(12 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe sole argument advanced today by the Chancellor as to why there should not be a thorough, comprehensive, judge-led inquiry is that it would not report quickly enough. Despite the enormous bluster and noise of this debate—I very much agree with the hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin) about that—that argument has been overturned by the Leader of the Opposition’s proposal for a two-tier inquiry, with the section on LIBOR to report by the end of December and the second part, which is the more important part, to report within 12 months.
We have to answer the question that has not been answered: why are the Government so coy about a genuinely independent inquiry? Is it because of their fears over what a Leveson-style inquiry into banking might expose? After all, the City, which is a pretty hard-nosed institution, does not give half the Tory party’s total income to it year after year for nothing. It expects, and undoubtedly gets, a great deal in return. Is that why the scams that repeatedly tumble out of the City under the false pretence of financial innovation, such as the mis-selling of private pensions in the 1970s, which has not yet been mentioned, and the recent mis-selling of payment protection insurance and credit default swaps, have always been treated so lightly?
Is that why the Vickers recommendations, which were already weak since the City will always get around Chinese walls by regulatory arbitrage, have been watered down further through the lobbying of the banks? The crucial rise in capital ratios was initially set at 4%, which is certainly the minimum that is necessary. That was reduced by the Chancellor to 3% and even that feeble reform has been postponed, almost unbelievably, until 2019.
I appreciated the right hon. Gentleman’s support for my efforts in January to secure a Back-Bench debate on criminal prosecutions in financial services. He asked why Government Members want a parliamentary inquiry. Does he not accept that our constituents have a visceral attitude towards the misdeeds in the financial services sector, and that one problem with a judicial inquiry is that it is the equivalent of a snooze button and the people disengage? A parliamentary inquiry would not suffer that fate.
I think the exact opposite is true. The Leveson inquiry has aroused and maintained intense public interest. Yesterday’s Treasury Committee sitting showed what happens on such occasions. Unfortunately, it became very personalised about what each Member had been saying and drew attention to the degree to which Bob Diamond was not put under serious threat. There are therefore very good reasons for a judge-led inquiry.
Is the close political-financial nexus that exists in this country the reason why the demands of Germany and France for a financial transactions tax have been swept so cavalierly under the carpet by the Prime Minister and the Chancellor? Is that why the pressure from Germany and the US to wind down the egregious tax avoidance that is largely centred on Britain’s Crown dependencies has been flatly rejected by the Government at the behest of the City?
Why are the complex derivatives that lay at the heart of the crash in 2008-09 being retained by the Government within the ring fence? Why has the incestuous relationship between the credit rating agencies and those whose creditworthiness they are supposed to be assessing been left untouched by the Government, when it allowed junk derivatives to be sold around the world with a triple A rating? What is the answer to all these questions? I think that they are very significant. Why has the colossal scandal of tax avoidance on the industrial scale of £42 billion a year, in which the City is so intimately involved, been ignored so unscrupulously?
I shall give an example. The Government set up the Aaronson group to consider the issue, led by a lawyer who has always represented the tax avoidance industry and never Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. On the first page of its report last November, that group said that a general anti-avoidance rule was not necessary. It produced the preposterous proposal that if there were such a rule, HMRC would have to seek the permission of an external body before it could be used. It gets worse, because there would have to be a majority of tax avoidance industry representatives on that body. Not surprisingly, the Government have accepted those recommendations in full. That shows the inordinate lengths to which they will go to protect the City by appearing to do something but in reality elaborately constructing a paper aeroplane in the sure knowledge that it will not fly. Those are just some of the reasons, and I believe a lot more remain hidden, why the Government do not want a judge-led inquiry at any price. They are exactly the same reasons why a systematic, wide-ranging inquiry is now so necessary.
I agree with many Members that in the last analysis, this is not about personalities or even about the corrupted culture of banking. It is much more about the deeply flawed structure and role of banking in Britain. The banks are far too big, and the big five control up to 90% of the money supply, which is far too much. We need smaller, more specialised banks that focus on key areas such as infrastructure, relational banking like that in the German mittelstand, the knowledge, science and research and development industries, the green economy, small and medium-sized enterprises and all the rest.
Above all, we need to regain public control of the money supply, which was privatised as a result of deregulation in the 1990s, so that—this is the crucial point—the nation’s financial resources are focused not on the banks’ interests of profiteering from overseas speculation, tax havens and property, in which they specialise most of all, but on the national interest of putting the nation’s resources primarily into industry, manufacturing and export. That is why the whole House should unite behind the Opposition’s motion.