I reiterate my gratitude to the Opposition for their co-operative behaviour, which I have been informed about by my predecessor, and to right hon. and hon. Members across the House for the challenge that they have put forward today. I am grateful to Members across the House for their contributions, and I hope that they continue to work with the Government. We will continue to work with Members as the Bill progresses through Parliament to ensure that it drives innovation, grows the economy and delivers better outcomes for consumers. That is what the Government care about. We want a highly competitive market that innovates and nurtures the technology companies of tomorrow to ensure that the digital online world serves consumers. For that reason, I respectfully ask Members not to press their amendments.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 5 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 6

Protected disclosures

“In the Public Interest Disclosure (Prescribed Persons) Order 2014 (S.I. 2014/2418), in the table in the Schedule, in the entry for the Competition and Markets Authority, in the right hand column, after ‘Kingdom’ insert ‘, including matters relating to Part 1 of the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 (digital markets)’.”—(Saqib Bhatti.)

This new clause (which would be inserted into Chapter 8 of Part 1 of the Bill) confirms that matters relating to Part 1 of the Bill (digital markets) are covered by the entry for the Competition and Markets Authority in the Public Interest Disclosure (Prescribed Persons) Order 2014.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

Clause 15

Notice requirements: decisions to designate

Amendments made: 2, in clause 15, page 8, line 34, leave out from “that” to the end of line 35 and insert

“the undertaking or digital activity, as the case may be, remain substantially the same”.

This amendment clarifies how the CMA may revise its view of an undertaking or digital activity by issuing a revised SMS decision notice.

Amendment 3, in clause 15, page 8, line 37, leave out from “not” to the end of line 38 and insert

“affect—

‘(a) the day on which the designation period in relation to that designation begins, or

(b) anything done under this Part in relation to that undertaking.”—(Saqib Bhatti.)

This amendment confirms that giving a revised SMS decision notice does not affect anything done under this Part in relation to a designated undertaking.

Clause 17

Existing obligations

Amendments made: 4, in clause 17, page 9, line 23, at end insert—

“(2A) In Chapters 6 (investigatory powers and compliance reports) and 7 (enforcement and appeals), references to a ‘designated undertaking’ are to be read as including an undertaking to which an existing obligation applies by virtue of provision made in reliance on subsection (1).”

This amendment provides that references in Chapters 6 and 7 to a designated undertaking include an undertaking to which an obligation applies by virtue of provision made in reliance on clause 17(1).

Amendment 5, in clause 17, page 9, line 37, at end insert—

“(ba) commitment (see sections 36 and 55);”.—(Saqib Bhatti.)

This amendment provides for the CMA to be able to apply an existing commitment, with or without modifications, in respect of certain new designations or to make transitional, transitory or saving provision in respect of a commitment when it would otherwise cease to have effect.

Clause 19

Power to impose conduct requirements

Amendments made: 6, in clause 19, page 10, line 30, leave out from “requirement” to the end of line 35 and insert

“or a combination of conduct requirements on a designated undertaking if it considers that it would be proportionate to do so for the purposes of one or more of the following objectives—

(a) the fair dealing objective,

(b) the open choices objective, and

(c) the trust and transparency objective,

having regard to what the conduct requirement or combination of conduct requirements is intended to achieve.”

This amendment provides that the CMA may only impose a conduct requirement or combination of requirements if it considers that it would be proportionate to do so, having regard to what the requirement or combination is intended to achieve.

Amendment 7, in clause 19, page 11, line 15, at end insert—

“(9A) Before imposing a conduct requirement or a combination of conduct requirements on a designated undertaking, the CMA must have regard in particular to the benefits for consumers that the CMA considers would likely result (directly or indirectly) from the conduct requirement or combination of conduct requirements.”—(Saqib Bhatti.)

This amendment provides that the CMA must consider the likely benefits for consumers when imposing a conduct requirement or combination of conduct requirements.

Clause 20

Permitted types of conduct requirement

Amendment made: 8, in clause 20, page 12, line 9, leave out from “to” to “in” on line 10 and insert

“materially increase the undertaking’s market power, or materially strengthen its position of strategic significance,”.—(Saqib Bhatti.)

This amendment clarifies that a conduct requirement is permitted if it is for the purpose of preventing an undertaking from carrying on activities other than the relevant digital activity in a way that is likely to materially strengthen its position of strategic significance in relation to the relevant digital activity.

Clause 21

Content of notice imposing a conduct requirement

Amendments made: 9, in clause 21, page 12, line 28, after “requirement” insert

“or, as the case may be, each conduct requirement as varied,”.

This amendment clarifies how the notice requirements in clause 21 apply in relation to the variation of a conduct requirement.

Amendment 10, in clause 21, page 12, line 31, leave out paragraphs (b) and (c) and insert—

“(b) the CMA’s reasons for imposing the conduct requirement, including—

(i) the objective for the purposes of which the CMA considers it is proportionate to impose the conduct requirement (see section 19),

(ii) the benefits that the CMA considers would likely result from the conduct requirement (see section 19(9A)), and

(iii) the permitted type of requirement to which the CMA considers the conduct requirement belongs (see section 20);”.—(Saqib Bhatti.)

This amendment requires the CMA to give reasons for imposing conduct requirements on a designated undertaking. Sub-paragraph (ii) is consequential on Amendment 7.

Clause 26

Power to begin a conduct investigation

Amendments made: 11, in clause 26, page 14, line 11, leave out “a designated” and insert “an”.

This amendment, together with Amendments 12, 16, 29, 37, 38, 40, 42, 43 and 65, ensures that enforcement action can be taken in respect of an undertaking that has ceased to be a designated undertaking in relation to its conduct while it was a designated undertaking.

Amendment 12, in clause 26, page 14, line 18, leave out “designated”.—(Saqib Bhatti.)

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 11.

Clause 27

Consideration of representations

Amendment proposed: 187, in clause 27, page 15, line 8, at end insert—

“(2) The CMA may have regard to any significant benefits to users or potential users that the CMA considers have resulted, or may be expected to result, from a factor or combination of factors resulting from a breach of a conduct requirement.”—(Alex Davies-Jones.)

This amendment would ensure that the CMA considers any significant benefits to users resulting from the breach of a Conduct Requirement when it is considering representations from designated undertakings as part of a Conduct Investigation.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Richard Thomson]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his intervention. There is already a multiplicity of legislation and entitlements—indeed, he appears to reference them in new clause 1—that can be used to tackle such circumstances when they arise, if indeed they do. I find it very encouraging that in drafting new clause 1, the right hon. Gentleman has alighted on the relevant provisions of the European convention on human rights, which provides a very useful earthing point for many of the fundamental rights that we hold dear and, indeed, are a bulwark of a civilised society. Perhaps we will see a similarly stout defence of them in future debates in this Chamber.

I very much welcome new clause 14, which will require companies to comply with requests for information from the Competition and Markets Authority when it comes to the pricing of motor fuel. On 9 November, the CMA published its first monitoring report on the road fuel market, and while 12 of the largest retailers responded to that request, I am given to understand that two did not. From my perspective and, I am sure, the perspective of many others wherever in this Chamber they sit, that is simply not acceptable. I am sure we can all point to large variations in the cost of petrol, diesel and other forms of motor fuel across our constituencies, sometimes in filling stations that are only a few miles apart or even within relatively close proximity. That is certainly a great source of contention for people right across my constituency, so the Government requiring retailers to provide the CMA with that information is an important strengthening of its powers, and one that we welcome.

New clauses 29 and 30, which stand in the name of the hon. Member for Pontypridd, seek to tackle subscription traps. I appreciate that the Government have tabled amendment 93, which seeks to tackle these traps by issuing reminders, and that is a welcome step forward. Nevertheless, I am bound to observe that SNP Members, at least, believe that a better balance could be struck by asking consumers whether they wish to opt in to automatic renewals or to variable rate contracts, rather than simply getting reminders about them, which will inevitably end up in the recycling bin or junk mail folder, even for the most attentive of consumers. Having to opt in would be far better and it would protect the consumer’s interest to a far greater extent than simply having the opt-out option emailed or mailed, or conveyed in some other way, in due course. If those new clauses are put to a vote, the SNP will support them in the Lobby.

[Sir Robert Buckland]

I hope to speak briefly, as the hors d’oeuvres for the pièce de résistance, which will be the speech by my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Sir Jacob Rees-Mogg), who has tabled excellent amendments. Although I did not sign them, for which I apologise, I very much endorse and support his efforts in these areas. These are important matters that need to be dealt with, and this is the right forum in which to do so. I wish to speak briefly in summary about provisions that I spoke to in the first group and simply reiterate that the thrust of the new clauses I have tabled, and am supported in by a number of right hon. and hon. Members, is all about accountability.

New clause 24 seeks a review of the work of the Competition Appeal Tribunal and is all about making sure that that body is functioning as effectively and expeditiously as possible to deal with these important matters. The work of the tribunal has become progressively more scrutinised. I do not wish to cast aspersions on its chairs or members, who work extremely hard. It is an impressive body, which is looked upon internationally for its work. However, there is no doubt in my mind and in the minds of many others that there is more work to be done to streamline and improve the CAT’s processes if it is increasingly to be looked upon and relied upon as an important arbiter of issues relating to digital markets, among other things.

The consumer interests duty set out in new clause 25 is at the heart of what we are trying to do here. Coupled with that, new clause 26 seeks to allow claims for damages under part 4 of the Bill and is an attempt to reframe the way in which the Government are approaching the provisions on subscriptions, to which I have tabled a number of amendments. I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Minister and the Government for having listened and moved on that issue. However, it seems to put the cart before the horse a little to not allow claims for damages, but to put through exemptions that would mean that if I were to seek to terminate my subscription via Twitter, the company concerned would not be liable. It would be far better to have a general liability in damages and not to have such prescriptive clauses in the first place that would be liable to misinterpretation. I am offering the Minister another way of looking at it that would be less prescriptive.

I have to come back to the Minister on the point that I made to the Under-Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, my hon. Friend the Member for Meriden (Saqib Bhatti): there is an odd juxtaposition between different parts of the Bill, where we are told in one breath that primary legislation is not the appropriate vehicle for prescribing procedures, yet here we are prescribing in minute detail procedures relating to subscriptions in the Bill. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Eddisbury (Edward Timpson) has made the point for me, and it is one we well know: secondary legislation allows for greater flexibility, so that if a new potential problem or abuse is identified in this fast-growing market, the Government would be able to plug the hole and deal with the subscription issue.