Investigatory Powers Bill (Fourth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateRobert Buckland
Main Page: Robert Buckland (Conservative - South Swindon)Department Debates - View all Robert Buckland's debates with the Home Office
(8 years, 4 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThe answer to my question appears to be no, there has never been an example of the ISC or any Committee ever commenting publicly on the exercise by the Secretary of State of her specific powers to issue warrants or not. That is what leads David Anderson to the view that the political accountability card is overplayed in the discussion.
This is a very important aspect of the debate. On the last remark made by the hon. and learned Gentleman, about David Anderson’s potential conclusion about political accountability being overplayed, I was interested in the arguments, but the fundamental point is the source of the authority that allows the Secretary of State as a democratically elected politician to make the decisions. Also, in particular in the context of national security, it is well set out in case law, as the hon. and learned Gentleman knows, that proper deference should be paid to the Executive on important decisions of national security. That is at the top end of the scale, then we move down—or across, in a different context—and is that not the issue?
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Owen, for the first time in what I am sure will be a number of important sittings.
May I address the amendment moved by the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras? I am grateful to him for rightly pointing our way to paragraph 4.7 of the draft code. Indeed, by reference, paragraph 4.8 gives a clear basis for the decision maker to assess the nature of the proportionality. Therein lies something of the problem with regard to the approach to be taken in the clause. It is tempting, on the face of it, to include the test in the primary legislation, but it might provoke more questions than answers.
Naturally, when one makes a bald statement about proportionality, people want to know more, so where does one end in terms of adding to the primary legislation the detail that is necessary for decision makers to reach a considered conclusion? My simple argument is that the amendments therefore are not necessary. What makes this the right balance is the combination of the primary legislation that sets out the framework and a living document—the code of practice—that will be more easily amendable and accessible in terms of any changes that need to be made in the light of experience and practice.
We do not want to end up with a situation where this type of warrantry can only be obtained when all other avenues have been exhausted, a bit like the position when one comes to an ombudsman. That would be an artificial scenario to end up with and would cause problems operationally. I can think of examples where the exhaustion of other avenues will just not be practicable. For example, in a kidnap situation where an individual’s life might be in danger, this type of warrantry would probably be the most appropriate step to take before any other type of intervention. Of course, there are occasions where other means of intelligence gathering, such as live human intelligence sources, might be high-risk or result in a higher degree of collateral inclusion.
I am concerned that we do not end up, despite the best intentions of the hon. and learned Gentleman, with an inflexible approach on the face of primary legislation. It is far better, in my submission, to keep the balance as it is, as clearly outlined in the code of practice and the framework within the clause.
I echo everything that the Solicitor General says. Is not the amendment trite, in that it is clear for any practitioner, judge or decision maker that the question in the amendment—whether the information sought could reasonably be obtained by other less intrusive means—is part and parcel of, and essential to, the proportionality test?
My hon. Friend makes a powerful point. There is a danger when dealing with primary legislation of gilding the lily. I mean that in the spirit of co-operation that I know we have managed to engender in these debates, in the main. For those reasons, I respectfully ask the hon. and learned Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.
I am grateful to the Solicitor General for the way he has approached this, but it misunderstands the amendment. Of course, whether information could be reasonably obtained by other means is relevant to the assessment of proportionality and necessity. The amendment proposes that, having taken all the factors into account, if it transpires at the end of that exercise that the information could have been reasonably obtained by other less intrusive means, it is not proportionate—that is the end of the exercise. That, in our submission, is the right test that should be on the face of the Bill. At this stage, I will withdraw the amendment with a view to raising it at a later stage if it is appropriate to do so. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 17 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 18
Grounds on which warrants may be issued by Secretary of State
I agree. I notice that my name is not on amendment 89. I think it should have been, because amendment 62 only works if subsection (2) comes out, but that is neither here nor there at this stage. I am not quite sure what happened, but given that both amendments have been tabled, it does not matter one way or another.
To be clear, the position is that it should be a substantive decision by the judge according to necessity and proportionality, and those terms obviously have their own special application. Through amendment 89, the review, whether by judicial review principles or otherwise, would come out, making it a true double and equal lock.
It is a new approach and a new provision, so it is for Parliament to decide on the appropriate way forward, but the amendments would give clarity and a real safeguard with an equal lock. That is the position. There probably is a fall-back position, which is that if it is to be a review of some sort, amendment 89 should stand on its own feet—that the review should not be on the principles of judicial review, and something more would need to be written into the Bill.
I do not know what response the Minister will give, but this matter goes to the heart of the issue, and it may be that further consideration needs to be given to the precise test. As it stands, the test is insufficiently precise and will lead to difficulties in its application. It is a matter of real concern to the judiciary. Lord Judge does not make such comments without a good deal of thought. If he is concerned about the provision, the Government should be, too. The simple way through is to have a simple but substantive double and equal lock.
The debate has been interesting. On a point of order, Mr Owen, I want to ensure that we are dealing with both groups of amendments. The grouping that I have seeks to group new clauses 1 and 5 in one group—
That is fine. I am grateful to you, Mr Owen. I will address those amendments, rather than the new clauses, which will be dealt with in the usual way, but the purport of the argument is similar.
To summarise, amendment 89 would remove the provision in the Bill that specifies that when reviewing the decision by a Secretary of State or a Scottish Minister to issue a warrant, the judicial commissioner must apply the same principles as would be applied by a court in an application for judicial review. Instead, the amendment would require him or her to determine the necessity and proportionality of a warrant for him or herself.
There has been a lot of debate on the important report by David Anderson and the Royal United Services Institute review. They have played a huge part in bringing the Bill to germination and its current state. There is a danger here. I listened very carefully to the evidence of Lord Judge and, indeed, asked him a number of questions. The dilemma that I put to him still remains. I can see the attractiveness in seeking to narrow or prescribe the particular criteria to be applied by the commissioners in every instance, but there is a danger that, in doing so, we fetter the proper discretion of judges exercising their review function in looking at each case purely on a case-by-case basis.
The hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras set out his stall very clearly. He prays in aid the equal lock, as he calls it. In essence, he wants a different approach from that which the Government say we should take. We make no apology that the decision made by the Secretary of State is reviewed by the judicial commissioner before coming into force. That is a very simple, staged approach that clearly reflects the way in which case law is going and is also ahead of the curve when it comes to the development of judicial oversight of warrantry in these particular cases.
I will deal with the Anderson carve-out, if I may use that phrase. The problem with the genuine intention of David Anderson in trying to carve out what he recognised to be an important part of the function of Government—namely, national security and foreign affairs, where he recognised that the Executive are the part of our constitution best placed to deal with those matters—and then creating a certification process is that that, in itself, is juridicable. An Executive decision will be made that is, in itself, capable of challenge. My concern is that, however well intentioned attempts to create a hard and fast definition that creates a theoretical space for Ministers to act might be, we will end up with further difficulty, further lack of clarity and, frankly, further litigation that means that the Bill is not future-proof in the way that I want it to be.
To save time—I probably should have made this clearer an hour ago when we were rowing about other things—I had seen this certification clause, or new clause 1, as going with the amendments to clause 17. In other words, it was my acceptance that, on certain measures, there ought to be a certificate from the Secretary of State for the limited accountability that I accept is there. Therefore, if it is helpful, amendments 62 and 89 are intended to be taken on their own, not cluttered by the certification process, which possibly would have been better discussed under clause 17.
I am grateful to the hon. and learned Gentleman. I remind myself that we will be able to debate those new clauses but I thought it important to look, in essence, at the full picture of David Anderson’s recommendations, bearing in mind that we had quite a lively debate about the role of the Executive. It would be a mischaracterisation of Mr Anderson’s view about the role of the Executive to say that somehow there was a wholesale move away from the Executive’s position with regard to warrantry and what Government Members certainly strongly feel is the important role of the Executive.
Coming back to where we are with regard to the judicial review test, we have already heard reference to the noble Lord Pannick. The intervention he has made is powerful and it is important that he thinks the test is robust. The criticism is, perhaps, not justified. Of course, that is not the only basis on which we have reached that conclusion. We all know—those of us who are lawyers and those who are not—the growing importance of judicial review in our public life. It is a concept that has evolved and that will continue to evolve. It is flexible, too.
It is so general. I have advised people on the potential for judicial review. Does the Minister agree that it is difficult to advise a client on the potential for judicial review in the absence of a reasoned decision? In this Bill, there is no duty on the Secretary of State to give a reasoned decision, so judicial review scrutiny will be happening in a vacuum in the context of a decision for which no written reasons have been given because the Bill does not demand it.
Herein lies the problem. We have the judicial lock—the commissioners, of course, will be giving reasons—so that there is a check and balance upon the decision of the Executive. The hon. and learned Lady makes a proper point, because Executive decisions are administrative decisions that are judicable. I want to avoid further unnecessary and, frankly, unhelpful litigation that will get in the way of the important work of warrantry, which has to be undertaken, bearing in mind not only the interests of national security but, looking down the scale, the various scenarios that will confront commissioners, such as serious crime cases. The flexible scrutiny will allow differing approaches to be taken. Returning to the main point, I am worried that we might end up creating something that is too inflexible, which will create injustice rather than solve the problem.
But how will the judicial commissioner scrutinise the Secretary of State’s decision, having regard to judicial review principles, when she is under no duty to give reasons for it? How will they do it practically?
They will have access to all the material that the primary decision maker has. The hon. and learned Lady is right to ask the question but, simply speaking, the judicial commissioner will have access to the material that the Secretary of State has. In fact, the judicial commissioner will be able to ask for more material, so there should not be any fear that the vacuum she mentioned will exist in relation to the judicial lock.
Returning to the obvious experience of judicial commissioners, I am keen to ensure that we end up in a position where commissioners feel that, on a case-by-case basis, they are not only free to agree with the Secretary of State, but are absolutely free to disagree. If there is not that element of flexibility, this double lock will be meaningless. Again, without casting any imputation upon the good intentions of those who have tabled amendments, my concern is that, first, this amendment is based on a difference of opinion on the nature of the judicial commissioner stage. Secondly, there is a danger that we might end up in a position where decisions are being second-guessed in a way with which the judiciary would feel uncomfortable, and where the balance between the actions of the Executive and proper scrutiny by the judiciary is not clearly delineated.
Does my hon. and learned Friend agree that a similar inclusion of a reference to judicial review has worked well in other legislation and in other regimes, such as in relation to control orders and terrorism prevention and investigation measures? We have a history of such references not causing major problems.
I entirely agree with my hon. Friend. It would not be right for me to make an easy draw-across to the TPIM regime. The hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras has experience of TPIMs, and I was on the Bill Committee that passed the TPIM law back in 2011, so I have a keen interest in the evolution from what were control orders to TPIMs. The point is staring us all in the face: myriad different circumstances will confront judicial commissioners. It would be too easy for the Committee to come to a conclusion that, somehow, we should create an artificially hard and fast set of criteria that would prevent the judicial commissioners from exercising their duties when considering the varying scale and nature of the applications that they will receive.
My understanding of what the Solicitor General is saying—perhaps he will confirm this—and my reading of the Bill is that the bar is being set a lot higher than the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West seems to imply. The onus in the first instance will be on those who will be making the case for the warrant. The Home Secretary, for example, will then review it to see whether it passes the tests in the Act and will do so, as will the author of the case before the Minister, in the knowledge that they will be, for want of a better phrase, peer reviewed by a commissioner. Therefore, the review of the review of the review is almost a triple lock of the case made by the authority seeking the warrant.
That is an interesting way of putting it. I want to make it clear that the review is on an appeal. There is a danger that we will end up mistakenly looking at some sort of a de novo application entirely on its merits, not an appeal. There are other mechanisms by which this matter could be taken further up. At this stage, it is part and parcel of the decision being made. That is an important point of clarification.
Can the Solicitor General point me to the words in clauses 1 and 2 that would make it wrong for a judge to apply long-armed judicial review principles to a decision?
I am not going to point to that because, as I have said, it is important to have wide discretion. But equally, as Sir Stanley Burnton said, there will be other approaches and judges will be compelled to take a much closer look or hands-on approach—I think Sir Stanley said “stringent approach”—when looking at the case. But that will depend on the case before the commissioner. For example, a case of extreme importance with potentially draconian impacts deserves a very close look under the microscope. That is important. What I want to get across is that there should be not a sliding scale, but a gradation and wide discretion in the test that allows differing approaches to be taken.
In response to the hon. and learned Gentleman, I would be surprised to see bald decisions on Wednesbury unreasonableness. Bearing in mind that, most of the time, European convention on human rights points will have to be engaged, and, by dint of that, necessity and proportionality will have to come into play anyway. Perhaps the point is too axiomatic to be made, but it is important that we do not get too fixated by a worry that judges will take an old-fashioned clubbish approach to whether the Home Secretary is totally out or order. I do not believe that will be the case, bearing in mind the calibre and experience of the commissioners who have done the work up to now and who I expect will carry on doing it in the unified commission that we will create.
In a nutshell—the point does not improve on repetition—there is a danger that in going down the seductive line of seeking greater clarity, we may end up fettering the reviewer’s discretion, which I do not think is in anyone’s interest and does not support the thrust of what all hon. Members want: an effective lock mechanism that properly involves the judiciary in a way that is unprecedented but welcome in our mature democracy.
I have heard nothing that answers what in my submission is a knockout point about lack of reasons. I am not tooting my own trumpet because it was not my idea. I got the point from my learned devilmaster, Laura Dunlop QC, a distinguished silk at the Scottish Bar and former law commissioner. I asked her to look at this and she said the first thing that occurred to her was how can there be scrutiny under judicial review principles when there is a vacuum of any reasoning. I have not heard any answer to that question in what the Solicitor General has said, with all due respect to him.
On that basis, I remain of the view that amendments 62 and 89 will be essential in due course, but following the course of action we have taken today, I will not insist on them at this stage. I reserve the right to bring them forward at a later stage, about which the Chairman has advised me.
SNP amendment 102 is very similar to amendment 39, which the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras spoke to, but there are two differences. First, on the areas in which a judicial commissioner must instruct the special advocate, I have deleted
“in the interests of the economic well-being”
in line with an earlier amendment. Secondly, in relation to the appropriate Law Officer who appoints special advocates, I have inserted, for the purposes of subsection (7)(b), the Lord Advocate as opposed to the Advocate General. The reason for that is that subsection (7)(b) deals with
“the consideration of items subject to legal professional privilege”,
which would relate to devolved rather than reserved matters in general terms. In my submission, it would be respectful for the Lord Advocate as well as the Advocate General to be consulted about special advocates.
I am wedded to the notion of special advocates. I do not have a huge amount to add to what the hon. and learned Gentleman said, other than to point out that David Anderson QC, in paragraph 18 of his written evidence to this Committee submitted following his oral evidence, states that he would
“like to confirm my view that the right of the Judicial Commissioners under the dual lock system should be clearly acknowledged”
and
“use standing counsel to act as amicus where appropriate in relation to applications for the approval of warrants”.
The special advocate scheme that I advocate goes a bit further than that. The purpose of the special advocate would be
“to represent the interests of any person or persons subject to the warrant or the wider public interest”
in the protection of privacy. The amendment would place a judicial commissioner under a duty to appoint a special advocate in a case involving a claim of national security or one that is subject to legal professional privilege. The appointment of the special advocate would ensure that the material produced to support an application is subject to adversarial testing as far as possible. That is the broad thrust of the amendment.
I am grateful to the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West and the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras. The hon. and learned Lady was very clear about the different basis of her amendment. My concern is that there are two schools of thought here. There is the amicus curiae school of thought, with which I have a great deal of sympathy. One of the roles of the Law Officers is, when we are approached by various jurisdictions, to consider whether the attorney himself should intervene or whether the court should have an amicus appointed. The hon. and learned Gentleman is right to talk about some of the confusion that can exist in regard to inherent jurisdiction. I am going to take that point away and consider it.
I am concerned about a full-blown replication of the important special advocate system that we have to assist, for example, the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, or of the genesis of the Justice and Security Act 2013 and the closed material procedure. There is an important difference between the public interest in having special advocates and this type of scenario. In such cases, there are affected parties—usually respondents to important applications—for whom huge issues are at stake and who need that sort of quality representation within what we accept are exceptional and unusual departures from the principle of open justice. That is why special advocates were created. They perform an invaluable and important role.
I do not see the read-across from that to this scenario. What we have here is an investigatory procedure. It takes place at the early stages—to take a case example—of the investigation of a crime or a threat to national security. There may not be at that stage an identifiable suspect; there is, therefore, a difference and a difficulty in identifying the prejudice that could be caused to the interest of an individual who is a party to the proceedings. It is a different scenario and, tempting though it might be to introduce that type of regime, it would serve only to introduce delay, bureaucracy and extra expense with no tangible benefit to the integrity of the system.
In a nutshell, I will consider carefully the amicus curiae point, but I have wholly to reject a wider approach and the creation of a special advocate system which, frankly, would go beyond even the American jurisdiction, with which comparison is often made—in the foreign intelligence surveillance court in the US they have amici curiae available to assist the court. On that basis, I urge the hon. and learned Member to withdraw the amendment.
I have nothing to add. In the light of what the Solicitor General has said I will not press the amendment. I look forward to what he produces and to further discussing that. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
With this, it will be convenient to discuss:
New clause 1—Power of Secretary of State to certify warrants—
“(1) The Secretary of State may certify a warrant in those cases where—
(a) The Secretary of State has reasonable grounds to believe that the conduct authorised by the warrant is necessary pursuant to section 18(2)(a) (national security) and relates to—
(i) the defence of the United Kingdom by Armed Forces; or
(ii) the foreign policy of the United Kingdom.
(b) The Secretary of State considers that the conduct authorised by the warrant is proportionate to what is sought to be achieved by that conduct.
(2) A warrant certified by the Secretary of State under subsection (1) is subject to approval by a Judicial Commissioner.
(3) In deciding whether to approve a warrant certified by the Secretary of State under subsection (1), the Judicial Commissioner must determine whether—
(a) the warrant is capable of certification by the Secretary of State under subsection (1); and
(b) in the opinion of the Judicial Commissioner, approving the warrant is necessary on relevant grounds under section 18(2)(a) and subsection (1)(a) or (b) of this section.
(4) Where a Judicial Commissioner refuses to approve a warrant certified by the Secretary of State under this Section, the Judicial Commissioner must produce written reasons for that decision.
(5) Where a Judicial Commissioner, other than the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, refuses to approve a warrant under subsection (3), the Secretary of State, or any special advocate appointed may ask the investigatory Powers Commissioner to decide whether to approve the warrant.”
This new clause is intended to replace existing Clause 21 and provides for the Secretary of State to certify warrants in cases concerning defence or foreign policy before they are considered by a judicial commissioner.
New clause 5—Power of Secretary of State to certify warrants—
“(1) The Secretary of State may certify an application for a warrant in those cases where the Secretary of State has reasonable grounds to believe that an application is necessary pursuant to section 18(2)(a) (national security) and involves—
(a) the defence of the United Kingdom by Armed Forces; or
(b) the foreign policy of the United Kingdom.
(2) A warrant may be certified by the Secretary of State if—
(a) the Secretary of State considers that the warrant is necessary on grounds falling within section 18; and
(b) the Secretary of State considers that the conduct authorised by the warrant is proportionate to what is sought to be achieved by that conduct.
(3) Any warrant certified by the Secretary of State subject to subsection (1) is subject to approval by a Judicial Commissioner.
(4) In deciding to approve a warrant pursuant to this section, the Judicial Commissioner must determine whether—
(a) the warrant is capable of certification by the Secretary of State subject to subsection (1);
(b) the warrant is necessary on relevant grounds subject to section 18(2)(a) and subsection (1)(a) or (b); and
(c) the conduct authorised by the warrant is proportionate to what is sought to be achieved by that conduct.
(5) Where a Judicial Commissioner refuses to approve the person’s decision to approve a warrant under this section, the Judicial Commissioner must produce written reasons for the refusal.
(6) Where a Judicial Commissioner, other than the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, approves or refuses to approve a warrant under this Section, the person, or any Special Advocate appointed, may ask the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to decide whether to approve the decision to issue the warrant.”
We have dealt admirably with many of the issues in the clause and I will not speak to the stand part debate.
I do not wish to speak to new clause 1. It stands or falls with the clause 17 amendments and is to that extent withdrawn along with them.
Thank you, Mr Owen, and apologies to Committee members. The purpose of the amendments is to—sorry, I have lost my train of thought completely.
I think we were dealing with urgent cases. I hope that is of some assistance.
Yes, I am very grateful to the Solicitor General. I skipped ahead to modifications, so I will skip back to urgent. The purpose of the amendments is to specify that urgent warrants can be issued only when they are necessary, in an emergency situation that poses an immediate danger of death or serious physical injury, and that a judicial commissioner should be informed immediately that an urgent warrant has been issued. They also seek to reduce the period within which a judicial commissioner must decide whether to approve the issue of a warrant to 24 hours after its issue.
There were differing recommendations from the Joint Committee and the Intelligence and Security Committee. I think I am correct in saying that the ISC recommended 24 hours and the Joint Committee 48. In terms of case law, recent decisions of the European Court of Human Rights suggest that 48 hours would be an absolute minimum, so I would insist on that as a fall-back position.
This is, of course, an important issue that has already seen a good deal of consideration for the Government and a move away from the original proposal to three working days; the hon. and learned Gentleman is right about that.
Although we are considering the matter carefully, at this stage the right balance is being struck between the interests of the security services and the other agencies in ensuring that crime is detected and prevented at the earliest possibly opportunity, and the interests of preserving the balance between the rights of the individual and the need to deal with crime and threats to national security. I am happy to consider amending the relevant draft codes to deal with the question about the notification to judicial commissioners, so that it is made clear on the face of the code that that should happen as soon as reasonably practicable. That wording is more appropriate than “immediately”, given that it may take a small period of time to draw together the materials that the commissioner will wish to review when considering whether to approve the warrant.
The hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West made a point about decision making in a vacuum. The commissioner will have the decision of the Secretary of State and all the materials upon which that Minister has made the decision, as well as access to further material. I think it is clear that the decision maker will have everything they need and more to come to an informed and reasoned decision based upon the principles of judicial review. On the basis of my undertaking to consider amending the draft code of practice, I hope that the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras feels able to withdraw the amendment proposing the word “immediately”.
Let me deal with the central points about the decision and the length of time within which the warrant should be approved. The effect of the amendments would be to reduce that, and I recognise that the Joint Committee that undertook the pre-legislative scrutiny of the Bill made a similar recommendation. We have therefore responded in an appropriate way by shortening the window within which urgent action can be taken. That has been widely welcomed. It is an important consideration and an example of how, throughout this procedure, the Government have taken note of reports, listened and acted accordingly on those recommendations.
It is not in anybody’s interests to create so tight a statutory framework that decisions end up being rushed. I therefore consider that the three working days now provided for in the Bill should give sufficient time for the judicial commissioner to be presented with and to consider the grounds upon which the Secretary of State decided to issue the urgent warrant. My worry is that by reducing the time period even further, we would give the commissioner even less time, which would lead to the sort of decision making that would perhaps not be in anybody’s interests, let alone those of the state.
Amendment 91 seeks to define urgency on the face of the Bill and to replace the definition currently provided for in the draft statutory codes of practice with a narrower definition. As the Committee will appreciate, we must provide law enforcement and the security and intelligence agencies with an operationally workable framework. We will have failed with this Bill if we provide the agencies with the powers that they need, but with ones that cannot keep up with the pace and scale of the threats that we face. I know that it is always a challenge for legislators to try and—to use the modern phrase—“future-proof” legislation, but it is important that we create a framework that is not only clear and simple to understand, but sufficiently flexible to take into account the fact that, from month to month, the nature of the threat changes.
I am afraid that the effect of the amendment would be to curtail that ability because the definition would be too narrow. The draft statutory codes of practice, which we have all been considering, define urgency, which is determined by whether it would be reasonably practicable to seek the judicial commissioner’s approval to issue the warrant in the requisite time. That time period would reflect when the authorisation needs to be in place to meet an operational or investigative need.
The code sets out the three categories with which we are familiar: first, where there is the imminent threat to life or serious harm, and I gave the example of a kidnap case earlier. The second is where there is an valuable intelligence-gathering opportunity, where the opportunity to do so is rare or fleeting—that might involve, for example, a group of terrorists who are just about to make that trip overseas and are making the final preparations to do so. The third is where there is a time-limited significant investigative opportunity—here I speak with years of experience of dealing with drugs cases—such as the imminent arrival of a major consignment of drugs or firearms, when timing is of the essence.
I am afraid that narrowing the definition of urgency so that it only relates to an immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to a person would mean significant lost opportunities when it comes to investigation and gathering of intelligence. It would have an impact on the ability to act in a way that would allow interception at a time, for example, that would be apposite to capture a particular drugs seizure.
Another example would be the terrorist cases that I deal with week in, week out—in terms of the function of the Law Officers granting consent to prosecution. If, for example, a group was making final preparations to travel out to Syria to join Daesh, it would cause a problem for the security and intelligence agencies if they were not able to seek urgent authorisation to intercept telephones because there was no immediate danger of death or serious physical injuries.
In my considered opinion, I am afraid that the amendment would allow a significant gap in the security, intelligence and law enforcement agencies’ ability to keep us safe. I do not think that any hon. Member in this House wants that to happen. I know that it not their intention but it is my genuine concern. On that basis, I invite hon. Members to withdraw the amendment.
I have listened carefully to the Solicitor General. The difficulty for him and the Government is this: according to recent case law from Strasbourg, a 48-hour timeframe for authorisation would be the maximum to harmonise the process with that recent case law. The case of Zakharov v. Russia included that a complaint for urgent interception could occur without judicial authorisation for up to 48 hours. There really is no reason why the UK should allow a longer period for approved surveillance than Russia. The difficulty with three working days is that if they fall over a weekend, it can mean five days or, indeed, if it is a bank holiday weekend, six days. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 22 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 23
Failure to approve warrant issued in urgent case
I will keep this fairly brief. The amendment would require a judicial commissioner to order that material collated under an urgent warrant that he does not authorise subsequently be destroyed, except in exceptional circumstances. As the Bill stands, should material be obtained under an urgent warrant that is later unapproved by the judicial commissioner, the judicial commissioner may, but is not required to, order destruction of material obtained. Once again, it is my argument that the provision, as it stands, creates a significant loophole that could be used to bypass the legal protections that purport to be provided by the judicial review mechanism.
An urgent warrant allows the relevant agency to access material that it may not be authorised to access in law. Permitting the retention of that material in anything other than exceptional circumstances creates a clear incentive to use the urgent process in inappropriate cases so, in order to ensure that the applying agencies—the agencies that apply for warrants—only use the urgent process where strictly necessary, the Bill needs to ensure that there are no advantages to be gained from seeking an urgent warrant where it is not strictly necessary. The amendment would ensure that where a judicial commissioner does not authorise the use of the warrant retrospectively, the position must be that the material collected is destroyed, except in exceptional circumstances.
I am once again grateful to the hon. and learned Lady for setting out her place clearly and with admirable succinctness. There is a problem with the amendment because it very much begs the question of what might constitute exceptional circumstances. The question of who will determine whether the threshold had been met in a given instance is also raised. Introducing that caveat to the Bill would unnecessarily complicate the commissioners’ decision-making process. The commissioners will be extremely well qualified to decide how material should be used when cancelling a warrant. They will take into account all the relevant circumstances on a case-by-case basis, and the clause, as drafted, allows them to do just that without the necessity of introducing subjective terms.
The amendments also suggest that the only two viable options following the failure to approve a warrant issued in an urgent case are to destroy the data or, in undefined exceptional cases, to impose restrictions on their use. That is unnecessarily limiting. There may be occasions when vital intelligence is acquired that could be used to save lives or to prevent serious crime, and where using that intelligence may not involve any further undue incursions into privacy. In that situation a judicial commissioner may wish to allow the intercepting agency to continue with its work without restriction in the interests of the great benefit it might have. Of course, that is a decision for the commissioner to determine, and clause 23, as drafted, allows just that. I am afraid that the amendments would mean that a judicial commissioner could not choose, after carefully considering the facts of the matter at hand, to allow such vital work to continue unrestricted. My worry is that the unintended consequences of such a proposal could seriously inhibit the work of the intercepting agencies.
Finally, the amendments would entirely remove the ability of a commissioner to decide what conditions may be imposed upon material selected for examination. By removing clause 23(3)(c), the remainder of the clause would relate only to material obtained under a warrant. Of course, a targeted examination warrant does not authorise the obtaining of any material, but rather the examination of material obtained under a bulk warrant, which is why clause 23(3)(c), as drafted, includes a specific provision that allows a judicial commissioner to direct how material that has been selected for examination under a rejected urgent warrant should be used.
In effect, the amendments attempt to change a carefully constructed safeguard that gives judicial commissioners absolute control over the actions of the intercepting agencies. I fear that the unintended result of these amendments would be an overall reduction of the judicial commissioners’ powers. For those reasons I invite the hon. and learned Lady to withdraw her amendment.
I have nothing to add, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 23 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 24
Members of Parliament etc.
Picking up on what the hon. and learned Gentleman just said, the purpose of amendment 104 is to address a lack of consistency of approach in the Bill regarding the protection afforded to correspondence with Members of Parliament, journalists and lawyers. I stress that the purpose behind the amendment is not to seek a particular privilege for parliamentarians, lawyers or journalists, but to protect the correspondence of members of the public with lawyers, parliamentarians and journalists.
The Bill contains different approaches. Clause 24 affords protections to Members of Parliament subject to targeted interception warrants, but not to journalists seeking to protect their sources. Similarly, although the provisions later in the Bill on access to communications data to target journalistic sources provide for authorisations to be subject to judicial review, access to other comms data that might engage the privilege afforded to Members of Parliament or to legally privileged material is not so protected.
Amendment 104 would provide consistency of approach to all three categories of privileged information, modelling the approach broadly on the provisions in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984—an English Act for which I must say I have much admiration. I am still trying to get to grips with it, but I think it is a good piece of legislation. It protects legally privileged material and journalistic material from interference during police searches.
The amendment would also provide a special procedure for access to MPs’ and journalists’ correspondence, which would be dependent on independent judicial authorisation, as opposed to authorisation by politicians. With all due respect to the Home Secretary, I did not find her triple lock on protection for parliamentarians terribly convincing. That is not a point about the present Government—it could apply to any Government of any persuasion—but it seems to me that having the Prime Minister as the triple lock does not give the appearance of political impartiality. Where parliamentarians’ communications are being interfered with, the authorisation should be judge-only.
Last night, I chaired an event with speakers from the Bar Council, the Law Society of England and Wales and the National Union of Journalists. They all consider that the protections in the Bill for journalists, for legal professional privilege and for parliamentarians are not sufficient. My own professional body, the Faculty of Advocates, which is the Scottish equivalent of England’s Bar Council, also considers that the protections in the Bill are not sufficient, as does the Law Society of Scotland.
I will quote what the Law Society of Scotland said in its evidence to the Joint Committee:
“On the 14 December we provided oral evidence to the Joint Committee, alongside the Law Society of England and Wales, expressing our shared and serious concerns in relation to professional legal privilege and the provisions of the Bill. Legal professional privilege”—
referred to in Scotland as the obligation of confidentiality—
“is key to the rule of law and is essential to the administration of justice as it permits information to be exchanged between a lawyer and client without fear of it becoming known to a third party without the clear permission of the client. Many UK statutes give express protection of LPP and it is vigorously protected by the courts. The ‘iniquity exception’ alleviates concerns that LPP may be used to protect communications between a lawyer and client which are being used for a criminal purpose. Such purpose removes the protection from the communications, allowing them to be targeted using existing powers and not breaching LPP.”
I do not wish to be seen to be making any special pleading, either as a lawyer and a politician or on behalf of the journalist profession. It is more about special pleading on behalf of the members of the public who contact journalists, parliamentarians and lawyers, and who wish to do so in confidence for a very good reason.
I am grateful to the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras for seeking not to get ahead of himself with respect to the arguments on legal professional privilege. I feel a degree of sympathy, because the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West was inevitably going to deal with these matters in the round. Although different considerations apply to each category—parliamentarians, journalists and legal professionals—both hon. and learned Members are absolutely right to lay emphasis not on individuals in those professions but on the client, the source and the constituent. That is why these roles have a special status: it is about the wider public interest. The Government absolutely understand that and we place it at the very heart of our consideration of how warrantry should operate in these areas.
As you will know, Mr Owen, there has already been significant movement by the Government as a result of the various reports that we know all too well. I am delighted that matters of legal professional privilege are now in the primary legislation in great measure. The debate will therefore be about the extent to which safeguards are placed in the primary legislation and about what form they take. I will heed the hon. and learned Gentleman’s exhortation and not stray too far into that area.
I will therefore deal with the amendment to clause 24 and the question of parliamentarians. We heard last year the Prime Minister’s statement about the issue and the important requirement that he or she is to be consulted before the Secretary of State can, with judicial commissioner approval, issue a warrant to acquire communications sent by or intended for a Member of a relevant legislature. The clause applies to all warrants for targeted interception, with the exclusion of warrants authorised by Scottish Ministers, and includes the all-important requirement for the Prime Minister to be consulted before a targeted examination warrant can be issued to authorise the examination of a parliamentarian’s communications collected under a bulk interception warrant.
Part 5 contains similar provisions for equipment interference carried out by the security and intelligence agencies. The important protection in clause 24 will apply to the communications of Members of Parliament, Members of the House of Lords, United Kingdom MEPs and Members of the devolved Parliaments and Assemblies. It is important to observe that for the first time, what was a doctrine for the best part of 50 years is now codified and enshrined in primary legislation.
It is important to remember in the spirit of the wider public interest that nobody, least of all parliamentarians, is above the law. The Wilson doctrine has perhaps been misunderstood for many years as a blanket exemption for parliamentarians, but that is exactly what it was not. It was actually an explanation that there will be times when the national or the public interest demands that the communications of Members of Parliament be intercepted because there might be criminal purpose behind them. We hope that that will never happen, but sadly human experience teaches us otherwise. It is therefore important to strike a balance between the proper exercise of the privileges of being a Member of this place or of the other Assemblies and Parliaments in the United Kingdom and the principle of equality before the law.
The amendments introduce the concept of special procedure material and try to combine the approach to the safeguards afforded to the three categories that I have discussed. To put it simply, I submit that what is on the face of the Bill and in the accompanying codes of practice already provide those safeguards and indeed go beyond what can be encompassed in primary legislation. At this stage, I will not say anything further, because I want to deal with points that I know hon. Members will raise about the other categories.
Can I ask the Minister about journalistic sources? I am concerned that there is nothing about them on the face of the Bill. He will know how anxious journalists are about this. Will he consider whether something should be put on the face of the Bill? There is an inconsistency: in other parts of the Bill, such as clause 68, there is express provision relating to journalists. There is something in the code of practice, but there is nothing on the face of the Bill, which is the problem. Without committing himself to a particular form of words, will he commit to considering one and perhaps liaising with us about what form it could take?
I am mindful of the fact that my colleague the Security Minister is meeting with the National Union of Journalists. I cannot commit the Government to a particular course of action, but let me put this on record. We are absolutely committed to the preservation and protection of a free press and freedom of expression in our democratic society. That includes the ability of sources to provide anonymous information to journalists, which is absolutely vital if we are to have throughput of important information that needs to be in the public domain.
At the same time, there is a danger. We must not unduly fetter, on the face of the legislation, the important work of our law enforcement, security and intelligence agencies. We live in an age of constant blogging and other social media tools. Journalists themselves do not like being defined as a profession. I have been criticised in the past for using that terminology when talking about journalists, for example in the context of the Leveson process. Now, however, there are increasingly wide and loose definitions of who are journalists and what journalism is, and my worry is that that will, and does, inadvertently prevent legitimate investigation of those who are threatening our national security or who are planning to commit serious crime.
I accept that it is a high standard to meet, but it is focused on the wrong target. If it is wrong in principle to target legally privileged material on the basis that that material might involve communications that further crime, on a proper understanding, that material has already lost its legal privilege. Having a higher test to target something that has not lost its legal privilege is a good thing, but it is not enough. Material that has not lost its legal privilege should not be targeted, because it is in fact not furthering crime. The proper way to deal with it is to recognise that what one really wants to target is communications that have lost their privilege. However, there is a risk of including—unintentionally, because one does not want to target it—other material, and that requires a different approach and a different regime. That is really the point. It is good to have a threshold, but the threshold does not work within the confines of this scheme.
I urge the Solicitor General to view the clause in that light and to reflect again on it. A lot of work has been done to try to get it into a better state, but that has not met with the approval of the Bar Council and, following analysis and discussion with the council, I can see why. New clause 2 is the council’s attempt to get it right. It has spent a lot of time on it and is very concerned about it. I invite the Minister to reflect again and commit to looking again at the clause, perhaps with us and the Bar Council, to try to get a clause that meets with the approval of everyone concerned. If that can be achieved, it will be a prize worth having; if it cannot, it will be a waste of a bit of time on a good cause.
Although it comes at a late hour, this is an important debate. We have come a long way on this issue. There was silence as to the presence of legal professional privilege in the draft Bill. The Government have rightly listened to the evidence and have now made important amendments to clause 25.
I and the Bar Council would like an example of that. If it is being advanced that even where the iniquity exception is not made out—in other words, it is properly legally privileged communications—there none the less may be circumstances in which the privilege yields under the Bill. We need to be clear about the circumstances he envisages. In a sense, he is suggesting that the communications can be targeted once they have lost their quality in cases where the iniquity exception is not made out—in other words, where it is a proper professional exchange between lawyer and client, fully protected until now. We had better have an example. The Bar Council will be very interested, because this issue goes to the heart of the privilege.
I know that the hon. and learned Gentleman has looked at the code, and the example I will give him is the example in the code under paragraph 8.37. I will read it into the record, because this is an important point. The example is:
“An intelligence agency may need to deliberately target legally privileged communications where the legal consultation might yield intelligence that could prevent harm to a potential victim or victims. For example, if they have intelligence to suggest that an individual is about to conduct a terrorist attack and the consultation may reveal information that could assist in averting the attack (e.g. by revealing details about the location and movements of the individual) then they might want to target the legally privileged communications.”
In other words, that is not the furtherance of a crime, because the legal adviser is not hearing or in any way participating in the outline of a plan. There might be information in there that seems to the adviser to be innocent information about the suspected terrorist living in a particular location or associating with particular individuals, but which, because of the surrounding intelligence in the case, may well give a basis for the intelligence agency to target that individual, because the information means more to the agency.
The Minister points to an example that I have discussed with the Bar Council. I must put its view on the record, which is that in those circumstances, there would be an offence if someone was not providing the relevant information about that sort of incident to other than the lawyer. We may need to take this discussion forward in an exchange of letters, with the benefit of what the Bar Council has to say, but in its view that is not a good example for what would be an exceptional incursion into legal privilege. That is why I urge the Minister, rather than batting this back at this stage, to take the opportunity to have further discussions with the Bar Council to get this provision into a form that is acceptable to all.
I am always happy to discuss matters with the Bar Council. As one of the leaders of the Bar, the hon. and learned Gentleman knows that I go to regular Bar Council meetings. I was with it on Saturday, and I listen carefully to what my friends and colleagues at the Bar have to say.
However, the example I am giving explains the situation. There might be information that is entirely innocuous to the lawyer. Let us say that there is a consultation happening. The lawyer might ask a few questions about the address and associates of the person that do not, to him or her, disclose an offence being committed, but which might, in the wider context, provide the security and intelligence authorities with evidential leads that build a wider picture of which the lawyer will be unaware. That is not the furtherance of a crime; it is innocent. What would be innocuous information to the lawyer might mean something more, because a wider context might give the appropriate agency the grounds upon which it could then make its application for warrantry.
There is a distinction. I am not saying that it will be commonplace—far from it. That is why we have worded the terms of the clause very carefully. We talk about “exceptional and compelling circumstances”. I cannot imagine a higher threshold for an applicant to meet than those words.
An additional attraction is that, for the purposes of this legislation, we do not try to define what is meant by legal professional privilege. It is a bit like the argument about parliamentary privilege—the more we try to modernise and define it, the more it ceases to exist as a meaningful concept. One has to be careful about using vehicles like the Bill to define what is a very wide-ranging principle that applies to myriad circumstances involving lawyers and their clients. Although I am in the spirit of dialogue, that is why I would strongly hesitate before adopting the amendments.
I have listened, with great care, to the submissions made by the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras, and I have some sympathy with the position that he has put forward. One of the issues that has consoled me is that any such warrants that are proposed will have to meet the threshold of the double lock, namely the Home Secretary and the judicial commissioner, who, I imagine, will be very careful to protect legal professional privilege. Is my understanding correct?
My hon. Friend sums it up admirably. We have taken a different approach from RIPA, and rightly so. We have listened to the concerns expressed by the wider community, not just members of the profession, and are fully cognisant of the importance of legal professional privilege. It was part of my daily professional life for nearly 20 years so, as a Minister and as a lawyer, I fully understand its importance. Therefore, I hope that the example I have given gives an important insight into what we regard as “exceptional and compelling circumstances”. For those reasons, I urge the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras to withdraw the amendment.
I will not take much time. The Solicitor General prays in aid the dangers of over-defining, but the danger of the clause is that it will cut across legal professional privilege. Let us be realistic about what that means: wire taps to listen to privileged legal communications where the iniquity exception does not apply. A lawyer will never again be able to say that a communication—even one within the proper limits of a legal communication—is protected, because there could be no such guarantee. There will always be the possibility that it will not be protected. At the moment, it can be said that as long as it does not fall into the inequity exception, a communication is protected. In the other examples that have been used, it would not be interceptors; it would be bugs in cells. In the end, that is the road that will be opened by this proposal. A lawyer believes that they are having a confidential discussion on proper terms and appropriately with their client, yet that is intercepted. That is why I think the Bar Council feels so strongly about it.
Of course, there is a danger in defining legal professional privilege, but there is a much greater danger in getting to a position where a lawyer can never again say, “I guarantee that, as long as it is within limits, this is a protected communication.” That is at the heart of the Bar Council’s concern. I have said all I need to say. That is the problem.
We have to be careful about this. We have prison rules, for example. The hon. and learned Gentleman and I know that there are already certain prescribed circumstances and scenarios that exist. I am not advocating a coach-and-horses approach that can be taken by authorities who have a cavalier regard for LPP. This is a very prescribed exception. The words “exceptional and compelling” are strong. He paints a nightmare scenario—I know that he does so with genuine concern for a privilege that he and I hold dear—but I think that we are getting the balance right and that what he envisages will not come to pass.